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THE  SERVICE 

1 1 


OF 


Security  and  Information 


BY 


> ' 

ARTHUR  L.  WAGUER, 


Captain , Sixth  Regiment  of  Infantry , U.  S.  Army;  Assistant 
Instructor  in  the  Art  of  War  at  the  U.  S. 

Infantry  and  Cavalry  School. 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
James  J.  Chapman,  Publisher. 
1893. 


Entered  according  to  act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1893,  by 

Arthur  L.  Wagner, 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington,  D.  C. 


Press  of 

McGill  & Wallace, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


PREFACE. 


This  book  lays  claim  to  no  other  merit  than  that  of  being  an  earnest 
attempt  to  meet  the  demand,  often  expressed,  for  an  American  text- 
book on  the  subjects  herein  discussed.  Many  of  the  features  of  the 
service  of  security  and  information  are  common  to  both  Hemispheres 
and  to  all  armed  forces,  whether  savage  hordes  or  highly-organized 
armies.  Other  details  of  the  same  science  vary  with  the  topography, 
the  organization  of  the  army,  national  characteristics,  and  the  nature 
of  the  enemy  encountered.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  a text-book  on 
this  subject  might  be  admirably  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  Euro- 
pean officers,  and,  at  the  same  time,  be,  in  some  respects,  quite  unsuited 
to  our  needs. 

English,  French,  and  German  military  writers  have  written  so  vol- 
uminously on  all  tactical  subjects,  that  the  author  has  found  a wealth 
of  valuable  books  at  hand  for  consultation  ; and  he  has  discovered, 
on  most  of  the  important  points,  a gratifying  unanimity  of  opinion 
on  the  part  of  writers  of  different  nations.  The  aim  of  the  author  has 
been  to  select  the  best  established  theories  of  European  tactical  au- 
thorities, to  illustrate  them  by  a reference  to  events  in  our  own  mili- 
tary history,  and  to  apply  to  them  the  touchstone  of  American  prac- 
tice in  war.  To  this  end  he  has  submitted  his  manuscript  to  several 
officers  of  high  rank  and  distinguished  ability,  who  have  criticised  it 
in  the  light  of  their  own  extensive  military  study  and  great  experi- 
ence in  actual  warfare. 

The  author  is  at  a loss  for  an  adequate  expression  of  thanks  to 
Brigadier-General  Thomas  H.  Ruger  and  Brigadier-General  Wesley 
Merritt,  U.  S.  A.,  for  the  valuable  criticism,  comments,  and  notes 
with  which  they  have  favored  him,  and  by  means  of  which  he  has 
been  enabled  to  place  upon  his  work  the  best  stamp,  as  it  were,  of 
American  experience  in  war.  He  desires  also  to  express  his  obliga- 
tions to  Lieut. -Col.  H.  S.  Hawkins,  23d  Infantry,  Lieut. -Col.  Guy  V. 
Henry,  7th  Cavalry,  Major  H.  C.  Hasbrouck,  4th  Artillery,  Major  C. 
C.  C.  Carr,  Sth  Cavalry,  and  Major  J.  B.  Babcock,  A.  A.  G.,  for 
valuable  information  and  comments.  To  Lieut.-Col.  Henry,  Cap- 


IV 


PREFACE. 


tain  E-  S.  Godfrey,  7th  Cavalry,  and  First  Lieutenant  Thomas  Cruse, 
6th  Cavalry,  the  author  is  indebted  for  most  of  the  information  on 
which  the  appendix  on  “ Indian  Scouting  ” is  based.  To  Colonel  E.  F. 
Townsend,  12th  Infantry,  Commandant  of  the  U.  S.  Infantry  and 
Cavalry  School,  in  compliance  with  whose  order  this  work  has  been 
written,  and  whose  steady  and  consistent  encouragement  has  accom- 
panied it  from  its  inception  to  its  appearance  in  these  pages,  the  au- 
thor’s thanks  are  especially  due  and  are  gratefully  tendered. 

A word  in  regard  to  the  form  in  which  this  book  makes  its  appear- 
ance may  not  be  out  of  place.  There  is  a fashion  in  books  as  in  all 
other  human  products  ; and  the  shape  in  which  some  of  our  most 
valuable  military  manuals  have  appeared  would  seem  to  indicate  a 
tendency  to  sacrifice  everything  to  the  fancied  benefits  of  portability  ; 
military  books  being  printed  in  small  type  to  reduce  them  to  a proper 
compass  to  fit  the  pocket — in  which,  by  the  bye,  they  are  never  car- 
ried. It  is  not  clear  that  this  fashion  has  anything  to  recommend  it ; 
while  anyone  who  has  noticed  the  impaired  eyesight  of  many  of  the 
graduates  of  our  officers’  schools  must  find  much  to  condemn  in  a 
typographical  style  which  seems  designed  mainly  for  the  benefit  of 
the  oculist.  It  is  hoped,  therefore,  that  the  typographical  dress  of 
this  volume  will  prove  a welcome  innovation. 

The  plates  with  which  this  work  is  illustrated  are,  with  a single 
exception,  from  drawings  made  by  Lieutenant  C.  B.  Hagadoru,  23d 
Infantry,  whose  skill  and  accuracy  in  such  work  are  well  known,  and 
to  whom  the  author  desires  to  express  his  obligations. 

A list  of  books  consulted  in  the  preparation  of  this  work  is  given 
below.  Where  the  author  has  felt  under  special  obligations  to  any 
particular  work,  acknowledgment  has  been  made  in  the  text  or  in  a 
foot-note.  In  many  cases,  however,  the  words  of  several  authorities  on 
the  same  subject  are  so  similar  that  it  has  seemed  impossible  to  render 
tribute  to  any  particular  one.  The  author  accordingly7  takes  pleasure 
in  expressing  his  obligations  generally7  to  all  the  works  mentioned 
in  the  following  list ; more  especially  to  De  Brack,  Riistow,  Von  Mirus, 
Clery,  Shaw,  Wolseley,  and  the  Guide  Manuel  du  Chef  de  Palrouille. 


PREFACE. 


V 


LIST  OF  BOOKS  CONSULTED  IN  THE  PREPARATION  OF  THIS  WORK. 
Aperjus  sur  Quelques  Details  de  la  Guerre,  Bugeaud. 

Artillery  Drill  Regulations,  (U.  S.). 

Art  of  War,  Jomini. 

Avant  Postes  de  Cavalerie  Legere,  De  Brack. 

Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War. 

Campaigns  of  Stuart’s  Cavalry,  H.  B.  McClellan. 

Catechism  of  Military  Training,  Marryatt. 

Cavalry  Field  Duty,  Von  Mirus  (tr.  by  Russell). 

Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  (U.  S.). 

Cavalry,  Regulations  for  the  Movements  and  Instructions  of,  (British). 
Cavalry  in  Modern  War,  Trench. 

Conduct  of  a Contact  Squadron,  De  Bieusau  (tr.  by  Bowdler-Bell). 
Duties  of  the  General  Staff,  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf. 
Dieustunterricht  des  Iufanteristen,  Von  Waldersee. 

Elements  of  Modern  Tactics,  Shaw. 

Esprit  des  Institutions  Militaires,  Marmont. 

Extracts  from  an  Infantry  Captain’s  Journal,  Von  Arnim  (tr.  by  East). 
Guide  Manuel  du  Chef  de  Patrouille. 

History  of  the  Crimean  War,  Hamley. 

History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  Napier. 

History  of  the  War  with  Mexico,  Ripley. 

Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (U.  S.). 

Infantry  Fire  Tactics,  Mayue. 

Instruction  for  Cavalry,  Von  Schmidt. 

Johnston’s  Narrative. 

La  Petite  Guerre,  Riistow  (tr.  by  Savin  de  Larclause). 

Letters  on  Cavalry,  Prince  Kraft  zu  Hoheulohe  Ingelfiugen. 

Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  Parton. 

Methodes  de  Guerre  Actuelles,  Pierron. 

Minor  Tactics,  Clery. 

Maximes  de  Guerre,  Napoleon. 

Memoirs  of  U.  S-  Grant. 

Memoirs  of  W.  T.  Sherman. 

Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan. 

Napoleon’s  Expedition  to  Russia,  Segur. 

Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

Operations  of  War,  Hamley. 


VI 


PREFACE. 


Precis  of  Modern  Tactics,  Home. 

Reglement  sur  le  Service  des  Armees  en  Campagne,  De  Savoye. 
Service  d’ Exploration  et  de  Surete,  Bonie. 

Soldiers’  Pocket  Book,  Wolseley. 

Strategic  Service  of  Cavalry,  Bowdler-Bell. 

Strategischer  Kavalleriedienst,  Von  Widdern. 

Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics  (Dufour). 

Studies  in  Troop  Leading,  Verdy  du  Vernois. 

Tactical  Deductions  from  the  War  of  iS70-’7i,  Boguslawski. 
Tactique  des  Renseignements,  Lewal. 

The  Army  in  the  Civil  War  (“  Scribner  Series  ”). 

The  Franco-German  War,  Borbstaedt  (tr.  by  Dwyer). 

The  Franco-German  War,  Von  Moltke  (tr.  by  Bell  and  Fischer). 
The  Nation  in  Arms,  Von  der  Goltz. 

War,  Clausewitz. 

War,  Maurice. 


CONTENTS. 


Vll 


CONTENTS. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS Page  xn 

CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

The  punctilio  of  private  combat  not  applicable  to  the  operations  of 
war. — Condition  of  an  army  taken  by  surprise. — Security  and  infor- 
mation inseparably  connected. — Information  necessary  for  a com- 
mander.— How  obtained. — Exceptions  in  former  wars. — Kind  of 
information  considered  in  the  subject  of  tactics Page  i 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 

Division  of  a column  of  troops  on  the  march. — The  duty  of  the  ad- 
vance guard. — Its  objects. — Its  strength. — The  several  parts  of  the  ad- 
vance guard. — The  formation  of  the  advance  guard. — Distance  from 
the  main  body. — The  commander  of  the  vanguard. — Staff  officer  with 
vanguard. — The  commander  of  the  advance  guard. — Halts. — Signals. — 
Compliments. — Cavalry  advance  guard. — Its  formation. — Advance 
guard  of  all  arms. — Formation  modified  by  terrain. — Encountering 
the  enemy. — Advance  guard  ofa  division. — Advance  guard  of  an  army 
corps  — Flank  guards. — Advance  guard  drill  (Infantry). — Advance 
guard  drill  (Cavalry) Page  7 

CHAPTER  III. 

OUTPOSTS. 

Definition  of  outposts. — Historical  instances  of  evil  results  of  ne- 
glect of  outpost  duty. — Duties  of  outposts. — Subdivisions  of  the  out- 
posts.— Two  systems  of  outposts. — Position. — Strength. — Composi- 
tion.— Distance  of  outposts  from  the  main  body. — The  commander  of 
the  outpost. — Sentinels  and  vedettes. — Connecting  sentinels. — The 
picket  sentinel. — Examining  posts. — Detached  posts. — Pickets. — Sup- 


Vlll 


CONTENTS. 


ports. — Cossack  posts. — The  reserve. — The  outpost  at  night. — Outpost 
patrols. — Visiting  patrols. — Reconnoitering  patrols. — Strong  patrols. — 
Posting  the  outpost. — Defense  of  the  outpost. — Relieving  the  out- 
post  Page  40 

CHAPTER  IV. 

RECONNAISSANCE- 

Importance  of  reconnaissance. — Kinds  of  reconnaissance. — Recon- 
naissance in  force. — How  conducted. — Objections. — Historical  in- 
stances.— Special  reconnaissance. — Historical  instances. — Patrol- 
ling.— Exploring  patrols. — Small  infantry  patrols. — Composition. — 
Preparation  and  inspection. — Signals. — Formation  of  the  patrol. — Con- 
duct of  the  patrol. — Encountering  the  enemy. — Inhabitants. — 
Guides. — Reconnaissance  of  different  kinds  of  ground. — Cross- 
roads.— Heights. — Defiles. — Bridges  or  fords. — Woods. — Inclosures. — 
Houses. — Villages. — Cities  and  towns. — Reconnaissance  of  the  enemy 
in  position. — Reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  on  the  march. — Signs  and 
trails. — Reports. — Strong  infantry  patrols. — Expeditionary  patrols. — 
Prisoners. — Harrassing  patrols. — Elauk  patrols. — The  advance  guard 
passing  through  a town. — Cavalry  patrols. — Historical  instances. — 
Connecting  patrols. — Pursuing  patrols Page  88 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 

Screening  and  reconnoitering  duty  in  the  Napoleonic  wars. — Re- 
vival of  the  duty  in  the  War  of  Secession. — The  cavalry  screen  in  re- 
cent European  wars. — By  whom  the  duty  may  be  performed. — Dis- 
tance of  the  screen  from  the  army. — Frontage  of  the  screen. — Forma- 
tion of  the  screen. — Typical  formation  of  a cavalry  screen  consisting 
of  a brigade. — Horse  artillery  with  the  brigade. — Patrols. — Bonie’s 
points. — Duties  of  the  scouts. — The  Uhlans  in  1870. — Officers’  patrols. — 
German  patrols  after  Spichern. — Battle  of  Tom’s  Brook. — Separa- 
tion of  the  duties  of  Security  and  Information. — Transmission  of  in- 
telligence.— Contact  and  fighting. — Buford  at  Gettysburg. — Protect- 
ing the  infantry. — Seizing  important  points. — Battle  of  Hoover’s 
Gap. — Foraging. — Connecting  posts. — A regiment  as  a screening 
orce — Conclusions Page  144 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


CHAPTER  VI. 

REAR  GUARDS. 

Effect  if  a defeated  army  be  vigorously  pursued. — Vigorous  pursuits 
not  often  made. — Duty  of  the  rear  guard. — Ney’s  method. — Strength 
of  the  rear  guard. — Morale. — Offensive  returns. — De  Fezensac  at  Smo- 
lensk.— Fee  at  Boonsboro. — Commander  of  the  rear  guard. — Distance 
from  the  main  body. — Formation  and  composition  of  the  rear  guard. — 
Typical  formations. — Withdrawal  from  action. — Communication  be- 
tween the  several  parts  of  the  rear  guard  and  with  the  main  body. — 
Protection  of  the  flanks. — Riistow’s  intermediate  body. — Contact  with 
the  enemy  to  be  preserved. — Defiles. — Negative  measures. — John- 
ston’s retreat  in  1863. — Sick  and  wounded. — Halts. — Retreating  by 
parallel  roads. — When  line  of  retreat  is  changed. — Rear  guard  in  a 
retrograde  movement  which  is  not  a retreat. — Rear  guard  in  a friendly 
country. — In  a hostile  country. — The  rear  guard  in  a forward  march. 

Page  175 


APPENDIX  I. 

SPIES. 

Military  and  civilian  spies. — When  the  services  of  spies  are  most 
valuable. — Persons  who  should  be  selected  as  spies. — Qualities  requi- 
site in  a spy. — Compulsory  espionage. — Double  spies. — Concealment 
of  messages. — Spies  as  a check  upon  each  other. — How  spies  should 
leave  and  return. — What  a spy  should  report. — Means  of  identifica- 
tion.— Use  of  the  telegraph. — Precautions  against  enemy’s  spies. — 
The  detection  of  spies. — Their  search. — The  management  of  the 
secret  service Page  200 


NEWSPAPERS. 

Their  importance  in  war. — Newspaper  correspondents  “the  plague 
of  modern  armies.” — Control  of  correspondents. — The  press  censor. — 
Not  merely  the  great  newspapers  that  betray  information. — Means  of 
utilizing  reporters. — Punishment  for  indiscreet  or  mischievous  publi- 
cation  Page  211 

APPENDIX  II. 

ORIENTATION  AND  MAP  READING. 

Definition  of  orientation. — Orientation  by  compass. — By  observing 
the  sun. — Use  of  a watch  as  a compass. — Orientation  by  observing 


X 


CONTENTS. 


the  moon. — By  observing  the  North  Star. — By  maps. — By  indications. — 
Practice  in  map  reading. — Measuring  distances  on  the  map... Page  215 

APPENDIX  III. 

INDIAN  SCOUTING. 

Apaches  as  small  infantry  patrols — Scouting  methods  in  Arizona. — 
Skill  in  selection  of  positions  and  in  defensive  dispositions. — The  Sioux 
scout. — Crook’s  march  from  Fort  Fetterman. — Scouting  methods  of 
the  Sioux. — Eong  distance  reconnoitering. — The  Sioux  camps. — The 
tactics  of  the  Sioux. — Knowledge  of  geography  and  topography. — 
Observations Page  221 


APPENDIX  IV. 


Questions  for  General  Review Page  229 

Index Page  257 


ILLUSTRATIVE  PLATES.  xi 


ILLUSTRATIVE  PLATES. 


Facing  Page 

I.  Company  of  Infantry  as  Advance  Guard io 

II.  Permissible  Formation  of  a Company  of  Infantry  as  Ad- 
vance Guard  on  an  Open  Plain 12 

III.  Two  Battalions  as  Advance  Guard  of  a Brigade 13 

IV.  Troop  of  Cavalry  as  Advance  Guard 18 

V.  Order  of  March  of  a Division  Acting  Independently 30 

VI.  Regiment  of  Infantry  as  Outpost  for  a Division 47 

VII.  Squadron  of  Cavalry  as  Outpost  for  a Cavalry  Brigade 48 

VIII.  Comparison  of  Cossack  Posts  with  the  Picket  System 70 

IX.  Outpost  Line,  Showing  Changes  Made  at  Night 74 

X.  Patrols 126 

XI.  Advance  Guard  Entering  Franklin,  Teun 134 

XII.  Cavalry  Screen  Consisting  of  One  Brigade 152 

XIII.  Company  of  Infantry  as  Rear  Guard 184 

XIV.  Troop  of  Cavalry  as  Rear  Guard 186 

XV.  Methods  of  Orientation 216 


Xll 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS. 


It  is  presumed  that  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  are  familiar  with 

all  the  military  terms  used  in  the  following  pages  ; but  the  definitions 

here  given  may,  perhaps,  be  useful  to  volunteers  or  members  of  the 

National  Guard. 

Abatis — Rows  of  felled  trees,  with  the  smaller  branches  lopped  off, 
and  the  others  sharpened  and  turned  towards  the  enemy. 

Base — “ A base  of  operations  is  the  portion  of  country  from  which  the 
army  obtains  its  reinforcements  and  resources,  from  which  it 
starts  when  it  takes  the  offensive,  to  which  it  retreats  when  neces- 
sary, and  by  which  it  is  supported  when  it  takes  position  to 
cover  the  country  defensively.  The  base  of  operations  is  most 
generally  that  of  supply — though  not  necessarily  so,  at  least 
as  far  as  food  is  concerned.” — -Jomini. 

Billet — Quarters  provided  for  troops  in  private  houses,  barns,  etc. 
Soldiers  billeted  generally  obtain  from  the  inhabitants  food 
and  drink  for  themselves  and  forage  for  their  horses  ; payment 
for  these  supplies  being  usually  made  at  the  rates  and  in  the 
manner  prescribed  in  regulations  and  orders. 

Bivouac — A temporary  place  of  repose  for  troops,  in  which  they  are 
sheltered  by  shelter-tents,  bowers,  or  improvised  shelter  of  any 
kind,  or  sleep  in  the  open  air.  A camp  differs  from  a bivouac, 
in  that  the  men  are  sheltered  with  regular  tents.  Troops  are 
cantoned  when  sheltered  in  huts  or  billeted  in  villages. 

Communications — The  routes  (roads,  railroads,  etc.)  by  which  an 
army  communicates  with  its  base,  or  by  which  the  several  parts 
of  an  army  communicate  with  each  other. 

Compliments — Ceremonious  marks  of  respect  paid  by  officers  and 
soldiers  to  their  military  superiors  ; such  as  saluting,  standing 
at  attention,  etc. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS. 


Xlll 


Containing  Force — A body  of  troops  charged  with  the  duty  of  hold- 
ing in  check  a body  (generally  numerically  superior)  of  the 
enemy,  while  the  main  efforts  of  the  army  are  directed  against 
another  portion  of  the  hostile  force. 

Crow's  foot — An  instrument  with  four  pointed  spikes,  so  arranged  that 
three  of  them  will  always  be  on  the  ground,  the  fourth  project- 
ing upwards. 

Depth — The  space  occupied  by  a body  of  troops  from  front  to  rear. 

Distance — The  space  between  bodies  of  troops,  or  individual  soldiers, 
from  front  to  rear. 

Escort  Wagon — A four-horse  wagon,  lighter  than  the  “army  wagon.” 

Front — The  extent  of  ground  occupied  by  the  front  rank  of  a body  of 
troops  in  any  formation. 

Glacis — A mound  of  earth,  with  a gentle  slope,  thrown  up  a few  yards 
in  front  of  the  ditch  of  a fortification. 

Impedimenta — Baggage,  and,  in  general,  anything  accompanying 
troops,  which  tends  to  impede  the  celerity  of  their  movement. 

Interval—  The  lateral  space  between  bodies  of  troops  or  individual 
soldiers. 

Morale — The  condition  of  troops  as  to  discipline,  bravery,  confidence, 
or  discouragement,  etc. 

Provost  Guard — A guard  under  the  orders  of  a provost-marshal. 

Provost-Marshal — An  officer  attached  to  the  headquarters  of  the  com- 
manding general  to  superintend  the  police  of  the  army  ; to 
provide  for  the  protection  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country 
from  pillage  and  violence  ; to  preserve  order  among  camp-fol- 
lowers ; to  take  charge  of  stragglers,  prisoners,  and  deserters  ■ 
and  to  superintend  the  secret  service. 

Shrapnel — Called  the  “man-killing  projectile.”  A shell  filled  with 
bullets,  and  having  a bursting  charge  only  sufficient  to  break 
the  case  and  release  the  bullets,  which  then  move  forward  with 
the  velocity  which  the  projectile  had  at  the  moment  of  bursting. 

Strategy — The  art  of  moving  an  army  in  the  theater  of  operations  with 
a view  to  placing  it  in  such  a position  relative  to  the  enemy  as 
to  increase  the  probability  of  victory,  increase  the  consequences 
of  victory,  or  lessen  the  consequences  of  defeat. 

Tactics — The  art  of  handling  troops  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Terrain— The  topography  of  a field,  considered  especially  in  its  rela- 
tion to  tactical  operations. 


XIV 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS. 


Theater  of  IVar — “The  theater  of  war  comprises  all  the  territory 
upon  which  the  parties  may  assail  each  other,  whether  it  be- 
long to  themselves,  their  allies,  or  to  weaker  states  who  may 
be  drawn  into  the  war  through  fear  or  interest.  When  the  war 
is  also  maritime,  the  theater  may  embrace  both  hemispheres. 
* * * The  theater  of  war  may  thus  be  undefined,  and  must 
not  be  confounded  with  the  theater  of  operations  of  one  or  the 
other  army.” — Jomini. 

Theater  of  Operations — “The  theater  of  operations  of  an  army  em- 
braces all  the  territory  it  may  desire  to  invade,  and  all  that  it 
may  be  necessary  to  defend.” — Ibid. 

Vedette  — A mounted  sentinel. 


CHAPTER  I. 


INTRODUCTION. 


It  is  pardonable  to  be  defeated,  but  never  to  be  taken  by 
surprise. — Frederick  the  Great. 

If  opposing  armies  could  march  unmolested  to  a desig- 
nated battlefield,  as  the  knights  of  old  repaired  to  their 
tournaments,  the  military  problem  would  consist  simply 
in  drawing  up  the  forces  in  order  of  battle,  and  nine- 
tenths  of  the  difficulties  of  the  art  of  war  would  be 
eliminated.  But  just  as  the  code  of  ethics  which  governs 
the  actions  of  individuals  is  varied  greatly  when  applied 
to  the  diplomacy  of  nations,  so  the  chivalry  and  punc- 
tilio of  private  combat  are  necessarily  lacking  in  the 
operations  of  war.  It  is  the  duty  of  a commander  to 
assail  the  enemy  under  circumstances  most  unfavorable 
to  the  latter  and  most  advantageous  to  himself ; to  catch 
the  hostile  army  astride  of  an  unfordable  stream,  or 
divided  by  an  impassable  obstacle  of  any  sort;  to  assail 
the  communications  of  his  opponent  while  covering  his 
own  ; to  surprise  him,  and,  in  brief,  to  take  advantage 
of  the  unfortunate  position  or  unskillful  dispositions  of 
the  foe,  and  to  guard  against  being  similarly  assailed 
himself. 

An  army  taken  by  surprise  may  be  compared  to  a 
sleeping  man  attacked  by  a well-prepared  enemy, 
i — w 


2 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Astonishment,  confusion,  and  alarm  are  opposed  to 
coolness,  preparation,  and  confidence  ; and  severe  blows 
are  received  before  any  can  be  given  in  return.  The 
surprised  army  must  possess  many  elements  of  superi- 
ority over  its  assailant  to  be  able  to  overcome  the  enor- 
mous disadvantage  at  which  it  is  taken  ; and  a surprise 
generally  means  a defeat. 

If  the  entire  army  were  constantly  011  the  alert,  its 
surprise  would  be  impossible:  so,  too,  if  the  plans  and 
movements  of  the  enemy  were  accurately  known  by  the 
commander,  surprise  could  easily  be  avoided.  But  to 
keep  the  entire  force  continually  on  the  watch  would 
be  to  ruin  it  by  physical  hardship  ; and  a knowledge  of 
the  enemy’s  movements  and  objects  is  generally  incom- 
plete and  usually  inferential.  To  guard  against  surprise 
without  making  undue  demands  upon  the  endurance  of 
the  soldiers,  use  is  made  of  covering  detachments,  which 
should  be  strong  enough  to  hold  the  enemy  while  the 
main  body  is  preparing  for  action.  On  the  march  the 
security  of  the  army  is  thus  provided  for  by  advance 
guards,  rear  guards,  and  flanking  detachments  : at  a 
halt  a chain  of  outposts  protects  it  from  surprise. 

Information  in  regard  to  the  enemy  is  the  indispensa- 
ble basis  of  all  military  plans,  and  nothing  but  faulty 
dispositions  for  the  security  of  an  army  can  be  expected 
if  such  information  is  lacking.  Moreover,  the  covering 
detachments,  being  nearer  the  enemy  than  the  main 
body  is,  are  charged  either  with  gaining  this  informa- 
tion, or  with  the  support  of  patrols  or  detachments 
engaged  in  scouting  and  observation.  In  military  sci- 
ence the  two  elements  of  security  and  information  are, 
therefore,  inseparable. 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

The  information  necessary  for  a commander  is  of  two 
kinds  : 

1.  That  relating  to  the  geography,  topography,  and 
resources  of  the  theater  of  operations. 

2.  That  which  relates  to  the  strength  and  composition 
of  the  enemy’s  forces,  and  their  position,  movements, 
and  morale. 

Among  military  nations,  the  first  kind  of  information 
is  now  generally  obtained  in  time  of  peace,  and  com- 
piled by  a bureau  of  military  intelligence  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  army.  This  has  not,  however,  always 
been  the  case.  When  the  Crimea  was  selected  by  the 
Allies,  in  1854,  as  a theater  of  operations,  it  was  practi- 
cally a terra  incog7iita.  Hamley  says  : 

“It  was  as  completely  an  unknown  country  to  the 
chiefs  of  the  allied  armies  as  it  had  been  to  Jason  and 
his  argonauts  when  they  journeyed  thither  in  search  of 
the  Golden  Fleece.  It  was  known  to  contain  a great 
harbor,  and  a city  with  docks,  fortifications,  and  arse- 
nal ; but  the  strength  and  resources  of  the  enemy  who 
would  oppose  us,  the  nature  of  the  fortifications,  and 
even  the  topography,  except  what  the  map  could  imper- 
fectly show,  lay  much  in  the  region  of  speculation.”  * 

Our  own  military  history  offers,  if  possible,  still  more 
striking  instances.  Such  was  the  lack  of  information 
concerning  Mexico,  that  our  war  with  that  country 
lasted  a year  before  definite  plans  of  campaign  were 
adopted.  Taylor’s  movement  upon  Monterey  was 
avowedly  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information 
respecting  the  capacity  of  the  country  to  sustain  a force 


* “The  War  in  the  Crimea,”  p.  24. 


4 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


of  6,000  men  or  more  ; and  Wool’s  expedition  against 
Chihuahua,  undertaken  upon  insufficient  information, 
terminated  fruitlessly  at  Monclova,  more  than  three 
hundred  miles  from  its  objective. 

In  the  War  of  Secession  much  of  the  theater  of  war 
had  never  been  accurately  mapped,  and  in  many  in- 
stances the  topography  of  the  immediate  theater  could 
be  learned  only  by  reconnaissances  conducted  during 
the  military  operations.  In  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  General  Mc- 
Clellan said:  “Our  maps  proved  entirely  inaccurate, 
and  did  us  more  harm  than  good,  for  we  were  constantly 
misled  by  them.”  In  his  report  he  states:  “The 
country,  though  known  in  its  general  features,  we 
found  to  be  inaccurately  described  in  essential  particu- 
lars in  the  only  maps  and  geographical  memoirs  or 
papers  to  -which  access  could  be  had.  Erroneous  courses 
of  streams  and  roads  were  frequently  given,  and  no 
dependence  could  be  placed  on  the  information  thus 
derived.  Reconnaissances,  frequently  under  fire,  proved 
the  only  trustworthy  sources  of  information.”  Delays 
and  embarrassments  were  caused  by  incorrect  maps  and 
faulty  topographical  information  in  Grant’s  Virginia 
campaign  also.* 

Such  instances  will  be  more  rare  in  future,  and  a 
nation  contemplating  the  invasion  of  another  country 
will  generally  possess  beforehand  an  accurate  knowledge 
of  its  geography,  topography,  and  resources.  But  in 
the  invasion  of  any  Central  American  or  South  Ameri- 


* See  Humphreys’  “The  Virginia  Campaign  of  ’64  and  ’65,”  pp. 
128  and  211  ; also  “ Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,”  Yol.  II,  p.  243. 


INTRODUCTION. 


5 


can  country,  we  should,  probably,  labor  under  the  same 
disadvantages,  in  this  respect,  that  were  encountered 
during  the  War  of  Secession  ; and  topographical  recon- 
naissance becomes  thus  a matter  of  much  importance 
to  American  officers.  This  subject  belongs,  however, 
to  military  topography  rather  than  to  tactics,  and  is 
exhaustively  treated  in  several  well-known  works.* 

The  second  class  of  information  is  gained  in  two 
ways  : 

1.  From  spies,  deserters,  prisoners,  newspapers,  etc. 

2.  By  reconnaissance. 

The  first  method  does  not  pertain  to  the  subject  of 
tactics.  All  the  information  gained  in  this  manner  is 
collated  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  to  which  all 
information  in  regard  to  the  enemy  should  be  sent 
without  delay,  f 

In  the  subject  of  tactics  we  have,  then,  to  deal  solely 
with  military  reconnaissance,  in  contradistinction  to 
topographical  reconnaissance.  A reconnaissance  may 
be  effected  by  forces  varying  in  size  from  a single  scout 
to  an  entire  division  ; and  the  reconuoitering  force  may 
consist  of  infantry  or  cavalry,  or  of  both,  or  of  all  three 
arms. 

To  gain  reliable  information  of  the  enemy,  contact 
with  him  should  be  quickly  gained  and  never  lost. 
On  the  march  bodies  of  cavalry,  pushed  out  in  advance, 

The  student  is  referred  to  Richards'  Military  Topography,  and  to 
Chapter  VII,  Vol.  I,  and  Chapter  VIII,  Vol.  II,  of  Bronsart  von 
Schellendorf s “The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff”  (Hare’s  transla- 
tion). 

t Further  on  this  subject,  see  Appendix  I. 


6 


INTRODUCTION. 


come  in  touch  with  the  advanced  parties  of  the  enemy, 
which  they  endeavor  to  drive  in  or  brush  aside,  at  the 
same  time  covering  their  own  army  with  a veil  which 
the  enemy  must  be  prevented  from  penetrating.  If  the 
army  is  at  a halt,  and  the  enemy  is  advancing,  similar 
reconnoitering  bodies  are  pushed  out  to  meet  him  while 
he  is  still  at  a distance. 

Reconnaissance  is  thus  primarily  performed  by  a 
screen  of  cavalry  extended  well  to  the  front  of  the  main 
body.  It  is  also  conducted  by  bodies  of  troops  sent 
out  from  the  main  body  or  its  advanced  detachments  or 
posts.  The  question  of  reconnaissance  is  inseparable 
from  each  of  the  subjects  considered  in  the  following 
chapters. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


7 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


Marches  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  can  not  be  made  with  too 
much  precaution  and  prudence. — Martnont. 

Troops  moving  in  one  body  would,  if  they  came  sud- 
denly upon  the  enemy,  certainly  be  thrown  into  con- 
fusion, and  perhaps  defeated,  before  deployment  for 
action  could  be  effected.  Moreover,  insignificant  bodies 
of  the  enemy  could  seriously  delay  the  march  of  the 
column  by  causing  it  to  halt  and  deploy  for  action. 

A column  of  troops  on  the  march  is,  therefore,  divided 
into  a main  body , an  advance  guard , a rear  guard,  and 
such  flanking  parties  as  may  be  necessary. 

The  objects  of  the  advance  guard  are,  in  general 
terms,  to  observe  and  to  resist ; specifically,  they  are  : 

1.  To  provide  for  the  security  of  the  main  body  by 
giving  it  time  for  deployment  when  the  enemy  is  en- 
countered. 

2.  To  clear  the  way  for  the  main  body  and  prevent 
its  march  from  being  delayed. 

3.  To  seize  and  hold  important  points  until  the  ar- 
rival of  the  main  body. 

4.  To  support  the  reconnoitering  cavalry,  and  afford 
a rallying  point  for  it  in  case  it  is  driven  in  by  the 
enemy.  Even  when  a cavalry  screen  is  operating  in 
front  of  the  advance  guard,  the  latter  should  not  relax 
its  vigilance.  The  cavalry  may  be  driven  in,  and  the 


8 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


advance  guard  must  then  check  the  enemy.  On  ad- 
vance the  security  of  the  column  must,  therefore,  depend 
essentially  upon  the  advance  guard. 

Strength. — The  proportionate  strength  of  the  advance 
guard  varies  with  the  size  of  the  main  body,  the  object 
of  the  march,  the  topography  of  the  country,  and  the 
nature  of  the  enemy.  In  a close,  rugged,  country'  and 
against  an  enemy  inferior  in  numbers  and  morale , it 
should  be  less  than  in  an  open  country,  against  a strong, 
aggressive,  enemy,  or  when  the  intention  is  to  bring  on 
a decisive  engagement.  With  a large  force  the  propor 
tionate  strength  of  the  advance  guard  is  larger  than  in 
the  case  of  a small  column.  No  absolute  rule  for  the 
strength  of  the  advance  guard  can  be  given.  If  too 
weak,  it  can  not  fulfill  its  proper  functions  ; if  too  strong, 
there  will  be  a hurtful  waste  of  energy,  for  service  with 
the  advance  guard  is  much  more  fatiguing  and  exhaust- 
ing than  marching  with  the  main  column.  Moreover, 
a strong  advance  guard  has  a tendency  to  engage  an 
enemy  seriously,  even  when  its  duty  requires  that  it 
should  merely  fight  a delaying  action  to  gain  time  for 
the  main  body. 

As  a general  rule  (subject,  however,  to  a multitude  of 
exceptions),  we  may  assume  the  strength  of  the  advance 
guard  to  be  one-sixth  of  the  whole  force,  and  the  rear 
guard  to  be  half  as  strong  as  the  advance  guard.  On  a 
retrograde  movement  the  relative  strength  of  the  ad- 
vance and  rear  guards  would  be  reversed.  The  flank- 
ing parties  are  taken  from  the  advance  and  rear  guards, 
except  in  the  case  of  very'  large  forces,  when  they  would 
be  separate  bodies  of  a strength  according  to  circum- 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


9 


stances.  Thus  we  have  about  a fourth  of  the  whole 
force  on  duty  with  the  covering  detachments  on  the 
march. 

With  a small  force  the  advance  guard  might  be  re- 
duced to  one-eighth,  or  even  one-tentli,  of  the  whole. 
The  time  required  for  the  deployment  of  a large  column 
(such,  for  instance,  as  an  army  corps)  being  much 
greater  than  in  the  case  of  a small  force,  the  delaying 
action  of  the  advance  guard  must  be  much  longer,  and 
its  strength  much  greater.  In  the  Franco-German  war 
the  German  columns  sometimes  pushed  forward  half  of 
their  force  as  advance  guard,  and  never  less  than  one- 
fourth.  But  this  proportion  can  not  be  recommended ; 
for  no  advantage  worth  considering  seems  to  have  been 
gained  by  these  great  advance  guards,  while  they  fre- 
quently brought  on  battles,  as  at  Spichern,  Worth,  and 
Coloinbey,  contrary  to  the  wishes  and  plans  of  the  com- 
manding general.  In  view  of  this  tendency  of  large 
advance  guards  to  commit  themselves  to  serious  engage- 
ment, Von  der  Goltz  says  : “The  advance  guard  must 

only  be  small.  It  was  formerly  the  rule  to  employ  a 
third  or  fourth  part  of  all  the  troops  on  this  duty.  The 
justification  of  this  proportion  appears  very  doubtful. 
The  commander-in-chief  parts  with  a considerable  por- 
tion of  his  own  troops,  and  creates  an  independent  will 
beside  his  own.  ” A large  advance  guard,  by  engaging 
seriously,  is  likely  to  defeat  the  object  for  which  it  is 
created;  for  instead  of  gaining  time  for  the  main  body 
to  deploy,  it  hurries  it  into  action.  Von  der  Goltz  adds  : 
The  experience  of  the  late  wars  has  taught  us  that  the 
main  body  never,  as  a rule,  deployed,  because  the  ur- 


IO 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


gently-needed  assistance  required  by  the  advance  guard 
when  struggling  with  a superior  enemy  demanded  that 
the  troops  should  be  led  by  driblets  straight  into  the 
battle.”  It  seems,  therefore,  that,  even  in  the  case  of 
large  forces,  the  advance  guard  should  not  have  so  great 
a proportionate  strength  as  the  Germans  gave  it,  and 
that  it  should  be  so  composed  as  to  admit  of  its  with- 
drawal from  action,  if  desirable,  without  precipitating 
a battle. 

Formation. — Shaw  aptly  describes  an  advance  guard 
as  being  “made  up  of  a number  of  detachments,  in- 
creasing progressively  in  strength  from  the  front  to  the 
rear.  The  object  of  each  of  these  detachments  is  to 
guard  against  surprise  the  stronger  body  which  follows 
immediately  in  its  rear,  and  give  the  latter  time  to  pre- 
pare for  attack.  ’ ’ 

The  advance  guard  is  divided  into  two  parts:  the  re- 
serve and  the  vanguard.  The  reserve  consists  of  from 
one-third  to  one-half  of  the  entire  advance  guard.  The 
remainder  constitutes  the  vanguard,  which  is  divided 
into  the  advance  party  and  the  support , the  latter  being 
generally  twice  as  strong  as  the  former.  In  large  ad- 
vance guards  this  proportion  is  often  different;  the  sup- 
port, relatively  to  the  advance  party,  and  the  reserve, 
relatively  to  the  vanguard,  being  considerably  greater. 
These  proportions  are,  moreover,  varied  according  to  the 
most  convenient  subdivisions  of  the  organizations  com- 
posing the  advance  guard.  They  may  be  regarded  as 
suitable  in  most  cases. 

The  following  is  given  as  a typical  (but  by  no  means 
invariable)  formation  of  a company  forming  the  advance 
guard  of  a battalion.  (See  Plate,  I.) 


1Z2ATE  I. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


II 


The  advance  party  (one  section)  throws  forward  a 
“point  ” consisting  of  three  or  four  men  under  a non- 
commissioned officer.  On  each  side  a flanking  group 
of  four  men  marches  about  150  yards  from  the  main 
route  to  the  right  and  left  rear  respectively  of  the  point. 
Each  flanking  group  should  be  under  a corporal  or  old 
soldier,  and  would  habitually  march  with  two  men  in 
front  and  one  in  rear  of  the  group  leader,  though  the 
formation  adopted  would  depend  upon  circumstances.  * 
The  rest  of  the  advance  party  follows  100  yards  in  rear 
of  the  point. 

The  support  (one  section)  follows  the  advance  party 
at  a distance  of  200  yards,  throwing  out  two  flanking 
groups  of  four  men  each  to  its  right  and  left  front,  and 
somewhat  farther  out  than  the  flankers  of  the  advance 
party.  These  groups  can  safely  move  farther  out  than 
those  of  the  advance  party,  thus  extending  the  field  of 
view ; while  each  can,  if  necessary,  protect  by  its  fire 
the  outer  flank  of  the  group  in  front.  A connecting 
file,  detached  from  the  advance  party,  marches  between 
the  advance  party  and  the  support  to  aid  in  the  trans- 
mission of  intelligence  from  one  to  the  other. 

The  reserve  marches  about  500  yards  in  rear  of  the 
support,  a connecting  file  marching  between  them.  The 
reserve  may  throw  flanking  groups  to  the  front  or  to  the 
front  and  rear,  the  groups  being  slightly  farther  out  than 
those  of  the  support.  The  flankers  from  the  reserve  can 
generally  be  dispensed  with,  and  should  be  thrown  out 
only  when  reasonable  prudence  requires  them  ; for,  as  a 
rule,  the  reserve  should  be  kept  entire  and  well  in  hand. 


See  chapter  on  Reconnaissance. 


12 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


The  main  body  follows  the  reserve  at  500  yards,  one 
or  two  connecting  files  marching  between  the  two 
bodies. 

The  distances  given  above  are  all  variable  ; but  those 
from  the  support  to  the  reserve,  and  from  the  reserve  to 
the  main  body,  can  not  prudently  be  made  more  than 
600  or  800  yards,  respectively,  in  the  case  of  so  small  a 
force  as  the  one  considered.  In  the  case  of  a single  com- 
pany acting  as  an  advance  guard,  the  rule  for  the  propor- 
tionate strength  of  the  advance  part)'  and  the  support  is 
necessarily  modified  to  accord  with  the  most  convenient 
subdivisions  of  the  company. 

If  the  nature  of  the  country  is  such  as  to  render  the 
use  of  flanking  groups  impracticable,  both  the  advance 
party  and  the  support  move  forward  entire,  with  the 
exception  that  the  advance  party  is  always  preceded  by 
a point. 

When  marching  in  an  open  country,  the  entire  ad- 
vance party  may  be  deployed  as  skirmishers,  with  con- 
siderable intervals,  the  support  following  in  line  of 
squads.  Both  lines  may  be  straight  or  echeloned  back 
slightly  from  the  center  toward  the  flanks.  The  reserve 
should  ordinarily  be  kept  in  column.  (See  Plate  II.) 

As  another  typical  case,  we  will  take  a force  of  two 
battalions  acting  as  advance  guard  for  a brigade.  (See 
Plate  III.)  The  advance  party  consists  of  one  company  ; 
the  support,  of  three  companies;  and  the  reserve,  of  one 
battalion.  The  distances  may  be  as  follows : From  point 
to  advance  party,  150  yards  ; from  advance  party  to  sup- 
port, 200  yards;  from  support  to  reserve,  600  yards;  from 
reserve  to  main  body,  800  yards. 


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THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


13 


Distance  from  Main  Body. — The  distance  from  the 
advance  guard  to  the  main  body  depends  so  entirely 
upon  circumstances  that  it  can  not  be  made  subject  to 
any  rigid  rule.  If  the  distance  were  too  great,  the  ad- 
vance guard  might  be  forced  into  a heavy  engagement 
while  beyond  the  assistance  of  the  main  body,  and  might 
even  be  entirely  cut  off  by  an  attack  upon  its  flank  and 
rear.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  distance  were  not  great 
enough,  time  could  not  be  afforded  for  the  preparation 
of  the  main  body  for  action. 

The  advance  guard  should  be  far  enough  ahead  to 
enable  the  commander  of  the  column  to  make  his  plan 
of  action  without  extreme  haste  while  the  advance  guard 
is  still  successfully  resisting  the  enemy;  but  it  should 
not  be  so  far  in  advance  that  the  commander  of  the  main 
body  should  be  obliged  to  abandon  every  other  consid- 
eration to  the  one  object  of  hurrying  to  the  succor  of  the 
advance  guard. 

A rough  rule,  which  will  answer  in  many  cases,  is 
that  the  minimum  distance  should  be  equal  to  the  depth 
of  the  main  body  ; as  the  time  required  for  the  rear  troops 
to  deploy  on  the  head  of  the  column  would  not  be  greater 
than  that  taken  by  the  advance  guard  in  falling  back. 

It  is  evident  that  this  rule  will  not  answer  when  a 
large  force  is  acting  with  energy  and  aggressiveness  for 
the  purpose  of  bringing  on  a battle,  as  the  advance 
guard  must  then  be  promptly  supported.  At  Mars-la- 
Tour,  when  the  German  army  was  moving  forward  with 
the  object  of  stopping  Bazaine’s  retreat  and  bringing 
him  to  battle,  the  advance  guard  of  Stulpnagel’s  divi- 
sion, being  separated  by  a considerable  distance  from 


i4 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


the  main  body,  was  so  roughly  handled  by  the  enemy 
that  the  leading  battalion  of  the  main  body  had  to  be 
hurried  into  action  without  deployment,  and  the  escape 
of  the  division  from  disastrous  defeat  was  due  only  to 
the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  French  to  take  advantage 
of  the  opportunity  presented. 

The  distance  will  also  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the 
country  and  the  state  of  the  weather.  If  the  country  is 
full  of  defensive  positions,  such  as  to  admit  of  a sturdy 
delaying  action  on  the  part  of  the  advance  guard,  the 
distance  may  be  decreased.  In  foggy  weather,  or  at 
night,  or  during  a storm  of  rain  or  snow,  the  distance 
should  be  decreased,  as  well  as  the  front  covered  by  the 
scouting  groups  or  flanking  parties.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  country  is  open,  the  weather  clear,  and  there 
is  danger  of  the  advance  guard  being  driven  back,  the 
distance  must  be  increased. 

It  will  be  observed  that,  in  the  typical  formations 
given  above,  the  main  body  is  from  1,300  to  1,750  yards 
from  the  point,  while  the  reserve  is  from  800  to  950 
yards  from  the  point.  Even  if  the  enemy  were  so  well 
concealed,  and  the  advance  guard  so  careless,  that  the 
point  should  be  in  actual  contact  with  the  enemy  before 
opening  fire,  the  reserve  would  be  at  least  800  yards 
from  the  hostile  force.  In  almost  every  conceivable 
case,  the  first  shots  fired  by  the  point  or  flankers  of  the 
advance  party  would  be  at  such  a range  that  (with  the 
distances  given  above)  the  reserve  could  prepare  for  ac- 
tion before  coming  under  destructive  fire.  The  reserve 
is  the  first  body  that  really  demands  time  for  deploy- 
ment. It  is  essentially  the  fighting  part  of  the  advance 
guard  ; the  vanguard  is  the  reconnoitering  part. 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


15 


The  Commander  of  the  Vanguard. — The  vanguard 
should  always  be  commanded  by  an  officer,  who  should 
be  mounted,  if  possible,  and  furnished  with  a detailed 
map  of  the  region  through  which  the  force  is  march- 
ing. He  habitually  marches  with  the  support,  but  goes 
to  any  part  of  the  vanguard  where  his  presence  may  be 
necessary.  He  may  take  immediate  command  of  the 
advance  party,  if  it  seems  advisable  to  do  so,  leaving 
the  support  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  officer 
or  non-commissioned  officer  next  in  rank.  If  guides 
are  present,  they  should  accompany  the  support  and  be 
under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  vanguard. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  vanguard  : 

1.  To  see  that  the  proper  road  is  taken  by  the  point. 

2.  When  cross  roads  are  passed,  to  see  that  a man  is 
left  to  guide  the  main  column. 

3.  To  send  out  special  patrols  to  examine  all  ground 
that  might  afford  shelter  to  the  enemy,  such  as  woods, 
farm-houses,  hamlets,  etc. 

4.  To  send  out  special  patrols  to  watch  and  oppose 
any  hostile  patrols  that  may  be  seen,  or  whose  presence 
may  be  suspected. 

5.  To  cause  necessary  repairs  to  be  made  in  roads, 
bridges,  approaches  to  fords,  etc. 

6.  To  transmit  promptly  to  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  advance  guard  all  information  that  he  may  gain 
about  the  enemy,  first  testing  its  accuracy  as  far  as  pos- 
sible. 

7.  To  see  that  the  march  of  the  column  is  not,  under 
any  circumstances,  unnecessarily  delayed. 


i6 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


The  support  replaces  any  men  of  the  advance  party 
who  may  be  relieved  or  placed  hors  de  combat.  When 
a scout  of  the  advance  party  brings  in  important  infor- 
mation, he  should,  if  practicable,  be  sent  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard.  His  place  with  the 
advance  party  is  at  once  supplied  from  the  support.  He 
is  retained  with  the  reserve,  from  which  another  man  is 
sent  forward  to  the  support.  The  number  of  men  with 
the  point  and  flankers  should,  if  possible,  remain  un- 
changed. When  there  are  particular  reasons  for  send- 
ing the  man  back  to  his  former  post,  the  man  wrho 
replaced  him  should  be  returned. 

Staff  Officer. — In  a command  of  considerable  size  a 
staff  officer  usually  accompanies  the  vanguard,  and  is 
charged  with  the  duty  of  selecting  a camp  or  bivouac 
for  the  main  body.  When  he  has  selected  the  place  he 
remains  there,  with  such  a detail  as  may  be  necessary, 
until  the  arrival  of  the  main  body,  the  advance  guard 
marching  on  and  forming  the  outpost,  at  least  tempor- 
arily. 

The  Commander  of  the  Advance  Guard. — The  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard  is  generally  with  the 
reserve  ; but  on  approaching  the  enemy,  should  go 
wherever  his  presence  is  most  needed.  He  should  always 
be  mounted,  if  practicable,  even  in  the  case  of  a small 
advance  guard.  With  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  the 
commander  of  the  rear  guard  in  retreat,  no  officer  needs 
a more  perfect  combination  of  courage,  self  reliance, 
and  good  judgment. 

A timid  officer  in  command  of  an  advance  guard  would 
suffer  the  column  to  be  delayed  by  small  parties  of  the 


THE  ADVANCE  GUARD. 


17 


enemy  ; a rash  one  would  plunge  into  combat,  and  might 
thus  impose  upon  his  superior  a course  of  action  at  total 
variance  with  his  plans.  Small  parties  of  the  enemy 
should  always  be  quickly  driven  back.  On  the  other 
hand,  an  engagement  should  generally  be  avoided,  unless 
the  commander  of  the  advance  guard  has  orders  to  touch 
upon  the  enemy  and  bring  him  to  a stand  at  all  hazards. 

The  commander  of  the  advance  guard  should  contin- 
ually consider  the  measures  necessary  for  the  security  of 
the  march,  and  for  rapidly  gaining  reliable  information 
of  the  enemy.  He  should  carefully  observe  the  ground, 
and  consider  the  tactical  use  that  might  be  made  of  it, 
and  should  have  a clear  idea  as  to  what  he  intends  to  do 
in  case  the  enemy  is  encountered.  His  orders  will  be 
either  to  march  in  a certain  direction  and  arrive  promptly 
at  a certain  point,  or  to  follow  the  enemy  with  prudence, 
and  profit  by  his  faults  and  by  all  advantages  that  offer 
themselves.  In  the  first  case  he  should  execute  his  orders 
promptly  and  exactly.  In  the  second  case  he  should 
move  cautiously,  venturing  upon  any  particular  route 
only  after  having  well  weighed  the  results  of  his  deter- 
mination, and  combined  a consideration  of  the  special 
duties  of  his  mission  with  the  probable  results  of  a check 
that  he  might  sustain,  his  distance  from  his  supports,  etc. 

Halts. — Whenever  the  advance  guard  halts,  all  ap- 
proaches should  be  reconnoitered  and  guarded,  and  an 
officer  should  be  sent  to  get  an  extended  view  from  the 
highest  available  point. 

Signals. — Information  from  one  part  of  the  advance 
guard  to  another  should  be  conveyed  by  some  code  of 
signals,  and  shouting  and  unnecessary  firing  should  be 
2 — w 


i8 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


carefully  avoided.  The  point  and  flankers  fire  only 
when  they  are  certain  that  they  have  been  seen  by  the 
enemy  and  that  he  is  not  retiring. 

Compliments. — Advance  guards  pay  no  compliments 
whatever. 


CAVALRY  ADVANCE  GUARDS. 

The  formation  of  a cavalry  advance  guard  is  similar 
to  that  of  one  composed  of  infantry.  An  advance  guard 
composed  of  a single  troop  will  be  first  considered.  (See 
Plate  IV.) 

If  the  troop  consists  of  but  two  platoons,  the  first  con- 
stitutes the  vanguard  and  the  second  the  reserve.  If 
there  are  three  platoons,  the  first  and  second  compose 
the  vanguard,  and  the  third,  the  reserve.  When  there 
are  four  platoons,  the  first  and  second  form  the  vanguard, 
and  the  third  and  fourth,  the  reserve.  The  point  con- 
sists of  four  troopers.  The  flanking  groups,  each  con- 
sisting of  four  troopers,  march  about  ioo  yards  in  rear 
of  the  point,  and  from  300  to  500  yards  from  the  line  of 
march.  The  advance  party  consists  of  the  point  and 
flankers,  and  is  under  the  command  of  a sergeant,  who 
is  generally  with  the  point.  In  some  cases  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  party  may  reduce  the  point 
to  two  troopers,  holding  the  other  two  in  rear  of  the 
point  and  abreast  of  the  flankers,  or  he  may  march  in 
this  position  himself  without  reducing  the  point.  He 
should  be  where  he  can  best  command  and  control  the 
reconnaissance  of  the  advance  party.  The  flanking 
groups  are  each  commanded  by  a corporal  or  an  old 
soldier.  Generally  two  troopers  ride  in  front  and  one 


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CAVALRY  ADVANCE  GUARDS. 


19 


in  rear  of  the  group  commander.  The  groups  may, 
however,  be  kept  together  in  any  suitable  formation,  or 
distributed  along  the  front  so  as  to  make  an  arc  of  scouts 
from  one  extreme  flanker,  through  the  point,  to  the  other 
extreme  flanker. 

The  support  follows  the  point  at  a distance  of  500 
yards,  a flanking  group  of  from  four  to  eight  men  being 
sent  out  on  each  flank  about  half  a mile  from  the  column 
and  slightly  in  advance  of  the  reserve.  In  an  enclosed 
country  these  groups  would  march  on  the  nearest  roads 
parallel  to  the  one  taken  by  tlm  main  column,  and  should 
keep  up  communication  with  the  advance  guard. 

The  reserve  follows  the  support  at  a distance  of  700 
yards.  As  a rule  it  is  kept  entire  ; but,  if  necessary, 
flanking  parties  may  be  thrown  out  in  such  a manner 
and  to  such  distances  as  circumstances  may  require. 
The  main  body  follows  the  reserve  at  a distance  of  700 
to  1,000  yards. 

Communication  between  the  parts  of  a cavalry  advance 
guard  being  much  easier  than  in  the  case  of  a corres- 
ponding body  of  infantry,  connecting  files  are  not  so 
necessary,  and  may  often  be  dispensed  with.  No  part 
of  the  advance  guard  should,  however,  lose  sight  of  the 
body  immediately  preceding  it ; and  whenever  it  be- 
comes necessary,  one  or  more  troopers  should  be  detached 
and  sent  ahead,  so  as  to  keep  in  view  both  the  body  in 
advance  and  the  one  from  which  detached.  On  a wind- 
ing road  and  in  a rough  country  connecting  files  are 
indispensable,  but  they  should  be  called  in  as  soon  as 
the  nature  of  the  terrain  renders  their  services  unneces- 
sary. 


20 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


If  two  troops  compose  the  advance  guard,  the  first 
troop  constitutes  the  vanguard  and  the  second  the  re- 
serve. In  this  case  the  advance  party  consists  of  a half- 
platoon, if  there  are  but  two  platoons  in  the  troop  ; or 
a platoon,  if  the  troop  contains  three  or  four.  The 
members  of  the  advance  party  not  employed  as  point 
and  flankers  form  a center  group,  which  marches  in  rear 
of  the  point  and  abreast  of  the  flankers.  Any  increase 
in  the  strength  of  the  advance  party  generally  increases 
the  center  group,  the  point  and  flanking  groups  rarely 
exceeding  four  men  each. 

In  the  case  of  a very  large  advance  guard  the  advance 
party  should  consist  of  an  entire  troop,  in  wdtich  case 
it,  instead  of  the  support,  -would  furnish  the  flanking 
patrols. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  distances  and  intervals  are 
considerably  greater  in  a cavalry  advance  guard  than  in 
one  composed  of  infantry.  Cavalry  possessing  much 
greater  mobility  than  infantry,  the  different  covering 
troops  can  safely  be  separated  from  each  other  by  greater 
distances  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter  arm.  More- 
over, the  resisting  power  of  cavalry  is  less  than  that  of 
infantry,  and  when  a cavalry  advance  guard  is  driven 
in  by  the  enemy,  the  ground  is  passed  over  more  rapidly 
in  retreat  than  in  the  case  of  a corresponding  infantry 
force.  Hence,  in  order  to  give  each  successive  body  in 
rear  time  to  prepare  for  action,  the  distances  must  neces- 
sarily be  greater  for  cavalry.  It  would  seem,  however, 
that  in  our  service  these  distances  might  safely  be  re- 
duced ; for  American  cavalry,  which  can  make  effective 
use  of  dismounted  fire-action,  has  greater  resisting 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  OF  ADD  ARMS. 


21 


power  than  European  cavalry,  and  it  is  not  limited,  as 
the  latter  seems  generally  to  be,  to  a charge  to  the  front 
or  a flight  to  the  rear. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  OF  ALL  ARMS. 

To  perform  its  functions  thoroughly,  an  advance  guard 
should  be  composed  of  all  arms.  Reconnoitering  duty 
can  be  performed  more  efficiently  and  more  easily  by 
cavalry  than  by  infantry — more  efficiently,  because  a 
cavalry  group  can  safely  push  much  farther  away  from 
the  column  than  an  infantry  group  can,  and  the  field  of 
observation  is  thus  extended  ; more  easily,  because  a 
trooper  can,  with  comparative  ease,  reconnoiter  to  a 
degree  that  would  exhaust  a foot  soldier. 

All  European  authorities  recommend  the  use  of  cav- 
alry as  reconnoiterers,  but  prescribe  that  the  support 
should  consist  in  part  of  infantry  to  supply  the  neces- 
sary resisting  power.  In  our  service  this  is  not  in  gen- 
eral necessary,  as  our  cavalry'  has  enough  resisting  power 
to  cany'  out  the  delaying  action  of  the  support ; and 
nothing  but  the  lack  of  sufficient  cavalry'  should  neces- 
sitate the  adoption  of  a composite  support. 

Artillery  is  of  great  value  to  the  advance  guard  in 
preparing  the  way  for  the  infantry'  attack,  and  in  com- 
pelling the  enemy  to  deploy  at  a distance.  Eight  field 
batteries  only  should  be  used  with  the  advance  guard, 
mobility  being  essential.  When  the  advance  guard  is 
specially  strong  in  cavalry,  a battery  of  horse  artillery 
should  be  attached  to  it.  The  guns  of  a battery  attached 
to  the  advance  guard  should  be  kept  together,  any  sub- 


22 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


division  being  generally  a mistake.  Under  exceptional 
circumstances,  part  of  the  guns  may  be  with  the  van- 
guard (marching  with  the  support);  but  in  such  an  ad- 
vanced position  the  artillery  would  be  liable  to  suffer 
from  the  enemy’s  infantry  fire  at  short  range,  and  would 
be  exposed  to  capture  by  sudden  assault.  When  the 
front  is  restricted  and  the  country  is  hilly,  part  of  the 
guns  may  be  with  the  vanguard  ; for  the  enemy  could 
find  advantageous  positions  from  which  to  bring  guns  to 
to  bear  upon  the  advance  guard,  and  would  have  to  be 
opposed  by  artillery ; and  in  such  a country  the  guns 
would  not  be  greatly  endangered  by  their  forward  posi- 
tion, as  the  enemy  could  advance  only  on  a narrow  front. 
In  a large  advance  guard  (such  as  that  of  an  army  corps) 
a battery  might  safely  march  at  the  rear  of  the  support. 
But,  as  a rule,  all  the  artillery'  of  the  advance  guard 
should  generally'  be  with  the  reserve,  and  should  be  pre- 
ceded by  a small  force  of  infantry  to  prevent  it  from 
being  taken  at  a disadvantage  by  sudden  attack.  In  any 
case,  the  delay  in  bringing  artillery  into  action  from  the 
reserve  would  be  so  slight  that  but  little  would  be  gained 
by  having  guns  with  the  vanguard.  As  the  guns  should 
come  into  action  within  artillery7  range,  but  beyond  in- 
fantry range,  of  the  enemy’s  position,  they  would  gen- 
erally be  nearer  to  their  proper  position  if  with  the 
reserve  than  they7  would  be  with  the  support.  The 
battery  commander  acompanies  the  commander  of  the 
advance  guard  on  the  march  and  in  reconnaissance  of 
the  enemy,  and  receives  his  orders  as  to  bringing  the 
battery  into  action. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  OF  ALL  ARMS. 


23 


A few  engineers  should  march  with  the  support,  to 
repair  bridges,  remove  obstacles,  etc.  If  the  rest  of  the 
support  consists  entirely  of  cavalry,  the  engineers  should 
be  mounted.  Owing  to  the  small  number  of  engineer 
soldiers  in  our  army,  this  duty  would  generally  be  per- 
formed by  pioneer  detachments  from  the  infantry. 

The  proportion  of  each  arm  in  the  advance  guard  de- 
pends upon  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  object  of  the 
march,  and  the  strength,  composition,  and  proximity  of 
the  opposing  force.  In  a close  or  mountainous  country 
the  proportion  of  infantry  should  be  increased.  In  an 
open  country  the  cavalry  should  be  strengthened.  If  the 
enemy  is  strong  and  near,  and  a battle  seems  imminent, 
the  advance  guard  should  be  specially  strong  in  infantry 
and  guns.  If,  however,  it  is  desired  merely  to  develop 
the  enemy  without  seriously  engaging,  the  advance 
guard  should  consist  of  cavalry  and  light  artillery  (horse 
artillery  if  possible),  as  these  troops  can  be  more  readily 
withdrawn  than  infantry.  In  the  pursuit  of  a beaten 
foe,  or  whenever  the  object  is  to  follow  and  keep  touch 
with  the  enemy,  the  proportion  of  cavalry  should  be  as 
great  as  possible.  In  any  ease  all  three  arms  are  needed. 

As  a rule,  the  different  organizations  of  the  command 
perform  in  turn  the  duty  of  advance  guard  ; but  in  oper- 
ations of  special  importance  it  may  be  desirable  to  have 
the  advance  guard  composed  of  select  troops.  Napoleon 
says  : “ It  is  necessary  that  the  advance  guard  should 
consist  of  klite  troops,  and  that  the  generals,  officers, 
and  soldiers  should  thoroughly  understand  their  tactics, 
each  according  to  the  needs  of  his  grade.  An  unin- 


24 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


structed  body  of  troops  would  be  only  an  embarrassment 
to  the  advance  guard.”  * 

Formation  Modified  by  Terrain. — In  the  formation  of 
an  advance  guard  considerations  of  terrain  take  prece- 
dence over  all  prescribed  rules.  If,  for  instance,  a ridge 
from  which  a good  view  can  be  obtained  lies  near  one  of 
the  flanks,  the  flankers  must  be  pushed  out  to  the  ridge, 
whether  it  be  nearer  or  farther  from  the  flank  than  the 
normal  distance.  When  the  nature  of  the  country  is 
such  that  flankers  are  unnecessary  or  can  not  keep  up 
with  the  command,  dispositions  must  be  made  accord- 
ingly. Whether  on  active  service  or  merely  at  drill , the 
commander  of  an  advance  guard,  outpost , or  rear  guard 
must  exercise  judgment,  and  make  his  dispositions  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  real  or 
supposed  circumstances  of  warfare  under  which  he  is 
acting. 

An  ingenious  disposition  of  the  advance  guard  made 
by  General  Cox,  in  West  Virginia,  in  1861,  is  worthy  of 
remark.  The  main  body  of  the  command,  embarked  on 
steamers,  moved  up  the  Kanawha  river,  on  either  side  of 
which  the  enemy  might  be  expected.  An  advance 
guard  accordingly  marched  along  each  bank,  the  main 
body  being  held  in  readiness  to  land  and  reinforce 
whichever  one  should  encounter  the  enemy. 

Encountering  the  Enemy. — As  soon  as  the  enemy  is 
seen,  the  advance  guard  must  endeavor  to  ascertain 
promptly  whether  it  has  to  deal  with  an  outpost  of  a 
stationary  force,  an  advance  guard  of  a marching  body, 
or  a flanking  detachment  of  a column.  It  should  lose 


* Maximes  de  Guerre  et  Pensees  de  Napoldon  Ier. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  OF  ALL  ARMS. 


25 


no  time  in  discovering  where  the  enemy’s  main  position 
is,  or  how  far  away  is  the  marching  column.  The  rel- 
ative numbers  and  position  and  the  orders  under  which 
the  advance  guard  is  acting  will  decide  the  question  of 
attacking  or  taking  up  a defensive  position.  The  offen- 
sive is  generally  the  best,  if  an  attack  seems  at  all  likely 
to  succeed.  If  between  the  advance  guard  and  the  en- 
emy there  is  an  exceptionally  good  position,  the  enemy 
should  be  attacked  vigorously,  in  order  that  the  position 
may  be  occupied  and  held  for  the  deployment  of  the 
main  body.  If  the  defensive  has  been  decided  upon, 
and  a good  defensive  position  has  been  passed  a short 
time  before  the  enemy  is  encountered,  or  if  the  latter  is 
in  such  force  that  the  advance  guard  can  not  hold  its 
own  against  him,  it  will  be  necessary  to  fall  back  slowly 
and  stubbornly  to  the  position  or  upon  the  main  body ; 
the  commander  of  the  advance  guard  sending  to  the 
commander  of  the  main  body  prompt  warning  of  the 
threatened  or  actual  attack. 

It  is  not  always  necessary  for  the  advance  guard  to 
take  up  a position  on  the  road  by  which  the  main  body 
is  advancing.  If  the  latter  is  compelled  in  its  advance 
to  adhere  to  the  route,  it  is  often  better  for  the  advance 
guard  to  make  a stand  at  one  side,  holding  the  road 
with  only  some  detached  troops.  The  main  body  advanc- 
ing along  the  road  is  thus  sometimes  enabled  to  make  its 
attack  in  the  most  effective  direction.  Moreover,  in 
case  the  advance  guard  is  driven  back,  it  will  not  be 
pushed  directly  upon  the  main  body,  to  which  it  might 
communicate  its  disorder.  In  case  of  a sudden  en- 
counter with  the  enemy,  the  advance  guard  will  probably 


26 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


be  compelled  to  take  up  a position  as  best  it  may,  which 
will  probably  be  on  the  road.  In  this  case  the  main 
body  may  sometimes  be  able  to  advance  by  a lateral 
road,  to  avoid  the  danger  of  being  compromised  in  a 
reverse  of  the  advance  guard,  and  at  the  same  time 
gain  the  advantage  of  a flank  attack  upon  the  enemy. 
When  the  advance  guard  is  strong  and  able  to  hold  its 
own  against  the  enemy  for  some  time,  and  when  the 
main  body  does  not  follow  the  advance  guard  too  closely, 
such  a movement  may  be  decisive. 

ADVANCE  GUARD  OF  A DIVISION. 

A division  consists  of  three  brigades  of  infantry  and 
two  or  more  batteries  of  artillery.  As  no  divisional 
cavalry  is  provided,  a portion  of  the  corps  cavalry  must 
be  detached  and  assigned  to  the  division  whenever  the 
latter  is  acting  independently,  or  when  the  front  is  not 
covered  by  a general  screen  of  corps  cavalry.  The 
corps  cavalry  will  not  comprise  more  than  two  regiments, 
and  may  consist  of  only  one.* 

It  can  not,  therefore,  be  safely  assumed  that  more  than 
one  squadron  will  be  assigned  to  each  division.  The 
experience  of  recent  wars  would  seem  to  indicate  four 
as  the  proper  number  of  batteries;  and  it  may  be  as- 
sumed, then,  that  the  division  consists  of  three  brigades 
(composed  of  nine  regiments,  or  twenty-seven  battalions) 

* Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  paragraphs  175,  176.  The  cavalry  be- 
longing to  the  corps  is  called  “divisional  cavalry,”  and  performs 
the  duties  which  would  otherwise  devolve  upon  the  true  divisional 
cavalry. 


ADVANCE  GUARD  OF  A DIVISION. 


2 7 


of  infantry,  four  batteries  of  light  artillery,  four  troops 
of  cavalry,  one  company  of  engineers,  two  companies 
of  hospital  troops,  and  a section  of  signal  soldiers.  * 

The  advance  guard  of  the  division  might  be  formed 
as  follows  (see  Plate  V)  : The  advance  party  consists 
of  one  troop  of  cavalry,  its  point  being  about  a quarter 
of  a mile  in  advance,  and  the  flankers  at  the  same  dis- 
tance from  the  line  of  march.  A flanking  patrol  would 
march  on  each  flank,  abreast  of  the  advance  party,  and 
from  two  to  four  miles  from  it.  Each  of  these  flanking 
patrols  should  be  not  less  than  a platoon,  and  should  be 
commanded  by  a lieutenant  or  experienced  sergeant. 

The  support  follows  one  mile  in  rear  of  the  advance 
party.  It  consists  of  two  and  one-half  troops  of  cavalry, 
two  battalions  of  infantry,  one  section  of  engineers, 
with  a tool  wagon  ; one  machine-gun  detachment,  and 
infantry  ammunition  carts.  The  number  of  carts  is 
regulated  by  the  fact  that  as  the  advance  guard  may 
have  to  fight  during  many  consecutive  hours  after  touch- 
ing upon  the  enemy,  it  should  have,  including  ammu- 
nition carried  by  the  soldiers,  at  least  200  rounds  per 
man. 

A flanking  detachment  varying  in  strength  from  one- 
half  to  one-fourth  of  a troop  is  sent  out  to  each  flank 
from  the  cavalry  of  the  support.  It  marches  slightly 
farther  out  from  the  line  of  march  than  the  correspond- 


* This  does  not  include  the  hospital  troops  on  duty  with  the  field 
hospital,  but  merely  the  bearer  and  ambulance  companies.  Most  of 
the  ambulances  and  the  field  hospital  would  be  with  the  train.  A 
complete  sanitary  service  would  require  about  290  hospital  soldiers  to 
the  division. 


28 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


ing  detachment  from  the  advance  party,  and  nearly 
abreast  of  the  reserve. 

The  reserve  follows  at  a distance  of  a mile  and  a 
quarter.  At  its  head  marches  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  advance  guard,  followed  by  a platoon  of  cavalry. 
The  rest  of  the  reserve  is  arranged  in  the  following 
order  : A battalion  of  infantry,  a battery,  a regiment  of 
infantry,  a section  of  engineers,  infantry  ammunition 
carts,  and  a platoon  of  hospital  troops  with  ambulances. 

Members  of  a mounted  signal  detachment  should  be 
with  the  advance  party,  the  support  and  the  reserve, 
and  at  the  head  of  the  main  body.  One  or  two  ma- 
chine guns  might  be  advantageously  used  with  the 
support.  Connecting  files  march  between  the  advance 
party  and  the  support,  and  between  the  support  and 
the  reserve. 

Two  or  three  escort  wagons  conveying  picks,  shovels, 
and  axes,  in  addition  to  those  required  for  the  use  of  the 
engineers,  should  accompany  the  reserve,  following  im- 
mediately in  rear  of  the  infantry.  The  War  of  Secession 
demonstrated  the  necessity  of  having  at  hand  every  fa- 
cility for  intrenching  rapidly  and  strongly ; and  these 
implements  would  be  a valuable  addition  to  the  intrench- 
ing tools  carried  by  the  soldiers.  The  number  and  kind 
of  tools  would  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  the  object  of  the  march.  If  the  advance  guard  were 
charged  with  the  duty  of  seizing  and  holding  an  im- 
portant point,  the  necessity  of  intrenching  would  be 
imperative.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
beaten  foe  intrenching  tools  might  be  neglected.  In  a 
wooded  country  axes  would  be  a prime  necessity;  in  a 


ADVANCE  GUARD  OF  A DIVISION.  29 

prairie  country  picks  and  shovels  would  be  most  impor- 
tant. * 

The  main  body  follows  the  reserve  at  a variable  dis- 
tance. In  the  case  of  a division  the  distance  would  vary 
from  half  a mile  to  three  miles,  but  should  not  ordina- 
rily exceed  a mile  and  a half.  In  the  case  of  large  forces 
the  distance  may  be  as  great  as  five  miles;  or  even  greater 
if  it  be  desired  to  seize  some  important  point  even  at  the 
risk  of  incurring  the  defeat  of  the  advance  guard  before 
it  can  be  succored  by  the  main  body.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  advance  guard  is  strong  and  has  orders  to 
bring  on  a battle,  the  distance  may  be  not  more  than  half 
a mile.  At  the  head  of  the  main  column  marches  the 
major  general  with  his  staff  and  a platoon  of  cavalry. 
The  main  body  is  formed  in  accordance  with  the  maxim 
that  the  troops  likely  to  be  first  needed  should  be  in  ad- 

* Immediately  after  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  Lee,  learning  that 
Grant  was  extending  his  left  toward  Spottsylvania,  began  to  push 
forward  his  own  right  toward  the  same  point,  Fitzhugh  Lee’s  cavalry 
division  in  advance.  The  two  armies  marched  on  parallel  roads  at  a 
short  distance  from  each  other.  Pushing  forward  rapidly,  Fitzhugh 
Lee  placed  his  division  across  the  Federal  line  of  advance  on  the 
Brock  Road,  and  quickly  intrenched  so  strongly  as  to  thwart  all 
attempts  to  dislodge  him.  The  important  point  of  Spottsylvania  was 
thus  secured  by  Lee. 

Later  in  the  same  campaign,  the  First  Cavalry  Division  (General 
Torbert)  seized  and  held  the  important  position  of  Cold  Harbor.  By 
some  mistake  it  was  withdrawn  in  the  night,  but,  under  orders,  retook 
the  position,  strengthened  it  with  slight  intrenchments,  and  held  it 
agaiust  a determined  assault  by  the  Confederate  infantry,  until  the 
arrival  of  General  Wright  with  the  Sixth  Corps  placed  the  position 
definitely  in  the  possession  of  the  Union  forces. 

Similar  results  might  often  be  gained  by  the  advance  guard  by 
seizing  and  intrenching  important  points. 


30 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


vance.  This  would  place  the  artillery  at  the  head  of 
the  column,  but  a small  force  of  infantry  must  precede 
it  for  its  protection.  We  have,  consequently,  the  follow- 
ing arrangement  of  the  main  body  from  front  to  rear : 
One  regiment  of  infantry,  followed  by  its  ammunition 
carts  ; three  batteries  ; one  brigade  of  infantry,  followed 
by  its  ammunition  carts  ; two  regiments  of  infantry  with 
ammunition  carts  ; the  remainder  of  the  hospital  troops 
with  ambulances  ; a platoon  of  engineers  with  a bridge 
train  ; the  ammunition  column,  and  the  baggage  and 
supply  train.  The  position  of  the  bridge  train  depends 
upon  circumstances.  Ordinarily  it  would  be  with  the 
main  body,  as  stated  above,  but  under  certain  circum- 
stances, especially  in  the  pursuit  of  a defeated  enemy,  it 
might  be  with  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard. 

The  commander  of  the  first  brigade  commands  the 
advance  guard,  all  the  infantry  of  which  is  taken  from 
his  brigade.  The  infantry  at  the  head  of  the  main 
column  also  belongs  to  the  first  brigade.  The  infantry 
of  the  rear  guard  (one  regiment)  is  taken  from  the  third 
brigade.  The  brigades  alternate  from  day  to  day  in 
their  positions  in  column. 

If  the  country  is  close  and  the  enemy’s  guerrillas  are 
active,  detachments  must  flank  the  train.  These  de- 
tachments are  generally  taken  from  the  rear  guard. 

ADVANCE  GUARD  OF  AN  ARMY  CORPS. 

If  the  entire  corps  were  operating  together,  the  corps 
cavalry  would  screen  its  front,  and  the  advance  guards 
of  the  divisions  wTould  be  composed  of  infantry  and  ar- 


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FLANK  GUARDS. 


31 


tillery.  In  view  of  the  protection  afforded  by  the  ad- 
vance screen  of  cavalry,  two  regiments  of  infantry  and 
a battery  would  probably  be  sufficient  for  the  advance 
guard  of  each  division,  if  the  corps  were  marching  on 
three  parallel  roads.  If,  however,  the  corps  were  march- 
ing on  two  parallel  roads,  the  column  composed  of  two 
divisions  should  be  preceded  by  at  least  a brigade  of 
infantry  and  two  batteries. 

The  above  dispositions  may  be  taken  as  a guide,  but 
must  not  be  blindly  followed.  In  nothing  does  the 
adage  ‘ ‘ circumstances  alter  cases  ’ ’ find  a more  com- 
plete verification  than  in  the  details  of  the  security  and 
information  of  an  army.  The  object  of  the  advance 
guard  must  be  continually  borne  in  mind , and  any  dis- 
position or  formation  that  will  enable  it  best  to  perform 
its  functions  is  right. 


FLANK  GUARDS. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  in  the  case  of  large 
forces  the  flanking  parties  are  taken  from  the  main 
body.  These  parties  are  not  mere  flanking  groups,  but 
are  bodies  varying  in  strength  and  composition  from  a 
small  patrol  of  infantry  or  cavalry  * to  a large  force  of 
all  arms. 

In  the  case  of  a flank  march  near  the  enemy,  the  flank 
guard  becomes  a body  of  the  greatest  importance,  and 


* The  movements  of  flank  patrols  and  the  minor  details  of  the  con- 
duct of  an  advance  guard  are  considered  in  the  chapter  on  Recon- 
naissance. 


32 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


its  composition  and  formation  resemble  those  of  an  ad- 
vance guard.  A flank  march  near  the  enemy  being  an 
especially  hazardous  operation,  and  one  never  made  to  a 
great  distance,  a force  undertaking  it  is  generally  in 
light  marching  order  and  ready  to  form  promptly  for 
action.  For  this  reason,  the  distance  from  the  flank 
guard  to  the  flank  of  the  column  is  not  so  great  as  the 
distance  from  an  advance  guard  to  the  head  of  the  main 
body.  Moreover,  the  formation  from  column  to  a flank 
can  be  made  more  quickly  than  a formation  on  the  head 
of  the  column. 

In  a flank  march  it  may  be  necessary  to  have  an  ad- 
vance guard,  flank  guard,  and  rear  guard,  each  of  very 
considerable  strength. 

ADVANCE  GUARD  DRILL. — INFANTRY. 

Often  in  active  service  a command  is  ordered  on  de- 
tached duty  from  a point  some  distance  within  the  out- 
posts of  the  army.  It  is  unnecessary  and  fatiguing  to 
march  from  the  camp  or  bivouac  with  an  advance  guard, 
which  should  be  thrown  out  only  when  the  outpost  line 
is  passed.  Troops  should,  therefore,  be  drilled  in  form- 
ing advance  guard  from  column  with  celerity. 

It  should  be  understood  that  when  a single  company 
forms  the  advance  guard,  the  first  section  constitutes  the 
advance  party,  the  second  section  the  support,  and  the 
second  platoon  the  reserve.  The  company  being  in  col- 
umn of  fours,  at  a halt,  the  captain  commands:  i.  Form 
advance  guard , 2.  March.  At  the  first  command  the 
first  sergeant  takes  command  of  the  first  section,  and  the 


ADVANCE  GUARD  DRIED — INFANTRY. 


33 


corporal  of  the  first  four  exchanges  places  with  his  rear 
rank  man.  At  the  command  march , the  front  rank  of 
the  first  four,  under  the  second  sergeant,  moves  to  the 
front  as  a point.  The  rear  rank  of  the  first  and  the  front 
rank  of  the  second  four  oblique  to  the  left  and  right, 
respectively,  to  form  flanking  groups.  The  point  and 
flankers  all  move  out  at  double  time,  reducing  their  pace 
to  quick  time  as  soon  as  they  reach  their  proper  positions. 
The  first  sergeant  detaches  two  men  from  the  rear  rank 
of  the  second  four  to  march  as  connecting  files  between 
the  advance  party  and  the  support,  puts  the  other  two 
in  the  line  of  fileclosers,  and  commands  : i.  Forward, , 
2.  March,  the  second  command  being  given  as  soon  as 
the  point  has  gained  its  proper  distance.  When  the  sec- 
tion consists  of  only  two  fours,  the  first  sergeant  marches 
the  rear  rank  of  the  second  four  forward,  and  the  con- 
necting files  are  furnished  by  the  support. 

The  first  lieutenant  (remaining  with  the  second  sec- 
tion) commands  : i.  Forward , 2.  March,  the  second 
command  being  given  as  soon  as  the  support  has  its 
proper  distance.  He  then  adds  : 1.  Rear  four , 2.  Right 
and  left  oblique , 3.  Doiible  time , 4.  March.  The  front 
rank  of  the  rear  four  obliques  to  the  right,  and  the  rear 
rank  to  the  left,  at  double  time,  forming  the  flankers  of 
the  support,  and  taking  quick  time  on  gaining  their 
positions. 

The  captain  (remaining  with  the  second  platoon)  com- 
mands, 1.  Forward , 2.  March,  the  second  command 
being  given  as  soon  as  the  reserve  has  its  proper  dis- 
tance. Should  flankers  be  necessary  for  the  reserve, 
they  are  then  sent  out,  at  double  time,  by  the  same  com- 


34 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


mands  as  in  the  case  of  the  support,  from  the  rear  (or 
rear  and  leading)  fours.  The  entire  advance  guard 
inarches  at  attention,  the  advance  party  and  support 
marching  on  as  broad  a front  as  practicable,  and  the 
reserve  in  column  of  fours. 

If  the  command  is,  i.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  Double 
time , 3.  March,  the  point  and  flankers  move  out  as 
already  prescribed,  but  do  not  reduce  their  pace  upon 
gaining  their  positions.  The  advance  party,  the  sup- 
port, and  the  reserve  move  forward  successively  at 
double  time.  The  reserve  takes  quick  time  at  the  com- 
mand of  the  captain,  and  the  other  parts  of  the  advance 
guard  then  conform  to  the  pace  of  the  reserve. 

The  formation  of  advance  guard  at  double  time  is 
made  either  from  a halt  or  when  the  company  is  march- 
ing at  quick  time. 

If  the  company  is  left  in  front,  the  duties  described 
above  for  the  first  lieutenant  will  be  performed  by  the 
second  lieutenant,  and  the  point  will  be  commanded  by 
the  third  sergeant.  In  either  case  the  first  sergeant 
commands  the  section  constituting  the  advance  party. 

When  the  advance  guard  consists  of  an  entire  battal- 
ion, the  first  and  second  companies  constitute  the  van- 
guard, and  the  third  and  fourth  form  the  reserve.  The 
vanguard  is  commanded  by  its  senior  captain.  The 
major  commands:  1.  Form  advance  guard , 2.  March, 
the  commands  being  repeated  by  the  commander  of  the 
vanguard.  The  point  and  flankers  move  out  from  the 
first  section  of  the  leading  company,  the  first  platoon  of 
this  company  constituting  the  advance  party.  The  first 
sergeant  does  not  take  command  of  the  first  section.  As 


ADVANCE  GUARD  DRIED — INFANTRY.  35 

soon  as  the  point  has  gained  its  proper  distance,  the 
lieutenant  commanding  the  first  platoon  moves  it  for- 
ward. As  soon  as  the  advance  party  has  gained  its 
proper  distance,  the  commander  of  the  vanguard  com- 
mands: 1.  Forward , 2.  March,  immediately  adding, 
1.  Rear  fours  first  and  second  companies , 2.  Right  and 
left  oblique , 3.  Double  time , 4.  March.  The  fours 
designated  move  out  as  flankers  in  the  manner  already 
prescribed,  those  of  the  first  company  being  slightly  in 
advance  of,  and  those  of  the  rear  company  slightly  in 
rear  of,  the  support.  If  only  one  group  of  flankers  is 
needed  on  each  flank,  they  are  formed  by  the  rear 
four  of  the  first  company.  When  the  support  has 
gained  its  proper  distance,  the  major  moves  the  reserve 
forward,  and  orders  flankers  out  from  the  reserve,  if  nec- 
essary, in  the  same  way  as  from  the  support. 

In  the  case  of  two  battalions  forming  the  advance 
guard  of  a brigade,  the  major  commanding  the  first  bat- 
talion, upon  receiving  instructions  from  the  commander 
of  the  advance  guard,  commands:  i.  Form  advance 
guard , 2.  March.  The  commands  are  repeated  by  the 
captain  of  the  first  company,  who  adds,  1.  Forward , 2. 
March,  in  time  to  move  his  entire  company  forward  as 
advance  party  as  soon  as  the  point  has  gained  its  proper 
distance.  The  major  commands  : 1.  Forward , 2. 
March,  the  second  command  being  given  the  moment 
the  advance  party  has  gained  the  proper  distance. 
The  major  then  adds  : i.  Rear  four  ( such)  company  or 
companies , 2.  Right  and  left  oblique , 3.  Double  time , 4. 
March,  the  flankers  being  taken  from  the  second, 
fourth,  or  third  company,  or  from  all  three  in  the  order 


36 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


mentioned,  according  to  the  number  of  groups  required 
on  each  flank.  When  the  support  has  gained  the  proper 
distance  the  major  of  the  second  battalion  moves  the  re- 
serve forward.  The  major  commanding  the  reserve 
should  ordinarily  be  the  senior,  as  the  commander  of 
the  advance  guard  is  habitually  with  the  reserve. 

To  assemble  the  advance  guard,  the  reserve  is  halted, 
and  the  other  parts  of  the  advance  guard  at  once  halt. 
The  command  is  then  given,  i.  Assemble , 2.  March, 
or  the  commander  gives  the  signal  of  assembly  as  pre- 
scribed in  the  drill  regulations.  The  command  is  re- 
peated by  the  commander  of  the  vanguard,  and  then  by 
the  commander  of  the  advance  party.  At  the  command 
march , the  point,  flankers,  and  connecting  files  move  on 
the  shortest  lines  to  the  body  from  which  they  were  sent 
out,  and  take  their  places  in  the  column.  The  detached 
men  having  thus  rejoined,  the  advance  party  marches 
back  and  joins  the  support,  and  the  united  bodies  then 
march  back  and  join  the  reserve.  Should  the  advance 
party  or  support  not  be  in  column  of  fours,  such  column 
should  be  formed  before  its  commander  gives  the  order 
for  assembling.  * 

If  it  is  desired  to  assemble  on  the  advance  part}',  the 
command  is,  1.  Assemble  on  the  advance  party , 2. 
March.  The  command  is  executed  as  prescribed  above, 
except  that  the  advance  party  remains  halted,  and  the 
support  and  reserve  move  forward  and  close  upon  it. 

The  assembly  may,  in  either  case,  be  made  at  double- 
time. 


This,  of  course,  does  not  apply  to  a very  small  advance  party. 


ADVANCE  GUARD  DRILL — CAVALRY. 


37 


ADVANCE  GUARD  DRILL — CAVALRY. 

The  troop  being  in  column  of  fours,  the  captain 
commands  : i.  Form  advance  guard , 2.  March.  At 
the  first  command,  the  commander  of  the  first  platoon 
takes  command  of  the  vanguard,  and  the  guidon  ser- 
geant takes  position  abreast  of  the  leading  four  of  the 
reserve.  At  the  command  march , the  first  four,  under 
the  command  of  the  right  principal  guide,  moves  for- 
ward at  a trot,  constituting  the  point.  The  second 
and  third  fours  oblique  to  the  right  and  left,  respect- 
ively, at  a trot,  until  they  are  about  300  yards  from 
the  line  of  march,  and  then  move  forward  until  they 
are  on  a line  about  100  yards  in  rear  of  the  point, 
increasing  their  pace,  if  necessary,  in  moving  forward 
to  their  position.  The  right  principal  guide  is  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  party,  and  regulates  the  move- 
ments of  the  point  and  flanking  groups. 

When  the  point  has  gained  a distance  of  600  yards, 
the  commander  of  the  vanguard  moves  the  support  for- 
ward at  a walk,  and  the  advance  party  (consisting  of 
the  point  and  flanking  groups)  at  once  takes  the  same 
pace.  The  commander  of  the  vanguard,  as  soon  as  he 
has  put  the  support  in  motion,  detaches  two  flanking 
groups  from  the  last  three  fours.  These  patrols,  which 
are  always  under  a non-commissioned  officer,  march,  one 
on  each  flank,  about  half  a mile  from  the  column  and 
slightly  in  advance  of  the  reserve.  As  one  flank  is  gen- 
erally more  exposed  than  the  other,  the  patrol  on  the 
dangerous  flank  would  consist  of  eight  and  the  other  of 
four  men.  If  both  flanks  appear  to  be  equally  exposed, 


38 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


each  patrol  should  consist  of  six  men,  but  it  is  not 
otherwise  advisable  to  break  up  the  unity  of  a four. 
These  patrols  move  to  their  positions  at  a trot,  and  take 
such  formation  as  circumstances  may  require. 

When  the  support  has  advanced  about  700  yards,  the 
captain  moves  the  reserve  forward.  When  flanking 
groups  are  thrown  out  from  the  reserve,  they  should  be 
taken  from  the  rear  fours. 

If  the  command  is  : 1.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  Trot , 
3.  March,  the  advance  guard  is  formed  as  above  de- 
scribed, except  that  the  point  and  flankers  move  to  their 
positions  at  a gallop,  and  the  support  and  reserve  move 
forward  at  a trot.  As  soon  as  the  support  moves  for- 
ward, the  advance  party  comes  down  to  a trot.  The 
entire  advance  guard  continues  to  move  at  a trot  until 
the  pace  of  the  reserve  is  either  increased  or  reduced, 
when  the  other  parts  at  once  conform  thereto.  Unless 
orders  be  given  to  the  contrary,  the  reserve  always  reg- 
ulates the  pace  of  the  advance  guard. 

If  the  command  is  : 1.  Form  advance  guard,  2.  Gal- 
lop, 3.  March,  the  advance  guard  is  formed  as  in  the 
last  case,  except  that  the  advance  party  continues  the 
gallop  and  the  other  bodies  move  out  successively  at 
the  same  pace.  The  cavalry  should  be  habitually  drilled 
in  forming  advance  guard  at  a gallop. 

If  the  troop  is  left  in  front,  the  advance  part}'  is  com- 
manded by  the  left  principal  guide,  and  the  vanguard 
by  the  corresponding  platoon  commander. 

The  above  method  of  forming  an  advance  guard  will 
answer  in  the  case  of  a troop  of  60  men  or  more.  If 
the  troop  numbers  only  60  men,  it  should  be  divided 


ADVANCE  GUARD  DRILL — CAVALRY. 


39 


into  three  platoons.  If  the  troop  is  small,  the  point  will 
he  taken  from  the  first  four,  and  the  flankers  of  the  ad- 
vance party  may  be  reduced  to  two  on  each  flank,  both 
taken  from  the  second  four.  The  flanking  patrols  sent 
out  from  the  support  may  be  reduced  to  four  men  each. 
When  the  troop  is  very  small,  and  (as  is  usually  the  case) 
the  country  is  such  that  these  patrols  can  not  be  dis- 
pensed with,  it  will  not  be  able  to  furnish  the  entire  ad- 
vance guard,  the  whole  strength  being  required  for  the 
advance  party  and  support. 

An  advance  guard  consisting  of  more  than  one  troop 
is  formed  by  similar  commands  and  means. 

The  assembly  is  executed  as  in  the  case  of  infantry. 
It  may  be  made  at  a walk,  trot,  or  gallop. 


40 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


CHAPTER  III. 


OUTPOSTS. 


To  exercise  ceaseless  vigilance,  to  be  in  constant  readiness  for 
action,  and  to  preserve  the  most  profound  silence,  are  the  cardinal 
principles  of  outpost  duty. — Van  Mulken. 

Outposts  are  detachments  thrown  out  from  a force 
when  halted,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  it  from  sur- 
prise. Like  advance  guards  on  the  march,  outposts  are 
charged  with  the  duties  of  observation  and  resistance. 
They  prevent  the  reconnaissance  of  the  position  by  the 
enemy’s  scouts  and  patrols,  give  warning  of  the  approach 
of  hostile  bodies,  and  offer  sufficient  resistance  to  the 
enemy’s  attacks  to  enable  the  main  body  to  prepare  for 
action. 

The  proper  performance  of  outpost  duty  is  of  vital  im- 
portance to  an  army,  and  history  presents  many  exam- 
ples of  disasters  resulting  from  its  neglect.  At  Laon,  in 
1814,  Marmout’s  neglect  to  exercise  proper  vigilance 
caused  him  to  be  overwhelmed  by  Bliicher’s  night  at- 
tack. At  Shiloh  the  carelessness  with  which  outpost 
duty  was  performed  by  the  United  States  army  enabled 
the  Confederates  to  form  their  line  of  battle  deliberately 
within  a mile  and  a half  of  the  camp  of  their  unsuspect- 
ing opponents,  and  to  take  the  Union  forces  at  a terrible 
disadvantage.  At  Vionville,  in  1870,  Forton’s  cavalry 


OUTPOSTS. 


41 


division  was  so  negligently  guarded  by  its  outposts,  that 
it  was  surprised  by  the  German  horse  artillery,  and  forced 
to  fly  in  confusion  through  the  camp  of  its  own  infantry. 
Scores  of  similar  examples  might  be  mentioned. 

When  a strong  cavalry  screen  is  in  front  of  the  army, 
the  duty  of  observation  becomes  much  less  important  to 
the  outposts  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case.  In  1870 
the  effectiveness  of  the  cavalry  screen  was  such  that 
Boguslawski  says : ‘ ‘As  an  additional  result  of  the  use 
to  which  our  cavalry  was  put,  we  may  mention  the  per- 
fect security  and  tranquility  enjoyed  by  our  army  corps 
on  the  march  and  in  camp,  in  rear  of  the  cavalry  divi- 
sions pushed  forward  half  or  a whole  day’s  march  to  the 
front.  The  army  corps  had  not,  as  a rule,  to  trouble 
themselves  with  outpost  duty,  but  only  to  provide  for 
the  immediate  security  of  the  bivouac  or  cantonment.” 
This  was,  however,  an  exceptional  condition  of  affairs, 
for  the  German  cavalry  was  strong  and  enterprising,  and 
the  opposing  cavalry  was  weak  and  dispirited.  While 
a good  cavalry  screen  greatly  increases  the  security  of 
an  army,  and  thus  materially  lightens  the  duty  of  the 
outposts,  it  furnishes  no  excuse  for  the  latter  to  be  care- 
less, or  to  forget  that  the  duty  of  observation  is  insepa- 
rably connected  with  that  of  resistance. 

Unbroken  rest  at  night  being  necessary  for  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  health  and  efficiency  of  troops  undergo- 
ing the  hardships  and  fatigues  of  a campaign,  it  is  of 
the  utmost  importance  that  the  repose  of  the  army  in 
camp  or  bivouac  should  not  be  disturbed  by  needless 
alarms.  The  army  must  feel  that  the  vigilance  of  its 
outposts  enables  it  to  sleep  in  security. 


42 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


The  duties  of  the  outposts  may  be  classified  as  fol- 
lows : 


Observation 


Resistance  : 


f i.  To  observe  constantly  all  approaches 
j by  which  the  enemy  might  advance. 

| 2.  To  watch,  and  immediately  report, 
the  movements  of  the  enemy, 
i.  To  prevent  reconnaissance  by  the 
enemy. 

-[  2.  Above  all , to  check  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  long  enough  to  enable 
the  main  body  to  prepare  for  action. 


Subdivisions  of  the  Outpost. — The  outpost  is  divided 
into  four  parts,  namely  : i.  Sentinels  or  vedettes  ; 2. 
Pickets  ; 3.  Supports  ; 4.  Reserve.  The  sentinels  or 
vedettes  occupy  the  line  of  observation.  They  are  sent 
out  from  the  pickets,  and  supported  by  them.  The  sup- 
ports usually  occupy  the  line  of  resistance , and  are 
supported  by  the  reserve. 

In  an  infantry  outpost  the  pickets  are  from  100  to  400 
yards  in  rear  of  the  sentinels;  the  supports,  from  400  to 
800  yards  in  rear  of  the  pickets;  and  the  reserve,  from 
400  to  800  yards  in  rear  of  the  supports.  In  a cavalry 
outpost  the  distance  from  the  vedettes  to  the  picket  is 
about  600  yards,  and  the  other  distances  vary  between 
the  limits  of  1,200  and  2,000  yards.  These  distances 
can  not  be  definitely  fixed,  as  they  depend  upon  many 
circumstances  of  ground,  weather,  and  the  nature  and 
proximity  of  the  enemy.  The  distances  given  above  are 
to  be  regarded  only  as  approximations  to  those  that 
might  be  adopted  in  most  cases. 

The  general  plan  of  an  outpost  may  be  likened  to  an 
open  fan,  the  sentinels  being  along  the  outer  edge  ; or, 


OUTPOSTS. 


43 


better  yet,  to  a hand  with  the  fingers  extended  and 
widely  opened.  A line  along  the  tips  of  the  fingers 
would  represent  the  chain  of  sentinels  ; the  first  joints, 
the  line  of  pickets  ; the  second  joints,  the  line  of  sup- 
ports ; and  the  knuckles,  the  line  of  the  reserve  ; while 
the  wrist  would  represent  the  position  of  the  main  body. 
(See  Plate  VI.) 

The  reserve  generally  consists  of  not  less  than  one- 
third  nor  more  than  one-half  of  the  entire  outpost. 
The  strength  of  the  supports  and  pickets  would  conse- 
quently vary  from  two-thirds  to  one-half  of  the  outpost. 
The  strength  of  each  picket  depends  upon  the  number 
of  sentinels  and  patrols  that  it  has  to  furnish,  and  the 
size  of  each  support  is  regulated  by  the  principle  that  it 
should  be  equal  to  the  aggregate  strength  of  all  the 
pickets  supported  by  it.  As  a general  rule,  one-third 
of  the  outpost  would  be  assigned  to  the  reserve,  one- 
third  to  the  supports,  and  one-third  to  the  pickets  and 
sentries. 

Two  Systems  of  Outposts. — Outposts  are  of  two  kinds: 
The  cordon  system,  in  which  the  entire  front  is  covered 
with  a chain  of  sentinels  ; and  the  patrol  system,  in 
which  only  the  roads  and  other  avenues  of  approach  are 
guarded  by  sentinels,  closely  backed  up  by  pickets, 
while  the  intervening  country  is  constantly  patrolled. 
The  best  results  are  generally  obtained  by  a combination 
of  the  two  systems. 

Position. — The  outpost  must  cover  the  front  of  the 
army  and  overlap  its  flanks,  unless  the  latter  are  secured 
by  impassable  obstacles.  A prominent  natural  feature 
should  be  selected  to  mark  the  general  line,  such  as  a 


44 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


ridge,  a river,  or  the  farther  edge  of  a wood.  The  most 
favorable  position  will  be  one  which  furnishes  a good 
view  and  field  of  fire  to  the  front,  while  affording  con- 
cealment from  the  enemy  and  shelter  from  his  fire.  One 
of  the  best  positions  is,  therefore,  a wood  held  at  the 
edge  toward  the  enemy,  and  one  of  the  worst  is  a wood 
held  at  the  nearer  edge.  * 

If  the  farther  edge  is  too  distant  to  be  occupied,  and 
no  broad  roads  or  continuous  clearings  exist  in  the 
wood,  the  measures  to  be  taken  will  depend  upon  the 
length  of  time  the  position  is  to  be  occupied.  If  the 
outpost  is  to  hold  the  position  for  some  time,  as,  for  in- 
stance, in  the  case  of  the  investment  of  a fortified  place, 
a belt  at  least  twenty  yards  wide  should  be  cleared,  an 
entanglement  made  of  the  felled  trees,  and  the  sentinels 
posted  along  the  near  edge  of  the  belt.  If,  as  is  usually 
the  case,  time  and  opportunity  do  not  admit  of  making 
such  a clearing,  and  the  outpost  line  must  traverse  the 
wood,  the  line  of  sentinels  should  be  along  a stream,  or- 
dinary road,  or  ridge  overlooking  a valley,  so  as  lo  get 

* When  Banks,  falling  back  after  his  defeat  at  Sabine  Cross  Roads 
the  day  before,  took  up  his  position  at  Pleasant  Hill  (April  9,  1S64), 
Benedict’s  brigade  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  was  in  line  in  an  open 
field  within  effective  infantry  range  of  the  southern  edge  of  a for- 
est. The  outpost  covering  the  brigade  was  established  in  the  wood, 
the  pickets  being  only  a short  distance  from  the  southern  edge.  The 
Confederates,  advancing  from  the  north,  through  the  wood,  drove  in 
the  outpost,  and,  with  little  or  no  loss,  took  up  a position  at  the  edge 
of  the  wood,  where  they  were  sheltered  by  the  trees,  while  the  Union 
troops  were  not  only  in  the  open,  but  had  their  fire  masked  for  a time 
by  the  outpost  troops  retreating  across  the  unsheltered  space.  The 
Federal  brigade  was  soon  thrown  into  confusion,  and  suffered  heavy 
loss,  its  commander  being  among  the  killed. 


OUTPOSTS. 


45 


the  best  view  practicable  under  the  circumstances.  In 
holding  the  outpost  line  in  a heavy  timber,  it  would  be 
well  to  make  use  of  Cossack  posts  closely  backed  up 
by  the  supports,  the  posts  sheltered  by  barricades  of 
timber,  patrolling  in  front  being  constant.  Instead  of 
carrying  the  outpost  line  through  the  wood  when  the 
farther  edge  can  net  be  occupied,  it  is  generally  advisa- 
ble to  place  the  sentinels  under  cover  of  some  kind, 
facing  the  wood,  and  at  least  200  yards  from  the  near 
edge,  the  wood  being  patrolled.  Where  a stream,  canal, 
or  other  obstacle  having  but  few  passages,  lies  parallel  to 
the  outpost  line,  the  sentinels,  or.even  the  pickets,  may 
sometimes  be  posted  beyond  it;  but  the  supports  should 
be  kept  on  the  near  side  for  fear  of  so  large  a body  being 
cut  off  before  it  could  make  good  its  retreat.  It  would 
generally  be  best  to  keep  even  the  line  of  sentinels  on 
the  near  side,  and  merely  patrol  beyond  the  obstacle. 
The  sentinels  may  be  withdrawn  some  distance  from  the 
obstacles,  especially  during  the  day,  if  they  can  thus 
get  a more  extended  view  or  find  better  cover. 

The  outpost  line  is  convex  towards  the  enemy,  or 
straight  with  its  extremities  thrown  back.  Unless  the 
nature  of  the  ground  compels,  it  should  never  be  con- 
cave, even  when  that  is  the  shape  of  the  position  which 
it  covers.  It  does  not  necessarily  conform  to  the  line  of 
the  position  in  any  case. 

Strength.  — To  avoid  overtaxing  the  troops,  the 
strength  of  the  outpost  should  be  the  least  that  is  com- 
patible with  the  proper  performance  of  its  functions. 
It  depends  upon  various  considerations,  such  as  the  na- 
ture of  the  country  and  the  strength,  proximity,  and 


46 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


character  of  the  enemy.  In  a country  well  adapted  to 
defense,  smaller  numbers  suffice  than  in  an  open  coun- 
try. When  the  enemy  is  near  and  aggressive,  the  out- 
posts must  be  strong  and  vigilant.  The  strength  of  the 
outpost  will  also  depend  upon  the  plan  of  action  deter- 
mined upon  in  case  of  attack.  If  the  line  chosen  for 
the  deployment  of  the  main  body  coincides  with  the 
line  of  resistance  of  the  outpost,  the  latter  force  must 
be  strong  enough  to  hold  the  chosen  position  to  the  ut- 
most. If  it  is  decided  to  fall  back  upon  the  main  body, 
the  outpost  not  only  may  be,  but  should  be,  weaker  than 
in  the  former  case,  as.  a strong  force  would  be  more 
likely  to  become  compromised  in  a serious  engagement 
than  a weaker  one. 

The  strength  of  the  outpost  thus  depends  upon  so 
many  different  considerations  that  no  definite  rule  on 
the  subject  can  be  prescribed.  Clery  gives  six  different 
examples  of  outposts  in  the  European  wars  of  1866  and 
1870-71,  in  which  the  strength  varies  from  250  to  1,000 
men  to  a mile.  As  a rule,  the  maximum  strength  of  an 
outpost  is  one-sixth  of  the  entire  force.  This  propor- 
tion should  not  be  exceeded,  except  in  case  of  absolute 
necessity,  and  it  should  be  less  whenever  a reduction  is 
consistent  with  prudence. 

Composition. — When  an  army  is  on  the  march  from 
day  to  day,  the  advance  guard  constitutes  the  outpost  at 
each  halt  ; but  if  its  duties  during  the  day’s  march  have 
been  arduous,  it  must  be  relieved,  as  soon  as  practicable, 
by  fresh  troops.  If  outposts  are  required  on  the  flanks 
and  rear,  they  will  be  composed  of  the  flank  and  rear 
guards,  when  such  guards  exist  in  sufficient  strength; 


OUTPOSTS. 


47 


otherwise  such  outposts  are  taken  from  the  main  body, 
which  will  also  furnish  them  when  the  duties  of  the 
flank  and  rear  guards  during  the  day  have  been  es- 
pecially trying.  In  the  disposition  of  an  outpost  the 
different  tactical  units  should  as  far  as  practicable  be  kept 
intact.  Thus,  supposing  the  outpost  of  a division  to 
consist  of  a regiment  of  infantry,  the  reserve  might  be 
composed  of  the  first  battalion ; the  supports,  of  two  com- 
panies of  the  second  battalion  and  two  of  the  third,  each 
supporting  the  remaining  companies  of  its  own  battal- 
ion, which  would  constitute  the  pickets  and  sentinels. 
(See  Plate  VI.)  Similarly  the  outpost  of  a cavalry 
brigade  (three  regiments)  might  consist  of  a squadron 
arranged  as  shown  in  Plate  VII. 

Each  division  will  generally  furnish  the  outpost  for 
its  own  front.  In  a large  force  especially  this  princi- 
ple may  be  advantageously  applied  to  brigades.  In  this 
case  the  outpost  of  the  division  might  consist  of  a bat- 
talion (four  companies)  from  each  of  the  three  brigades. 
The  brigade  outpost  would  then  have  two  companies  in 
reserve,  one  in  the  support,  and  the  other  furnishing 
the  pickets  and  sentinels.  As  alternative  formations, 
one  company  might  furnish  the  reserve;  two,  the  sup- 
ports; and  one,  the  pickets  and  sentinels:  or  the  reserve 
and  support  might  each  consist  of  one  company,  the 
pickets  and  sentinels  consisting  of  the  other  two.  The 
outpost  of  each  brigade  would  be  under  the  command 
of  the  officer  commanding  the  battalion  composing  it, 
and  would  constitute  a section  of  the  general  outpost. 
An  officer  should  be  detailed  to  command  the  entire 
outpost. 


48 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


If  two  brigades  encamp  in  the  first  line,  with  the  third 
in  reserve,  the  outpost  for  the  division  is  taken  from  the 
first  two.  If  outposts  for  the  flank  and  rear  should  be 
necessary,  they  should  be  taken  from  the  reserve  brigade. 

All  the  baggage  of  the  troops  on  outpost  duty  re- 
mains in  rear  with  the  main  body,  the  only  vehicles 
brought  up  being  those  containing  intrenching  tools 
and  a part  of  the  reserve  ammunition. 

An  outpost  may  consist  of  infantry,  of  cavalry,  or 
both,  or  of  all  three  arms.  The  proportion  of  the 
different  arms  depends  upon  circumstances.  In  an 
open  country,  in  daytime,  the  duty  can  be  best  per- 
formed by  cavalry.  In  a close  country,  at  night,  and 
when  the  enemy  is  near,  infantry  is  preferable.  The 
best  performance  of  outpost  duty  requires  a combina- 
tion of  the  two  arms.  Cavalry  is  of  the  greatest  value 
when  pushed  well  to  the  front  as  a screen,  but  it  may 
often  be  advantageously  combined  with  infantry  in  the 
outpost  proper.  It  may  thus  occupy  look-out  stations 
too  distant  to  be  held  by  infantry,  or  to  patrol  to  a dis- 
tance beyond  the  outpost  that  would  be  impracticable 
for  the  latter  arm.  When  a considerable  portion  of  the 
outpost  line  is  in  wooded  or  enclosed  country  and  the 
space  adjoining  it  is  open,  the  former  portion  may  be 
held  by  infantry  and  the  latter  by  cavalry.  As  a rule, 
however,  when  it  is  impracticable  to  use  the  cavalry  as 
an  advanced  screen,  its  use  with  the  outposts  should  be 
limited  to  patrolling  and  to  furnishing  orderlies,  when 
necessaryq  to  the  pickets,  supports,  and  reserve.  The 
experiment  was  made  at  Metz  of  employing  cavalry  on 
picket  duty,  but  it  was  soon  given  up,  and  the  use  of 


FA  3JYH 


OUTPOSTS. 


49 


cavalry  with  the  outposts  confined  to  attaching  mounted 
orderlies  to  the  infantry  pickets.  True,  the  German 
cavalry  was  not  as  well  suited  as  American  cavalry  to 
this  duty;  but  it  may  safely  be  laid  down  as  a general 
rule  that  cavalry  ought  never  to  be  used  on  any  duty 
that  can  be  performed  as  well,  or  better,  by  infantry. 

Commanders  inexperienced  in  the  service  of  cavalry 
are  too  apt  to  impose  this  duty  on  the  cavalry  as  a mat- 
ter of  convenience.  The  superb  cavalry  force  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  badly  treated  in  this  respect. 
In  describing  the  condition  of  the  cavalry  corps  when 
he  assumed  command  of  it,  General  Sheridan  says  : 
‘ ‘ The  horses  were  thin  and  very  much  worn  down  by 
excessive  and,  it  seemed  to  me,  unnecessary  picket  duty; 
for  the  cavalry  picket  line  almost  completely  encircled 
the  infantry  and  artillery  camps  of  the  army,  covering 
a distance,  on  a continuous  line,  of  nearly  sixty  miles, 
with  hardly  a mounted  Confederate  confronting  it  at 
any  point.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  the 
enemy  had  shown  more  wisdom  respecting  his  cavalry 
than  we.”* 

Cavalry  is  an  expensive  arm  ; its  efficiency  is  more 
easily  impaired  than  that  of  infantry;  and  its  peculiar 
uses  are  of  such  vital  importance  to  an  army  that  its 
strength  should  not  be  needlessly  frittered  away.f 

Artillery  is  of  great  value  to  an  outpost  when  it  can 
be  so  posted  as  to  command  an  important  road  or  defile, 

♦Personal  Memoirs  of  P.  H.  Sheridan,  Vol.  I,  p.  355. 

|It  would  be  well  to  furnish  each  regiment  of  infantry  with  a suf- 
ficient number  of  horses  to  provide  for  mounted  orderlies  with  the 
outpost  and  the  mounting  of  the  commanders  of  the  advance  guard 
and  vanguard. 

4 — w 


50 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


and  be  at  the  same  time  beyond  the  effective  range  of 
the  enemy’s  rifle  fire.  It  may  aid  materially,  with 
shrapnel  fire,  in  supporting  the  advanced  portions  of 
the  outpost  and  in  covering  their  retreat.  It  should  be 
in  constant  readiness  to  move  from  one  point  to  another, 
the  horses  being  kept  harnessed,  and  only  a portion  fed 
or  watered  at  a time.  Only  the  limbers  should  be  with 
the  battery,  the  caissons  and  other  carriages  being  at  the 
rear.  All  cover  afforded  by  the  ground  should  be  util- 
ized for  the  concealment  of  the  guns  from  the  enemy; 
and  the  pieces  should  not  be  exposed,  except  when  some 
definite  object  is  to  be  gained.  As  a rule,  they  should 
not  take  position  within  artillery  range  of  ground  on 
which  the  enemy’s  batteries  could  take  post  unper- 
ceived ; should  it  be  necessary  to  do  so,  they  must  be 
carefully  concealed  and  their  prompt  withdrawal  pro- 
vided for.  The  artillery,  when  not  posted  to  command 
bridges  or  roads,  should  be  with  the  reserve,  preferably 
near  a road.  Machine  guns  may  be  used  with  the  out- 
post to  command  approaches  with  long-range  fire.  Horse 
artillery  is  best  suited  to  the  requirements  of  outpost 
duty. 

Distance  of  Outposts  from  Alain  Body. — The  outpost 
must  be  far  enough  from  the  main  body  to  give  the  lat- 
ter time  to  form  for  action  before  the  outlying  troops 
are  driven  in.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  not  be  so  far 
distant  as  to  be  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  the  enemy. 
The  distance  will  also  depend  upon  the  strength  that 
can  be  spared  for  the  outpost  line,  the  length  of  the  line 
increasing  almost  in  direct  proportion  with  the  distance. 
When  the  country  is  open,  the  distance  will  generally  be 


THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  OUTPOST.  5 1 

greater  than  in  an  enclosed  country  which  offers  good 
positions  for  defense.  When  the  main  body  is  under 
the  enemy’s  artillery  fire,  it  can  not  form  for  action  in  the 
security  which  it  needs ; but  if  the  line  of  resistance  is 
at  a distance  from  the  camp  or  bivouac  equal  to  the 
limit  of  the  effective  range  of  artillery,  the  outpost  must 
be  driven  from  that  line  before  the  main  body  can  he 
subjected  to  the  fire  of  the  hostile  guns.  The  supports 
(occupying  the  line  of  resistance)  should,  therefore,  be 
at  a distance  of  about  3,000  yards  from  the  main  body. 
This  fixes  the  line  of  supports,  at  proper  distances  from 
which  the  other  parts  of  the  outpost  are  established. 
The  maximum  distance  from  an  infantry  outpost  to  the 
body  which  it  covers  is  about  three  miles,  supposing 
the  outpost  to  be  of  considerable  strength  and  strongly 
posted. 


THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  OUTPOST. 

The  officer  detailed  to  command  the  outpost  makes 
his  headquarters  with  the  reserve,  and  establishes  there 
liis  field  telegraph  or  signal  station.  If  the  front  of  the 
outpost  is  considerable,  it  is  divided  into  sections  of  about 
a mile  or  a mile  and  a half  for  infantry  and  three  miles 
for  cavalry,  and  an  officer  assigned  to  the  command  of 
each  section.  Each  section  commander  makes  his  head- 
quarters with  one  of  his  supports,  and  is  under  the  orders 
of  the  commander  of  the  outpost.  When  each  brigade 
guards  its  own  front,  the  sections  of  the  outpost  coincide 
with  the  brigade  fronts. 


52 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


The  outpost  commander  receives  from  the  commander 
of  the  forces  instructions  as  to  the  general  front  to  be 
occupied  by  the  outposts,  their  object,  and  the  amount 
of  resistance  they  are  expected  to  make.  He  is  also 
informed  about  the  avenues  of  approach  from  the  direc- 
tion of  the  opposing  force,  and  is  made  acquainted  with 
everything  known  in  regard  to  the  position  and  proba- 
ble intentions  of  the  enemy.  He  then  determines  the 
strength  of  the  reserve,  supports,  and  pickets ; decides 
upon  the  distance  of  the  line  of  resistance  from  the  main 
body,  and  selects  a line  of  observation  farther  in  advance. 
A good  topographical  map  of  the  position  selected  for  the 
camp  and  the  surrounding  country  would  enable  him  to 
choose  these  positions  at  once.  In  the  absence  of  such 
a map  they  must  be  determined  by  reconnaissance,  and 
in  any  case  the  ground  must  be  carefully  examined  before 
the  detachments  move  out.  The  station  of  the  reserve 
is  next  fixed,  the  positions  of  the  supports  pointed  out, 
places  for  the  pickets  approximately  designated,  and  the 
general  line  of  the  sentinels  roughlyr  indicated. 

The  outpost  commander  then  gives  instructions  to  his 
subordinates  as  to : 

1.  The  general  front  of  the  outpost  line. 

2.  The  ground  to  be  occupied  by  each. 

3.  The  positions  of  neighboring  supports  and  pickets. 

4.  The  night  positions  of  the  pickets  and  supports. 

5.  What  is  known  of  the  enemy  and  his  probable 
movements. 

6.  The  approaches  by'  which  the  enemyr  might 
advance. 

7.  The  direction  and  method  of  patrolling. 


THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  OUTPOST. 


53 


8.  What  is  to  be  done  in  case  of  attack. 

9.  How  flags  of  truce  and  deserters  are  to  be  received. 

10.  The  kind  of  reports  required. 

11.  Where  he  himself  is  to  be  found. 

12.  The  countersign  and  parole. 

When  the  outpost  has  been  posted,  its  commander 
makes  his  inspection ; orders  such  changes  in  the  posi- 
tions of  supports,  pickets,,  or  sentinels  as  may  seem 
advisable  ; sees  that  the  roads  and  paths  leading  from 
the  enemy  are  properly  guarded  ; gives  directions  for 
the  fortification  of  such  parts  of  the  position  as  need 
strengthening;  and  is  especially  careful  that  the  flanks 
are  secured  by  resting  them  on  impassable  obstacles,  or 
by  refusing  them  and  protecting  them  by  detachments. 
As  a rule,  the  outpost  should  strengthen  its  position 
by  intrenching.  A continuous  line  of  intrenchments  is 
out  of  the  question,  as  it  would  require  too  much  labor 
to  make  it  and  too  many  men  to  hold  it ; but  each 
picket  and,  above  all,  each  support,  should  intrench 
when  practicable.  Whether  the  reserve  should  intrench 
or  not  will  depend  on  circumstances.  If  the  outpost  re- 
mains in  the  position  for  some  time,  the  sentinels  should 
shelter  themselves  in  pits  about  two  and  a half  feet  in 
depth,  the  earth  being  thrown  up  toward  the  enemy  and 
covered  with  sod  or  twigs,  in  order  that  it  may  not  attract 
attention. 

The  outpost  commander  sends  to  the  commander  of 
the  main  body  all  information  received,  first  testing  its 
accuracy  as  far  as  practicable. 


54 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


SENTINELS  AND  VEDETTES. 

Sentinels  must  be  so  posted  as  to  have  a good  view  to 
the  front  and  flanks,  and  be  concealed  as  much  as  pos- 
sible. They  do  not  walk  their  posts,  but  remain  station- 
ary, being  generally  posted  double,  so  that  one  man  may 
go  to  examine  any  suspicious  point  while  the  other 
remains  on  post.  They  may  also  be  posted  in  groups. 
In  the  former  case  the.  reliefs  not  on  post  remain  with 
the  picket ; in  the  latter  case  the  group  accompanies  the 
sentinel  to  his  post  and  remains  in  concealment  a short 
distance  behind  him.  When  the  group  system  is  used,  a 
single  sentinel  for  each  will  suffice  by  day,  but  double 
sentinels  should  be  used  at  night.  As  the  group  fur- 
nishes the  reliefs,  it  should  consist  of  three  or  six  men, 
and  every  two  or  three  groups  should  be  under  charge 
of  a non-commissioned  officer. 

There  should  be  easy  communication  with  neighbor- 
ing sentinels  and  with  the  picket,  and  a clear  view  of  all 
approaches;  and  the  post  (especially  at  night)  should  not, 
if  it  can  be  avoided,  be  so  situated  that  the  noise  of  fall- 
ing water  or  the  soughing  of  the  wind  through  the  trees 
would  deaden  the  noise  of  approaching  footsteps.  Sen- 
tinels are  generally  not  less  than  ioo  nor  more  than  400 
yards  apart — the  lesser  limit  being  usually  the  minimum 
for  single  sentinels,  and  the  greater  limit,  the  maximum 
for  double  ones.  Vedettes  may  be  as  far  as  600  yards 
apart.  But  no  definite  rule  can  be  laid  down  in  this 
matter,  except  that  the  number  of  posts  should  be  suffi- 
cient to  insure  a vigilant  watch  on  all  points  at  which 


sentinels  and  vedettes.  55 

the  enemy  might  approach.  The  posts  furnished  by 
each  picket  are  numbered  from  right  to  left. 

Sentinels  should  watch  and  listen  without  betraying 
their  own  presence  ; but  observation  is  the  first  consid- 
eration, and  concealment  is  of  secondary  importance. 
A sentinel  must  expose  himself  to  see,  rather  than  limit 
his  observation  for  the  purpose  of  remaining  concealed. 

Sentinels  must  not  smoke,  and  such  conversation  as 
may  be  necessary  between  them  must  be  conducted  in 
a whisper.  The  sentinel  must  not  have  about  him  any 
glittering  accouterments  ; and,  except  in  foggy  weather 
or  on  a dark  night,  must  keep  his  bayonet  in  its  scabbard. 

Each  sentinel  should  clearly  understand  the  follow- 
ing : 

1.  The  countersign. 

2.  The  number  of  his  own  post. 

3.  The  number  and  position  of  his  own  picket  and 
the  name  of  its  commander. 

4.  The  position  of  the  neighboring  sentinels  and  of 
the  examining  post,  when  there  is  one. 

5.  The  direction  of  the  enemy  and  the  probable  line 
of  his  advance. 

6.  The  points  to  which  all  roads,  paths,  and  railroads 
in  sight  lead. 

7.  The  names  of  all  villages  and  rivers  in  view. 

8.  The  signals  by  which  he  should  communicate 
with  the  pickets  or  detached  posts. 

The  mistake  of  giving  sentinels  too  many  instructions 
and  orders  should  be  avoided.  If  his  mind  is  bur- 
dened with  many  details,  the  sentinel  is  likely  to  become 
hesitating,  timid,  and  confused.  The  principal  thing  is 


56  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

that  he  should  know  where  to  look  for  the  enemy  and 
what  to  do  if  he  sees  him. 

Only  persons  in  the  performance  of  duty  with  the 
outpost,  or  having  authority  over  it,  are  allowed  to  cross 
the  line  of  sentinels.  All  other  people,  with  the  excep- 
tions below,  are  halted,  not  more  than  one  being  ad- 
vanced at  a time,  and  then  conducted  to  the  examining 
post.  If  there  is  no  examining  post,  they  are  conducted 
by  one  of  the  sentinels  back  to  the  picket,  or  detained 
until  the  arrival  of  the  visiting  patrol.  If  they  refuse 
to  halt,  or  attempt  to  escape,  they  must  be  shot  down. 

Deserters  from  the  enemy  are  halted  at  some  distance 
from  the  post,  and  required  to  lay  down  their  arms. 
The  commander  of  the  picket  is  at  once  notified,  and 
he  sends  out  a patrol  to  bring  them  in.  If  the  deserters 
are  pursued  by  the  enemy,  they  are  ordered  to  throw 
down  their  arms,  the  picket  being  at  the  same  time 
alarmed.  If  they  refuse  to  obey  the  order,  the  picket 
opens  fire  on  them  as  a necessary  precaution  against  a 
possible  ruse  on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  As  a rule,  in- 
habitants and  deserters  are  not  allowed  to  cross  the  line 
of  sentinels  at  night.  An  exception  to  this  rule,  in  the 
case  of  deserters,  is  when  the  demoralization  of  the 
enemy  is  known  to  be  such  that  wholesale  desertions 
are  to  be  expected.  Under  any  circumstances  too  much 
care  can  not  be  exercised  in  receiving  deserters.  In  the 
spring  of  1865  there  were  many  desertions  from  Lee’s 
army,  and  the  Federal  sentinels  in  front  of  Petersburg 
had  fallen  into  the  habit  of  allowing  the  deserters  to 
bring  their  arms  in  with  them.  Taking  advantage  of 
this  carelessness,  the  Confederates,  on  the  morning  of 


SENTINELS  AND  VEDETTES. 


57 


the  25th  of  March,  quietly  gained  possession  of  several 
picket  posts  by  means  of  sham  deserters,  and  immedi- 
ately thrusting  in  a storming  party  overwhelmed  the 
trench  guard,  broke  the  main  line  between  batteries  9 
and  10,  turned  to  the  right  and  left,  captured  battery 
10,  and  overpowered  the  garrison  of  Fort  Stedman. 

When  a flag  of  truce  approaches,  the  bearer  is  halted 
in  front  of  the  line  of  sentinels,  and  word  is  at  once  sent 
back  to  the  commander  of  the  picket.  While  the  bearer 
is  halted,  the  sentinel  must  not  converse  with  him  nor 
allow  him  to  reconnoiter. 

The  vigilance  of  the  sentinel  in  watching  the  enemy 
must  not  be  disturbed  by  any  requirements  of  military 
etiquette.  He  pays  no  compliments,  and  takes  no  notice 
of  any  of  his  officers  who  come  upon  his  post,  unless 
addressed  by  them. 

Everything  observed  by  the  sentinel  in  regard  to  the 
enemy  should  be  communicated  at  once  to  the  picket, 
especial  care  being  taken  to  report  promptly  all  indica- 
tions of  the  enemy’s  approach.  If  the  sentinel  is  sat- 
isfied that  the  enemy  is  advancing  to  attack,  he  gives  the 
alarm  by  firing  ; but  when  immediate  alarm  is  not  neces- 
sary, firing  should  be  avoided  ; it  disturbs  the  repose  of 
the  troops,  and  if  groundless  alarms  are  frequently  given, 
the  troops  grow  careless  and  fail  to  heed  the  warning 
when  real  danger  comes.  The  so-called  ‘ ‘ picket  firing,  ’ ’ 
so  common  in  the  early  days  of  the  War  of  Secession, 
deserves  even  more  serious  condemnation  than  it  has 
generally  received.  It  seems  to  have  been  the  custom  of 
the  sentinels  to  fire  whenever  a sentinel  of  the  opposing 
force  was  seen.  This  slaughter  of  sentinels  doubtless 


58 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


added  considerably  to  the  aggregate  loss  of  life,  but  it 
probably  never  benefited  either  army,  while  certainly 
acting  to  the  detriment  of  each.  The  sentinel,  by  fir- 
ing, often  needlessly  alarmed  his  own  outpost,  and  gave 
a certain  amount  of  information  to  the  enemy  by  betray- 
ing his  own  position  ; while  by  remaining  hidden  and 
watching  carefully  he  might  have  been  able  to  give  a 
valuable  report  of  the  disposition  of  the  opposing  out- 
post. As  the  armies  grew  in  their  knowledge  of  “ the 
trade  of  war,  ’ ’ this  pernicious  custom  disappeared  ; quite 
as  much,  it  seems,  from  the  good  sense  of  the  soldiers 
themselves  as  from  orders  from  higher  authority.  * 

It  is  advisable  to  keep  the  same  men  on  the  same 
posts  instead  of  changing  them  to  new  ones  each  time 
they  are  posted.  For  very  important  posts  the  most  in- 
telligent men  should  be  selected.  The  sentinels  should 
be  relieved  every  two  hours  during  the  day  and  every 
hour  during  the  night.  In  very  inclement  weather  they 
should  be  relieved  every  hour  during  the  day. 

The  foregoing  principles  are  applicable  to  vedettes  as 
well  as  sentinels.  Vedettes,  like  sentinels,  are  posted  in 
pairs,  and  for  similar  reasons.  One  is  habitually  six  or 
eight  yards  to  the  right  or  left  rear  of  the  other  ; a 
greater  distance  would  make  the  horses  uneasy,  and  thus 
distract  the  attention  of  the  riders,  while  a less  distance 
would  encourage  conversation  between  the  vedettes. 
When  cavalry  is  operating  in  a close  or  wooded  coun- 

* Sentinel  firing  might  be  employed  for  the  purpose  of  annoying 
the  enemy  when  it  is  practicable  for  a sentinel  to  play  the  part  of  a 
harassing  patrol  (see  next  chapter),  but  such  exceptional  cases  serve 
only  to  mark  the  general  rule. 


SENTINELS  AND  VEDETTES. 


59 


try,  the  vedettes  may  dismount,  one  holding  the  horses 
while  the  other  keeps  watch.  Whenever  the  vedette 
can  perform  his  duty  dismounted,  he  should  do  so  as  a 
means  of  sparing  his  horse.  The  horse  may  sometimes 
he  held,  with  the  lariat,  behind  the  brow  of  a hill,  while 
the  vedette,  lying  down,  peers  over  the  crest.  In  any 
case,  the  mode  of  action  must  be  determined  by  the  two 
considerations  of  observation  and  concealment,  it  being 
always  remembered  that  it  is  more  important  to  see  than 
to  avoid  being  seen. 

Connecting  Sentinels. — When  the  sentinel  post  is  not 
in  plain  view  of  the  picket,  a connecting  sentinel  is 
posted  at  a point  where  he  can  see  the  post  and  be  seen 
by  the  picket.  It  is  his  duty  to  transmit  signals  from 
one  to  the  other.  Connecting  sentinels  are  always  sin- 
gle. A connecting  vedette  is  generally  mounted  by  day, 
and  always  at  night.  If  dismounted,  his  horse  is  with 
the  picket. 

The  Picket  Sentinel. — A single  sentinel  is  posted  at 
the  picket  to  keep  a look-out  on  the  sentinels  or  con- 
necting sentinels,  and  report  all  signals  made  by  them 
or  any  unusual  occurrence.  In  a cavalry  picket  the 
sentinel  is  dismounted. 

Examining  Posts. — It  is  recommended  by  many  mili- 
tary writers  that  no  persons,  except  in  the  performance 
of  duty  with  the  outpost,  be  allowed  to  pass  the  line  of 
sentinels  except  at  certain  designated  points  on  the 
main  roads,  where  examining  posts  are  established,  each 
consisting  of  an  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  and 
six  men— -three  reliefs  for  one  double-sentinel  post.  On 
the  approach  of  any  person  to  the  examining  post,  one 


6o 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


of  the  sentinels  advances  and  halts  him  at  some  distance 
from  the  line,  while  the  other  notifies  the  commander  of 
the  post,  who  examines  the  stranger,  and  either  allows 
him  to  pass  or  conducts  him  to  the  commander  of  the 
picket.  Any  person  approaching  the  line  of  sentinels  at 
any  other  than  a designated  point,  is  passed  along  from 
post  to  post  until  he  is  brought  to  the  examining  party; 
care  being  taken  that  he  is  not  given  an  opportunity  to 
observe  the  location  of  the  pickets  and  supports.  The 
bearer  of  a flag  of  truce,  or  a suspected  spy,  should  be 
blindfolded  before  being  conducted  to  the  examining 
post,  if  he  be  conducted  thither  instead  of  direct  to  the 
picket.  In  either  case,  he  will  be  sent  (blindfolded), 
without  delay,  to  the  commander  of  the  outpost. 

Examining  posts  do  not  seem  to  have  been  used  at  any 
time  in  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  Though  they 
are  in  use  in  the  German,  Austrian,  and  Dutch  armies, 
and  have  the  sanction  of  such  authorities  as  Von  Wal- 
dersee,  Van  Mulken,  and  Shaw,  their  use  is  doubtful. 
On  this  subject  Von  Arnirn  says  : 

‘ ‘ I have  never  been  able  to  convince  myself  of  the 
advisability  of  the  order  which  requires  all  unknown 
persons  to  be  directed  to  the  examining  post.  Suspected 
persons  and  spies  can  in  such  a manner  see  all  they  wish, 
and  then  suddenly  run  away.  It  is,  moreover,  difficult 
on  service  to  act  up  to  this.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
often  necessary,  as  in  peace  time,  to  let  country  people 
pass  the  line  of  outposts  in  order  to  cany'  on  their  daily 
work.  Such  humane  considerations  open  a wide  door 
to  espionage,  which  must  be  especially  avoided  if  it  be 
wished  to  maintain  a complete  investment.  If  the 
country  people  only  notice  that  they  are  invariably 


SENTINELS  AND  VEDETTES. 


6l 


taken  to  the  outposts,  they  will  not  be  in  a hurry  to  let 
themselves  be  seen  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  same.  ’ ’ 

If  the  sentinels  are  intelligent  and  well  instructed, 
and  the  non-commissioned  officers  on  duty  with  the  out- 
post understand  their  business,  examining  posts  are 
generally  unnecessary.  In  the  close  investment  of  a 
place,  or  when  preparations  are  being  made  for  the 
secret  execution  of  an  important  movement,  orders  will 
probably  be  given  to  allow  no  persons  to  pass  the  chain 
of  sentinels  without  the  most  rigid  scrutiny  ; and  in  such 
cases  examining  posts  may  be  of  use,  if  care  is  exercised 
to  see  that  the  people  conducted  to  them  do  not  thus 
gain  an  opportunity  of  spying  out  the  dispositions  of 
the  outposts. 

Detached  Posts.  — Small  parties  are  often  detached 
from  a picket  to  protect  exposed  points  or  support  iso- 
lated sentinels.  These  detached  posts  consist  generally 
of  from  three  to  twelve  men,  and  are  under  an  officer  or 
non-commissioned  officer,  according  to  their  strength 
and  the  importance  of  their  position.  They  are,  in 
fact,  small  pickets,  and  must  act  in  concert  with  the 
pickets  from  which  they  are  taken. 

A bridge  on  a flank  might  be  held  by  a detached  post. 
An  isolated  hill,  affording  a good  outlook,  too  far  to  the 
front  to  be  included  in  the  general  line,  but  near  enough 
to  be  occupied  without  extreme  risk,  should  be  held  by 
such  a post,  communicating  with  the  outpost  by  signal. 
If  there  is  reason  to  expect  the  enemy  to  attempt  to  oc- 
cupy the  hill,  a support  may  be  pushed  forward  to  assist 
in  holding  it  against  an  isolated  attack,  but  not  against 
a general  advance. 


62 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


If  practicable,  detached  posts  should  be  relieved  every 
six  hours.  They  are  not  allowed  to  light  fires,  and  the 
men  are  required  to  keep  on  their  equipments  and  have 
their  arms  constantly  at  hand.  In  a detached  post  com- 
posed of  cavalry  the  horses  are  kept  constantly  saddled 
and  bridled  and  held  by  horse-holders,  three-fourths  of 
the  men  being  ready  to  fight  on  foot.  The  sentinels  or 
dismounted  vedettes  are  posted  close  in  front  of  the 
party.  Vedettes  may  be  pushed  farther  forward. 

PICKETS. 

An  infantry  picket  generally  consists  of  from  25  to 
50  men,  and  a cavalry  picket  usually  varies  between  20 
and  30.  A picket  furnishes  from  two  to  four  double 
sentinels  or  vedettes,  there  being  three  reliefs  for  each 
post.  If  detached  posts  are  to  be  sent  out  from  the 
picket,  corresponding  additional  strength  must  be  given 
it,  and  an  allowance  must  be  made  for  patrolling.  The 
requirements  for  patrolling  vary  so  much  that  the  pro- 
portion of  the  picket  to  be  used  for  that  purpose  can  not 
be  fixed.  Generally,  about  a third  of  the  picket  should 
be  used  in  patrolling.  In  a close  country,  the  patrols, 
rather  than  the  sentinels,  should  be  increased  ; and  at 
night  the  patrols  are  the  principal  reliance  for  observa- 
tion. There  should  be  enough  men  for  three  patrols,  so  as 
to  admit  of  one  patrol  being  out,  one  ready  to  go  out,  and 
one  resting.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  a cavalry 
picket.  The  strength  of  the  picket  will  thus  vary;  but 
its  minimum  strength  must  allow  six  men  for  every 
double-sentinel  post,  three  for  each  connecting  sentinel, 


PICKETS. 


63 


three  for  the  picket  sentinel,  and  at  least  three  non- 
commissioned officers.  These  are  the  barest  require-  • 
ments,  without  considering-  patrols.  The  picket  com- 
mander should  always,  if  possible,  be  a commissioned 
officer. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  distance  between 
sentinels  will  vary  from  100  to  400  yards,  the  smaller 
limit  being-  in  the  case  of  single  sentinels,  four  of  whom 
could  easily  be  supplied  by  a small  picket.  The  mini- 
mum front  covered  by  the  sentinels  of  a single  picket 
may,  therefore,  be  placed  at  400  yards.  The  maximum 
front,  even  when  the  picket  furnishes  four  double  senti- 
nels, may  be  placed  at  800  yards  : for,  as  we  have  already 
seen  that  the  distance  from  the  sentinels  to  the  picket 
may  be  as  great  as  400  yards,  it  is  evident  that  with  a 
front  of  800  yards  the  commander  of  the  picket  or  the 
reliefs,  in  visiting  or  relieving  the  sentinels,  would  have 
to  go  about  a mile.  The  front  covered  by  the  vedettes 
of  a cavalry  picket  varies  from  1,000  to  2,000  yards. 
Infantry  pickets  are  generally  from  600  to  800  yards 
apart,  and  cavalry  pickets  from  1,000  to  1,500  yards. 
All  these  distances  vary  with  different  circumstances  of 
ground  and  weather  : the  distances  given  above  have 
been  found  by  experience  to  answer  in  many  cases,  but 
they  must  often  be  materially  changed. 

As  a rule,  the  line  of  observation  should  be  made  the 
first  consideration  in  selecting  the  ground  for  the  out- 
post; the  position  of  the  sentinels  regulating  that  of 
the  pickets,  and  not  the  reverse.  The  following  points 
should  be  considered  in  posting  a picket: 


64 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


1.  It  should  be  near  enough  to  the  sentinels  to  give 
them  prompt  support,  but  not  so  close  as  to  be  involved 
in  their  disaster  if  they  should  be  surprised  and  suddenly 
driven  in ; 

2.  It  should  be  posted  on,  and  command,  some  route 
leading  from  the  enemy  ; the  largest  pickets  on  the 
most  important  routes  ; 

3.  It  should  be  in  a good  defensive  position,  should 
have  a good  field  of  fire  to  the  front,  and  should  be  so 
far  concealed  that  the  enemy  could  not  discover  it  with- 
out attacking  ; 

4.  It  should,  as  far  as  consistent  with  the  foregoing 
requirements,  be  in  rear  of  the  center  of  its  line  of 
sentinels  ; 

5.  It  should  have  free  approaches  to  its  sentinels, 
neighboring  pickets,  supports,  and  reserves,  and  should 
have  a good  line  of  retreat; 

6.  It  should  be  close  enough  to  the  neighboring 
pickets  for  mutual  support,  and  a mutual  flanking  fire 
should  be  provided  for. 

A position  fulfilling  all  these  requirements  can 
scarcely  be  hoped  for  ; the  best  position  will  be  the  one 
which  fulfills  the  greatest  part  of  them. 

If  the  picket  is  posted  in  a defile,  its  front  should  be 
covered  with  obstacles,  in  order  that  it  may  not  be  over, 
powered  by  a sudden  rush  of  the  enemy. 

A picket  should  not  be  posted  in  a house  nor  in  an 
enclosure.  An  exception  to  this  rule  is  found  in  the 
case  of  a besieging  force,  whose  front  is  covered  with 
formidable  obstacles.  Thus,  at  the  siege  of  Paris,  the 
German  pickets  were  frequently  sheltered  in  houses  or 


PICKETS. 


65 


in  underground  posts,  security  from  surprise  being 
afforded  by  constant  patrolling  well  to  the  front,  and  by 
formidable  abatis  in  front  of  the  line  of  sentinels. 

Any  junction  of  roads  leading  from  the  enemy’s  posi- 
tion should  be  in  front  of  the  picket,  and  roads  passing 
the  flank  should  be  carefully  guarded. 

When  an  impassable  obstacle,  such  as  a swamp,  lake, 
or  stream,  lies  along  a portion  of  the  front  of  the  outposts, 
the  strength  at  that  part  of  the  line  may  be  limited  to 
the  requirements  of  observation,  the  sentinels  being  few, 
and  the  chief  reliance  being  placed  upon  patrolling. 

Other  considerations  affecting  the  position  of  the 
picket  have  already  been  noticed  in  connection  with  the 
general  subject  of  the  position  of  the  outpost. 

Fires  should  not  be  lighted  by  a picket  unless  they 
can  be  well  concealed  from  the  enemy.  If  a fire  is 
allowed  at  night,  the  rallying  point  should  be  some 
distance  in  its  rear.  “Nine  times  out  of  ten,”  says 
Riistow,  ‘ ‘ the  enemy  will  march  upon  the  fires,  and 
the  picket,  which  will  distinguish  him  perfectly  while 
it  remains  in  the  darkness,  will  then  attack  him  with 
advantage.  ’ ’ 

The  men  composing  the  picket  stack  arms  and  may 
remove  their  equipments,  with  the  exception  of  the 
cartridge  belt.  They  must  not  leave  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  picket,  and  must  be  ready  to  fall  in  at  a 
moment’s  notice.  Part  of  the  men  must  be  constantly 
under  arms  at  night,  and  separated  from  the  rest,  who 
keep  their  arms  close  at  hand  while  sleeping.  If  dan- 
ger seems  imminent,  the  entire  picket  must  be  awake 
and  under  arms.  The  commander  of  the  picket  will 
5— w 


66 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


cause  it  to  stand  to  arms  at  once  if  a noise  is  heard  from 
a neighboring  picket ; and  if  that  picket  is  attacked,  he 
will  endeavor  to  relieve  it  by  an  attack  upon  the  enemy’s 
flank.  If  an  attack  is  not  evident,  but  the  noise  seems 
suspicious,  a patrol  must  be  sent  to  investigate. 

In  a cavalry  picket,  or  in  the  case  of  mounted  order- 
lies attached  to  an  infantry  picket,  the  horses  should  be 
kept  constantly  saddled,  and  the  bridles  should  be  taken 
off  only  for  feeding  and  watering.  Not  more  than  one- 
third,  or  at  most  one-half,  of  the  horses  should  be  fed 
at  a time.  When  there  is  no  water  close  to  the  picket, 
only  a few  horses  should  be  taken  to  the  water  at  a time, 
the  men  in  charge  of  them  being  under  arms  and  fully 
equipped.  Saddles  should  be  adjusted  once  every  twelve 
hours,  or  as  much  oftener  as  necessary,  under  direction 
of  an  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer. 

SUPPORTS. 

The  supports  constitute  a force  upon  which  the  pickets 
fall  back  if  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  or  with  which  (in 
exceptional  cases)  the  pickets  may  be  reinforced.  The 
ground  regulates  their  position,  as  they  should  occupy 
the  line  of  resistance.  The  position  selected  should 
afford  a good  general  line  of  defense,  ground  uniformly 
moderately  good  being  preferable  to  that  which  is  very 
strong  in  some  parts  and  weak  in  others.  The  supports 
should  not  be  too  far  away  from  the  pickets  to  render 
timely  aid,  nor  so  close  as  to  be  involved  in  their  defeat 
if  suddenly  driven  in.  They  should  be  located  as  cen- 
trally as  practicable  in  reference  to  the  pickets  in  their 


SUPPORTS. 


67 


front,  and  should  preferably  be  upon,  or  near,  the  main 
routes  by  which  the  enemy  might  advance.  A defile 
on  the  road  leading  from  the  enemy’s  position  to  the 
camp  is  generally  a good  position  for  a support.  Some- 
times the  best  line  of  resistance  lies  close  to  the  line  of 
observation,  or  even  coincides  with  it.  In  such  cases 
the  supports  may  be  close  to  the  pickets  or  merged  with 
them.  One  support  is  generally  sufficient  for  two  or 
three  pickets. 

The  commander  of  the  support  should  make  arrange- 
ments with  the  commanders  of  the  pickets  in  his  front 
for  concerted  action  in  case  of  attack,  and  should  main- 
tain communication  with  them,  with  the  neighboring 
supports,  and  with  the  reserve.  This  communication  is 
generally  kept  up  by  means  of  patrols. 

The  support  must  provide  for  its  own  immediate 
safety  by  sentinels  or  vedettes,  but  may  relax  to  some 
extent  the  watchfulness  exacted  from  the  pickets.  The 
men  stack  arms  and  are  allowed  to  remove  their  accou- 
terments (excepting  always  the  cartridge  belt),  but  they 
are  not  permitted  to  wander  away  from  the  post  of  the 
support,  and  must  be  ready  at  all  times  to  fall  in.  They 
are  usually  allowed  to  light  fires,  and  may  be  required 
to  do  the  cooking  for  the  pickets  as  well  as  for  them- 
selves. The  horses  with  the  support  are  kept  in  the 
same  degree  of  readiness  as  those  with  the  pickets.  No 
shouting  or  unnecessary  noise  of  any  kind  should  be 
permitted  in  any  part  of  the  outpost. 


68 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


COSSACK  POSTS. 

In  many  cases  it  will  be  expedient  to  replace  the  pick- 
ets and  sentinels  with  a line  of  Cossack  posts,  sent  out 
directly  from  the  supports.  Each  of  these  posts  consists 
of  four  men  ; namely,  three  reliefs  of  a single  sentinel, 
and  a non-commissioned  officer  or  old  soldier  for  the 
command  of  the  post.  Each  support  furnishes  from 
four  to  twelve  Cossack  posts,  which  are  placed  from  300 
to  400  yards  in  advance  of  it,  and  from  100  to  300  yards 
apart ; the  smaller  limits  of  distance  in  the  case  of  very 
close  and  rugged  ground,  and  the  latter  in  the  case  of 
very  open  ground.  The  sentinel  is  stationed  from  10  to 
30  yards  in  advance  of  the  post,  the  other  members  of 
which  remain  concealed  and  keep  him  constantly  in 
view.  The  sentinels  are  relieved  every  hour  and  the 
post  every  three  hours.  One  or  two  men  may  be  sent 
from  the  post,  from  time  to  time,  to  patrol  to  the  post  on 
either  side  ; but,  as  a rule,  all  the  patrolling  is  done 
from  the  support. 

It  would  seem  at  first  thought  that  a line  of  Cossack 
posts  must  lack  the  resisting  power  of  the  two  lines  of  sen- 
tinels and  pickets,  and  that  it  should,  therefore,  be  used 
only  when  the  ground  affords  strong  defensive  positions. 
It  is  not,  however,  without  many  positive  elements  of 
strength.  The  sentinels  are  more  likely  to  be  free  from 
the  timidity  of  loneliness,  and  to  be  more  resolute  in 
the  performance  of  their  duty,  when  they  are  closely 
backed  up  by  a friendly  post,  than  wffien  they  are  at  a 
considerable  distance  from  a picket.  Each  post  could 
be  intrenched,  and  should  be  so  stationed  as  to  be  able 


COSSACK  POSTS. 


69 


to  cross  its  fire  with  that  of  the  posts  on  its  right  and 
left.  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  posts  could 
thus  hold  their  own  long  enough  to  enable  the  supports 
to  prepare  fully  for  action.  In  consideration  of  these 
facts  and  the  still  more  important  one  that  the  system  of 
Cossack  posts  is  in  thorough  keeping  with  the  nature  of 
American  warfare,  its  adoption  in  almost  every  case  may 
be  safely  recommended.  * 

A comparison  of  the  diagrams  on  Plate  VIII  will  show 
the  economy  of  men  for  outpost  duty  effected  by  the  use 
of  Cossack  posts.  In  each  case  the  line  of  observation 
is  2,400  yards  in  length.  In  the  first  case  we  have  four 
pickets,  each  supplying  three  reliefs  for  two  double-sen- 
tinel posts  and  the  post  at  the  picket.  Add  three  reliefs 
of  (say)  four  connecting  sentinels  for  the  entire  line,  and 
we  have  72  men  ; but  one-third  of  the  picket  consists  of 
patrols,  which  makes  the  total  for  the  pickets  108  men. 
In  the  second  case  we  will  take  the  same  number  of 
connecting  sentinels  and  make  the  same  allowance  for 
patrols,  assigning  them,  however,  to  the  supports. 

* Notwithstanding  the  name,  Cossack  posts  are  of  American 
origin,  and  are  the  outgrowth  of  our  own  experience.  Gen.  Pierron 
(quoting  Baron  von  Valentini)  says:  “In  the  American  war  (1776- 
1783),  as  the  terrain  was  extremely  wooded  and  rough,  instead  of 
forming  the  first  line  of  a thin  chain  of  sentinels  separated  from  each 
other  (who  could  not  have  been  relieved  during  the  night,  as  the  relief 
would  have  lost  its  way  in  the  underbrush),  a cordon  of  small  groups 
was  employed,  in  which  one  man  watched  while  those  who  were  in 
turn  to  relieve  him  slept.  These  groups  were  placed  at  the  edge  of 
the  wood  and  on  the  roads.” — Methodes  de  Guerre , tome  III,  iere 
partie,  p.  52. 


70 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


We  have,  then,  the  following  : 


Fig.  i. 


Fig.  2. 


Pickets...  108  men. 
Supports,  108  “ 

Reserve..  108  “ 


Cossack  posts,  48  men. 

Supports 96  “ 

Reserve 96  “ 


Total. ...324 


Total 240 


Adding  non-commissioned  officers,  we  should  have  in 
the  first  case  about  360  men  for  the  strength  of  the  out- 
post, and  in  the  second  case  about  260.  In  round  num- 
bers, we  should  require  four  companies  (war  strength) 
in  the  first  case  and  three  in  second.  This  estimate 
may  be  regarded  as  a minimum  rather  than  a maximum. 


The  reserve  forms  the  general  support  and  pivot  of 
resistance  of  the  whole  outpost,  and  usually  consists  of 
all  three  arms.  It  should  be  concealed  from  the  enemy, 
and  should  be  posted  as  centrally  as  practicable,  so  as  to 
enable  it  to  move  quickly  to  any  endangered  point.  It 
may  sometimes  be  divided  into  two  parts,  to  facilitate 
supporting  the  more  advanced  bodies  ; and  it  should  be 
upon  their  principal  line  or  lines  of  retreat  to  the  main 
body.  Its  position  may  be  intrenched  and  strengthened 
with  obstacles  ; but,  as  a rule,  it  will  advance  to  rein- 
force the  supports  or  pickets,  and  the  intrenchments 
should  be  on  the  line  of  resistance. 

The  same  rules  obtain,  in  regard  to  the  men  and 
horses,  with  the  reserve  as  in  the  case  of  the  supports. 
The  reserve  is  allowed  to  light  fires  ; and  in  the  excep- 


THE  RESERVE. 


PJATF,  m 


THE  RESERVE — THE  OUTPOST  AT  NIGHT.  7 1 

tional  cases  where  fires  are  prohibited  to  the  more  ad- 
vanced parties,  it  must  do  the  cooking-  for  them. 

In  the  case  of  a small  force  which  can  prepare  quickly 
for  action,  or  when  the  main  body  bivouacs  in  order  of 
battle,  the  reserve  may  sometimes  be  dispensed  with. 
When  the  reserve  is  not  needed,  its  omission  greatly 
relieves  the  troops  from  the  pressure  of  outpost  duty  ; 
but  it  can  rarely  be  safely  omitted  from  the  composition 
of  the  outpost.  The  line  of  resistance  being  3,000  yards 
from  the  main  body,  it  is  evident  that,  unless  the  latter 
were  in  a state  of  instant  readiness,  the  supports  might 
be  overwhelmed  before  they  could  receive  assistance,  if 
there  were  no  reserve.  To  keep  the  main  body  in  such 
a state  of  readiness  would,  to  a great  extent,  defeat  the 
prime  object  of  the  outpost.  In  rare  cases,  where  the 
supports  occupy  a very  strong  defensive  position,  and 
the  main  body  can  be  held  close  at  hand  sheltered  from 
the  enemy’s  artillery  fire,  the  reserve  may  be  omitted. 

No  compliments  are  paid  by  the  outpost ; but  when  a 
reserve,  support,  or  picket  is  approached  by  a general 
officer,  the  commander  of  the  outpost,  or  an  armed  party, 
the  men  fall  in  in  rear  of  the  stacks,  ready  to  take  arms. 

THE  OUTPOST  AT  NIGHT. 

The  foregoing  description  of  the  outpost  duties  relates 
principally  to  the  cordon  system.  If  this  system  were 
retained  at  night,  it  would  be  necessary  either  to  increase 
the  number  of  sentinels  greatly,  thus  adding  to  the  bur- 
den of  outpost  duty,  or  else  to  draw  in  the  outpost  line 
closer  to  the  main  body,  thus  contracting  the  front.  The 


72 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


greatest  objection  to  the  latter  alternative  is,  that  valu- 
able ground  would  thus  be  abandoned,  which,  if  the 
enemy  were  enterprising,  might  be  regained  only  at  the 
cost  of  an  engagement.  If  it  can  be  avoided,  the  out- 
post line  must  never  be  drawn  in  at  night  ; but  should 
such  a measure  become  necessary,  the  position  should 
be  resumed  again  at  early  dawn,  and  the  outpost  should 
occupy  it  with  as  much  caution  and  vigilance  as  when 
it  was  first  taken  up. 

The  outpost  system  of  Marshal  Bugeaud  is  generally 
adopted  in  its  essential  features  for  night.  This  is  based 
on  the  idea  that  in  making  a night  attack,  in  any  but 
an  exceptionally  open  country,  the  enemy’s  movements 
must  necessarily  be  confined  to  roads  and  clearly-defined 
paths.  In  a close  country  movements  off  the  roads  can 
not,  in  fact,  be  made  by  any  force  larger  than  a patrol  ; 
while,  in  an  open  country7,  roads  and  paths  must  be  fol- 
lowed for  guidance,  unless  the  ground  is  thoroughly 
known  and  there  is  a bright  moon.  The  uncertainty  of 
effecting  the  necessary  combinations  at  night,  and  the 
danger  of  columns  losing  their  way  and  not  arriving  at 
appointed  destinations  at  the  proper  time,  render  night 
attacks  in  force  very  infrequent.  They  must,  however, 
be  carefully  guarded  against ; and  partial  attacks  for  the 
purpose  of  alarming  the  outpost,  capturing  sentinels  or 
pickets,  or  reconnoitering  the  position,  must  be  ex- 
pected. 

If,  then,  double  sentinels  are  placed  on  the  roads  and 
paths,  and  closely  backed  up  by  their  reliefs,  the  ad- 
vanced posts  thus  formed  will  give  timely  warning  of 
the  enemy’s  approach  in  force.  But  the  intervening 


THE  OUTPOST  AT  NIGHT. 


73- 


ground  must  not  be  neglected,  or  hostile  patrols  might 
push  through  and  reconnoiter  the  position.  The  ground 
between  the  sentinels  is,  therefore,  thoroughly  patrolled, 
the  number  of  men  available  for  this  purpose  being  in- 
creased by  the  diminution  of  the  number  of  sentinel 
posts.  Nothing  more  than  careful  observation  and 
warning  should  be  expected  of  the  advanced  posts,  the 
duty  of  resistance  falling  first  upon  the  pickets,  which 
should  be  nearer  the  sentinels  at  night  than  during  the 
day,  and  should  be  in  strong  defensive  positions  on  the 
roads,  in  rear  of  the  advanced  posts  furnished  by  them. 

In  cavalry  outposts,  the  pickets  are  placed  on  the 
roads,  double  vedettes  being  pushed  out  in  front.  The 
picket  must  be  on  the  alert  and  prepared  to  fight  on 
foot.  Its  position  may  be  strengthened  by  barricading 
the  road  ; but  care  must  be  taken  to  leave  a passage  by 
which  the  vedettes  may  retire,  and  the  barricade  must 
not  be  so  constructed  as  to  prove  an  obstacle  to  the  ad- 
vance of  the  troops  in  rear. 

When  the  enemy  is  close  at  hand  and  aggressive,  it 
may  sometimes  be  advisable,  in  addition  to  barring  his 
advance  on  the  main  roads,  to  post  a cordon  of  sentinels 
near  the  camp  or  bivouac,  to  check  small  patrols  of  the 
enemy,  which  might  otherwise  annoy  and  alarm  the 
main  body  and  destroy  its  repose.  As  a rule,  however, 
patrolling  between  the  advanced  posts  will  be  sufficient 
to  check  such  hostile  parties. 

All  changes  in  the  position  of  the  outpost  must  be 
arranged  during  daylight,  and  made  at  late  dusk.  Even 
if  the  cordon  system  is  retained  and  the  line  is  not 
drawn  in,  the  positions  of  the  sentinels  and  pickets 


74 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


should  be  changed,  in  order  to  prevent  their  possible 
capture  by  the  enemy,  who  may  have  noted  their  posi- 
tions during  the  day.  The  sentinels,  who  are  habitually 
posted  on  high  ground  during  the  day,  should  be  moved 
to  lower  ground  at  night,  so  as  to  bring  an  approaching 
enemy  in  view  on  the  sky  line.  As  a rule,  the  sentinels 
should  be  pushed  forward  from  the  high  ground  rather 
than  drawn  back,  in  order  to  retain  possession  of  the 
ridge. 

Plate  IX  illustrates  the  changes  made  m the  position 
of  the  outpost  at  night,  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
normal  formation  may  be  modified  to  suit  the  topogra- 
phy. In  this  case  the  lines  of  observation  and  resist- 
ance are  coincident,  and  in  case  of  attack  the  supports 
would  advance  to  the  line  of  the  pickets.  Support  C is 
on  the  coincident  lines,  its  front  covered  with  Cossack 
posts.  The  reserve  is  necessarily  divided,  the  right  por- 
tion being  in  readiness  to  reinforce  supports  C and  D, 
and  the  left  portion,  to  reinforce  support  E.  Picket  K 
sends  out  a detached  post  N to  watch  the  bridge,  and 
establishes  one  double  sentinel  whose  functions  are 
mainly  those  of  a connecting  sentinel  between  the 
picket  and  the  detached  post. 

At  night,  picket  K moves  close  to  the  detached  post  at 
the  bridge.  Pickets  H and  I are  united  and  posted  at 
E,  sending  out  a single  double  sentinel  closely  backed 
up  by  the  relief.  In  a similar  way  picket  G moves  to 
G'  and  picket  F to  F'.  There  are  no  changes  in  support 
C and  its  Cossack  posts.  Support  D is  divided  and 
moves  to  D'  D'.  Similarly,  support  E is  divided  and 
stationed  at  E'  E'.  It  is  not  usual  either  to  divide  or 


p 

\. 

J?\ 

® \ 


Out  pouf  Lino 


Showing  Changes  Made  at  Night 


Day  Positions  JVirjlii  Positions 


Main  Eottif . 
Beserx-e 
Supjiorfti . 
Pickets 


A 

BB 

ODE... 

FGHIK 


Cossack  Posts  . .() . . 

Detached „ -V 

Ai-tiUerif 

Small  Patrols  p 


A 

B'B’ 

CDDEE 

FGLM 

O 

JV 

P 


OUTPOST  PATROLS. 


75 


advance  the  supports,  but  in  this  case  topographical 
conditions  make  it  necessary.  The  same  conditions 
render  it  advisable  to  advance  the  reserve  B B to  B'  B'. 
It  will  be  observed,  however,  that  the  line  of  resistance 
is  the  same  as  by  day,  and  that  the  distance  from  this 
line  to  the  main  body  remains  the  same. 

The  artillery  of  the  outpost  is  posted  on  the  hill  P, 
where  it  commands  every  avenue  of  approach,  and  is 
supported  by  the  reserve.  The  range  and  direction  of 
the  bridges  and  other  important  approaches  are  obtained 
during  the  day,  and  the  guns  remain  in  the  same  posi- 
tion at  night. 

The  extent  and  direction  of  the  patrolling  are  indi- 
cated in  the  diagram. 

Sandy  Creek  is  fordable  with  difficulty,  and  is  pass- 
able for  all  arms  only  at  the  bridges.  Swamp  Run  is 
everywhere  fordable,  but  the  swamp  is  impassable. 

OUTPOST  PATROLS. 

The  outpost  patrols  are  of  two  kinds  : visiting  patrols 
and  reconnoitering  patrols. 

Visiting  Patrols. — Visiting  patrols  usually  consist  of 
a non-commissioned  officer  and  two  or  three  men.  They 
are  sent  out  from  the  picket,  and  keep  up  communica- 
tion between  it  and  its  sentinels  and  detached  posts, 
the  neighboring  pickets,  and  the  support.  In  making 
its  rounds  the  patrol  first  touches  upon  the  nearest  senti- 
nel of  the  picket  on  its  right  (or  left),  and  then  passes 
along  the  front  of  its  own  sentinels  to  the  nearest  senti- 
nel of  the  picket  on  its  left  (or  right),  returning  by  the 


76  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

rear  to  its  own  picket.  The  patrol  (especially  if  com- 
posed of  cavalry)  may  often  find  it  expedient,  as  a 
means  of  concealment,  to  pass  in  rear  of  the  sentinels. 
The  patrol  must  see  that  the  sentinels  of  its  picket  un- 
derstand, and  faithfully  perform,  their  duties.  They  ex- 
amine any  suspicious  points  which  the  sentinel  can  not 
inspect  without  going  too  far  away  from  his  post  ; take 
charge  of  persons  detained  by  the  sentinels,  and  relieve 
any  sentinel  who  may  be  sick  or  wounded. 

Visiting  patrols  are  mainly  used  at  night.  When  the 
sentinels  can  be  seen  from  the  picket,  the  patrol  would 
not  ordinarily  make  the  rounds,  during  the  day,  oftener 
than  once  each  relief.  At  night,  the  patrol  should  not 
cover  a front  of  more  than  500  yards  in  its  operations. 
When  the  distance  between  two  advanced  posts  exceeds 
this,  they  should  be  visited  by  separate  patrols,  which 
would  generally  be  from  dilferent  pickets,  as  posts  at  so 
great  an  interval  would  rarely  be  furnished  by  the  same 
picket.  It  is  seldom  necessary  for  a visiting  patrol  to 
examine  beyond  the  line  of  observation  during  the  da}-. 
When  it  does  so,  it  should  not  go  beyond  sight  of  the 
sentinels  ; and  at  night  it  should  not  advance  beyond 
short  rifle  range.  When  the  picket  is  weak,  the  reliefs 
must  be  used  as  visiting  patrols. 

Reconnoitering  Patrols. — The  sentinels  guard  against 
surprise,  but  the  information  they  can  gain  in  regard  to 
the  enemy  is  generally  very  slight.  This  information 
must  be  sought  by  reconnoitering  patrols  sent  out  to- 
wards the  enemy,  to  watch  his  movements,  and,  if  pos- 
sible, examine  his  position. 


OUTPOST  PATROLS. 


77 


Reconnoitering  patrols  are  either  small  or  strong.  A 
small  patrol  varies  in  size  from  three  men  to  a squad. 
If  composed  of  infantry,  it  should  not,  as  a rule,  advance 
more  than  half  a mile  beyond  the  line  of  sentinels  at 
night : in  daytime  it  may  often  prudently  advance  far- 
ther. Cavalry  is  generally  used  for  this  duty  by  day,  and 
may  push  out  five  or  ten  miles,  or  even  farther,  accord- 
ing to  the  discretion  of  the  patrol  commander.  The 
patrol  should  go  far  enough  to  see  the  enemy’s  senti- 
nels, if  not  too  distant,  and  may  even  penetrate  his  line 
of  observation. 

It  is  a good  rule  to  use  at  night  the  patrols  that  have 
scouted  the  same  region  by  day.  The  time,  direction, 
and  manner  of  sending  out  patrols  must  be  constantly 
varied,  in  order  that  the  enemy  may  not  be  prepared  to 
cut  them  off.  A small  patrol  must  constantly  bear  in 
mind  that  its  business  is  not  to  fight,  but  to  observe.  It 
should  accordingly  be  careful  to  avoid  engagements, 
unless  ordered  to  take  prisoners.  Its  duty  is  most 
efficiently  performed  when  it  comes  back  with  val- 
uable information  without  having  been  seen  by  the 
enemy. 

Patrolling  Posts. — At  night  the  advanced  posts  in 
front  of  the  pickets  may  be  replaced  by  patrolling  posts 
of  four  men  each.  The  patrolling  posts  are  small 
patrols  sent  out  at  dusk  along  all  the  avenues  by  which 
the  enemy  might  approach.  The  commanders  of  these 
patrols  should  be  selected  with  care,  and  should  be 
hampered  with  as  few  restrictions  as  possible ; usually 
receiving  general  instructions  to  patrol  a certain  road  to 
a certain  distance.  The  distance  will  depend  upon  cir- 


78 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


cumstances  ; but  it  should  always  be  such  that  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy’s  approach  may  be  sent  back  in  time 
to  enable  the  picket  and  support  to  be  ready  to  receive 
him.  When  the  distance  is  greater  than  1,000  yards,  the 
patrolling  post  might  better  be  composed  of  cavalry.  If 
composed  of  infantry,  a mounted  orderly  should  accom- 
pany it. 

The  patrolling  post  must  not  leave  the  road  or  path 
assigned  to  it ; but  it  may  either  keep  moving  or  remain 
stationary  at  the  limit  of  the  distance  to  which  it  is  or- 
dered to  patrol.  In  the  latter  case  a sentinel  or  vedette 
is  posted,  and  the  rest  of  the  patrol  remains  near  at  hand 
and  well  concealed.  The  sentinel  should  be  relieved 
every  half  hour,  and  the  patrolling  post  every  three 
hours.  The  relief  moves  out  from  the  picket,  along  the 
designated  road  or  path,  until  it  comes  upon  the  patrol- 
ling post.  As  the  picket  itself  must  generally  be  con- 
stantly on  the  alert  at  night,  the  only  object  in  relieving 
the  patrolling  posts  is  to  make  an  equitable  division  of 
a hazardous  duty.  If  the  number  of  patrolling  posts  is 
such  as  to  weaken  the  picket  materially,  the  support 
must  be  moved  up  close  enough  to  it  to  render  prompt 
assistance ; or,  if  this  can  not  be  done  without  abandon- 
ing a strong  position  for  a weaker  one,  the  support  must 
send  reinforcements  to  the  picket,  and  draw  correspond- 
ine  reinforcements  from  the  reserve.  The  members  of 
the  patrolling  post  must  preserve  the  strictest  silence, 
and  must  not  under  any  circumstances  smoke  or  light 
fires  ; for  the  safety  of  the  post  depends  upon  the  dark- 
ness, silence,  absence  of  fire,  and  the  enemy’s  ignorance 
of  its  location. 


OUTPOST  PATROLS. 


79 


Strong  Patrols. — When  strong  patrols  are  sent  out 
from  the  outpost  they  are  generally  taken  from  the  sup- 
port or  reserve.  They  vary  in  size  from  nine  men  to  a 
company  or  troop  ; and  if  composed  of  less  than  two 
squads,  may  be  taken  from  a picket.  As  a rule,  the 
movements  of  a strong  patrol  are  not  so  cautious  as 
those  of  a small  one.  Its  object  is  to  gain  information 
that  can  not  be  acquired  by  sentinels  or  small  patrols. 
It  rarely  goes  more  than  a mile  and  a half  from  the  line 
of  sentinels,  and  if  composed  of  infantry,  it  should  have 
one  or  two  mounted  men  with  it  to  insure  the  rapid 
transmission  of  intelligence  back  to  the  outpost.  If  a 
post  of  the  enemy  is  discovered,  the  patrol  will  gener- 
ally endeavor  to  remain  concealed  in  observation  of  it, 
sending  back  information  of  anything  important  that 
may  be  noted  ; but  a strong  patrol  may  sometimes  be 
used  offensively  to  discover  the  enemy’s  position  or  in- 
tentions by  attacking  a post.  Patrols  of  the  enemy  must 
be  kept  back,  and  may  be  attacked,  especially  for  the 
purpose  of  capturing  prisoners ; but,  as  a rule,  the  patrol 
avoids  firing,  and  endeavors,  as  far  as  possible,  to  see 
without  being  seen.  * 

If  the  patrols  return  without  reporting  anything,  vig- 
ilance must  not  be  relaxed  ; for  it  is  possible  for  patrols 
to  take  a wrong  direction,  or  to  pass  close  to  the  enemy 
without  discovering  him.  On  the  afternoon  before  the 
battle  of  Shiloh,  General  Prentiss  sent  a force,  consist- 
ing of  three  companies  of  the  21st  Missouri  Infantry 
(Col.  Moore),  to  reconnoiter  in  his  front.  They  followed 
a line  oblique  to  the  front  of  the  camp,  which  led  them 


* For  the  conduct  of  patrols,  see  the  next  chapter. 


So  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

to  the  right,  in  front  of  Sherman’s  line.  After  marching 
three  miles,  they  returned  to  camp,  and  reported  that 
they  had  seen  nothing.  Had  they  moved  direct  to  the 
front,  they  would  have  struck  Hardee’s  Confederate 
•corps. 

As  a rule,  patrols  are  frequent ; and  when  the  enemy 
is  in  force  and  close  at  hand,  they  are  constant. 

POSTING  AND  RELIEVING  THE  OUTPOST. 

The  men  detailed  for  outpost  duty  should  have  a 
proper  supply  of  ammunition,  and  (when  practicable) 
out  day’s  cooked  rations.  Their  canteens  should  be 
filled  with  coffee,  or,  if  cooking  is  to  be  allowed,  with 
water.  Each  officer  should  have  a watch,  compass, 
field-glass,  memorandum  pad  and  lead-pencil  ; and,  if 
possible,  he  should  be  provided  with  a topographical 
map  of  the  ground  to  be  occupied  by  the  outpost. 
Every  non-commissioned  officer  should  have  a lead  pen- 
cil and  a small  memorandum  pad. 

The  troops  detailed  having  been  inspected,  and  the 
subordinate  officers  having  taken  down  in  writing  the 
instructions  of  the  outpost  commander  (if  time  admits), 
the  force  moves  out,  with  an  advance  guard,  to  take  up 
the  designated  positions.  The  reserve  and  supports 
may  each  march  independently  from  camp  directly  to 
its  position  ; or  they  may  march  together  and  be  de- 
tached from  the  column  at  suitable  points.  Each  body 
moves  to  its  position  covered  by  a point  and  flanking 
groups,  and  the  pickets  especially  move  with  extreme 
vigilance.  When  the  picket  is  halted,  slightly  in  rear 


POSTING  AND  RELIEVING  THE  OUTPOST. 


8l 


of  the  selected  line  of  observation,  two  or  more  squads 
are  deployed  as  skirmishers,  with  sufficient  intervals  to 
enable  their  front  to  cover  approximately  the  front  of 
the  sentinels  of  the  picket,  and  are  pushed  forward  cau- 
tiously to  reconnoiter,  being  followed  by  the  first  relief 
of  sentinels.  The  picket  commander  halts  on  the  line 
of  observation,  and  the  skirmishers  move  on  to  recon- 
noiter in  its  front,  not  going  farther  than  ioo  yards  if 
the  country  is  close  or  wooded.  When  the  relief  comes 
up,  the  picket  commander  posts  the  sentinels  quickly, 
the  posts  afterwards  being  changed  as  may  be  required. 
Any  tree,  building,  haystack,  or  other  object  affording 
a good  view  should  be  occupied  at  once  as  a lookout  by 
two  men,  one  of  whom  should,  if  practicable,  be  pro- 
vided with  a field-glass.  As  soon  as  the  sentinels  have 
been  tentatively  posted,  the  skirmishers  are  recalled  and 
sent  back  to  the  picket  ; after  which  the  picket  com- 
mander touches  upon  the  nearest  sentinel  of  the  picket 
on  his  right  (or  left),  and  passes  along  his  own  line  of 
observation  to  the  nearest  sentinel  of  the  picket  on  his 
left  (or  right).  He  assures  himself  that  his  sentinels  are 
in  positions  best  suited  for  observation  and  concealment, 
sees  that  the  number  of  posts  does  not  exceed  the  re- 
quirements of  efficient  observation,  and  then  returns  to 
his  picket.  He  next  posts  the  picket  sentinel  and  such 
connecting  sentinels  as  may  be  necessary,  sends  out  such 
detached  posts  as  may  be  requisite,  details  a portion  of 
the  picket  for  patrolling  (dividing  the  men  thus  detailed 
into  patrols  numbered  consecutively),  orders  the  picket 
to  stack  arms  and  fall  out,  and  sends  to  the  commander 
of  the  outpost  or  section  a report  of  his  position  and 
6 — w 


82 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


dispositions,  accompanied,  if  practicable,  with  a rough 
sketch  of  the  same. 

If  Cossack  posts  are  established  instead  of  pickets  and 
sentinels,  the  force  on  leaving  the  supports  deploys  first 
into  line  of  squads,  and  then  into  line  of  skirmishers, 
taking  such  intervals  as  to  cover  the  front  to  be  occupied. 
On  halting  on  the  line  of  observation,  such  reconnais- 
sance to  the  front  as  may  be  necessary  is  effected,  and 
the  skirmishers  are  then  assembled  by  squads.  Num- 
bers 3 and  4,  front  and  rear  rank,  of  each  squad  are  then 
marched  half  way  to  the  next  squad  on  their  left,  and 
halted.  Each  group  of  four  men  then  constitutes  a 
Cossack  post. 

A cavalry  picket  is  posted  in  a manner  similar  to  the 
method  of  posting  one  composed  of  infantry.  If  the 
country  is  open,  the  picket  remains  mounted  during  the 
posting  of  the  vedettes ; if  the  country  is  wooded  and 
close,  it  is  prepared  to  fight  on  foot.  When  the  picket 
commander  returns  to  the  picket,  the  men  are  allowed 
to  dismount ; or,  if  prepared  for  fighting  on  foot,  they 
are  assembled  and  stand  to  horse.  The  horses  are  then 
placed  under  a proper  guard,  and  the  men  fall  out. 

After  the  picket  commander  has  sent  in  his  first  report, 
he  visits  his  detached  posts,  and  makes  such  inspection 
of  the  ground  as  may  be  necessary  to  familiarize  him 
with  the  roads,  paths,  and  other  topographical  features 
of  his  position,  but  should  not  go  beyond  reach  of  his 
picket.  If  streams  or  other  obstacles  exist  in  front  of 
his  position,  he  ascertains  at  what  points  they  are  pass- 
able ; and  he  must  satisfy  himself  that  the  picket  occu- 
pies a post  fulfilling,  as  far  as  possible,  the  requirements 


POSTING  AND  RELIEVING  THE  OUTPOST.  83 

already  set  forth.  He  takes  such  measures  in  regard  to 
strengthening  his  position  as  may  be  required  by  cir- 
cumstances and  be  in  consonance  with  orders  received 
by  him  ; but  while  he  should  make  all  prudent  prepara- 
tions to  defend  the  main  avenues  of  approach,  bridges, 
fords,  etc.,  he  should  not  obstruct  a main  road  with 
obstacles  whose  removal  might  delay  the  advance  of  the 
main  body,  nor  destroy  bridges,  without  orders  from 
higher  authority.  He  must  be  especially  careful  to  see 
that  the  picket  post  at  night  is  prepared  for  a stubborn 
defense  ; and  he  must,  at  all  times,  consider  what  he 
would  do  in  case  of  attack.  4 4 Though  by  nature  he  be 
slow  of  thought,  he  has  nothing  to  fear,  provided  he  has 
made  up  his  mind  beforehand  as  to  what  he  will  do 
when  attacked.”* 

When,  at  the  close  of  a day’s  march,  the  advance 
guard  forms  the  outpost,  the  advance  party  furnishes 
the  pickets  and  sentinels  (being  reinforced,  if  necessary, 
from  the  support  until  the  two  bodies  are  equal  in 
strength)  ; the  support  furnishes  the  supports  ; and  the 
reserve  constitutes  the  reserve  of  the  outpost.  When 
the  place  for  camp  or  bivouac  is  selected,  the  advance 
guard  marches  to  its  post  as  an  outpost  in  the  same 
general  manner  as  though  detailed  from  camp. 

Whenever  practicable,  the  outpost  should  be  divided 
into  three  equal  parts,  which  should  so  relieve  each 
other  as  to  make  an  equitable  division  of  the  duty  on 
the  line  of  observation.  At  the  end  of  each  eight  hours 
the  reserve  should  take  the  place  of  the  support,  the 
support  should  relieve  the  pickets,  and  the  latter  should 


*Wolseley. 


84  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

march  back  and  unite  at  the  position  of  the  reserve. 
This  arrangement  would  give  each  sentinel  two  hours 
and  forty  minutes  on  post  (which  might  be  divided  into 
two  periods  of  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes  each)  during 
his  tour  of  outpost  duty.  If,  for  any  reason,  this  method 
of  equalizing  the  duty  should  be  impracticable,  a care- 
ful roster  of  sentinel  duty,  and  especially  of  night  duty, 
should  be  kept,  and  the  burden  should  be  equalized  in 
the  course  of  several  tours.  To  equalize  the  burden  of 
sentinel  duty  as  advised  above,  it  might  often  be  expe- 
dient to  change  the  typical  formation  as  given  in  Plate 
VI,  so  as  to  have  one  entire  battalion  in  each  line. 

THE  DEFENSE  OF  THE  OUTPOST. 

The  outpost  should,  as  a rule,  avoid  unnecessary 
movements  tending  to  bring  on  an  engagement ; but  if 
attacked,  it  should  resist  stubbornly,  in  order  to  give 
the  main  body  time  to  prepare  for  action.  The  chief 
resistance  is  generally  made  on  the  line  of  supports, 
though  in  some  cases  it  may  be  best  for  the  supports  to 
advance  to  the  line  of  pickets.  In  the  former  case,  the 
picket  usually  deploys  as  skirmishers,  and  advances  to 
reinforce  the  line  of  sentinels  ; the  whole  line  then  fall- 
ing back  slowly  upon  the  supports,  taking  advantage  of 
every  defensive  feature  of  the  ground,  and  fighting  reso- 
lutely. In  order  that  the  fire  of  the  support  may  not  be 
masked,  the  pickets  will  direct  their  retreat  upon  its 
flanks,  instead  of  falling  directly  back  upon  it.  The 
skirmishers  then  form  on  a line  with  the  skirmishers  of 
the  support.  In  the  latter  case  the  pickets  should  be 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  THE  OUTPOST. 


85 


intrenched.  The  sentinels  fall  back  upon  them,  moving 
towards  their  flanks  to  unmask  their  fire  ; and  the  sup- 
ports are  brought  up  and  deployed  in  the  intervals  be- 
tween the  pickets.  In  either  case,  the  reserve  is  brought 
up  to  reinforce  the  troops  in  front,  as  soon  as  the  nature 
and  direction  of  the  attack  become  apparent. 

In  case  the  enemy  is  repulsed,  the  infantry  should 
resume  its  former  positions,  but  should  not  ordinarily 
pursue.  The  cavalry  should  send  out  patrols  to  discover 
where  the  enemy  halted.  These  patrols  should  beware 
of  ambuscade,  and  must  not  push  beyond  an  indicated 
distance.  When  the  outpost  is  composed  of  infantry 
alone,  small  detachments  deployed  as  skirmishers  may 
sometimes  be  sent  in  pursuit,  but  the  outpost  must  not 
be  much  weakened  for  this  purpose.  Soon  after  the 
repulse  of  the  attack,  the  pickets  and  supports  should 
shift  their  positions  (unless  by  so  doing  it  would  be 
necessary  to  abandon  strong  points),  in  order  to  deprive 
the  enemy  of  profiting  by  the  knowledge  of  the  position 
gained  by  attacking. 

When  knowledge  of  the  enemy’s  approach  is  gained 
in  time  to  admit  of  full  preparation,  he  should  be  re- 
ceived with  volleys.  This  would  enable  the  officers  to 
keep  the  troops  better  in  hand,  and  would  have  a desira- 
ble moral  effect  on  the  enemy,  as  volleys  may  be  re- 
garded as  an  indication  of  coolness  and  readiness  on  the 
part  of  the  troops  delivering  them. 

The  pickets  should  be  under  arms  an  hour  before  day- 
break, as  an  attack  is  most  likely  to  occur  at  dawn. 


86 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


RELIEVING  THE  OUTPOST. 

The  outpost  is  relieved  at  daybreak,  in  order  that 
there  may  be  double  strength  on  the  outpost  line  at  the 
time  when  an  attack  is  most  to  be  feared. 

The  new  reserve  marches  to  the  post  of  the  old  one, 
where  both  rest  with  arms  stacked,  and  the  new  com- 
mander receives  from  the  old  all  information  possessed 
by  the  latter  in  regard  to  the  enemy,  and  the  standing 
orders  for  the  reserve.  Each  support  marches  to  the 
post  of  the  support  which  it  is  to  relieve,  and  both  sup- 
ports rest,  while  information  and  orders  are  turned  over 
as  in  the  case  of  the  reserves.  When  a new  picket 
arrives  to  relieve  an  old  one,  each  stands  at  ease  while 
the  new  and  the  old  commanders  visit  the  sentinel’s 
posts  together,  followed  by  the  first  relief  from  the  new 
picket.  The  old  commander  points  out  to  the  new  the 
important  topographical  features  of  the  vicinity,  and  the 
known  or  suspected  positions  of  the  hostile  posts  ; and 
gives  him  all  the  information  that  has  been  gained  in 
regard  to  the  enemy.  * 

When  the  old  sentinels  and  detached  posts  have  been 
relieved,  the  commander  of  the  old  picket  (unless  there 
appears  to  be  danger  of  an  attack)  sends  in  a written 
report  to  the  commander  of  the  outpost  or  section,  and 
marches  his  picket  back  to  its  support.  As  soon  as  the 
support  has  been  joined  by  its  pickets,  it  marches  back 

‘There  is  a complete  absence  of  ceremony  in  relieving  an  outpost. 
There  is  no  position  prescribed  for  the  new  reserve,  supports,  or  pick- 
ets. They  rest  solely  to  avoid  fatigue,  and  the  pickets  stand  at  ease  , 
merely  to  insure  silence. 


RELIEVING  THE  OUTPOST. 


87 


to  its  reserve,  and  the  entire  old  outpost  returns  to 
camp  ; or  each  support  may  march  directly  back  to  camp 
as  soon  as  it  is  joined  by  its  pickets.  If  while  the  old 
outpost,  or  any  part  of  it,  is  returning,  the  enemy  should 
attack,  it  must  be  at  once  marched  back  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  new  outpcst. 

As  a rule,  outposts  should  be  relieved  every  twenty- 
four  hours.  With  cavalry  this  is  necessary  ; but  in  the 
case  of  infantry,  if  the  enemy  is  not  near  and  enterpris- 
ing, it  may  sometimes  be  advisable  to  keep  the  same 
troops  on  outpost  duty  for  forty-eight  hours,  if  the  com- 
mand remains  in  camp. 

If  the  army  is  on  the  march,  the  outpost  will  be  re- 
lieved as  soon  as  the  advance  guard  has  passed  the  chain 
of  sentinels.  The  pickets  will  not,  as  a rule,  fall  back 
to  the  supports,  but  will  join  them  at  some  designated 
point  on  the  line  of  march,  in  order  to  save  the  fatigued 
men  from  unnecessary  marching.  The  reserve  follows 
the  rear  of  the  column,  and  the  supports  and  pickets, 
united  at  designated  rendezvous,  form  the  rear  guard  of 
the  column. 

If  the  army  is  retreating,  the  outpost  each  day  (when 
practicable)  forms  the  rear  guard.  The  manner  of  re- 
lieving the  outpost  in  this  case  is  considered  in  the 
chapter  on  Rear  Guards. 


88 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


How  can  any  man  decide  what  he  should  do  himself,  if  he  is  igno- 
rant of  what  his  enemy  is  about . — -Jomini. 

It  is  an  easy  matter  to  criticise  military  operations 
after  the  event  ; but  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  conditions  and  relative  positions  of  the  opposing 
forces,  always  set  forth  with  clearness  by  a good  histo- 
rian, are  matters  of  doubt  to  the  commanders  while  the 
operations  are  in  progress.  The  curtain  which  sepa- 
rates the  players  in  the  game  of  kriegsspiel  is  an  apt 
symbol  of  the  veil  of  uncertainty  which  hangs  between 
two  opposing  armies.  To  screen  his  own  movements 
and  positions,  and  to  gain  a knowledge  of  those  of  his 
opponent,  a commander  must  depend  mainly  upon  re- 
connoitering  bodies ; and  upon  the  zeal,  daring,  pru- 
dence, and  skill  of  these  bodies,  the  intelligence  and 
promptness  with  which  their  reports  are  collated,  and 
his  own  power  of  making  correct  deductions  or  syn- 
thetical conclusions  from  separate  facts  reported,  must 
in  a great  measure  depend  his  chances  of  success. 

Reconnaissance  may  be  considered  under  the  follow- 
ing heads  : 

1.  Reconnaissance  in  force  ; 

2.  Special  reconnaissance  ; 

3.  Patrolling. 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


89 


Reconnaissance  in  Force. — Reconnaissances  in  force 
are  made  only  by  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
and  the  force  employed  generally  consists  of  all  three 
arms.  They  are  often  made  just  before  an  action,  for 
the  purpose  of  discovering  the  enemy’s  strength  and 
dispositions,  and  frequently  lead  to  a battle.  The  re- 
connaissance is  conducted  in  the  same  general  manner 
as  a regular  attack.  Artillery  is  brought  into  action  for 
the  purpose  of  drawing  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  guns  and 
thus  discovering  their  position.  The  outposts  are  at- 
tacked, and,  if  possible,  driven  in,  and  different  parts  of 
the  enemy’s  line  are  threatened,  or  actually  attacked, 
by  skirmishers  in  strength  according  to  the  result  de- 
sired. Efforts  are  made  while  driving  in  the  enemy’s 
pickets  to  capture  prisoners.  Staff  officers,  advancing 
with  the  skirmishers,  rapidly  sketch  the  different  fea- 
tures of  the  enemy’s  position,  and  note  his  apparent 
strength  at  different  points. 

Prisoners  captured  in  a reconnaissance  in  force  should 
be  questioned  as  to  the  regiments,  brigades,  divisions, 
etc.,  to  which  they  belong.  If  prisoners  have  been  cap- 
tured all  along  the  line,  their  answers  will  discover  the 
enemy’s  positions  and  strength.  Even  if  the  prisoners 
should  be  uniformly  stubborn  and  untruthful,  their  regi- 
mental badges  would  convey  valuable  information. 

Cavalry  and  horse  artillery  are  especially  valuable  in 
a reconnaissance  in  force,  as  they  can  be  withdrawn 
from  action  more  easily  than  infantry;  and  it  would  be 
well  to  limit  the  reconnaissance  to  these  two  arms  when 
they  are  in  ample  force,  and  circumstances  render  their 
action  sufficient.  To  be  successful,  however,  a recon- 


90 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


naissance  in  force  should  impose  upon  the  enemy  the 
belief  that  he  is  encountering  a real  attack  ; and  this 
consideration  will  determine  the  kind  of  troops  to  em- 
ploy and  the  hour  at  which  the  attack  should  be  made. 
If  infantry  be  employed  in  the  attack,  it  will  be  hard  to 
break  off  the  action  ; but  if  it  be  not  employed,  it  will 
generally  be  manifest  that  the  attack  is  not  serious.  As 
to  the  time  of  making  the  reconnaissance,  if  it  be  made 
late  in  the  afternoon,  the  troops  may  be  withdrawn  under 
cover  of  the  darkness ; but  if  made  at  that  hour,  the 
enemy  will  probably  suspect  the  true  nature  of  the 
operation.  If  made  in  the  morning,  the  enemy  will 
doubtless  believe  it  to  be  a serious  attack  ; but  it  may 
very  easily  precipitate  a battle. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  a reconnaissance  in  force 
is  a difficult  operation.  Indeed,  it  should  never  be  made 
except  when  other  means  of  getting  necessary  informa- 
tion about  the  enemy  fail.  It  is  open  to  three  serious 
objections  : 

1.  It  often  results  in  committing  the  troops  so  com- 
pletely to  action  as  to  bring  on  a battle  through  the 
necessity  of  bringing  up  other  troops  to  their  assistance. 

At  Worth  a reconnaissance  by  the  20th  Prussian  Brig- 
ade developed  the  enemy;  and  the  other  German  troops 
“moving  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon,”  precipitated  a 
battle  a day  earlier  than  the  Crown  Prince  had  intended. 

2.  The  withdrawal  of  the  troops  in  pursuance  to  the 
general  plan  of  the  reconnaissance  may  often  present 
the  appearance  of  defeat. 

In  1859  Giulay  caused  a reconnaissance  in  force  to  be 
made  by  Stadion’s  Corps.  It  developed  Forey’s  Divi- 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


91 


sion  near  Montebello;  and  although  the  Austrians  with- 
drew in  accordance  with  the  plan  of  reconnaissance,  the 
inoral  effect  of  the  action  on  both  sides  was  that  of  a 
victory  of  a French  division  over  an  Austrian  army 
corps. 

On  July  18,  1861,  McDowell  ordered  Tyler  to  observe 
with  his  division  the  roads  leading  from  Centerville  to 
Bull  Run,  but  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement.  Tyler 
exceeded  his  instructions  by  making  a reconnaissance 
in  force  ; and,  though  he  succeeded  in  developing  the 
enemy’s  front  in  the  vicinity  of  Blackburn’s  Ford,  his 
left  flank  was  turned  by  the  Confederates,  he  was  forced 
to  fall  back,  and  the  apparent  defeat  had  a depressing 
effect  upon  the  raw  troops  composing  the  Union  army. 

3.  It  is  always  a costly  means  of  gaining  information. 
The  Atlanta  campaign,  conducted  mainly  in  a heavily- 
wooded  country,  where  the  opposing  forces,  though 
always  near,  were  often  completely  concealed  from  each 
other,  furnishes  numerous  examples  of  reconnaissances 
in  force,  which  were  generally  very  costly  ones.  These 
reconnaissances  were  termed  demonstrations , and  were 
usually  made  by  a continuous  line  of  considerable  ex- 
tent. In  advancing,  the  army  was  always  covered  by  a 
line  of  skirmishers,  which  on  halting  became  a line  of 
sentinels.  When  a demonstration  was  ordered,  the  sen- 
tinels advanced,  thus  becoming  again  a line  of  skir- 
mishers, and  were  supported  more  or  less  by  the  troops 
in  rear  according  to  the  earnestness  of  the  demonstra- 
tion. 

On  June  22,  1864,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  presence 
and  position  of  Johnston’s  army  at  the  base  of  Kene- 


92 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


saw  Mountain,  a demonstration  was  made  in  front  of 
the  2d  Division  of  the  IV.  Corps.  The  97th  Ohio  In- 
fantry (Ivieutenant-Colonel  Barnes),  operating  in  front 
of  the  2d  Brigade  of  that  division,  encountered  the 
enemy  in  a strong  position,  and  suffered  the  severe  loss 
of  98  killed  and  wounded  (including  7 officers)  out  of  a 
total  strength  of  369 — a heavier  loss  than  it  incurred  in 
any  of  the  great  battles  in  which  it  was  engaged  dur- 
ing the  war.* 

Special  Reconnaissances.  — Reconnaissances  of  this 
class  have  some  limited  and  definite  object  in  view  : to 
discover  whether  a certain  point  is  occupied  in  force  by 
the  enemy  ; whether  a bridge  is  broken,  or  a defile  is 
fortified  ; to  capture  a picket,  with  a view  to  gaining 
information  ; or  to  attack  a post  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
covering the  intentions  or  morale  of  the  enemy.  In 
the  latter  case,  the  inference  to  be  drawn  is  that  the 
post  is  of  much  or  little  importance,  or  that  the  enemy 
is  confident  or  dispirited,  according  to  its  stubborn  de- 
fense or  quick  abandonment.  The  post  might,  how- 
ever, be  abandoned  solely  because  of  its  lack  of  support 

* The  reconnaissance  in  front  of  the  1st  Brigade,  made,  at  the  same 
time,  by  the  24th  Wisconsin  Infantry  (Major  MacArthur),  furnishes 
an  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  severe  losses  on  special  reconnais- 
sance. The  men  of  this  regiment  were  instructed  each  to  select  a tree 
about  50  yards  in  front  of  the  line,  and,  at  command,  to  run  forward 
and  halt  behind  the  tree  selected.  The  regiment  thus  pushing  for- 
ward by  a series  of  rushes,  advanced  three-fourths  of  the  distance 
separating  it  from  the  enemy,  developed  his  position,  and  completely 
gained  the  object  of  the  reconnaissance,  with  the  loss  of  only  two 
men  killed  and  eleven  wounded.  This  happy  adaptation  of  tactics  to 
the  terrain  enabled  the  reconnaissance  on  this  part  of  the  line  to  he 
made  with  an  exceptionally  small  loss. 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


93 


by  other  parts  of  the  line.  Thus  the  abandonment  of 
the  Turkish  posts  at  Balaklava  at  the  first  attack  was 
evidence  neither  of  the  unimportance  of  the  posts  nor 
of  the  impaired  morale  of  the  defenders,  but  it  was  an 
indication  that  the  dispositions  of  the  Allies  were  ex- 
tremely faulty.  Though  this  was  not  a case  of  recon- 
naissance, but  of  a real  attack,  the  same  result  might 
occur  in  a special  reconnaissance. 

The  manner  of  conducting  a special  reconnaissance 
depends  upon  its  object  and  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  is  conducted.  A good  rule  in  one  case  might 
be  a fatal  guide  in  another.  The  following  instance  of 
a brilliant  and  successful  special  reconnaissance  shows 
how  the  alert  intelligence  and  personal  daring  of  a com- 
mander of  a reconnoitering  party  may  solve  a problem 
for  which  no  rule  can  be  prescribed  : 

In  the  spring  of  1863,  the  First  Cavalry  Division, 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  ordered  to  make  a recon- 
naissance towards  Orange  Court-House,  to  develop  the 
position  and  strength  of  the  enemy  on  the  Rapidan  ; 
other  troops,  infantry  and  cavalry,  being  detached  on 
similar  duty  towards  other  points  of  the  enemy’s  line. 
When  the  cavalry  division  arrived  at  the  Rapidan,  it 
discovered  a weak  line  of  Confederate  outposts  and  a 
long  line  of  earthworks  ; but  was  unable  to  ascertain 
whether  the  latter  was  occupied,  especially  as  orders 
discouraged  any  considerable  engagement  or  “ the  sac- 
rifice of  men.”  To  induce  the  enemy  to  show  his  force, 
various  expedients  were  resorted  to,  but  without  result. 
It  was  finally  determined  to  cross  the  stream  at  the  ford 
in  front,  and  the  advance  squadron  (5th  U.  S.  Cavalry) 


94 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


moved  towards  the  crossing.  The  line  of  advance  gave, 
at  points,  a view  of  the  interior  of  the  enemy’s  line, 
which  seemed  to  indicate  that  it  was  held  by  a strong 
force.  Acting  with  prompt  resolution,  the  squadron 
commander  (Captain  Ash)  quickly  placed  his  men  be- 
hind cover  near  by,  and  rode  alone  along  the  bank  of 
the  river  at  a rapid  gallop,  looking  into  the  enemy’s 
works.  A furious  fusillade  from  the  earthworks  fol- 
lowed his  movement  ; but  he  succeeded  in  making  a 
complete  inspection,  and,  waving  his  hat  triumphantly 
over  his  head,  rode  back  to  his  command,  loudly  cheered 
by  the  forces  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  the  Confed- 
erates mounting  their  breastworks  and  waving  their 
hats  in  admiration  of  the  gallant  exploit.  Thus  the 
object  of  the  reconnaissance  was  gained  without  the 
loss  of  a man. 

In  an  attempt  upon  a picket  of  the  enemy,  the  most 
favorable  place  for  crossing  his  line  of  sentinels  is 
sought  out,  and  the  necessary'  dispositions  are  made, 
before  dark  ; the  attack  being  made  at  night  or  at  late 
dusk.  The  force  should  ordinarily  be  divided  into  two 
detachments,  one  of  which  should  remain  concealed 
and  ready  to  rush  forward  to  the  assistance  of  the  other 
if  necessary.  The  latter  endeavors  to  cross  the  line  of 
sentinels  unperceived,  advancing  silently,  in  close  order, 
without  flankers,  and  with  only  one  or  two  scouts  in 
advance.  As  soon  as  the  line  of  sentinels  is  passed,  the 
greatest  difficulty  is  overcome.  The  detachment  moves 
quickly  upon  the  picket  so  as  to  attack  it  on  the  flank 
and  rear.  It  is  imperative  that  the  attack  should  be 
prompt  and  impetuous,  and  made  simultaneously  from 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


95 


two  or  more  directions.  The  great  object  of  the  attack 
is,  of  course,  to  capture  prisoners,  with  a view  to  ob- 
taining information  from  them.  The  prisoners  are 
hurried  away,  and  the  reconnoitering  force  makes  its 
retreat  without  delay. 

The  force  employed  in  a special  reconnaissance  varies 
in  size  from  a company  or  troop  to  a division.  The 
dividing  line  between  a special  reconnaissance  and  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  is  often  very  dim,  and  in  many 
cases  the  same  operation  could  be  designated  by  either 
term.  On  the  4th  of  July,  1864,  Sherman  being  in 
doubt  as  to  the  presence  of  Johnston’s  army  at  Smyrna 
Camp  Ground,  Howard  ordered  a demonstration,  which 
he  describes  as  follows  : 

“I  called  Stanley,  whose  division  held  the  front. 
‘General,  double  your  skirmishers  and  press  them.’ 
At  once  it  was  done.  The  lines  sped  forward,  capturing 
the  outlying  pits  of  the  enemy,  and  took  many  prisoners; 
but  a sheet  of  lead  instantly  came  from  the  hidden 
works  in  the  edge  of  the  wood  beyond  us,  and  several 
batteries  hurled  their  shot  across  our  lines,  some  of  them 
reaching  our  grove  and  forcing  us  [Sherman  and  How- 
ard] to  retire.”  * 

This  demonstration  may  wdth  equal  correctness  be 
termed  either  a reconnaissance  in  force  or  a special  re- 
connaissance. The  force  employed  would  justify  the 
former  term,  and  the  limited  and  special  object  would 
render  the  latter  proper. 

Patrolling. — Patrols  are  divided  into  small  patrols  and 
strong  patrols.  A strong  patrol  varies  in  strength  from 

* Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol.  IV,  p.  313. 


96  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

nine  men  to  a troop  of  cavalry  or  a company  of  infantry. 
A small  patrol  varies  from  three  men  to  a squad.  A 
patrol  should  never  consist  of  less  than  three  men  ; for 
if  it  were  composed  of  only  two,  it  would  be  impossible 
to  send  back  a report  of  anything  seen  or  heard,  without 
leaving  one  man  alone,  without  support,  in  the  prox- 
imity of  the  enemy. 

In  our  service  patrols  are  also  classified  as  officers' , 
recon noitering,  visiting , covering  (flanking),  and  con- 
necting patrols.*  To  these  may  be  added  exploring , 
harrassing , expeditionary , and  pursuing  patrols.  The 
classification  into  small  and  strong  patrols  is  the  im- 
portant one;  for  without  changing  its  size,  and  without 
material  modification  of  its  methods,  the  patrol  may 
combine  the  functions  of  several  of  the  different  kinds 
of  patrols  contained  in  the  second  classification.  In 
fact,  the  latter  classification  is  mainly  for  convenience  of 
description. 

Officers’  patrols  are  extensively  used  in  connection 
with  the  cavalry  screen,  and  will  therefore  be  con- 
sidered. in  the  next  chapter.  Visiting  patrols  have 
already  been  considered  ; they  belong  exclusively  to 
outposts. 

Exploring  patrols  have  for  their  object  to  explore  the 
country  in  front  of  the  army.  The  nature  of  this  ex- 
ploration and  the  manner  of  conducting  it  belong  rather 
to  “Military  Topography”  than  to  the  subject  here 
considered  ; but  the  following  observations  of  different 
natural  features  should  always  be  made,  and  it  may  not 
be  out  of  place  to  mention  them  here  : 

* Cavalry  Drill  Regulations,  par.  97S. 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


97 


Roads. — Their  direction  ; their  nature  (macadamized, 
corduroy,  plank,  “dirt,”  etc.);  their  condition  of  re- 
pair ; their  grade  ; the  nature  of  lateral  roads,  and  the 
points  where  they  leave  the  main  road  ; their  borders 
(woods,  hedges,  fences,  or  ditches);  the  places  at  which 
they  pass  through  defiles,  across  heights  or  rivers,  and 
where  they  intersect  railroads  ; their  breadth  (whether 
suitable  to  column  of  fours  or  of  platoons,  etc.). 

Railroads. — Their  direction  ; the  number  of  tracks, 
stations,  and  junctions  ; their  grade  ; the  nature  of  the 
cuts,  embankments,  and  tunnels. 

Bridges. — Their  position  ; their  width  and  length  ; 
their  construction  (wood,  brick,  stone,  or  iron) ; the_ 
roads  and  approaches  on  each  bank. 

Rivers  ( and  other  streams'). — Their  direction,  width,, 
and  depth  ; the  rapidity  of  the  current ; liability  to  sud- 
den rises  and  extreme  fluctuations  in  depth,  as  indicated 
by  driftwood,  etc. ; fords  ; the  nature  of  the  banks  ; 
kind,  position,  and  number  of  islands  at  suitable  points 
of  passage  ; heights  in  the  vicinity  and  their  command 
oyer  the  banks. 

Woods. — Their  situation,  extent,  and  shape  ; whether 
clear  or  containing  underbrush  ; the  number  and  extent 
of  “ clearings  ;”  whether  cut  up  by  ravines,  or  contain- 
ing marshes,  etc. ; nature  of  roads  penetrating  them. 

Canals. — Their  direction,  width,  and  depth  ; condi- 
tion of  towpath  ; locks,  and  means  for  protecting  or 
destroying  them. 

Telegraphs. — Whether  they  follow  railroads  or  com- 
mon roads  ; stations  ; number  of  wires. 

Villages. — Their  situation  (on  a height,  in  a valley, 

7 — w 


98 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


or  on  a plain) ; nature  of  the  surrounding  country ; 
construction  of  the  houses  ; nature  and  width  of  the 
streets  ; means  of  defense. 

Defiles. — Their  direction  ; whether  straight  or 
crooked  ; whether  heights  on  either  side  are  accessible 
or  inaccessible  ; nature  of  ground  at  each  extremity’ ; 
width  (frontage  of  column  that  can  pass  through). 

Ponds  and  Marshes. — Means  of  crossing  ; defensive 
use  that  might  be  made  of  them  as  obstacles  against 
enemy ; whether  the  marshy  grounds  are  practicable 
for  any  or  all  arms. 

Springs  and  Rivulets.  — Nature  of  approaches  ; 
whether  water  is  drinkable  and  abundant. 

Valleys. — Extent  and  nature  ; towns,  villages,  ham- 
lets, streams,  roads,  and  paths  therein  ; obstacles  offered 
by,  or  in,  the  valley  to  the  movements  of  troops. 

Heights. — Whether  slopes  are  easy  or  steep  ; whether 
good  defensive  positions  are  offered  ; whether  plateau 
is  wide  or  narrow ; whether  passages  are  easy  or  diffi- 
cult ; whether  the  ground  is  broken  or  smooth,  wooded 
or  clear. 

Cultivated  Ground. — Nature  of  cultivation  and  kind 
of  crops. 

Good  camping  places  should  always  be  noted. 

The  report  should  be  rendered  as  quickly’  as  possible 
after  the  return  of  the  patrol,  accompanied,  -when  prac- 
ticable, with  a map.  * 


For  a complete  and  excellent  description  of  the  requirements  of 
the  kind  of  reconnaissance  here  considered,  see  “The  Duties  of  the 
General  Staff,”  by  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  Vol.  II,  p.  249,  et  seq. 
For  technical  information  in  regard  to  sketching  and  map-making  in 


RECONNAISSANCE. 


99 


A patrol  of  any  nature  should  endeavor  to  note  care- 
fully the  different  features  of  the  ground  over  which  it 
passes,  whether  required  to  make  a report  or  not.  In 
every  case  a railroad  embankment , a ditch , or  any  other 
object  that  would  furnish  a good  defensive  position  should 
be  noted. 

Reconnoitering  patrols  are  used  to  reconnoiter  the 
position  and  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

Harrassing  patrols  are  for  the  purpose  of  disturbing 
and  annoying  the  enemy,  and  thus  depriving  him  of 
sleep  and  rest. 

Expeditionary  patrols  have  for  their  mission  the  cap- 
ture of  sentinels  or  patrols,  or  the  destruction  of  roads, 
railroads,  or  telegraphs. 

Coitnecting  patrols  are  used  to  preserve  communica- 
tion between  columns  of  troops  on  the  march  or  be- 
tween different  bodies  in  battle. 

Pursuing  patrols  hang  upon  a retreating  enemy,  and 
render  prompt  information  as  to  his  movements,  loca- 
tion, and  morale. 

Exploring,  reconnoitering,  harrassing,  expeditionary, 
and  pursuing  patrols  may  be  either  strong  or  small  ; 
connecting  patrols  are  always  strong. 

Cavalry  is  the  arm  par  excellence  for  patrolling,  es- 
pecially when  (as  is  the  case  with  American  cavalry)  it 
unites  mobility  and  defensive  power,  and  does  not 
need  to  be  hampered  with  a supporting  force  of  infantry. 
The  composition  of  the  patrol  will,  however,  depend 

connection  with  such  reconnaissance,  consult  Richards’  “ Military  To- 
pography ” or  Hutchiuson  and  MacGregor’s  “ Military  Sketching  and 
Reconnaissance.” 


IOO 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


upon  the  ground  to  be  reconnoitered,  the  distance  to 
which  the  reconnaissance  is  to  be  extended,  and  the 
hour  at  which  the  patrol  is  sent  out.  The  union  of 
infantry  and  cavalry  is  recommended  by  some  military 
writers  ; but  such  a measure  seems  of  doubtful  value 
in  any  case,  and  worse  than  useless  when  the  cavalry 
can  take  care  of  itself  with  its  own  fire  action.  In- 
fantry is  preferable  to  cavalry  for  patrolling  only  at 
night,  or  in  a very  close  and  broken  country.  It  is 
often  advisable  to  attach  a few  troopers  to  an  infantry 
patrol  merely  as  mounted  orderlies,  but  no  further 
union  of  the  two  arms  on  this  service  should  ordinarily 
be  contemplated. 

SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 

The  conditions  under  which  small  infantry  patrols  are 
sent  out  differ  very  much.  If  possible,  the  following 
rules  should  be  observed  : 

Composition. — Experienced  soldiers  should  be  de- 
tailed, and  if  no  non-commissioned  officer  is  available, 
an  intelligent  private  should  be  selected  to  command 
the  patrol,  and  the  others  ordered  to  obey  him.  It  is 
desirable  that  at  least  one  member  of  the  patrol  should 
be  able  to  speak  the  language  of  the  country  in  which 
the  army  is  operating. 

Preparation  and  Inspection. — The  patrol  commander 
should  be  given  clear  and  definite  instructions  in  regard 
to  the  duty  to  be  performed,  and  he  should  be  required 
to  repeat  them  to  the  members  of  the  patrol  in  the 
presence  of  the  officer  giving  them.  These  instruc- 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


IOi 


tions  should  inform  him  of  the  object  of  the  reconnais- 
sance, what  is  known  about  the  enemy,  the  nature  of 
the  ground  to  be  reconnoitered,  whether  he  is  to  recon- 
noiter  in  one  direction  or  in  several,  how  long  he  is  to 
remain  out,  where  his  reports  are  to  be  sent,  and,  if 
other  patrols  are  sent  out  at  the  same  time,  the  particu- 
lar route  which  he  is  to  follow.  For  instance — 

Captain  (to  sergeant  of  patrol)  : Do  you  know  the 
country  in  front  ? 

Sergeant:  No,  sir. 

Captain:  Well,  you  see  that  hill  half-a-mile  out — the 
road  forks  there.  Small  parties  of  the  enemy  are  sus- 
pected in  that  vicinity.  Move  out  and  observe  the  fork 
and  the  open  fields  to  the  left.  Don’t  reconnoiter  the 
ground  at  the  right  of  the  fork  ; another  patrol  will  take 
care  of  that.  If  you  see  this  patrol  don’t  mistake  it 
for  the  enemy.  Remain  out  until  dark.  Report  to  me 
at  No.  2 Picket.  Don’t  fire  unless  you  have  to. 

The  patrol  commander  must  be  sure  that  he  under- 
stands his  instructions.  If  he  has  the  slightest  doubt 
about  it,  he  must  ask  for  a repetition. 

Pie  then  inspects  the  patrol,  being  careful  that  each 
man  has  the  proper  amount  of  ammunition,  and  that 
none  are  sick,  intoxicated,  or  foot-sore.  If  any  man  has 
a cold  which  causes  him  to  cough,  he  must  be  replaced 
by  another  man,  even  though  he  be  not  on  sick-report. 
The  patrol  commander  also  sees  that  the  arms  and 
accouterments  of  his  men  are  so  arranged  as  neither  to 
rattle  nor  to  glisten  in  the  sunlight.  He  also  points  out 
to  the  members  of  the  patrol  the  positions  of  troops  of 
their  own  army,  and  a place  of  assembly  for  men  who 


102 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


may  be  detached  or  become  separated  from  the  patrol, 
choosing,  if  practicable,  some  prominent  land-mark. 
He  next  gives  the  men  their  general  instructions,  cau- 
tioning them  especially  that  they  must  neither  talk  nor 
smoke,  and  explains,  if  they  be  not  already  familiar 
with  them,  the  signals  by  which  they  are  to  communi- 
cate. 

Signals. — In  addition  to  the  signals  described  in  the 
Drill  Regulations,  the  following  should  be  used  : 

Attention,  or,  Do  you  see  anything?  Wave  the  hand 
across  the  face,  or  whistle  once. 

Affirmative  signal  : Raise  and  lower  the  arm  verti- 
cally twice,  or  whistle  twice. 

Negative  signal : Extend  the  arm  horizontally  thrice, 
or  whistle  thrice. 

Enemy  in  sight  or  hearing  : Hold  the  rifle  horizon- 
tally above  the  head  with  both  hands,  holding  it  steadily 
if  the  enemy  is  in  small  bodies,  and  raising  and  lower- 
ing it  repeatedly  if  he  is  in  force.  To  signal  by  whistle, 
whistle  four  times. 

To  ask  for  reinforcements  : Extend  the  arm  horizon- 
tally and  wave  it  rapidly  with  a circular  motion,  or  give 
a long,  continuous  whistle. 

In  a very  close  country,  in  foggy  weather,  or  at  night, 
the  whistle  must  be  relied  upon,  but  at  all  other  times 
its  use  should  be  avoided.  In  giving  the  signals,  the 
whistle  must  be  used  softly,  as  a loud  noise  might  be 
heard  by  the  enemy.  In  every  case,  except  wrheu  ask- 
ing for  reinforcements,  the  note  should  be  short.  If 
the  men  are  not  provided  with  whistles,  they  should 
give  the  whistle  signals  by  mouth.  Many  different 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  103 

signals  may  be  devised,  such  as  waving  the  hat  or 
handkerchief,  striking  the  butt  of  the  piece  with  the 
knuckles,  etc.  No  signals  should  be  made  unneces- 
sarily, and  when  near  the  enemy  the  greatest  care 
should  be  exercised  that  the  signals  be  not  detected  by 
him. 

Formation. — The  disposition  of  the  patrol  while  on 
the  march  can  not  be  definitely  prescribed.  The  patrols 
should  have  the  general  formation  of  main  body,  ad- 
vance guard,  rear  guard,  and  flankers,  even  when  each 
can  be  represented  by  only  one  man.  If  the  patrol 
consists  of  less  than  five  men,  the  rear  guard  or  one  or 
both  flankers  may  be  dispensed  with  ; but  the  advance 
guard  should  always  be  retained.  It  is  generally  better 
to  do  without  one,  or  even  both,  of  the  flankers  than 
without  the  rear-guard  man,  whose  vigilance  prevents 
the  patrol  from  being  attacked  in  the  rear  and  cut  off. 
On  nearing  the  enemy,  the  patrol  should  generally  ex- 
tend in  line  to  facilitate  observation.  Figures  1 to  6, 
plate  X,  give  typical  formations  of  a small  patrol. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  typical  forma- 
tions are  merely  hints,  the  formation  of  the  patrol 
always  depending  upon  its  object,  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  and  the  character  and  position  of  the  enemy. 
The  only  definite  rule  that  can  be  laid  down  is  the  fol- 
lowing : The  patrol  must  always  be  so  formed  as  to 
facilitate  the  gaming  of  information , and  to  insure , if 
possible , the  escape  of  at  least  one  man , if  the  patrol  should 
be  cut  off.  Any  disposition  that  complies  with  this  rule 
is  right. 

The  distances  and  intervals  between  the  members  of 


104  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

the  patrol  depend  upon  circumstances.  They  are  rarely 
less  than  twenty-five  or  more  than  one  hundred  yards. 
The  men  should  be  close  enough  to  see  and  hear  each 
other’s  signals,  and  for  mutual  support.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  should  not  so  crowd  together  that  the  patrol 
could  not  see  more  than  a single  man  could — a fault  to 
which  men  are  prone  through  anxiety  about  being  cut 
off.  The  commander  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  point, 
and  the  other  members  should  keep  the  same  man  in 
view;  or,  in  the  case  of  a large  patrol,  or  one  on  an  ex- 
tended front,  each  man  should  endeavor  to  keep  in  sight 
the  man  next  him  towards  the  point.  The  point  should, 
when  practicable,  consist  of  two  men,  in  order  that  one 
may  scout  vigilantly  towards  the  enemy  while  the  other 
watches  for  signals  from  the  men  on  the  right  and  left 
and  from  the  commander.  The  signals  from  the  other 
members  of  the  patrol  are  generally  transmitted  to  the 
commander  through  the  point.  To  assemble  the  patrol, 
the  commander  signals  to  the  point  to  halt,  and  moves 
up  to  it,  followed  by  the  rear-guard  man.  The  other 
men  at  once  close  in  on  the  point,  conforming  their  pace 
to  that  of  the  commander. 

Conduct  of  Patrol. — The  patrol  moves  cautiously,  but 
not  timidly , along  hedges,  walls,  ditches,  ravines,  etc., 
seeking  in  every  way  to  see  without  being  seen.  It 
halts  frequently  to  listen,  and  to  make  careful  observa- 
tion of  the  ground.  At  each  halt  the  men  should  note 
their  bearings  relatively  to  certain  landmarks,  and  the 
commander  should  frequently  turn  about  to  observe  the 
general  appearance  of  the  landscape  and  note  particular 
objects,  in  order  that  he  may  not  lose  his  way  even  if 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


io5 


compelled  to  make  a hasty  retreat.  It  may  be  well  in 
some  cases  to  mark  the  route  by  blazing  the  trees,  fast- 
ening wisps  of  straw  to  posts,  or  marking  the  path  by 
dropping  small  stones  ; but  such  methods  are  open  to 
the  objections  that  they  take  time  and  might  betray  the 
trail  of  the  patrol  to  the  enemy.  * 

It  is  advisable  for  a patrol  to  return  by  a different 
route  from  the  one  followed  on  advance,  if  it  be  practi- 
cable for  it  to  do  so,  as  it  thus  extends  its  reconnais- 
sance and  lessens  the  danger  of  being  cut  off ; but  a 
small  patrol  rarely  goes  more  than  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  beyond  the  force  which  sends  it  out,  and  in  this 
limited  distance  it  does  not  often  have  a choice  of  more 
than  one  road. 

Generally,  the  patrol  should  avoid  moving  on  great 
roads  and  entering  villages  and  inhabited  places.  But 
this  does  not  mean  that  observation  of  great  roads  is  to 
be  neglected.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  the  very  ones 
that  should  be  most  carefully  watched;  for  they  are  the 
routes  that  must  be  followed  by  any  bodies  of  the  enemy 
whose  movements  are  really  worth  reporting.  The 
patrol,  while  moving  across  fields  and  along  such  ob- 
jects as  have  been  already  mentioned,  should  endeavor 
to  keep  a constant  watch  on  the  great  roads.  Inhabited 
places  should  be  turned  and  carefully  observed,  but 
should  not  ordinarily  be  entered  by  a small  patrol.  At 
night,'  or  in  a fog  or  snow  storm,  the  patrol  must  of 
necessity  move  on  the  great  roads,  in  order  to  avoid 
losing  its  way,  unless  it  is  moving  over  ground  with 
which  it  is  perfectly  familiar. 

* These  methods  have,  however,  the  sanction  of  such  good  authori- 
ties as  Shaw  and  the  Guide  Manuel  du  Chef  de  Patrouille. 


io6 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


The  patrol  should  not  halt  to  rest  before  its  return, 
unless  circumstances  render  it  imperatively  necessary 
to  do  so.  In  such  case  it  should  rest  in  concealment  in 
some  place  which  offers  advantages  for  defense,  and 
from  which  a retreat  can  be  easily  effected.  In  the  case 
of  a small  patrol,  the  latter  consideration  is  the  more 
important.  The  position  chosen  should  not  be  near 
any  habitation.  During  the  day  it  should  be  on  high 
ground,  from  which  an  extensive  view  may  be  obtained; 
at  night  it  should  be  on  low  ground,  so  as  to  bring  ap- 
proaching people  into  view  on  the  sky-line. 

If  another  patrol  of  the  same  army,  or  any  other 
friendly  force,  is  met,  the  patrol  commander  should  ex- 
change information  with  it,  and  inform  himself  of  its 
strength,  its  destination,  and  the  name  of  its  com- 
mander, in  order  that  he  may  report  the  same  on  his 
return.  Friendly  patrols  should  recognize  each  other 
without  noise  ; but  at  night,  the  one  that  first  discovers 
the  other  must  challenge  and  demand  the  parole  and 
countersign. 

Encountering  the  Enemy. — The  patrol  should  exer- 
cise the  utmost  vigilance  from  the  moment  of  its  de- 
parture ; but,  unless  it  has  received  orders  to  return 
immediately  upon  discovering  hostile  troops,  its  real 
work  begins  when  it  touches  upon  the  enemy.  If  a 
small  hostile  patrol  is  discovered,  it  is  generally  better 
to  remain  in  concealment  than  to  attack  ; for  the  noise 
of  combat  might  cause  enough  mischief  to  more  than 
counterbalance  all  that  could  be  gained  by  defeating 
the  hostile  patrol,  even  if  prisoners  were  captured.  If 
the  patrol  is  discovered  by  the  hostile  patrol,  and  finds 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  107 

itself  unable  to  escape  without  fighting,  it  should  at- 
tack boldly,  and  should  endeavor  to  take  prisoners. 

When  a hostile  patrol  has  penetrated  so  far  as  to  make 
it  probable  that  it  has  gained  important  information, 
an  attempt  should  be  made  to  ambuscade  and  capture 
it.  If  surprised,  a patrol  should  fight  resolutely,  unless 
the  enemy  were  in  such  force  as  to  make  resistance 
hopeless.  In  the  latter  case,  or  if  defeated  in  any  case, 
the  patrol  should  disperse,  each  man  making  his  way 
back  to  the  rendezvous  designated  beforehand.  It 
should  then,  after  uniting,  continue  its  reconnaissance, 
sending  one  man  back  to  the  command  with  a report. 
It  should  be  an  invariable  rule  not  to  quit  the  recon- 
naissance until  some  result  has  been  obtained.  If  the 
enemy  is  near  at  hand  and  in  force,  the  patrol  must 
open  fire,  and  keep  up  a lively  fusillade  in  retreat,  as 
the  only  means  of  giving  prompt  warning  of  impend- 
ing danger. 

If,  notwithstanding  its  prudence,  the  patrol  falls  into 
an  ambuscade,  it  should  boldly  attack;  for  courage  and 
coolness  may  wrest  success  from  the  most  adverse  cir- 
cumstances. If  a sentinel  or  patrol  of  the  enemy  is 
suddenly  encountered  in  the  dark,  no  answer  should  be 
made  to  his  challenge,  but  the  patrol  should  remain 
halted  and  silent.  The  enemy  may  think  himself  mis- 
taken and  pay  no  further  attention.* 

If  the  challenge  is  repeated,  the  patrol  should  sneak 

*The  following  remarkable  instance  is  mentioned  by  Dufour  : “At 
the  siege  of  Luxembourg,  Vaubau,  wishing  to  ascertain,  by  persoual 
observation,  the  real  condition  of  affairs,  as  was  his  custom,  advanced 
under  the  escort  of  a few  grenadiers,  who  were  left  in  rear  lying  upon 


io8 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


away  as  quickly  as  possible,  unless  it  has  orders  to  cap- 
ture prisoners,  in  which  case  a sudden  rush  upon  the 
sentinel  might  enable  the  patrol  to  overpower  him  and 
carry  him  off  before  he  could  receive  assistance.  If 
some  members  of  the  patrol  can  speak  the  language  of 
the  sentinel,  they  may  succeed  in  completely  allaying 
his  suspicions  with  a plausible  answer  to  his  challenge.! 

Inhabitants. — Whenever  the  approach  of  people  is 
signalled,  the  patrol  remains  concealed  in  observation. 
If  they  prove  to  be  civilians  coming  from  the  direction 
of  the  enemy,  they  should  be  questioned  carefully,  as 
they  may  sometimes  give  valuable  information.  They 
should  be  asked  whether  they  have  seen  any  of  the 
enemy’s  soldiers;  where  they  were,  what  they  were 
doing  ; whether  they  were  infantry,  cavalry,  or  artil- 
lery ; whether  they  were  regular  troops  or  militia  ; what 
kind  of  uniforms  they  wore  ; whether  the  horses  and 
men  were  in  good  condition,  or  seemed  to  be  worn  out 
and  fatigued  ; how  the  troops  of  the  enemy  behaved 


the  ground.  He  was  crossing  the  glacis  alone,  under  cover  of  the 
twilight  darkness,  when  he  was  discovered.  He  beckoned  with  his 
hand  to  the  sentinels  not  to  fire,  and  continued  to  advance  instead  of 
retiring.  The  enemy  took  him  for  one  of  themselves,  and  Vauban, 
having  seen  what  he  wished,  retired  slowly,  and  was  saved  by  his  ad- 
mirable coolness.” 

f When,  in  the  retreat  from  Moscow,  Eugene  was  executing  his  peri- 
lous march  across  Milaradowitch’s  front,  under  cover  of  the  darkness, 
the  moon  suddenly  emerged  from  a heavy  cloud,  and  at  the  same  mo- 
ment a Russian  sentinel  challenged.  A Polish  officer  with  the  French 
rau  up  to  the  sentinel,  and  coolly  said  to  him,  in  Russian,  in  a low 
tone  : “ Be  silent ! don’t  you  see  that  we  belong  to  the  corps  of 
Ouwaroff,  and  that  we  are  going  on  a secret  expedition?”  The  sen- 
tinel thus  assured  kept  quiet.  (Segur.) 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  IO9 

themselves  ; how  the  road  leading  to  the  enemy  is 
situated,  and  its  condition  ; whether  the  enemy  has 
scouting  parties  out  ; whether  he  seems  to  be  vigilant  ; 
whether  he  has  taken  any  guides  from  the  village,  etc. 
Ignorance  is  more  likely  to  be  encountered  than  un- 
truthfulness, and  even  information  given  sincerely  will 
probably  be  more  or  less  inaccurate.  Military  terms 
should  be  avoided  when  questioning  country  people. 
It  is  best  to  ask  them  when  the  enemy’s  troops  began 
arriving,  when  they  all  got  in,  etc.,  and  thus  get  data 
from  which  to  compute  the  enemy’s  strength  ; for  the 
estimates  of  country  people  as  to  the  numbers  of  a 
military  force  are  almost  sure  to  be  worthless.  In  a 
report,  dated  Gettysburg,  June  30,  1863,  General  Buford 
says  : 

“ I entered  this  place  to-day  at  11  A.  M.  Found  every- 
body in  a terrible  state  of  excitement  on  account  of  the 
enemy’s  advance  upon  this  place.  He  had  approached 
to  within  half  a mile  of  the  town  when  the  head  of  my 
column  entered.  His  force  was  terribly  exaggerated  by 
reasonable  and  truthful  but  inexperienced  men.” 

Questions  formulating  a statement  to  which  the  person 
questioned  may  answer  yes  or  no,  should  be  avoided. 
The  questions  should  be  such  as  to  draw  out  a narrative 
from  the  person  interrogated.  It  should  always  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  questions  asked  may  be  repeated  to  the 
enemy,  and  the  questioner  must,  therefore,  be  careful 
so  to  frame  them  that  they  will  not  give  a key  to  his 
designs.  When  several  persons  are  questioned,  they 
should  be  examined  separately. 

The  matter  of  questioning  civilians,  employing  guides, 


IIO 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


and  examining  prisoners,  is  more  applicable  to  cavalry 
than  infantry  patrols,  and  to  strong  rather  than  small 
ones.  This  seems,  however,  to  be  the  most  convenient 
place  to  consider  these  subjects,  and,  in  fact,  they  are 
applicable  to  all  patrols. 

People  going  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  should  be 
halted,  and  never  allowed  to  proceed,  unless  they  have 
undoubtedly  genuine  passes  from  proper  authority.  If 
they  are  contumacious,  they  must  be  threatened,  and 
sometimes  roughly  handled.  It  may  be  necessary  in 
some  cases  to  tie  them  to  trees  or  posts,  or  even  to 
gag  them  or  threaten  them  with  death  if  they  cry  out  ; 
but  it  should  be  an  invariable  rule  never  to  resort  to 
harsh  measures  when  gentler  means  will  secure  the 
same  end. 

Guides. — If  it  be  necessary  to  take  a guide  from  among 
the  people  of  the  country,  he  should  be  kindly  treated, 
but  warned  that  he  will  pay  with  his  life  the  penalty  of 
treachery.  The  degree  of  intelligence  and  education 
possessed  by  the  guide  will  decide  the  measures  proper 
to  employ  with  him  ; but  he  must  always  be  carefully 
guarded,  and  must  not  be  discharged  until  there  is  no 
longer  danger  of  his  betraying  the  patrol.  No  one  but 
the  commander  should  communicate  with  the  guides, 
and  the  soldiers  should  not,  under  any  circumstances, 
be  allowed  either  to  chaff  or  threaten  them.  Drovers, 
peddlers,  livery-stable  employes,  and  country  doctors 
will  generally  be  the  best  guides.  If  a man  can  be 
found  who  has  served  as  a guide  to  the  enemy,  so  much 
the  better.  Many  people,  in  order  to  escape  service  as 
guides,  will  declare  that  they  know  nothing  about  the 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


Ill 


country.  If  they  appear  to  be  intelligent,  it  is  best  to 
take  them  along  in  spite  of  their  pretended  ignorance, 
if  better  guides  are  not  manifestly  available,  and  keep 
them  until  their  want  of  knowledge  seems  to  be  more 
than  a sham. 

Reconnaissance  of  Different  Kinds  of  Ground. — The 
manner  of  reconnoitering  different  kinds  of  ground 
depends  mainly  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  indi- 
vidual case,  and  no  rigid  rule  can  be  prescribed.  There 
are,  however,  certain  general  methods  of  reconnoiter- 
ing various  places,  which  may  be  given  as  the  result  of 
centuries  of  warfare,  and  which  are,  in  some  respects, 
common  to  the  armies  of  the  most  enlightened  nations 
and  the  warriors  of  savage  tribes.*  The  following  sug- 
gestions are  offered;  but  the  student  must  bear  in  mind 
that  each  case  presents  its  own  problem,  to  be  solved 
according  to  its  own  circumstances  : 

Whenever  possible,  the  men  composing  the  patrol 
should  keep  under  cover.  If  there  is  a bank  or  cover 
of  any  kind  parallel  to  the  line  of  march,  they  will  keep 
it  between  them  and  the  supposed  position  of  the  enemy. 
If  the  different  features  affording  cover  lie  perpendicular 
to  the  line  of  march,  the  patrol  will  halt  a moment  be- 
hind each,  peer  cautiously  about,  and  then  pass  rapidly 
to  the  next,  the  men  moving  one  at  a time,  stooping 
and  running.  No  country  is  so  open  that  small  folds 
of  ground  affording  some  degree  of  concealment  can 
not  be  found. 

Cross-roads. — When  the  patrol  comes  to  a cross-road, 

* For  remarks  upon  the  methods  of  scoutiug  in  use  among  the  In- 
dians, see  Appendix  III. 


112 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


two  men  should  be  sent  along  it  on  each  flank  until  they 
come  to  the  first  turn,  the  patrol  halting.  If  the  men 
see  nothing  suspicious,  they  return,  and  the  patrol  pushes 
on.  If  anything  suspicious  is  seen,  one  man  rushes  back 
quickly  to  the  patrol,  while  the  other  remains  in  obser- 
vation. If  the  patrol  is  very  small,  two  men  should  be 
sent  first  to  one  side  and  then  to  the  other,  in  preference 
to  sending  a single  man  in  each  direction. 

Heights. — If  the  natrol  is  large  enough  to  admit  of 
detaching  them,  one  or  two  men  climb  the  slope  on 
either  flank,  keeping  in  sight  of  the  patrol  if  possible. 
In  any  case,  one  man  moves  cautiously  up  the  hill,  fol- 
lowed by  the  others  in  single  file  at  such  distance  that 
each  can  keep  his  predecessor  in  view. 

Defiles. — If  time  permits,  the  heights  on  either  side 
should  be  reconuoitered  by  flankers  before  the  patrol 
enters  the  defile.  If  the  heights  are  inaccessible,  or 
time  is  urgent,  the  patrol  pushes  through,  in  single 
file,  at  double  time,  the  distance  being  the  same  as  in 
ascending  a hill.  The  same  method  should  be  adopted 
in  reconnoitering  a railroad  cut  or  sunken  road. 

Bridges  or  Fords. — The  front  of  the  patrol  is  con- 
tracted so  as  to  bring  all  the  men  to  the  passage.  The 
patrol  then  crosses  rapidly,  and  takes  up  a proper  forma- 
tion. A bridge  is  first  examined,  to  see  that  it  is  safe 
and  has  not  been  tampered  with  by  the  enemy. 

Woods. — The  patrol  enters  in  skirmishing  order,  the 
intervals  being  as  great  as  may  be  consistent  with  mu- 
tual observation  and  support  on  the  part  of  the  members 
of  the  patrol.  On  arriving  at  the  farther  edge  of  the 
wood,  the  patrol  should  remain  concealed  and  care- 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  113 

fully  look  about  before  passing  out  to  the  open  ground. 
When  there  is  such  a growth  of  underbrush  as  to  make 
this  method  impracticable,  a road  through  the  wood 
must  be  reconnoitered  as  in  the  case  of  a defile,  though 
not  usually  at  double  time.  If  in  this  case  a cross-road 
is  found  in  the  wood,  the  patrol  must  be  assembled  and 
the  lateral  road  reconnoitered  (see  “Cross-roads”)  before 
passing  beyond  it. 

Inclosures  (gardens,  parks,  ce7neteries\ — The  lead- 
ing patrollers  first  examine  the  exterior,  to  make  sure 
that  the  enemy  is  not  concealed  behind  one  of  the  faces 
of  the  inclosure.  They  then  proceed  to  examine  the 
interior.  Great  care  should  be  taken  in  reconnoitering 
and  entering  an  inclosure,  as  an  imprudent  patrol  might 
find  it  a veritable  trap. 

Houses. — When  a house  or  farm  - building  is  ap- 
proached by  a patrol,  it  is  first  carefully  reconnoitered 
from  a distance,  and  if  nothing  suspicious  is  seen,  it  is 
then  approached  by  two  men,  the  rest  of  the  party  re- 
maining concealed  in  observation.  If  the  patrol  is 
large  enough  to  admit  of  it,  four  men  approach  the 
house,  so  as  to  examine  the  front  and  back  entrances 
simultaneously.  Only  one  man  enters  the  door,  the 
other  remaining  outside  to  give  the  alarm,  should  a 
party  of  the  enemy  be  concealed  in  the  house.  The 
patrol  should  not  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  the  house 
any  longer  than  necessary,  as  information  relative  to 
its  numbers  and  movements  might  be  given  to  the 
enemy,  if  a hostile  party  should  subsequently  visit  the 
place. 

Villages. — If  the  village  is  seen  to  be  in  possession  of 
8 — w 


1 14  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

the  enemy,  the  patrol  must  be  content  with  reconnoiter- 
ing  it  from  the  outside.  If  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
is  not  apparent,  the  patrol  should  enter  the  village, 
being  disposed  in  any  way  conforming  to  the  general 
rule.  A formation  suitable  in  many  cases  would  be 
in  single  file  at  proper  distances  for  observation  and 
support,  each  man  being  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
street  from  his  predecessor.  The  patrol  should  push 
through  the  village  as  rapidly  as  possible  ; and  when 
it  has  reached  the  opposite  side,  two  of  the  party 
might  be  detached,  if  expedient,  to  reenter  the  village 
to  seek  further  information,  the  rest  of  the  patrol  re- 
maining in  some  position  affording  good  observation 
and  secure  retreat. 

If  the  patrol  is  strong  enough,  it  should  seize  the 
post-office,  telegraph  office,  aud  railroad  station,  and 
secure  all  important  papers  that  may  be  there.  If  the 
patrol  is  part  of  an  advance  guard,  it  should  seize  the 
mayor  and  postmaster  of  the  place,  and  turn  them  over 
to  the  commander  of  the  vanguard  with  the  papers 
seized. 

At  night,  a village  must  be  even  more  cautiously  ap- 
proached by  a small  patrol  than  by  day.  The  patrol 
should  glide  through  back  alleys,  across  gardens,  etc., 
rather  than  move  along  the  main  street.  If  a light  is 
seen  in  a window,  two  of  the  men  should  approach, 
look  in,  aud  listen.  If  there  are  no  signs  of  the  enemy, 
they  should  knock  and  make  inquiry.  If  no  light  is 
seen,  and  it  seems  imprudent  to  rouse  any  of  the  people, 
the  patrol  must  watch  and  capture  one  of  the  inhabit- 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  II5 

ants,  and  get  from  him  such  information  as  he  may 
possess.  * 

The  best  time  for  a patrol  to  approach  a village  is  at 
early  dawn,  when  it  is  light  enough  to  see,  but  before 
the  inhabitants  are  up. 

Cities  and  Towns. — It  is  dangerous  in  the  extreme 
for  a small  patrol  to  enter  a village,  unless  it  is  certain 
that  it  is  not  occupied  by  the  enemy  ; for  the  men 
could  be  easily  shot  down  by  a fire  from  windows,  cellar- 
ways,  etc.,  or  entrapped  and  captured.  As  a rule,  cities 
and  large  towns  should  not  be  entered  by  a small  patrol', 
but  should  be  merely  watched  from  the  outside. 

Reconnaissance  of  Enemy  in  Position. — The  patrol 
endeavors  to  ascertain  the  direction  and  extent  of  the 
line  of  observation,  how  its  flanks  are  supported,  the 
positions  of  the  sentinels,  their  number,  the  number  of 
pickets,  the  places  where  the  line  may  be  penetrated 
with  the  least  risk  of  discovery,  the  strength  of  the 
hostile  patrols,  and  the  routes  taken  by  them.  It  is 
also  of  great  importance  to  ascertain  whether  good 
roads  extend  laterally  behind  the  enemy’s  pickets,  as 
such  roads  could  be  used  by  a force  sent  out  to  capture 
them.  If  the  enemy’s  line  of  sentinels  is  penetrated, 
the  patrol  may,  perhaps,  approach  near  enough  to  the 
picket  to  overhear  the  countersign  and  parole  ; but  it 
must  be  certain  that  the  advantage  to  be  gained  is 
worth  the  risk,  as  the  patrol  will  be  in  great  danger  of 
capture.  If  a point  can  be  found  on  the  flank  of  the 
enemy’s  position  from  which  a view  of  his  dispositions 
in  rear  of  the  line  of  sentinels  can  be  obtained,  the  com- 


* Von  Mirus. 


n6 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


mander  of  the  patrol  endeavors  to  gain  such  point,  and, 
concealing  his  patrol  near  at  hand,  makes  careful  ob- 
servation. The  best  time  for  such  observation  is  at 
daybreak,  and  the  selected  point  should  be  gained  be- 
fore dawn,  so  as  to  enable  the  patrol  to  observe  the 
relieving  of  the  outpost.  The  longer  the  patrol  re- 
mains, the  more  it  will  see,  but  the  greater  will  be  its 
danger  of  being  discovered.  The  patrol  commander 
should  have  sufficient  courage  to  remain  long  enough 
to  gain  valuable  information,  and  sufficient  prudence  to 
withdraw  in  time  to  escape  capture. 

If  any  important  movements  are  observed,  such  as 
the  withdrawing  of  the  sentinels,  the  changing  of  their 
positions,  preparations  for  advance  or  retreat,  etc.,  the 
patrol  commander  sends,  a man  back  at  once  with  a re- 
port of  what  has  been  seen. 

Reconnaissance  of  Enemy  on  the  March.  — If  the  enemy 
is  on  the  march,  the  patrol  should  conceal  itself  close  to 
the  hostile  column,  but  far  enough  away  to  escape  dis- 
covery by  the  enemy’s  flankers.  Conspicuous  places 
should  be  avoided,  even  if  at  some  distance  from  the 
column,  as  they  would  probably  be  carefully  searched. 
The  best  place  is  a ditch  or  wallow,  which  will  conceal 
the  patrol  and  not  be  visible  even  at  a short  distance. 
The  patrol  carefully  observes  the  progress  of  the  column, 
noting  its  breadth  of  front,  its  rate  of  march,  and  the 
time  it  takes  to  pass  a given  point.  A given  point  is 
passed  in  one  minute  by  about  250  infantry  in  column 
of  fours  ; by  about  150  cavalry  in  fours  at  a walk,  or,  if 
iu  rear  of  the  infantry,  by  about  120  ; by  about  260  cav- 
alry in  fours  at  a trot,  and  by  about  4 guns  if  in  rear  of 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


II? 


infantry.  If  the  whole  column  can  be  seen,  and  its 
length  can  be  ascertained  by  the  known  distance  be- 
tween any  two  points  which  it  passes,  its  strength  can 
at  once  be  estimated  by  allowing  one  yard  for  every  two 
infantry  soldiers,  one  yard  for  each  cavalry  soldier,  and 
twenty  yards  for  each  gun  or  caisson.  An  allowance  of 
from  one-fourth  to  one-half  must  be  made  for  opening 
out,  depending  upon  the  state  of  the  roads  and  weather 
and  the  discipline  of  the  troops  composing  the  column. 
Reports  will  be  sent  in,  from  time  to  time,  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  patrol,  who  will  not  hesitate,  if  necessary, 
to  send  back  his  last  man  with  a report. 

Signs  and  Trails. — The  patrol  must  carefully  watch 
for  all  signs  and  trails  of  the  enemy,  as  information  of 
the  greatest  value  is  thus  sometimes  obtained.  The 
different  indications  to  be  looked  for  are  almost  innu- 
merable. The  following  are  among  the  most  impor- 
tant : * 

If  boats  in  great  number  are  seen  assembled  on  the 
bank  of  a stream,  it  is  an  indication  of  preparation  to 
cross.  If  they  are  found  burned,  it  is  an  indication  of 
retreat.  If  important  bridges  are  found  broken,  it  is  a 
sign  of  a long  retreat.  If  at  some  distance  above  the 
point  where  we  are  preparing  to  throw  a bridge,  large 
boats  heavily  laden  with  stone  are  found,  it  is  an  evi- 

* These  notes  on  signs  and  indications  are  compiled,  with  some 
modification,  from  De  Brack,  Von  Mirus,  and  the  Guide  Manuel  du 
Chef  de  Patrouille.  Many  of  the  same  rules  are  found  in  Wolseley’s 
“ Soldier’s  Pocket  Book  ” and  Shaw’s  “ Elements  of  Modem  Tactics.” 
All  later  authorities  follow  General  De  Brack  in  the  essentials  of  this 
subject. 


n8 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


dence  of  the  enemy’s  intention  to  destroy  the  bridge 
and  oppose  the  crossing. 

If  at  night  the  flames  of  the  enemy’s  camp-fires  dis- 
appear and  reappear,  something  is  moving  between  the 
observer  and  the  fires.  If  smoke  as  well  as  flame  is  visi- 
ble, the  fires  are  very  near.  If  the  fires  are  very  numer- 
ous and  lighted  successively,  and  if  soon  after  being 
lighted  they  go  out,  it  is  probable  that  the  enemy  is 
preparing  a retreat  and  trying  to  deceive  us.  If  the 
fires  burn  very  brightly  and  clearly  at  a late  hour,  the 
enemy  has  probably  gone,  and  has  left  a detachment  to 
keep  the  fires  burning.  If,  at  an  unusual  time,  much 
smoke  is  seen  ascending  from  the  enemy’s  camp,  it  is 
probable  that  he  is  engaged  in  cooking  preparatory  to 
moving  off. 

The  rumbling  of  vehicles,  cracking  of  whips,  neigh- 
ing of  horses,  braying  of  mules,  and  barking  of  dogs 
often  indicate  the  arrival  or  departure  of  troops.  If 
the  noise  remains  in  the  same  place,  and  new  fires  are 
lighted,  it  is  probable  that  reinforcements  have  arrived. 
If  the  noise  grows  more  indistinct,  troops  are  probably 
withdrawing.  If,  added  to  this,  the  fires  appear  to  be 
dying  out,  and  the  enemy  seems  to  redouble  the  vigi- 
lance of  his  outposts,  the  indications  of  retreat  are  very 
strong. 

The  noise  made  by  a strong  column  on  the  march  is 
distinct  and  continuous  ; that  of  a small  body,  feeble 
and  interrupted.  The  distance  at  which  the  noise  of 
marching  can  be  heard  depends  upon  the  nature  of 
the  ground  marched  over,  the  direction  of  the  wind, 
and  the  presence  or  absence  of  other  sounds.  On  a calm 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


II9 

night,  a company  of  infantry,  marching  at  route  step  on* 
a hard  road,  can  be  heard  at  a distance  of  500  or  600 
yard’s  ; a troop  of  cavalry  at  a walk,  600  or  700  yards  ; 
a troop  of  cavalry  at  a trot  or  gallop,  artillery,  and 
heavy  wagons,  900  or  1,000  yards. 

The  dust  raised  by  the  march  of  a column  furnishes 
an  indication  not  only  of  the  direction  of  the  march, 
but  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  column.  When 
infantry  is  marching,  the  dust  is  low  and  thick.  With 
cavalry,  the  dust  is  higher  ; and  as  this  arm  moves  rap- 
idly, the  upper  part  of  the  cloud  is  thinner  and  disap- 
pears more  quickly  than  in  the  case  of  infantry.  The 
clouds  of  dust  raised  by  artillery  and  wagons  are  une- 
qual in  height  and  disconnected.  Hence,  by  noting  the 
length  of  a line  of  dust  and  the  intervals  in  it,  the 
strength  and  composition  of  the  column  may  be  esti- 
mated. The  effect  of  the  wind  in  dissipating  the  dust 
must,  however,  be  taken  into  consideration. 

If  the  reflection  from  the  weapons  of  marching  troops 
is  very  brilliant,  it  is  probable  that  the  troops  are  march- 
ing towards  the  observer  ; otherwise,  it  is  presumable 
that  they  are  marching  in  the  other  direction.  If  the 
rays  of  light  slant  from  left  to  right  downwards,  the 
troops  are  marching  to  the  observer’s  right ; if  the  rays 
slant  from  right  to  left  downwards,  the  column  is 
marching  to  the  observer’s  left. 

A man  with  good  vision  should  be  able,  on  a clear 
day,  to  distinguish  objects  on  the  sky-line  as  follows  : 

At  a distance  of  9 to  12  miles,  church  spires  and  towers. 

“ “ 5 to  7 “ windmills. 

2 to  “ chimneys  of  light  color. 

“ 2,000  yards,  trunks  of  large  trees. 

“ 1,000  “ single  posts. 


120  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

At  500  yards  the  panes  of  glass  may  be  distinguished 
in  a window. 

Troops  are  visible  at  2,000  yards,  at  which  distance 
a mounted  man  looks  like  a mere  speck  ; at  1,200  yards 
infantry  can  be  distinguished  from  cavalry  ; at  1,000 
yards  a line  of  men  looks  like  a broad  belt  ; at  600 
yards  the  files  of  a squad  can  be  counted,  and  at  400 
yards  the  movements  of  the  arms  and  legs  can  be 
plainly  seen. 

The  larger,  brighter,  or  better  lighted  an  object  is, 
the  nearer  it  seems.  An  object  seems  nearer  when  it 
has  a dark  background  than  when  it  has  a light  one, 
and  closer  to  the  observer  when  the  air  is  clear  than 
when  it  is  raining,  snowing,  foggy,  or  the  atmosphere 
is  filled  with  smoke.  An  object  looks  farther  off  when 
the  observer  is  facing  the  sun  than  when  he  has  his 
back  to  it.  A smooth  expanse  of  snow,  grain  fields,  or 
water  makes  distances  seem  shorter  than  they  really 
are.* 

Optical  illusions  are  not  uncommon,  and  must  be 
guarded  against. 

The  trail  of  the  enemy  furnishes  excellent  means  of 
gaining  information  about  the  direction,  strength,  and 
composition  of  his  column,  and  sometimes  even  of  the 
object  of  his  march.  If  the  ground  is  evenly  trodden,  the 
column  was  composed  of  infantry  alone.  If  there  are 
many  prints  of  horse-shoes,  the  column  also  contained 
cavalry.  If  the  wheel  tracks  are  deep  and  wide,  artil- 
lery was  in  the  column.  Each  arm  was  more  numer- 
ous in  proportion  to  the  number  and  plainness  of  its 


* Mayne’s  Fire  Tactics. 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


121 


indications.  If  the  trail  is  fresh,  the  column  has  re- 
cently passed.  If  the  trail  is  narrow,  the  troops  felt 
secure,  as  they  were  marching  in  column  of  route  ; if 
broad,  they  expected  an  action,  as  they  were  marching 
in  column  of  platoons  or  companies,  ready  to  deploy. 
If  the  fields  on  each  side  of  the  road  are  cut  up  with 
many  tracks,  the  cavalry  marched  on  the  flanks  of  the 
column,  and  the  enemy  was  pushing  on  with  his  troops 
well  in  hand  for  action.  A retreating  army  makes  a 
broad  trail  across  fields,  especially  before  the  rear  guard 
is  formed  and  the  retreat  is  regularly  organized.  This 
indication  was  strangely  ignored  just  after  the  battle  of 
Salamanca,  when  Wellington,  thinking  that  the  re- 
treating French  were  making  for  the  ford  of  Huerta, 
proceeded  thither  in  person  with  his  left  wing,  failing 
to  note  that  he  was  marching  through  standing  grain 
where  no  enemy  could  have  preceded  him.  The  French 
retreated  upon  Alba  without  molestation,  and  Welling- 
ton found  nothing  at  Huerta. 

Indications  of  a camp  or  bivouac  are  found  mainly  in 
the  remains  of  camp-fires.  These  will  show,  by  their 
degree  of  freshness,  whether  much  or  little  time  has 
elapsed  since  the  enemy  quitted  the  place,  and  the 
quantity  of  cinders  will  give  an  indication  of  the  length 
of  time  he  occupied  it.  They  will  also  furnish  a means 
of  estimating  his  force  approximately,  ten  men  being 
allowed  to  each  fire.  Other  valuable  indications  in  re- 
gard to  the  length  of  time  the  position  was  occupied 
and  the  time  when  it  was  abandoned  may  be  found  in 
the  evidences  of  care  or  haste  in  the  construction  of 


122 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


huts  or  shelters,  and  in  the  freshness  of  straw,  grain, 
dung,  or  the  entrails  of  slaughtered  animals. 

Abandoned  clothing,  equipments,  or  harness  will 
give  a clue  to  the  arms  and  regiments  composing  a re- 
treating force.  Dead  horses  lying  about,  broken  weap- 
ons, discarded  knapsacks,  abandoned  and  broken-down 
wagons,  etc.,  are  indications  of  its  fatigue  and  demor- 
alization. Bloody  bandages  lying  about,  and  many 
fresh  graves,  are  evidences  that  the  enemy  is  heavily 
burdened  with  wounded  or  sick.  Graves  which  seem 
to  have  been  made  with  much  care  are  probably  those 
of  officers  of  rank.  A head-board  at  a new  grave  mav 
sometimes  give  valuable  information. 

The  manner  and  bearing  of  the  inhabitants  in  a hos- 
tile country  should  be  carefully  noted.  If  they  are 
gloomy  and  anxious,  it  is  an  indication  of  a want  of 
confidence  in  their  cause,  or  that  their  troops  are  distant. 
If  they  are  excited  and  insolent,  it  is  an  indication  that 
their  army  is  strong  and  near,  and  that  they  anticipate 
success.  If  they  are  friendly  and  pleasant  in  their  de- 
meanor, it  is  probable  that  the  war  is  not  popular,  and 
that  the  government  lacks  cordial  support. 

Reports. — Reports  should  be  sent  in  whenever  any- 
thing of  importance  is  seen,  or  anything  happens  which 
should  be  known  by  the  officer  who  sent  out  the  patrol. 
Trivial  matters  should  not  be  reported;  but  if  there  is  a 
doubt  as  to  the  importance  of  something  seen  or  heard, 
a report  should  be  made  ; for  it  is  better  to  report  an 
insignificant  matter  than  to  let  one  of  great  moment  go 
unheeded. 

Reports  may  be  either  verbal  or  written.  If  a verbal 


SMALL  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


123 


report  is  sent  in,  it  should  be  intrusted  to  an  intelligent 
man,  and  he  should  be  required  to  repeat  it  before  start- 
ing, so  as  to  be  sure  that  he  understands  it.  The  man 
who  carries  the  report  should,  if  possible,  himself  de- 
liver it  to  the  officer  for  whom  it  is  intended.  If  the 
•country  is  dangerous  and  carefully  watched  by  the 
•enemy,  the  same  report  should  be  sent  in  by  several 
men,  each  taking  a different  route.  In  this  case  a 
verbal  report  is  better  than  a written  one,  as  the  enemy 
•can  not  get  possession  of  it  by  capturing  the  bearer, 
.and  the  report  of  each  man  will  be  a check  upon  the 
accuracy  of  the  others. 

The  indispensable  qualities  of  a written  report  are 
■scrupulous  accuracy  as  to  facts,  simplicity,  clearness  of 
■diction,  legibility  of  handwriting,  and  correct  spelling 
of  proper  names.  Surmises  should  never  be  given  as 
facts,  and  the  person  making  the  report  should  carefully 
■separate  what  he  himself  knows  from  what  has  been 
told  him  by  others.  Brevity  is  desirable,  but  not  at 
the  price  of  obscurity  : a report  should  not  be  expressed 
ambiguously  in  ten  words  when  it  can  be  stated  clearly 
in  twenty.  When  the  spelling  of  proper  names  does 
not  correspond  with  their  pronunciation  by  the  people 
•of  the  country,  their  phonetic  spelling  should  also  be 
given  in  parenthesis.  Thus  : “ The  enemy  is  reported 
in  force  at  Saguache  (Siwash),  and  we  have  seen  small 
hostile  parties  on  the  Cebolla  (Savoya).  ’ ’ * 


* These  names  will  be  recognized  by  officers  who  have  served  in 
Southwestern  Colorado. 


124 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


rnJJtt 


T' 


A convenient  form  of  report  is  given  below  : 

PATROL  NO.  i 

REPORT  NO.  ^ 

FROM  Gt/rjunrfid 

PLACE  S i^utuftc^urir  (Tffi-ct  shaasy 

TO 

/\T  JldUUUHhJtf cJL^  (I'TY^U^i' ca  . 

SENT  £ H./J'M.,  Ci.  M.,  JUa^eL  /4t  189J. 

&JUC  ovlAt  rtTilldU.  tyHrf  7^"  1 

'luwi,  , Osi-  iLcrucd-  Hud'  WxzJu-cl  L*jr  f*\  JJ 

V UJUU  ^ 

fe  4 

* ( Sit/nalure  of  Sender.) -=*-■■■■ 

REPORT  NO. 

RECEIVED,  6 n.SfrW.  #■  M. 

( Signature  of  Recnver ) 

f*>  £&-****£  » 


STRONG  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


!25 


If  practicable,  the  commander  of  the  patrol  should 
be  furnished  with  a pad  of  printed  order  blanks  similar 
to  this  model.  The  receipt  should  be  signed,  torn  off, 
and  given  to  the  bearer  of  the  report  as  his  voucher  for 
its  delivery.  A report,  either  written  or  verbal,  should 
invariably  be  made  whenever  the  patrol  returns. 

STRONG  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 

The  foregoing  principles  are  nearly  all  quite  as  appli- 
cable to  strong  patrols  as  to  small  ones — some  of  them 
more  so.  The  limits  of  the  strength  of  a strong  patrol 
have  already  been  given.  The  strength  should  always  be 
proportionate  to  the  object  to  be  effected  by  the  patrol  and 
the  distance  it  is  to  go.  It  should  neither  be  so  weak  as 
to  be  obliged  to  retire  before  small  parties  of  the  enemy, 
nor  so  strong  as  to  attract  attention.  The  object  for 
which  the  patrol  is  sent  out  should  be  distinctly  speci- 
fied, and  the  commander  should  be  provided  with  a 
good  map,  by  means  of  which  he  may  select  his  route. 
But  if  he  chooses  his  route  by  map,  it  is  none  the  less 
imperative  that  he  pay  careful  attention  to  the  various 
features  of  the  ground  (not  always  clearly  indicated  by 
the  best  maps),  with  a view  to  utilizing  them  in  ap- 
proaching the  enemy,  in  avoiding  him,  in  retreating,  or 
in  defense. 

The  larger  the  patrol,  the  less  secret  are  its  move- 
ments, and  the  more  nearly  does  its  formation  correspond 
to  that  of  a column  on  the  march,  or  a line  deployed  for 
action,  as  the  case  may  be.  As  a rule,  at  least  half  the 
strength  of  the  patrol  should  be  in  the  main  body;  but 


126 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


its  point,  flanking,  and  rear  groups  each  constitute  a 
small  patrol,  and  are  each  guided  by  the  principles 
already  laid  down  for  the  conduct  of  a small  patrol, 
modified  by  their  dependence  on  the  main  body.  A 
strong  patrol  may  extend  its  reconnaissance  farther  than 
a small  one  ; being  careful,  however,  not  to  go  so  far  as 
to  incur  unnecessary  risk  of  being  cut  off  by  the  enemy. 
It  is  generally  practicable  for  it  to  return  by  a different 
route  than  the  one  by  which  it  advances  ; as  the  extent 
of  its  operations  is  usually  such  as  to  give  a choice  of 
several  roads. 

Some  typical  formations  of  a strong  patrol  are  given 
in  the  last  three  figures  on  Plate  X.  Figures  7 and  8 
explain  themselves.  In  Figure  9 the  men  detached  to 
reconnoiter  and  guard  the  bridge  would  ordinarily  be 
sent  out  from  the  point,  their  places  being  taken,  at 
double  time,  by  men  from  the  main  body  of  the  patrol. 
The  patrol  moves  slowly,  or  halts  if  necessary,  while 
the  bridge  is  being  reconnoitered.  After  the  patrol  has 
passed  on,  the  detachment  follows  as  rear  group,  the 
former  rear  group  closing  up  to  the  main  body  of  the 
patrol  at  double  time.  The  detachment  may  in  some 
cases  be  left  to  guard  the  bridge.  * 

Expeditionary  Patrols. — These  are  generally  strong 
patrols,  though  in  some  cases  the  object  in  view  may  be 
better  attained  by  small  ones.  The  object  of  an  expe- 
ditionary patrol  is  always  a special  one,  and  the  opera- 
tions of  a force  of  this  kind  generally  differ  from  a 
special  reconnaissance  only  in  the  size  of  the  force 
employed. 

* This  explanation  of  Fig.  9 must  not  be  understood  as  a rule  ; it  is 
merely  a suggestion  as  to  the  method  which  might  be  adopted. 


PJtATJZ  JC 


STRONG  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


127 


If  the  object  in  view  is  the  capture  of  a sentinel,  the 
patrol  should  ordinarily  be  a small  one.  A sentinel  is 
chosen  whose  post  can  apparently  be  easily  approached, 
who  appears  to  be  isolated,  and  who,  as  far  as  can  be 
judged,  is  not  in  plain  sight  of  his  picket.  The  patrol 
cautiously  steals  up  close  to  the  sentinel’s  post,  being 
extended  as  circumstances  may  require,  and,  upon  a 
pre-arranged  signal,  rushes  forward,  and  endeavors  to 
surround  the  sentinel  and  seize  him  before  he  can  fire. 
Even  if  he  fires,  the  patrol  can  probably  run  him  off  be- 
fore he  can  receive  assistance,  if  he  has  been  surprised. 

If  the  object  is  the  capture  of  a patrol,  the  expedi- 
tionary force  should  be  a large  patrol.  It  must  prepare 
an  ambuscade,  or  take  up  a position  such  that  it  can  sur- 
round the  enemy’s  patrol,  or  at  least  cut  off  its  retreat. 
If  the  opposing  patrol  is  equal  or  superior  in  numbers, 
the  attack  must  be  a surprise,  must  be  audaciously 
pushed,  and  the  surviving  members  of  the  enemy’s 
party  must  be  hurried  away  before  they  can  be  succored 
by  their  friends. 

In  all  cases  when  a large  patrol  is  charged  with  the 
capture  of  prisoners,  its  commander  must  seek  a place 
of  observation  for  himself  and  a place  of  concealment 
for  his  men  ; the  two  places  being  either  coincident  or 
near  each  other.  He  then  waits  until  one  or  a small 
party  of  the  enemy  draw  far  enough  away  from  their 
camp  or  column  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  prompt 
assistance,  and  waylays  or  gives  chase  to  them.  In 
these  expeditions  the  prime  object  is  to  bring  in  the 
prisoners,  and  harsh  measures  to  hasten  their  march  are 
excusable. 


128 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Prisoners  are  a most  valuable  source  of  information. 
In  his  description  of  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  Gen- 
eral Humphreys  says  that  an  examination  of  prisoners 
during  the  night  of  May  5,  1864,  drew  from  them  the 
statement  that  Dongstreet  was  expected  to  be  up  in  the 
morning  to  attack  the  Federal  left,  and  that  his  force 
was  about  12,000  men.  Hancock  -was  thus  enabled  to 
prepare  to  receive  the  attack  which  Longstreet  made 
the  following  morning.* 

“ Napoleon  often  complains,  in  his  ‘ Correspondence,’ 
of  the  lack  of  accurate  news  of  the  enemy  because  of  the 
absence  of  prisoners.  He  frequently  enjoins  the  cavalry 
corps,  and  notably  Murat,  to  neglect  no  means  of  cap- 
turing them.  This  shows  the  extreme  importance 
which  he  attached  to  information  obtained  from  prison- 
ers. The  most  favorable  moment  for  questioning  pris- 
oners is  when  they  have  just  been  captured.  They  are 
then  agitated  and  have  not  sufficient  self-control  to 
deceive. 

“The  longer  the  questioning  is  postponed,  the  more 
evasive  and  studied  will  their  answers  become.  Their 
answers  at  the  place  of  capture  may  to  a certain  extent 
be  verified.  Such  is  not  the  case  after  the  lapse  of  some 
time  and  in  another  place.  The  prisoners  are  ques- 
tioned at  once  by  one  of  the  officers  of  the  detachment 
which  captures  them.  Their  replies  are  written  down 
and  transmitted  with  the  prisoners  to  the  Department 
of  Intelligence,  where  they  are  questioned  more  at 
length.”  t 

Prisoners  have  very  different  values.  It  is  more  de- 
sirable to  capture  an  officer  than  an  enlisted  man  ; an 
officer  of  high  rank  rather  than  a subaltern  ; a staff 


* “The  Virginia  Campaign  of  ’64  and  ’65,”  page  37. 
t Lezual,  Tadique  des  Renseignements,  Tome  I,  p.  SS. 


STRONG  INFANTRY  PATROLS. 


129 


officer*  rather  than  a line  officer.  In  brief,  the  object 
should  be  to  capture  those  who  are  likely  to  possess  the 
most  extended  information.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  how- 
ever, that  those  who  possess  the  most  complete  informa- 
tion will  generally  be  the  ones  most  skillful  in  conceal- 
ing it.  If  enlisted  men  are  captured,  they  should  be 
questioned  in  regard  to  their  regiments,  brigades,  and 
divisions  ; the  length  of  time  they  have  been  in  the  posi- 
tion ; whether  their  rations  are  satisfactory  ; whether 
certain  commanders  are  popular  and  have  the  confidence 
of  their  men  ; whether  there  are  many  men  on  sick 
report ; what  news  has  lately  been  received  in  camp, 
and  what  the  rumors  are — in  brief,  all  questions  cal- 
culated to  elicit  information  in  regard  to  the  enemy’s 
position,  movements,  and  morale.  If  tact  be  exercised 
in  questioning,  much  information  may  be  gained  ; for 
the  prisoner  will  probably  consider  the  questions  as 
prompted  merely  by  natural  curiosity. 

When  the  object  is  the  destruction  of  roads,  railroads, 
or  telegraphs,  the  expeditionary  patrol  should  generally 
be  a large  one  ; but  in  some  cases  a small  patrol  may 
answer  the  purpose  better,  as  it  can  move  to  its  destina- 
tion more  secretly,  and  the  use  of  high  explosives  gives 
it  a great  destructive  power.  In  any  case,  the  patrol 
should  endeavor  to  reach  its  objective  unseen,  and  part 
should  be  on  the  alert  watching  the  enemy  while  the 

*The  term  “ staff  officer  ” is  here  used  in  what  the  author  conceives 
to  be  its  proper  sense — i.  e.,  an  officer  of  the  Adjutant  General’s  or 
Inspector  General’s  Departments,  or  one  belonging  to  the  staff  of  a 
general  officer. 

9 — w 


130  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

rest  of  the  men  are  engaged  in  the  work  of  destruction.  * 

A patrol  may  be  sent  out  to  gain  information  by 
“tapping”  a telegraph  line.  In  this  case,  a telegraph 
operator,  using  a small  pocket  instrument,  taps  the  line 
and  learns  the  messages  passing  over  it.  The  rest  of 
the  men,  carefully  concealed,  look  out  for  the  enemy. 
An  expeditionary  patrol  for  the  purpose  of  tapping  a 
telegraph  line  is  generally  a cavalry  patrol,  sent  out  from 
the  cavalry  screen  or  from  a raiding  column.  In  addi- 
tion to  learning  the  enemy’s  movements,  the  operator 
can  often  give  him  false  information — order  him  to  con- 
centrate on  wrong  points,  and  work  mischief  to  him 
generally. 

Harrassing  Patrols. — These  patrols  are  generally 
strong  ; for  their  object  being  not  to  seek  information, 
but  to  annoy  the  enemy,  they  must  be  prepared  to 
fight.  In  some  cases,  however,  better  results  may  be 
obtained  by  reducing  the  size  and  increasing  the  num- 
ber of  the  patrols.  When  an  army  halts  in  a position 
to  await  reinforcements,  or  because  of  the  irresolution  of 
its  chief,  the  opposing  commander  (even  if  his  army  be 
inferior  in  numbers)  may  often  raise  the  morale  of  his 
own  troops,  and  impair  the  courage  and  efficiency  of 
those  of  his  adversary,  by  causing  frequent  alarms,  de- 
stroying the  enemy’s  rest ; compelling  the  hostile  out- 
posts repeatedly  to  rush  to  arms,  and  exciting  their 
sentinels  to  such  a degree  that  they  fancy  a foe  in  every 
shadow,  and  imagine  a hostile  attack  in  every  rustling 

* For  the  method  of  destroying  railroads,  telegraphs,  bridges,  etc., 
see  the  “ Manual  of  Elementary  Field  Engineering,”  compiled  at  the 
School  of  Military  Engineering,  Chatham,  p.  155,  et  seq. 


STRONG  INFANTRY  PATROLS.  131 

leaf.  The  method  of  operating-  with  a harrassing  patrol 
will  depend  upon  circumstances,  but  in  every  case  the 
attack  should  be  of  the  nature  of  a surprise.  If  the  patrol 
is  small,  the  enemy’s  sentinels  should  be  shot  down  or 
captured  in  a noisy  rush.  If  the  patrol  is  large,  the 
attack  should  be  made  upon  the  enemy’s  pickets  ; the 
object  being  the  creation  of  alarm  and  the  infliction  of 
loss  rather  than  the  capture  of  prisoners.  If  many 
small  harrassing  patrols  are  employed,  strong  patrols 
should  be  sent  out,  from  time  to  time,  to  make  vigorous 
attacks  on  the  pickets  ; as  the  enemy  would  otherwise 
find  it  sufficient  merely  to  redouble  the  vigilance  of  his 
sentinels  and  patrol  to  the  front.  The  method  of  attack 
should  be  continually  changed,  and  the  point  selected, 
the  size  of  the  assailing  force,  and  the  hour  of  attack 
should  all  be  variable. 

Jackson’s  defense  of  New  Orleans  furnishes  an  illus- 
tration of  the  effective  use  that  may  be  made  of  harassing 
patrols.  Between  the  night  battle  of  December  23, 
1814,  and  Pakenham’s  defeat  sixteen  days  later,  the 
British  were  incessantly  annoyed  by  small  parties  of 
Americans. 

‘ ‘ The  plain  between  the  two  hostile  camps  was 
alive  day  and  night  with  small  parties  of  foot  and  horse, 
wandering  to  and  fro  in  pursuit  of  adventure,  on  the 
trail  of  reconnoiterers,  stragglers,  and  outpost  senti- 
nels. After  a while  there  grew  up  a regular  science  in 
the  conduct  of  these  modes  of  vexing,  annoying,  and 
weakening  the  enemy.  It  was  as  follows  : A small 
number  of  each  corps,  being  permitted  to  leave  the  lines, 
would  start  from  their  position,  and  all  converge  to  a 
central  point  in  front  of  the  lines.  Here  they  would, 


132  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

when  all  collected,  make  quite  a formidable  body  of 
men,  and  would  proceed  to  attack  the  nearest  British 
outpost,  or  advauce  in  extended  lines,  so  as  to  create 
alarm  in  the  enemy’s  camp,  and  subject  them  to  the 
vexation  of  being  beaten  to  arms,  in  the  midst  of  which 
the  scouting  party  would  be  unusually  unlucky  if  it  did 
not  succeed  in  ‘ bagging  ’ one  or  two  of  the  enemy's 
advance  sentinels.  In  such  incessant  scouting  parties 
and  volunteer  operations  a majority  of  Jackson’s  com- 
mand were  engaged  during  the  greater  part  of  the  night. 
So  daring  were  these  attacks  that  on  more  than  one 
occasion  the  six-pounders  were  advanced  from  the  lines 
and  drawn  within  cannon  shot  of  the  outposts,  when 
they  would  be  discharged  at  the  sentinels  or  any  living 
object,  generally  with  some  effect,  and  always  with  great 
terror  to  the  British  camp,  causing  a general  apprehen- 
sion that  the  Americans  were  advancing  to  attack  them 
in  full  force.”* 

Flank  Patrols. — These  are  always  strong  patrols,  and 
usually  operate  on  roads  parallel  to  the  line  of  march  of 
the  main  body.  They  reconnoiter  defiles,  farms,  -woods, 
etc. , at  some  distance  from  the  flanks  of  the  main  column. 
They  usually  consist  of  from  ten  to  twenty  men  (but 
may  contain  the  maximum  strength  of  a patrol),  and  are 
generally  detached  for  a specific  reconnaissance,  with 
orders  to  rejoin  the  main  body  at  a designated  rendez- 
vous, when  the  object  of  the  reconnaissance  has  been 
gained.  The  patrol  should  be  guided  by  the  general 
principles  already  laid  down  for  patrols,  and  should  avail 
itself  of  every  practicable  opportunity  of  communicating 
with  the  main  column. 


* This  description  is  condensed  from  Walker’s  account,  quoted  in 
Parton’s  “Life  of  Andrew  Jackson.’’ 


ADVANCE  GUARD  PASSING  THROUGH  A TOWN.  1 33 

Flanking  patrols  of  the  maximum  strength  are  often 
detached  from  a marching  column  to  reconnoiter  and 
guard  roads  crossing  the  line  of  march  during  the  pas- 
sage of  the  main  body.  They  are  sometimes  called  cover- 
ing patrols.  The  forces  employed  on  this  duty  are, 
however,  generally  larger  than  patrols,  and  are  covering 
detachments  charged  with  the  duties  of  a containing 
force. 

THE  ADVANCE  GUARD  PASSING  THROUGH  A TOWN. 

Having  discussed  the  details  of  patrolling,  we  may 
now  consider  the  manner  in  which  an  advance  guard 
would  pass  through  a town. 

On  approaching  the  village  or  town,  the  advance 
guard  halts,  and  the  advance  party  moves  forward  to 
reconnoiter;  the  point,  well  in  advance,  acting  as  already 
prescribed  for  a small  patrol.  If  the  enemy’s  presence 
is  suspected,  the  village  must  be  turned  by  a portion  of 
the  advance  party  or  support,  and  entered  simultane- 
ously by  the  front  and  flank.  If,  on  the  contrary,  all 
seems  well,  the  point  signals  to  the  rear  and  advances  up 
the  principal  street,  the  advance  party  following  at  a 
suitable  distance,  its  flankers  working  up  the  side 
streets,  always  keeping  up  communication  with  the  ad- 
vance party  and  with  the  flank  patrols — if  there  be  any. 
The  support  follows  at  a suitable  distance,  the  reserve 
remaining  at  the  edge  of  the  village  until  the  patrols 
have  gone  through.  If  the  point  discovers  that  the  vil- 
lage is  occupied  by  the  enemy,  it  falls  back  quickly  and 
quietly  to  the  advance  party,  whose  commander  imme- 


134  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

diately  sends  information  to  the  rear.  The  support  at 
once  comes  up,  and  the  commander  of  the  support,  in 
the  case  of  a large  advance  guard,  or  of  the  advance 
guard,  in  the  case  of  a small  one,  makes  dispositions  for 
a reconnaissance  of  the  village,  with  a view  to  ascertain- 
ing the  most  practicable  point  for  forcing  it. 

A village  is  approached  at  night  in  the  same  manner 
as  by  day,  with  the  exception  that  the  distances  and  in- 
tervals between  the  different  parts  of  the  advance  guard 
are  less. 

A strong  patrol  reconnoiters  and  enters  a village  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  advance  guard  of  a larger  force. 

In  considering  the  details  relative  to  the  reconnais- 
sance and  attack  of  villages,  most  waiters  on  minor  tac- 
tics have  in  view  the  conditions  presented  by  European 
villages,  whose  streets  are  generally  narrow  and  crooked, 
and  whose  houses  (usually  built  of  stone  or  brick)  are 
well  adapted  to  defense.  The  broad  streets  of  American 
villages,  and  the  inflammable  material  of  which  their 
houses  are  mostly  constructed,  make  them  much  more 
difficult  to  defend  than  European  villages,  and  an  ad- 
vance guard  might,  consequently,  enter  them  with  less 
risk. 

By  way  of  illustration  of  the  manner  of  reconnoiter- 
ing  and  entering  a town,  let  us  suppose  that  an  advance 
guard  is  approaching  Franklin,  Tennessee,  from  the 
south,  on  the  Columbia  Pike.  (See  Plate  XI.) 

The  advance  guard  halts  from  a half  to  a quarter  of  a 
mile  from  the  town,  and  two  patrols  are  detached  from 
the  support  to  the  right  and  left  respectively.  The  ad- 
vance party  continues  its  march  to  the  edge  of  the  town, 


PIATK  JSJ 


FranMin 

Term. 


CM. 


''limit!'' 


CAVALRY  PATROLS. 


*35 


where  it  halts,  the  point  continuing  to  advance.  The 
point  moving  up  Main  street  to  Indigo  street,  signals 
that  all  seems  well,  and  the  advance  party  follows  it  up 
Main  street,  the  flankers  advancing  along  Church  street 
and  Bridge  street.  The  right  patrol  from  the  support 
xeconnoiters  the  railroad  cut,  and  proceeds  along  the 
railroad.  The  left  patrol  reconnoiters  the  valley  of  the 
brook  west  of  the  town,  and  advances  along  North 
Margin  street.  The  advance  guard  takes  up  its  march, 
the  reserve  halting  at  the  edge  of  the  town.  The  pa- 
trols communicate  as  they  pass  Indigo,  Main,  Cameron, 
and  East  Margin  streets.  If  any  one  of  the  patrols 
fails  to  be  seen,  the  others  halt  until  communication  is 
established,  the  advance  being  as  expeditious  as  possi- 
ble. On  passing  through  the  town,  the  advance  party 
seizes  the  bridge,  which  is  first  reconnoitered  by  the 
point.  The  right  patrol  crosses  the  railroad  bridge, 
where  it  halts  and  rejoins  the  support  on  the  arrival  of 
the  latter  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth.  The  left 
patrol  crosses  the  bridge  in  rear  of  the  advance  party 
and  rejoins  the  support.  The  reserve  passes  through 
the  town  as  soon  as  it  receives  signal  that  the  patrols  are 
all  through.  The  hills  on  the  north  bank  are  occupied 
promptly,  as  they  command  the  town  and  the  passage 
of  the  Harpeth. 


CAVALRY  PATROLS. 

The  principles  governing  the  action  of  infantry  pa- 
trols are,  in  the  main,  equally  applicable  to  patrols  com- 
posed of  cavalry : but  there  are  some  points  of  difference 
which  must  be  considered. 


136 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Owing  to  the  greater  mobility  of  cavalry,  the  dis- 
tances and  intervals  separating  the  scouts  from  each 
other,  and  from  the  main  body  of  the  patrol,  are  greater 
than  in  infantry.  In  very  open  country  the  cavalry 
scouts  may  sometimes  be  as  far  as  1,000  yards  apart. 
Another  essential  difference  in  the  conduct  of  infantry 
and  cavalry  patrols,  depending  also  upon  the  superior 
mobility  of  the  latter,  is  the  detaching  of  scouts  from 
strong  cavalry  patrols.  These  scouts  are  not  merely 
detached  after  the  manner  of  the  flankers,  or  even  the 
flank  patrols,  of  an  advance  guard  ; but  work  quite  in- 
dependently, joining  the  main  body  of  the  patrol  at 
fixed  rendezvous,  or  maintaining  connection  with  it  by 
occasionally  sending  in  reports  to  its  commander. 
These  detached  scouts  usually  work  in  pairs,  one  man 
being  in  command,  and  may  be  sent  as  far  as  five  or  six 
miles  from  the  main  body  of  the  patrol.  Each  scout 
should  understand  what  he  is  to  look  for,  and  how  and 
where  he  is  to  make  his  report. 

Intelligent  and  well-mounted  soldiers  should  be 
selected  for  patrol  duty.  Before  starting  out,  the  patrol 
is  carefully  inspected  by  its  commander,  who,  in  addi- 
tion to  seeing  that  his  men  are  in  proper  condition  and 
properly  equipped  and  supplied,  assures  himself  that  his 
horses  are  in  good  condition  and  well  shod.  The  same 
precautions  in  regard  to  arms  and  accouterments  are 
taken  as  in  the  case  of  an  infantry  patrol. 

As  in  the  case  of  infantry,  no  rules  for  the  formation 
of  the  patrol  can  be  positively  prescribed,  except  the 
general  and  important  one,  that  the  patrol  must  always 
be  so  formed  as  to  facilitate  the  gaining  of  information, 


CAVALRY  PATROLS. 


137 


and  insure,  if  possible,  tbe  escape  of  at  least  one  man 
if  the  patrol  should  be  cut  off.  It  may  be  said,  how- 
ever, that  every  patrol,  however  small,  should,  if  possi- 
ble, have  a scout  detached  as  advance  guard,  and 
another  as  rear  guard.  When  the  size  of  the  patrol  per- 
mits, flankers  should  also  be  thrown  out.  All  the  men 
of  a small  patrol,  and  the  point,  flankers,  and  rear  guard 
of  a strong  one,  should  have  their  carbines  loaded  and 
advanced,  or  the  pistol  at  the  position  of  “ raise  ” or 
“lower.”  The  distances  and  intervals  between  differ- 
ent parts  of  a patrol  depend  upon  circumstances.  They 
should  not  be  so  great  that  the  commander  could  not 
easily  convey  his  commands  by  voice  or  signal,  and 
would  rarely  exceed  100  yards  except  in  open  country. 
At  night,  the  flankers  and  detached  scouts  should  always 
be  drawn  in,  unless  their  communication  with  the  main 
body  of  the  patrol  is  perfectly  secured. 

The  signals  for  a cavalry  patrol  are  the  same  as  in 
the  case  of  the  infantry  (substituting  carbine  for  rifle), 
with  the  exception  that  in  the  signal  “Enemy  in 
sight,”  the  carbine  is  held  up  in  one  hand  by  the  small 
of  the  stock,  and  to  ask  for  reinforcements  the  arm  is 
extended  horizontally,  holding  the  piece  vertically,  and 
given  a circular  motion  several  times. 

On  open  ground  the  following  signals  may  sometimes 
be  found  useful  : 

Enemy  in  sight : Move  in  a circle  at  a walk,  and 
halt : to  the  right,  if  the  hostile  troops  are  cavalry  ; 
to  the  left,  if  they  are  infantry.  For  a mixed  force, 
describe  a figure  eight.  This  movement  may  be  re- 


138  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

peated  as  often  as  necessary,  but  the  halt  should  always 
be  distinct. 

Enemy  advancing  : Same  as  above,  except  that  the 
circling  is  continuous  and  at  a trot.  If  the  enemy  is 
advancing  rapidly  or  in  heavy  force,  make  the  signal 
at  a gallop. 

As  the  movements  of  the  scout,  while  making  these 
signals,  would  probably  be  seen  by  the  enemy,  they 
should  be  used  only  when  the  signals  with  the  carbine 
might,  owing  to  distance,  be  misunderstood. 

At  night,  a patrol  must  rely  mainly  upon  its  sense  of 
hearing.  Strict  silence  should  be  maintained,  and  smok- 
ing should  be  prohibited.  Each  scout  should  watch  his 
horse  for  indications  of  danger,  not  only  at  night,  but 
at  all  times  ; and  if  the  animal  pricks  up  his  ears  at- 
tentively or  snorts  excitedly,  the  warning  should  never 
be  neglected,  but  the  cause  should  be  investigated. 

Though  exercising  the  utmost  vigilance,  and  en- 
deavoring to  avoid  being  discovered,  a cavalry  patrol 
must  move  along  turnpikes  and  good  roads.  To  do 
otherwise  would  be  to  follow  by-paths  and  traverse  diffi- 
cult ground,  where  the  horses  would  often  have  to  be 
led.  The  mobility  which  gives  a cavalry  patrol  its 
special  value  would  thus  be  lost,  and  the  patrol  would 
not  be  worth  as  much  as  one  composed  of  infantry  ; for 
the  horses  would  become  a mere  burden.  The  patrol 
should,  however,  always  move  upon  soft  ground  or 
sward  at  the  side  of  the  road,  if  it  be  practicable  to  do 
so,  and  should  always  move  with  the  least  possible 
noise.  De  Brack  says  that,  in  the  campaign  in  Portugal, 
the  French  cavalry  patrols,  having  to  march  on  rocky 


CAVALRY  PATROLS. 


I39 


and  resounding  roads,  wrapped  the  hoofs  of  their  horses 
with  sheepskin,  tied  around  the  pastern,  with  the  wool 
inside;  and  that  they  thus  approached  very  close  to  the 
English  vedettes  without  being  heard.  Riistow  recom- 
mends this  measure  to  cavalry  patrols  under  similar 
circumstances.  This  incident  does  not,  however,  seem 
to  be  of  any  value  further  than  illustrating  the  ingenu- 
ity which  patrols  are  called  upon  to  exercise. 

The  patrol  commander  should  carefully  select  his 
route  before  starting  out,  and  should  adhere  to  it  unless 
driven  away  by  force.  He  should  clearly  indicate  the 
places  of  rendezvous,  and  explain  to  the  scouts,  as  far 
as  practicable,  how  to  reach  them.  “Nothing,”  says 
Shaw,  “can  be  more  disconcerting  to  the  commander  of 
a patrol  than  to  miss  his  scouts  at  the  time  or  place  at 
which  they  should  come  in.  He  does  not  know  whether 
they  have  lost  their  way,  or  whether  they  have  fallen 
into  hostile  hands,  and  his  further  action  is  often  de- 
pendent upon  their  reports,  which  he  does  not  receive. 
The  position  also  of  the  scouts  who  have  lost  their  way, 
or  who  have  not  hit  off  their  party  at  the  place  of  ren- 
dezvous, is  one  of  difficulty.  In  the  attempt  to  find 
their  commander,  they  constantly  wander  about  in  an 
aimless  manner  and  end  by  losing  themselves  alto- 
gether. ’ ’ 

The  general  manner  of  reconnoitering  different  kinds 
of  ground  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  infantry  patrols: 
but  the  following  details  should  be  noted.  Scouts 
should  peep  around  every  corner  or  turn  in  the  road 
before  riding  on.  If  they  come  to  an  object  too  exten- 
sive to  be  reconnoitered  without  assistance,  they  must: 


140  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

signal  for  reinforcements,  or  one  man  must  ride  back 
and  report  to  the  patrol  commander,  while  the  others 
remain  in  observation.  If  obstacles  are  encountered  on 
the  road,  such  as  barricades  or  felled  trees,  the  patrol 
must,  if  possible,  move  round  them  and  continue  its 
reconnaissance.  If  the  patrol  can  remove  the  obstacle, 
it  does  so  ; otherwise,  or  if  a bridge  is  broken,  word 
must  be  sent  back,  if  a column  is  following. 

In  ascending  a hill,  a scout  should  not  ride  quite  to 
the  top  ; but,  unless  time  is  urgent,  should  halt  at  a 
short  distance  from  the  crest  and  then  advance  with  cau- 
tion. It  may  often  be  well  for  two  scouts  to  approach 
the  crest  together,  one  of  them  dismounting  and  recon- 
noitering  the  crest  on  foot  while  the  other  holds  his 
horse. 

A cavalry  patrol  or  advance  guard  approaches  a town 
or  village  in  practically  the  same  manner  as  correspond- 
ing bodies  of  infantry.  A city  or  large  town  should  ordi- 
narily be  avoided  by  a reconnoitering  party;  but  after  a 
victory,  when  the  enemy  is  demoralized,  more  may  be 
dared  than  would  otherwise  be  possible.  After  the 
battle  of  Worth,  Nancy,  a city  of  50,000  inhabitants, 
was  entered  by  six  Uhlans;  and  twenty-six  others,  who 
followed  later,  occupied  the  railroad  station  and  tore  up 
a portion  of  the  track.  The  whole  squadron  (150  men) 
then  assembled  and  marched  through  the  city. 

As  a rule,  a patrol  should  not  halt  at  inhabited  places, 
taverns,  etc.,  or  enter  an  inclosure.  If  it  is  necessary 
to  halt  to  feed  or  water  the  horses,  some  secluded  place 
should  be  selected,  which  could  be  guarded  by  sentinels 
in  concealed  positions.  A neglect  of  this  precaution 


CAVALRY  PATROLS. 


141 

has  more  than  once  been  the  cause  of  disaster.  In  1846, 
Captain  Thornton,  reconuoitering  with  a troop  of  dra- 
goons, imprudently  entered  an  inclosed  corral  with  his 
command.  The  result  is  thus  described  by  Ripley  : 

“Hardly  had  the  rearmost  files  entered  when  the 
alarm  was  given.  The  squadron  was  in  confusion  ; but 
Thornton,  taking  the  lead,  dashed  at  once  at  the  only 
opening  of  the  inclosure.  That  was  already  shut  and 
defended  by  a large  body  of  Mexicans,  and  the  passage 
was  impracticable.  In  searching  for  a passage  to  the 
right,  the  dragoons  encountered  a galling  fire,  which 
increased  the  confusion,  and  Thornton’s  horse  falling 
wounded  upon  his  rider,  the  whole  party  gave  back  to 
the  center  of  the  corral.  Captain  Hardee,  who  suc- 
ceeded to  the  command,  rallied  the  men,  and,  after  a 
vain  endeavor  to  find  an  opening,  surrendered.  In  this 
affair  Lieutenant  Mason  had  been  killed,  and  sixteen 
non-commissioned  officers  and  men  had  fallen  dead  or 
wounded.”* 

A similar  occurrence  at  Pont-a-Mousson  on  the  night 
of  the  I2th-i3th  of  August,  1870,  is  thus  described  by 
Borbstaedt : 

“The  detachment,  consisting  of  sixty  dragoons  and 
hussars,  was  received  by  the  inhabitants  in  the  most 
friendly  manner  : so  that  the  soldiers  for  the  most  part 
dismounted  and  put  their  horses  into  stables,  while  the 
commandant,  accompanied  by  a few  men,  rode  out  to 
reconnoiter.  All  of  a sudden,  two  squadrons  of  Chas- 
seurs d’Afrique  and  Spahis,  most  probably  sent  for  by 
the  inhabitants  from  Metz,  dashed  into  the  town,  sur- 
prised the  dragoons  and  hussars  in  the  stables,  and  took 
the  greater  part  prisoners,  the  townspeople  now  turning 


* The  War  with  Mexico,  Vol.  I,  p.  107. 


142  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

on  the  Germans,  and  giving  their  ready  assistance  to 
the  French  cavalry.”* 

As  a rule,  patrols  do  not  fight,  except  to  escape  cap- 
ture ; but  when  there  is  a line  of  patrols  whose  front  is 
covered  with  detached  scouts,  each  scout  and  each 
patrol  may  be  charged  with  a certain  amount  of  resist- 
ance, in  order  to  gain  time  for  the  bodies  in  rear.  This 
will  be  considered  more  at  length  in  the  next  chapter. 

Connecting  Patrols. — These  patrols  are  always  com- 
posed of  cavalry.  The  patrols  keep  in  the  intervals 
between  the  different  bodies,  and  detach  scouts  to  the 
front  and  flanks.  The  scouts  to  the  front  watch  the 
enemy  : those  on  the  flanks  observe  all  movements  and 
changes  of  position  of  the  body  of  troops  nearest  them, 
with  which  they  keep  in  constant  communication.  The 
commander  of  the  patrol  keeps  the  body  of  troops  on 
either  flank  informed  of  the  movements  of  the  other. 
If  the  army  is  moving  on  parallel  roads,  in  a close  coun- 
try, the  connecting  patrols  must  be  detached  from  the 
cavalry  at  the  head  of  each  column.  In  this  case  they 
communicate  at  each  lateral  road,  and  each  column  is 
thus  kept  informed  of  the  progress  of  its  neighbor,  and 
• of  the  condition  of  affairs  along  the  entire  front.  If  the 
army  is  marching  on  parallel  roads  in  a sufficiently 
open  country,  a chain  of  patrols  extends  along  its  front, 
thus  linking,  as  it  were,  the  different  columns.  Con- 
necting patrols  are  always  strong. 

Pursuing  Patrols. — These  are  always  composed  of 
cavalry,  and  may  be  either  small  or  strong.  They  keep 


*History  of  the  Franco-German  War,  p.  357. 


CAVALRY  PATROLS. 


I43 


on  the  trail  of  the  enemy,  do  not  lose  contact  with  him, 
and  keep  their  own  army  fully  informed  of  his  move- 
ments. They  should  have  definite  orders  as  to  the  dis- 
tance to  which  they  are  to  pursue,  and  the  matters 
which  it  may  be  specially  desirable  to  report.  For  in- 
stance, the  pursuing  patrols  the  day  after  the  battle  of 
Lfigny,  doubtless  had  special  instructions  to  report 
everything  that  would  indicate  whether  the  Prussians 
were  retreating  upon  Namur  or  upon  Wavre.  Pursuing 
patrols  must  not  be  confounded  with  a pursuing  force 
following  headlong  upon  the  heels  of  a routed  army  to 
complete  the  destruction  of  battle.  They  merely  fol- 
low, watch,  and  hang  on  an  army  that  is  retreating 
without  demoralization,  in  order  that  touch  with  it  may 
not  be  lost.  To  gain  and  transmit  information  are  the 
objects  of  a pursuing  patrol,  and  the  capture  of  prison- 
ers, or  the  picking  up  of  stragglers,  must  be  sought 
only  with  a view  to  gaining  information. 

A discussion  of  connecting  and  pursuing  patrols  glides 
naturally  into  a consideration  of  the  subject  of  “Screen- 
ing and  Reconuoitering,”  which  will  be  reserved  for 
the  next  chapter. 


144 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


The  cavalry  is  the  eye  with  which  the  army  sees.  The  activity  of 
this  arm  can  best  ascertain  with  clearness  the  measures  and  intentions 
of  the  enemy. — Von  der  Goltz. 

The  employment  of  the  cavalry  as  a reconnoitering 
screen  in  advance  of  the  army  was  habitual  in  the  wars 
of  the  Consulate  and  First  Empire,  though  the  details 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  French  cavalry  performed 
the  duty  of  screening  and  reconnoitering  have  not,  un- 
fortunately, been  preserved.  We  know  only  that  (ex- 
cepting the  campaign  of  1813,  in  which  the  cavalry, 
destroyed  in  Russia,  had  not  been  re-created)  the  move- 
ments of  Napoleon’s  armies  were  always  covered  by  a 
screen  of  cavalry  pushed  forward  to  a considerable  dis- 
tance. Davoust’s  famous  flank  march  from  Ratisbon  to 
Abensberg  was  screened  by  cavalry;  and  in  the  Russian 
campaign  Murat’s  cavalry  covered  the  front  of  the 
French  army,  being  sometimes  fifty  miles  in  advance  of 
it.  The  campaigns  of  1S06  and  1814  furnish  brilliant 
examples  of  the  use  of  a cavalry  screen  by  Napoleon  ; 
and  the  conduct  of  Katzler’s  contact  squadrons,  and  the 
extended  use  of  covering  detachments  of  Cossacks,  show 
that  the  allies  had  learned  the  lesson  of  screening  and 
reconnoitering  from  their  great  opponent. 

In  the  long  period  of  peace  from  Waterloo  to  the 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


145 


Crimea  (scarcely  broken  by  the  insignificant  hostilities  of 
1823,  i832,  and  1849),  ^ie  principles  of  war  as  demon- 
strated by  the  greatest  of  military  leaders  were  forgotten 
or  neglected  in  a mass  of  theoretical  tactical  details  ; 
and  in  the  Crimean  and  Italian  wars,  the  commanders, 
as  a rule,  were  ignorant  of  everything  that  took  place 
beyond  their  chain  of  sentinels.  In  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion the  art  of  screening  and  reconnoitering  was  revived 
by  the  American  cavalry,  and  brought  to  a high  state  of 
development,  notably  by  Sheridan  and  Stuart.*  In 
1866  the  Prussians  began  to  evolve  from  their  own 
experience  principles  already  demonstrated  in  America 
but  ignored  in  Europe;  and  in  1870-71  the  results  ob- 
tained by  the  German  cavalry  screen  were  so  striking  as 
to  command  the  attention  of  the  military  world. 

The  cavalry  screen  may  be  said  to  constitute  the 
strategic  advance  guard  of  the  army;  each  column  in 
rear  furnishing  what  may  be  termed  its  own  tactical 
advance  guard.  The  screening  may  be  performed  either 
by  the  divisional  cavalry  or  the  cavalry  divisions,  f 
In  the  former  case  the  head  of  each  division  or  corps 
is  covered  by  its  own  cavalry:  in  the  latter,  the  cavalry 
divisions  cover  the  front  of  the  entire  army.  In  our 

* This  duty  was  also  well  understood  and  efficiently  performed  by 
Cooke,  Stoueman,  and  Pleasontou. 

f The  divisional  cavalry  is  the  force  attached  to  the  infantry  divi- 
sions or  to  the  army  corps  ; generally  in  the  proportion  of  400  to  600 
sabers  to  each  infantry  division.  The  cavalry  divisions  are  bodies 
under  the  command  of  cavalry  generals,  subject  only  to  the  orders  of 
the  commander  of  the  army,  or  the  chief  of  cavalry  if  there  be  one. 
In  the  U.  S.  Army  the  divisional  cavalry  consists  of  “one  or  more 
regiments  ” attached  to  each  army  corps. 

10 — w 


146 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


service,  it  is  probable  that,  following  our  own  traditions, 
the  divisional  cavalry  would  be  reduced  to  a minimum, 
and  that  the  cavalry  divisions,  united  into  a cavalry 
corps , would  be  intrusted  with  the  duty  of  screening  the 
front  of  the  entire  army.  During  the  Peninsula  cam- 
paign,Cooke’s  cavalry  screened  the  advance  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  to  the  Chickahominy,  and  masked  its 
flank  march  to  the  James  River.  Stoneman  performed 
a like  service  for  Hooker  in  the  masterly  movement 
which  preceded  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville;  and  had 
the  cavalry  not  been  detached  on  a bootless  raid,  the 
surprise  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  by  Stonewall  Jackson 
would  have  been  impossible.  In  the  Gettysburg  cam- 
paign, the  screening  and  reconnoitering  duty  was  excel- 
lently performed  by  Pleasonton’s  cavalry  corps. 

In  the  Wilderness  and  Appomattox  campaigns,  similar 
duty  was  similarly  performed  by  Sheridan’s  cavalry; 
and  in  the  Red  River  campaign,  the  Union  cavalry  so 
completely  screened  the  movements  of  the  rest  of  the 
army,  that  Taylor,  a few  hours  before  the  battle  of  Sa- 
bine Cross  Roads,  reported  to  Kirby  Smith  that  no  ad- 
vance had  been  made  in  his  front,  except  by  cavalry. 
In  these  campaigns  no  divisional  cavalry  existed.  If  a 
division  were  acting  independently,  it  would,  of  course, 
be  necessary  to  attach  some  cavalry  to  it;  in  which  case 
the  operations  of  the  cavalry  detachment  would  be 
regulated  by  the  general  principles  that  govern  the  con- 
duct of  a screen  in  front  of  an  army. 

Distance  of  the  Screen  from  the  Army. — The  distance 
of  the  cavalry  screen  from  the  main  army  will  depend 
upon  many  considerations,  chief  of  which  are  the  dis- 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


147 


tance  and  character  of  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy  is  at 
a distance,  or  if  his  cavalry  is  cowed  and  demoralized, 
the  screen  may  safely  be  pushed  much  farther  to  the 
front  than  when  he  is  nearer  and  his  cavalry  is 
bold  and  enterprising.  In  1870-’ 71  the  German  cavalry 
“overflowed  the  country  miles,  and  even  several 
marches,  ahead  of  the  main  body  of  the  infantry.”  * 
The  screen  was  rarely  less  than  15  or  20  miles  in 
front  of  the  army,  and  during  the  march  from  the 
battle-field  of  Sedan  to  Paris,  it  was  always  several 
marches  ahead.  In  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  how- 
ever, where  the  enemy  was  enterprising,  aggressive, 
and  confident,  Buford’s  screening  cavalry  was  habitually 
less  that  ten  miles  in  advance  of  the  army.  The  cavalry 
screen  should  be,  as  a rule,  at  least  one  march  in  ad- 
vance of  the  main  force;  but  as  it  betrays,  to  a certain 
extent,  the  presence  of  troops  behind  it,  it  may  some- 
times be  advisable  to  draw  it  in  close  to  the  main  body 
with  a view  to  deceiving  the  enemy.  Thus,  in  1814, 
Napoleon  directed  Marmont  to  execute  this  device  for 
the  purpose  of  misleading  the  Allies. 

It  is,  therefore,  impossible  to  prescribe  definite  rules 
for  the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the  army.  While  the 
armies  are  concentrating,  the  cavalry  may  generally  be 
pushed  far  ahead  of  the  army,  patrols  being  extensively 
and  vigorously  used  ; but  when  the  armies  begin  their 
advance,  the  distance  is  usually  reduced  to  not  more 
than  15  or  20  miles,  diminishing  after  contact  to  5 or  6 
miles,  and  finally  disappearing  altogether  when  tactical 


* Hohenlohe. 


148  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

operations  begin.  In  general  terms,  it  may  be  stated 
that  contact  with  the  enemy  is  the  first  consideration, 
and  that  this  will  largely  and  generally  influence  the 
distance  of  the  screen  from  the  forces  in  rear. 

Frontage  of  the  Screen. — The  object  of  the  cavalry 
screen  is  two-fold  : namely,  (1.)  To  gain  information  of 
the  enemy,  and  (2.)  To  prevent  him  from  gaining  in- 
formation of  one’s  own  army.  The  methods  necessary 
to  gain  these  two  objects  necessarily  conflict.  To  re- 
connoiter,  the  greatest  dispersion  of  front  is  desirable  ; 
but  if  the  screen  be  too  widely  extended,  it  will  be 
everywhere  weak,  its  concentration  will  be  difficult,  and 
the  enemy  will  be  able  easily  to  rupture  it.  The  front 
covered  by  the  advanced  cavalry  will,  therefore,  depend 
upon  circumstances ; such  as  the  nature  of  the  country 
(open  or  intersected)  ; the  number  of  roads  parallel  to 
the  advance  (as  affecting  the  prompt  transmission  of  in- 
telligence to  the  rear)  ; and  the  number  of  lateral  roads 
(as  facilitating  the  concentration  of  the  screening 
troops.)  Above  all  is  the  consideration  of  rapid  concen- 
tration. 

In  the  advance  from  the  Saar  to  the  Moselle,  the  front 
of  the  German  screen  averaged  from  five  to  six  miles 
to  a regiment;  * a division  of  six  regiments  covering  a 
front  of  30  miles,  and  a force  of  ten  regiments  recou- 
noitering  on  a front  of  60  miles.  The  screen  was  thus 
very  weak  at  all  points;  and  its  success  was  mainly  due 
to  the  weakness  and  inefficiency  of  the  French  cavalry. 
Trench  is  of  the  opinion  that  a cavalry  division  (3,600 


* A German  cavalry  regiment  numbers  600  sabers. 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


149 


sabers)  should,  in  open  country,  cover  a front  of  20  to 
25  miles,  when  there  is  no  reason  to  apprehend  the  close 
proximity  of  large  bodies  of  the  enemy;  and  that  in  a 
close  country,  where  the  scouting  parties  would  have  to 
work  much  nearer  to  each  other,  the  front  should  be 
reduced  to  two-thirds  or  half  of  that  distance.  Bonie 
takes  from  11  to  12^  miles  for  the  front  of  a division. 
While  emphasizing  the  statement  that  no  fixed  width 
of  front  can  be  prescribed,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the 
front  covered  by  an  American  brigade  in  screening  and 
xeconnoitering  would  average  ten  or  twelve  miles.* 

Certain  bodies  of  the  enemy  will  generally  be  assigned 
as  the  objective  of  the  brigade;  or,  when  still  at  a dis- 
tance from  the  opposing  army,  a certain  zone  of  coun- 
try will  be  assigned  to  it;  and  the  front  to  be  covered 
by  the  brigade  will  thus  be  incidentally  determined. 
To  form  an  efficient  screen,  there  should  be  about  a 
brigade  of  cavalry  for  each  army  corps  in  the  force 
covered. 

Formation  of  the  Screen. — The  main  body  of  the 
cavalry  employed  in  screening  duty  should  be  kept  con- 
centrated and  well  in  hand.  It  is  a mistake  to  fritter 
away  the  force  in  small  groups  which  could  not  concen- 
trate in  time  for  fighting,  however  much  such  a plan 
might  facilitate  reconnaissance.  The  strength  of  the 
detachments  should  be  adjusted  to  the  nature  of  their 
duty ; and  it  may  be  stated,  in  general  terms,  that  the 
small  patrols  are  charged  with  the  service  of  informa- 
tion; and  the  larger  bodies,  with  that  of  security. 

* A cavalry  brigade  in  the  U.  S.  Army  consists  of  three  regiments, 
and  would  accordingly  have  a war  strength  of  3,600  sabers — exactly 
the  strength  of  a German  division. 


150  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

It  must  be  frankly  stated  that  the  question  of  the 
proper  formation  and  employment  of  the  cavalry  screen 
has  not  yet  emerged  from  the  realms  of  theory.  The 
best  European  writers  on  the  subject  base  their  ideas 
upon  the  experience  of  a single  war,  in  which  the  suc- 
cessful cavalry  was  not  resisted  by  a worthy  opponent; 
and  these  ideas  may,  moreover,  be  said  to  be  based  upon 
the  results  rather  than  upon  the  methods  of  the  Franco- 
German  conflict;  for  there  was  no  uniformity  in  the 
screening  and  reconnoitering  methods  of  the  Germans 
in  1870-’ 71.  The  student  must,  therefore,  regard  the 
following  typical  formations  as  suggestions,  and  not  as 
authoritative  prescriptions.  In  any  case,  the  commander 
must  make  his  dispositions  in  accordance  with  circum- 
stances rather  than  diagrams;  and  in  almost  every  case, 
some  modification  of  the  typical  formations  will  be  ren- 
dered necessary  by  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  direc- 
tion of  the  roads,  or  the  character,  proximity,  or  strength 
of  the  enemy. 

If  the  brigade  is  operating  in  an  open  country,  one 
regiment  constitutes  the  reserve,  and  is  preceded  by  a 
squadron  of  each  of  the  other  regiments  at  a distance  of 
about  two  and  a half  miles.  These  squadrons,  consti- 
tuting the  supports,  are  separated  by  an  interval  of  not 
more  than  six  miles,  the  reserve  being  situated  centrally 
in  their  rear.  About  two  and  a half  miles  farther  to 
the  front  is  the  second  squadron  of  each  advanced  regi- 
ment, either  in  one  column,  or  in  two  columns  of  two 
troops  each.  These  may  be  termed  the  intermediate 
squadrons.  They  are  separated  by  about  the  same  in- 
terval as  the  squadrons  composing  the  supports.  About 


THE  CAVAXRY  SCREEN. 


I5I 

two  and  a half  miles  farther  to  the  front,  the  remaining 
squadron  of  each  regiment  is  distributed  along  the  front 
in  contact  troops,  which  are  preceded  at  suitable  dis- 
tances by  patrols,  detailed  either  from  the  contact 
troops,  the  intermediate  squadrons,  or  the  supports. 
When  necessary,  these  patrols  detach  scouts  still  farther 
to  the  front.  (See  Plate  XII.) 

When  the  enemy  is  at  a distance  or  lacking  in  aggres- 
siveness, the  intermediate  squadrons  may  be  placed  in 
the  contact  line ; thus  extending  the  front  at  a time 
when  “information”  is  to  be  considered  more  than 
“security.”  If  the  enemy  is  close  and  enterprising, 
the  intermediate  squadrons  may  be  merged  with  the 
supports,  the  front  being  contracted  and  distances 
diminished,  owing  to  the  paramount  importance  of 
“security.  ” 

The  intervals  between  the  contact  troops  are  such  as 
to  admit  of  covering  the  front  assigned  to  the  brigade. 
In  a close  country,  the  number  of  contact  bodies  and 
the  intervals  between  them  depend  upon  the  number  of 
available  roads  within  the  front  occupied.  On  some 
roads  there  might  be  one  troop;  on  others,  two  or  three; 
or  the  whole  squadron  might  have  to  march  on  a single 
road.  As  a rule,  a greater  number  of  columns  would 
be  requisite  in  a close  country  than  in  an  open  one. 
Each  of  the  contact  troops,  each  intermediate  squadron, 
and  each  support,  as  well  as  the  reserve,  has  its  own 
advance  guard,  and  keeps  in  constant  communication 
with  the  bodies  on  its  right,  left,  front,  or  rear.  The 
major  commanding  the  contact  troops  of  each  regiment 
may  accompany  any  troop,  but  is  habitually  with  the 


152  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

second.  The  colonel  of  an  advanced  regiment  is  habit- 
ually with  the  support,  but  may  accompany  any  one  of 
his  squadrons.  The  brigade  commander  is  habitually 
with  the  reserve,  but  goes  wherever  his  presence  seems 
necessary.  If  the  reconnaissance  is  likely  to  lead  to  a 
battle,  it  may  be  well  for  him  to  be  wdth  the  contact 
line. 

A battery  of  horse  artillery  should  be  attached  to  the 
brigade,  and  should  habitually  accompany  the  reserve, 
marching  in  rear  of  the  leading  squadron.  * 

The  battery  should  not,  in  any  case,  be  placed  so  far 
to  the  front  that  the  leading  troops  could  not  manoeuver 
or  fall  back  without  exposing  it  to  capture.  If  the 
cavalry  is  pursuing  the  enemy,  the  battery  should  be 
with  one  of  the  leading  regiments  ; but  guns  should  not 
be  detached  from  the  battery  except  in  unusual  emer- 
gencies— for  instance,  in  the  case  of  a village  held  by  a 
hostile,  but  undisciplined,  population,  upon  whom  the 
moral  effect  of  a few  shells  would  be  great.  If  a con- 
siderable cavalry  fight  is  expected,  the  battery  should 
always  be  with  the  reserve.  If  a force  of  infantry  in 
wagons  accompanies  the  brigade,  it  forms  part  of  the 
reserve. 

When  the  brigade  is  marching  on  two  parallel  roads, 

* As  the  American  cavalry  brigade  is  equal  in  numerical  strength  to 
a French,  German,  or  Austrian  cavalry  division,  it  should  seem,  at 
first,  that  it  should  have  a number  of  horse  batteries  equal  to  those  of 
the  Continental  cavalry  division.  The  condition  of  our  roads,  and 
the  general  nature  of  the  terrain  in  any  of  our  probable  theatres  of 
operations,  are  not,  however,  favorable  to  the  extended  use  of  artillery; 
and  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  (par.  753I  are  undoubtedly  right  in 
assigning  only  one  battery  to  the  cavalry  brigade. 


PLATE  XU 


Count rr/  Screen,  consisting  of  lJ3rin.- 3 Sediments. 

• 

9 

PcitroZs  • # 

I ? -Pnirx>l-s 

‘ • 

* ' \ * 1 1 i 

• • 

! ; • 

Contact  Troops  *'"4  “ * 4 A * a A a A ‘ A I 

* -j‘iA  *2A  ‘-fi-*' 

1st*Sq’d'it  7 th  Cclu.  S 

I 

/6t  Sq'd'n  !i  (h  Car . 

intermediate  Sq'clr'ns  y- ---i-- ■«■««>» — y 

%r*Sq  Wnc  y^Cazt.  4 

ZS*Sqdm  9‘i  Car 

1 

t1:  V A ] f,  V /, 

Supports  y — y 

3-rdJSqdn  7^  Car  5 

3r^Sq’dh  991  Cav. 

■f 

f f Ijj  f /Sq’d’n 

T 

* 

fjeserve , jCrCav.  J 

a 

a 

ZTLcljSq'dh 

i 

37rL>Sq'd'rv 

V i V 

Jjr 

-Note  The  troops  are  not  ctnzwrv  to  scale. 

JLJi.Oui-ari/ij', 

THE  CAVARRY  SCREEN. 


*53 


the  reserve  follows  the  regiment  that  seems  most  likely 
to  need  assistance.  If  the  extent  of  front  is  too  great 
to  admit  of  the  reserve  moving  promptly  to  the  assist- 
ance of  either  wing,  the  unsupported  wing  must  be 
given  great  independence,  and,  if  necessary,  must 
adopt  a separate  line  of  retreat. 

When  the  brigade  is  forced  to  march  in  a single 
column,  the  contact  troops,  the  intermediate  squadron, 
and  the  support,  are  all  furnished  by  the  leading  regi- 
ment. A strong  patrol  should  be  pushed  out  well  to 
the  front,  and  a troop  should  be  detached  to  a consider- 
able distance  to  either  flank.  These  distances  can  not 
be  definitely  prescribed:  they  should  be  great  enough 
to  give  the  column  warning  in  time  to  prepare  for  action, 
but  not  so  great  as  to  expose  the  detachments  to  immi- 
nent danger  of  being  cut  off  by  an  enterprising  enemy. 
The  immediate  front  should  be  covered  by  two  contact 
troops. 

When  the  ground  permits,  and  no  serious  engage- 
ment is  expected  within  the  next  twenty-four  hours,  all 
three  regiments  may  march  on  the  same  front,  the 
brigade  thus  having  twelve  contact  troops  and  no  re- 
serve. This  formation  is  desirable  whenever  it  can  be 
adopted,  as  it  promotes  celerity  of  movement,  facilitates 
foraging,  and  increases  the  front  of  reconnaissance.  This 
formation  may  be  adopted  even  when  the  several  col- 
umns are  a short  day’s  march  from  each  other;  as  the 
concentration  on  the  center  column  could  then  be  easily 
effected  within  twenty-four  hours. 

The  duty  of  contact  troops  being  very  arduous,  they 
must  be  relieved  as  often  as  practicable. 


154 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


A rear  guard  is  always  provided  from  the  reserve. 
It  generally  consists  of  two  troops,  and  is  charged  not 
only  with  the  arrest  of  stragglers  and  the  preservation 
of  order,  but  also  with  keeping  a careful  watch  for  all 
suspicious  indications  in  the  rear.  If  clouds  of  dust  are 
seen,  the  cause  must  be  investigated  ; and  villages  and 
prominent  points  must  be  watched  after  the  column 
has  passed,  to  see  that  no  signals  are  given  out  to  the 
enemy. 

The  topography  of  most  of  the  States  of  the  Missis- 
sippi Valley,  with  their  absolutely  parallel  roads  a mile 
apart,  and  with  lateral  communication  at  every  mile, 
would  probably  lend  itself  admirably  to  the  typical 
formations  suggested  above;  but  in  many  of  the  more 
wooded  and  broken  regions  of  the  United  States 
and  Canada,  where  the  roads  are  fewer  and  less  regular, 
the  following  formation,  based  upon  the  experience  of 
the  War  of  Secession,  would  doubtless  be  much  better:* 

* “In  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  the  roads  leading  in  the  direction  of 
the  enemy  were  generally  not  more  numerous  than  two,  each  of 
which  was  important  enough  to  occupy  with  a brigade,  or  oftener 
with  a division,  of  cavalry.  The  enormous  distances  to  which  the 
German  cavalry  was  sent  apply  to  conditions  that  would  not  exist  in 
The  presence  of  an  enterprising  and  efficient  opposing  cavalry.” — Gen- 
eral Wesley  Merritt,  U.  S.  A.,  in  response  to  inquiries  by  the  author 
on  this  subject. 

“It  remains  yet  to  be  proved  by  the  contact  of  equal  foes,  whether 
the  immense  spread  of  the  German  cavalry  in  1870,  radiating  in  de- 
creasing subdivisions  from  a common  center,  can  be  maintained,  to 
its  full  extent,  in  the  presence  of  an  equally  active  cavalry  foe.  It  is 
more  likely  that  to  obtain  the  information  which  in  ’70  was  brought 
in  by  small  groups  of  horsemen,  fearlessly  riding  over  the  country  at 
a great  distance  from  their  regiments,  it  will  be  found  necessary  to 
hold  them  somewhat  more  in  hand  and  push  forward  on  every  avenue 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


155 


The  brigade,  if  practicable,  operates  on  not  more  than 
two  roads,  about  five  miles  apart;  a regiment  and  two 
squadrons  on  one  road,  and  a regiment  and  one  squadron 
on  the  other.  Each  body  detaches  a squadron  about  two 
miles  to  the  front.  In  advance  of  these,  patrols,  pushed 
out  to  suitable  distances,  cover  the  entire  front,  main- 
taining communication  with  the  center,  and  forming  a 
line  of  patrols  extending  about  three  miles  beyond  the 
roads  used  by  the  brigade.  This  gives  a line  of  patrols 
about  eleven  miles  long,  sixteen  patrols  being  employed 
— eight  from  each  advanced  squadron.  The  advanced 
squadron  on  each  road  may  either  be  held  together  or 
broken  up  into  supports  for  the  patrols,  as  circumstances 
may  require.  In  some  cases  each  patrol  may  even  be 
supported  by  a half-troop.  Each  flank  of  the  line  is 
strongly  supported  by  nearly  half  of  the  brigade;  and  any 
small  force  of  the  enemy  penetrating  the  center  of  the 
line  would  be  caught  between  the  two  columns.  No 
road  practicable  for  a large  force  should  be  between  the 
columns,  unless  timely  information  and  speedy  concen- 
tration were  so  sure  as  to  leave  no  danger  of  a large 
hostile  force  separating  the  two  parts  of  the  brigade. 

If  parallel  roads  do  not  exist  at  suitable  distances,  the 
force  must  be  held  in  a single  column  in  rear  of  the  cen- 
ter of  the  line  of  patrols,  two  squadrons,  if  necessary,  be- 
ing detached  to  the  front.  In  fact,  whatever  alterations 

of  approach  to  the  enemy  a self-supporting  body  of  cavalry  of  consid- 
erable size,  trained  to  fight  under  all  conditions.  So  it  is  that  the 
careful  study  of  the  expeditions  of  cavalry  against  cavalry,  so  fruitful 
of  good  results  in  1863,  ’4  and  ’5,  is  of  the  first  importance  to  us  as 
students  of  cavalry  progress.” — Major  J.  B.  Babcock,  U.  S.  A.,  in 
Journal  of  the  United  States  Cavalry  Association. 


156  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

circumstances  may  demand  in  any  of  the  foregoing- 
dispositions,  the  main  body  of  the  brigade  should,  in 
any  case,  be  on,  or  near,  the  principal  route  by  which 
the  enemy  may  advance,  and  must  be  as  concentrated 
as  possible.  Lateral  roads  must  be  reconnoitered,  and, 
if  necessary,  occupied  by  covering  patrols. 

Patrols. — Scouting  patrols  are  sent  out  in  advance  of 
the  contact  troops  to  such  distances  as  circumstances 
may  require.  They  are  either  small  patrols  or  officers* 
patrols ; the  latter  being  always  under  the  command  of  an 
officer,  and  generally  varying  in  strength  from  two  to  ten 
men — sometimes  consisting  of  one  or  two  officers  alone. 
Larger  detachments  may  be  necessary  for  particular 
objects;  but,  as  a rule,  the  patrols  should  be  small, 
as  they  would  otherwise  be  too  conspicuous,  and  would 
lack  the  mobility  essential  to  the  proper  performance  of 
their  duties.  As  a general  rule  for  the  size  of  a detach- 
ment, it  may  be  said  that  if  it  is  to  fight,  it  can  not  be 
too  strong;  if  it  is  merely  to  observe,  it  can  not  be  too 
weak.  If,  however,  in  the  latter  case,  it  is  likely  to 
encounter  similar  parties  of  the  enemy,  it  should  be 
strong  enough  to  hold  its  own  against  a hostile  patrol 
of  five  or  six  men,  such  as  are  most  frequently  met. 

The  scouting  patrols  are  taken  generally  from  the 
contact  troops,  though  they  may  be  taken  also  from  the 
intermediate  squadrons,  or  even  from  the  supports, 
when  extensive  reconnaissance  is  necessary.  The  num- 
ber of  these  patrols  will  depend  entirely  upon  circum- 
stances; but  they  would  rarely  exceed  two  to  each 
contact  troop.  In  Borne’ s system  these  patrols  are 
termed  “points,”  each  consisting  of  an  officer,  a corpo- 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


I57 


ral,  and  six  men.  The  point  may  be  divided  into  two 
equal  groups,  the  officer  retaining  immediate  command 
of  one  and  assigning  the  corporal  to  the  command  of 
the  other.  As  a formation  suited  to  secure  the  escape 
of  at  least  one  man,  in  case  the  patrol  should  meet  with 
disaster,  he  suggests  the  following:  The  officer  with  the 
first  group,  preceded  at  some  distance  by  a trooper;  the 
corporal  with  the  second  group,  followed  correspond- 
ingly by  another  trooper,  the  distance  from  the  leading 
to  the  rear  trooper  being  about  a third  of  a mile. 

A patrol  rarely  goes  more  than  six  miles  from  the 
contact  troops,  and  detached  scouts  do  not  often  go 
more  than  the  same  distance  from  the  patrol;  but  they 
may  be  called  upon  to  make  very  long  and  exhausting 
rides,  and  the  men  and  horses  should,  therefore,  be 
carefully  chosen.  Each  patrol  should  keep  informed  of 
the  positions  of  the  patrols  on  its  flanks,  and  of  its  own 
squadron.  Each  troop  and  squadron  should  always 
have  similar  knowledge  of  the  positions  of  correspond- 
ing bodies  and  the  reserve,  and  each  squadron  and  troop 
commander  should  know  where  to  send  his  reports  and 
where  to  establish  connecting  posts,  if  such  posts  are  to 
be  used. 

The  patrols  explore  not  only  to  the  front,  but  on  the 
flanks  of  the  brigade;  the  flanking  patrols  being  gener- 
ally taken  from  the  reserve,  on  account  of  the  heavy 
demands  made  on  the  advanced  squadrons  for  other 
patrols. 

The  patrols  should  be  given  great  freedom  of  action. 
It  is  their  duty  to  gain  and  keep  contact  with  the 
enemy,  and  in  their  movements  everything  should  be 


158  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

subordinated  to  the  one  object  of  gaining  information. 
They  make  no  attempt  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the 
troops  in  rear  (except  indirectly  by  furnishing  timely 
information);  do  not  think  of  fighting,  except  to  escape 
capture;  and  if  compelled  to  retreat,  they  choose  such 
a line  as  to  them  seems  best,  regardless  of  the  troops  in 
rear.  Neighboring  patrols  communicate  their  discov- 
eries to  each  other,  and,  if  they  do  not  fall  back  upon 
the  contact  squadrons,  join  for  the  night,  when  practi- 
cable, in  order  to  economize  vedettes,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  have  the  increased  strength  that  comes  from  in- 
creased numbers. 

If  the  scouting  patrols  are  driven  away  by  the  enemy, 
they  return  as  quickly  as  possible  and  continue  their 
reconnaissance.  “They  may,”  says  Bonie,  “best  be 
compared  to  flies,  which  one  keeps  constantly  trying  to 
drive  away,  but  without  effect,  as  they  again  and  again 
return  with  an  enervating  persistence.”  The  conduct 
of  the  German  scouts  in  1870  is  thus  described  by  the 
same  author:  “At  noon,  on  the  8th  of  August,  we  re- 
ceived orders  to  saddle  and  mount,  because  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  was  in  view.  Some  scouts  were  mistaken  for 
the  head  of  numerous  columns.  We  then  retired. 
From  that  moment  until  we  reached  Luneville,  their 
scouts  watched  us  incessantly.  Linked  to  their  army 
by  horsemen,  they  gave  an  exact  account  of  our  posi- 
tions, of  our  halts,  of  our  movements  ; and  as  they 
watched  us  from  some  little  distance,  incessantly  ap- 
pearing and  disappearing,  they  spread  uneasiness.” 

These  scouts,  by  their  mere  presence,  appearing  and 
disappearing,  manifestly  watching,  invariably  eluding 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


159 

pursuit,  and  returning  to  their  impudent  intrusion,  pro- 
duced upon  the  French  much  of  the  annoyance  caused 
by  harassing  patrols.  Holienlohe  says: 

“ It  is  necessary  to  have  seen  it,  as  I did  the  day  be- 
fore the  battle  of  Beaumont,  before  one  can  realize  how 
our  cavalry  swarmed  round  the  enemy’s  columns  on 
the  march,  just  as  bees  swarm  out  of  their  hives  against 
an  intruder.  I saw  one  corps,  which,  as  it  marched  by 
me  during  many  hours,  I reckoned  at  forty  battalions, 
continually  annoyed  and  delayed  by  our  troublesome 
Uhlans.  Sometimes  whole  companies  broke  out  in 
anger  from  the  column  of  march  and  fired  volleys  at 
single  patrols,  who  then  quickly  fell  back,  and,  as  far 
as  possible,  avoided  loss.  The  result  of  all  this  was 
indescribable  fatigue  for  the  enemy’s  infantry.  They 
reached  the  end  of  their  march  as  night  fell,  utterly 
tired  out,  and  neglected,  from  very  weariness,  the  most 
ordinary  precautions  as  to  outposts  around  their  miser- 
able bivouacs,  while  our  infantry,  quite  near  them,  but 
without  their  knowledge,  was  comfortably  housed  in 
villages.” 

As  a rule,  officers’  patrols  are  detailed  for  each  of  the 
main  routes  and  the  flanks,  the  intervening  country  and 
lesser  roads  being  intrusted  to  small  patrols  under  non- 
commissioned officers.  If  detached  from  a contact 
troop,  the  officer’s  patrol  will  have  for  its  duty  part  of 
the  general  reconnoitering  duty  of  the  troop;  if  detailed 
otherwise,  the  patrol  will  probably  be  intrusted  with  a 
special  mission; — such  as  to  open  communication  with 
some  portion  of  the  command  which  is  not  in  contact 
with  the  brigade;  to  ascertain  whether  the  enemy  is 
present  in  a certain  village;  or  to  reconnoiter  a distant 
village  or  defile.  Officer’s  patrols  thus  sent  out  may  go 


i6o 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


very  much  farther  than  the  ordinary  scouting  patrols, 
depending  while  gone  entirely  upon  their  own  resources. 
Officers  are  sometimes  detached  singly  to  watch  the 
enemy  or  particular  points,  rejoining  when  their  object 
is  accomplished  or  they  are  driven  in  by  the  enemy. 
A patrol  sent  out  on  a special  mission  should  return  the 
moment  its  object  is  accomplished,  without  undertaking 
other  objects  on  its  own  responsibility.  Care  should  be 
taken  that  neither  too  many  missions  nor  too  great  an 
extent  of  ground  be  assigned  to  a single  patrol. 

Having  in  view  the  possibility  of  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  the  officers  should  not  have  on 
their  persons  any  papers  that  could  give  information 
to  the  enemy.  They  should  commit  their  orders  to 
memory,  and  then  destroy  the  printed  or  written  copy.* 

Owing  to  the  superior  celerity  and  efficiency  of  offi- 
cers’ patrols,  they  are  especially  valuable  in  seizing 
postoffices,  telegraph  stations,  etc.  In  entering  a vil- 
lage or  town  in  the  enemy’s  country,  the  greatest  safety 
is  found  in  the  sudden  appearance  and  prompt  dis- 
appearance of  the  party.  The  patrol  should  quickly 
gain  the  desired  information,  or  seize  the  persons  or 

* This  rule  might  sometimes  be  profitably  adopted  by  officers  when 
not  on  duty  with  patrols.  Geueral  J.  G.  Walker,  formerly  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  in  speaking  of  Lee’s  “Special  Orders,  No.  191,”  a copy 
of  which  accidentally  fell  into  McClellan’s  hands,  says:  “On  receiv- 
ing my  copy  of  the  order  I was  so  impressed  with  the  disastrous 
consequence  which  might  result  from  its  loss  that  I pinned  it  securely 
in  an  inside  pocket.  In  speaking  with  General  Longstreet  on  this 
subject  afterward,  he  remarked  that  the  same  thought  had  occurred 
to  him,  and  that,  as  an  absolutely  sure  precaution,  he  memorized  the 
order  and  then  ‘chewed  it  up.’” — “ Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War,”  Yol.  II,  P-  607. 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


161 


documents  constituting  its  object,  and  should  disappear 
before  the  inhabitants  recover  from  their  astonishment 
sufficiently  to  appreciate  how  small,  or  how  isolated, 
the  party  is. 

The  general  rules  for  the  conduct  of  the  scouting  pa- 
trols have  already  been  considered  in  the  subject  of  re- 
connaissance; and  but  little  remains  to  be  said  about 
them.  While  independence  of  action  must  be  given  to 
these  patrols;  while  no  attempt  must  be  made  to  rally 
them  every  night  on  the  advance  guards  of  the  contact 
troops;  they  will,  as  a rule,  if  driven  back,  rally  upon 
the  troops  immediately  in  their  rear.  Indeed,  it  is  im- 
possible to  get  good  scouting  service  unless  the  patrols- 
are  supported  by  a sufficient  force  to  insure  some  de- 
gree of  protection  from  the  assaults  of  the  enemy’s 
cavalry.  In  the  retreat  from  Spichern,  General  de 
Cissey  ordered  a regiment  of  cavalry  to  drive  away  the 
German  patrols  which  were  pertinaciously  hanging 
upon  the  rear  of  the  French.  A squadron  quickly 
drove  back  the  patrols,  but  coming  upon  the  squadrons 
in  rear,  it  was  defeated  and  driven  back  with  loss, 
and  the  annoying  scouts  were  again  seen  hovering 
around  the  retreating  army. 

In  this  case  the  French  attacking  force  was  too  small; 
and,  in  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  only  way  to  get 
rid  of  the  enemy’s  annoying  scouts,  when  they  are 
properly  supported,  is  by  inflicting  a heavy  defeat  upon 
his  cavalry.  When  (some  days  after  his  victory  at 
Fisher’s  Hill)  Sheridan  withdrew  down  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  he  was  followed  by  Early,  whose  parties  of 
cavalry,  as  soon  as  they  gained  contact,  hung  upon  the 
II — w 


i62 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Union  army  much  after  the  manner  of  the  Prussian  pa- 
trols described  above.  Sheridan,  “ resenting  this  bold- 
ness of  an  enemy  so  lately  routed,”  halted  the  next  day, 
and  launched  his  entire  cavalry  force  against  that  of  the 
enemy.  A spirited  engagement  of  two  hours1  duration 
(known  as  the  Battle  of  Tom’s  Brook)  resulted  in  the 
complete  defeat  of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  Lomax  be- 
ing driven  in  flight  nearly  thirty  miles  by  Merritt, 
while  Rosser  was  routed  by  Custer.  So  thoroughly  was 
the  Confederate  cavalry  used  up  that  nothing  further 
was  seen  of  Early’s  contact  parties. 

The  movements  of  the  scouting  patrols  will  depend 
on  those  of  the  enemy;  for  they  must  never  lose  con- 
tact with  him,  unless  ordered  to  do  so.  The  contact 
troops  must  always  be  ready,  if  possible,  to  lend  prompt 
support  to  the  patrols;  and  we  thus  have  the  move- 
ments of  the  leading  squadrons  entirely  contingent 
upon  those  of  the  enemy.  The  patrols  on  the  flanks 
of  the  brigade  must  endeavor  to  work  round  the  flanks 
of  the  enemy;  and  for  this  purpose  they  and  the  sup- 
porting contact  troops  must  be  given  considerable  inde- 
pendence of  action,  both  in  advancing  and  in  falling 
back. 

Separation  of  the  Duties  of  Security  a?id  Informa- 
tion.— The  duties  of  security  and  those  of  information 
thus  come  into  direct  conflict.  The  cavalry  screen  acts 
as  the  advanced  outpost  of  the  army,  and  the  contact 
troops  constitute  the  outpost  for  the  main  body  of  the 
cavalry  thus  employed.  Now,  the  outpost  must  not 
be  pushed  so  far  in  advance  of  the  main  body  as  to  be 
beyond  prompt  support;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


163 


scouting  parties  and  contact  troops  must  touch,  upon  the 
enemy  in  order  to  get  information.  It  follows,  then, 
that  when  the  opposing  armies  are  at  a distance  of 
several  days’  march  from  each  other,  the  duties  of  se- 
curity must  be  separated  from  those  of  information; 
and  this  is  usually  effected  by  intrusting  the  latter 
duties  to  detached  patrols.  During  the  first  concentra- 
tion of  the  armies  on  the  theater  of  operations,  these 
detached  patrols  are  generally  small  officers’  patrols; 
celerity  of  movement  and  intelligence  in  reconnoiter- 
ing  being  here  even  more  necessary  than  usual,  as  (the 
regular  cavalry  screen  not  having  yet  been  formed)  the 
patrols  are  without  support. 

Transmission  of  Intelligence. — All  information  gained 
by  the  cavalry  screen  is  promptly  transmitted  to  the 
headquarters  of  the  commander-in-chief.  In  case  the 
screening  force  consists  of  divisional  cavalry,  the  re- 
ports are  made  to  the  divisional  commander.  The  com- 
mander of  the  screen  keeps  up  constant  communication 
with  the  commanders  of  the  advance  guards  of  the  col- 
umns in  his  rear,  and  keeps  them  posted  in  regard  to 
matters  in  their  front  which  they  should  know.  Staff 
officers  from  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  or  of  the 
army  corps  immediately  in  rear,  are  frequently  sent  with 
the  screening  force,  moving  with  the  most  important 
detachments.  Thus,  in  the  operations  just  preceding 
the  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour,  Lieut. -Col.  von  Caprivi,  * 
the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Xth  Corps,  accompanied  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division.  Many  similar  instances  occur- 
ring in  the  same  war  might  be  cited. 


* The  present  Chancellor  of  Germany. 


164  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

Contact  and  Fighting. — On  gaining  contact  with  the 
enemy,  concentration  is  the  first  consideration;  for  fight- 
ing will  now  be  necessary,  either  to  break  his  screen  or 
to  preserve  onr  own,  and  victory  should  rest  with  that 
cavalry  which  is  in  the  best  formation  for  combat.  The 
cavalry  should  be  concentrated  on  two  or  more  parallel 
roads,  in  supporting  distance,  ignoring  the  enemy’s 
scouts  and  patrols,  and  pushing  through  to  his  reserves.  * 
If  the  enemy  has  been  more  intent  upon  “information” 
than  “ security,”  and  has  his  force  disseminated,  his 
reserves  will  be  crushed,  and  the  rest  of  his  screen,  find- 
ing a concentrated  body  of  hostile  cavalry  in  its  rear, 
will  collapse  and  seek  safety  in  a rapid  retreat  by  the 
flanks.  If  the  enemy  has  his  force  concentrated,  our 
cavalry  must  also  be  concentrated  to  avoid  ruin.  The 
following  may,  therefore,  be  given  as  an  invariable 
rule:  From  the  outset  spare  no  means  of  gaining  in- 
formation; but  on  touching  the  enemy,  shape  everything 
to  the  end  of  being  ready  to  fight.  The  best  way  to 
screen  an  army  is  by  defeating  the  opposing  cavalry. 

If  the  patrols  perform  their  duty  properly,  the  pres- 
ence of  large  forces  of  the  enemy  should  be  known  in 
time  for  the  necessary  orders  for  concentration  to  be 
given;  but  if  the  contact  troops  find  themselves  in  the 
presence  of  large  hostile  bodies,  advancing  or  deployed 
for  battle,  they  fall  back  upon  the  supports,!  even 
though  no  orders  to  that  effect  have  been  given.  Un- 
less the  contact  troops  are  themselves  surprised  (which 

*This  was  Sheridan’s  plan  of  action  at  the  Battle  of  Tom’s  Brook:, 
f It  is  presumed  that  at  this  stage  the  intermediate  squadrons  are 
merged  with  the  supports. 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


165 

is  absolutely  without  excuse),  they  fall  back  slowly;  and 
when  they  have  joined  the  supports,  the  united  force 
falls  back  upon  the  reserve,  or  the  latter  is  moved  up 
to  reinforce  the  former.  If  there  is  no  special  reserve, 
the  threatened  troop  or  squadron  closes  in  upon  a neigh- 
boringone,  warning  it  quickly  beforehand 

The  concentration  efFected,  the  action  of  the  cavalry 
depends  upon  circumstances.  If  the  enemy’s  cavalry 
covers  his  front,  it  should  be  vigorously  attacked.  If 
the  hostile  screening  force  has  been  driven  away  from, 
or  has  voluntarily  uncovered,  the  front  of  its  army,  our 
cavalry  should  remain  in  observation  of  the  enemy’s 
front  only  until  our  army  is  ready  for  battle,  when  it 
should  withdraw  to  one  or  both  flanks  of  the  corps  or 
army,  taking  up  a position  to  check  the  attempts  of  the 
enemy  to  attack  or  reconnoiter.  During  the  movement 
to  the  flanks,  and  in  all  movements  of  concentration, 
unceasing  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  is  kept  up  by 
officers’  patrols. 

In  an  attempt  to  break  through  our  screen,  the  enemy 
(especially  if  accompanied  by  artillery)  must  generally 
advance  on  one  of  the  main  roads  perpendicular  to  its 
front — a road  upon  which  our  cavalry  should  itself  be 
advancing.  Good  cavalry,  under  an  efficient  leader, 
should  never  be  surprised  by  such  a movement;  for  if 
provision  for  mutual  support  by  the  different  bodies  has 
been  made  beforehand;  if  communication  has  been 
maintained,  and  scouting  has  not  been  neglected ; the 
enemy’s  movements  should  be  quickly  perceived  and 
promptly  met.  If,  however,  the  cavalry  is  driven  in  by 
the  enemy,  the  direction  of  its  retreat  will  generally  de- 


1 66 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


pend  upon  the  seeming  designs  of  the  enemy  and  the 
direction  of  his  advance.  The  retiring  cavalry  may 
find  it  expedient  to  draw  the  enemy  after  it  in  a false 
direction,  in  order  to  obtain  favorable  conditions  for  its 
own  army.  But,  in  order  to  act  judiciously  in  such 
cases,  a correct  appreciation  of  the  state  of  affairs  and  a 
sound  judgment  as  to  what  will  be  advantageous  are 
necessary.* 

The  cavalry  screen  may  sometimes  find  it  necessary 
to  act  as  a veritable  advance  guard,  and  fight  a delaying 
action  to  hold  an  advantageous  position  and  cover  the 
deployment  of  the  army;  just  as  Buford  held  the  posi- 
tion at  Gettysburg  until  the  arrival  and  deployment  of 
the  First  Corps,  keeping  in  check  with  his  two  small 
cavalry  brigades  Heth’s  Confederate  infantry  division. 
In  such  a case  the  chief  reliance  should  be  placed  on 
dismounted  fire  action,  and  the  cavalry  should  not  hesi- 
tate to  resort  to  the  intrenching  tool. 

In  combating  the  opposing  cavalry  screen,  the  judg- 
ment of  the  commander  must  decide  whether  the  saber 
or  the  carbine  should  be  used.  This  question  will 
largely  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  on  the 
action  of  the  opposing  force.  It  may  be  said  that  where 
suddenness  of  action  is  desirable,  the  saber  should  be 
used  whenever  possible;  and  the  penetrating  force 
should,  therefore,  be  partial  to  its  employment.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  resisting  force  should  incline  to  the  use 
of  the  carbine,  unless  it  has  been  able  to  concentrate  as 
rapidly  as  its  opponent,  and  thus  has  reason  to  expect 
favorable  results  from  a counter  charge.  Cavalry  must 


*Von  Schmidt. 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


167 


always  be  ready  for  effective  fire  action  ; for  it  may  find 
its  progress  opposed  by  infantry  or  partisan  troops  shel- 
tered in  villages  or  behind  breastworks.* 

When  the  enemy  is  defeated,  the  cavalry  resumes  its 
place  in  advance  of  the  other  troops.  Its  mode  of  action 
then  can  not  be  better  described  than  in  the  words  of 
Boguslawski : 

“Immediately  after  these  actions  [Spieliern,  Weis- 
senburg,  and  Worth],  the  cavalry  divisions  again  led  the 
way.  Their  mission  was,  above  all,  to  pursue  and  keep 
in  contact  with  the  enemy.  They  threw  forward  strong- 
detachments,  which  everywhere  forced  the  enemy  back 
and  sought  to  discover  the  direction  of  his  march  or  his 
new  position.  If  they  found  their  way  clear  before 
them,  they  sent  on  officers’  patrols,  with  orders  to  push 
forward  at  any  risk  until  they  came  upon  the  foe.  These 
parties  were  dispatched  in  all  directions,  and  performed 
their  duties  generally  with  equal  ability  and  determina- 
tion. It  is  they  who  spread  the  fear  of  les  Prussiens 
many  miles  in  front  of  the  army  corps’  advance  guards; 
to  them  cities  like  Nancy  opened  their  gates  without 
an  attempt  at  resistance;  and  if  here  and  there  a cavalry 
patrol  some  days’  march  in  advance  of  the  division  was 
dispersed  or  cut  off,  one  or  two  horsemen  generally 
made  their  way  back  to  give  intelligence,  which  was 
what  was  wanted.” 

It  is  not  often,  however,  that  the  cavalry,  even  of  a 
victorious  army,  can  have  its  own  way  so  completely. 


* It  seems  incredible  to  American  cavalrymen  that  in  December, 
1S70,  a German  cavalry  brigade  was  stopped  at  the  village  of  Vibray 
by  twelve  riflemen.  The  lesson  taught  by  this  humiliating  check  was 
not  lost  on  the  Germans  ; and  the  arms  and  training  of  their  cavalry 
are  now  such  that  a repetition  of  such  an  occurrence  would  be  im- 
possible. 


1 68 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


It  is  only  when  the  cavalry  has  beaten  its  opponent  into 
a sense  of  hopeless  inferiority  that  such  audacious  recon- 
naissance can  be  successfully  carried  out. 

Protecting  the  Infantry. — The  work  of  the  infantry 
is  greatly  lightened  when  a cavalry  screen  in  advance 
performs  its  duty  efficiently  and  has  gained  the  upper 
hand  of  the  opposing  cavalry.  In  i870-’7i,  the  Ger- 
man infantry  w7as  not  disturbed  by  any  apprehensions 
in  regard  to  the  enemy,  but  marched  and  rested  in  se- 
curity, knowing  that  the  country  was  reconnoitered  so 
far  ahead  that  the  cavalry  could  give  warning  of  the 
enemy’s  advance  a full  day  before  the  attack  could  be 
made.  During  the  entire  war,  the  German  infantry 
was  not  once  alarmed  by  the  enemy,  and  its  marches 
were  made  as  easily  as  in  “autumn  maneuvers.” 

Seizing  Important  Points. — In  addition  to  screening 
the  movements  of  its  own  army  and  discovering  those 
of  the  enemy,  the  advanced  cavalry  is  often  required  to 
seize  passes,  heights,  or  bridges,  the  possession  of  which 
is  important,  and  which  must  be  gained  quickly,  and 
held  until  the  main  army  can  arrive.  In  this  operation, 
celerity  of  movement  and  fighting  power  are  prime 
considerations. 

In  1863  Rosecrans  moved  against  the  Confederate 
army,  which  occupied  the  line  from  Wartrace,  through 
Shelbyville,  along  Duck  River.  His  plan  was  to 
menace  Bragg’s  left,  and  then  turn  his  right  by  way  of 
Hoover’s  Gap  and  Manchester.  Thomas’  corps,  which 
constituted  the  center,  moved  out  on  the  Manchester 
road,  covered  by  Wilder’s  brigade  of  mounted  infantry. 
A Confederate  corps  under  Hardee  was  in  cantonments 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


169 


about  three  miles  back  of  Hoover’s  Gap,  and  it  was  the 
intention  of  that  commander,  as  soon  as  he  should  hear 
of  an  advance  of  the  United  States  forces,  to  push  for- 
ward and  hold  the  gap  at  its  northern  entrance,  where 
the  ground  was  favorable  for  defense,  but  unsuited  to 
camping.  Striking  the  Confederate  outposts  on  the 
hither  side  of  the  gap,  Wilder  pressed  them  so  vigorously 
as  to  drive  them  through  at  a run.  He  then  took  up  a 
position  at  the  southern  outlet  of  the  gap,  where  he  had 
the  same  defensive  advantages  that  the  enemy  would 
have  had  at  the  northern  end.  Attacked  here  by  greatly 
superior  numbers,  he  held  his  ground  until  the  arrival 
of  reinforcements  enabled  him  definitively  to  repulse 
the  enemy.  Thus  with  a loss  of  less  than  100  men  was 
secured  a position  which  General  Thomas  expected  to 
gain  only  at  the  cost  of  many  lives. 

Foraging. — Another  mission  of  the  advanced  cavalry 
is  to  furnish  and  cover  foraging  parties.  The  cavalry 
screen  generally  moves  over  an  untouched  country,  and 
can  thus  easily  supply  itself:  moreover,  considerations 
of  mobility  demand  that  its  train  should  be  light,  if  it 
can  not  dispense  with  a train  altogether.  The  contact 
troops  should  not  be  accompanied  by  wagons  of  any  de- 
scription, but  should  carry  the  necessary  rations  and 
forage  either  on  their  own  horses  or  on  requisitioned 
animals;  and,  to  the  greatest  possible  degree,  the  sup- 
plies needed  by  them  should  be  obtained  by  “ foraging 
liberally  on  the  country.” 

The  train  of  the  brigade,  limited  to  the  barest  re- 
quirements, and  preferably  composed  of  pack  mules, 
marches  with  the  reserve.  Special  foraging  parties 


170  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

are  detailed  from  the  intermediate  squadrons  or  the 
supports.  These  parties,  acting  under  the  orders  of 
the  commander-in-chief,  and  under  the  general  super- 
vision of  a commissary  officer,  generally  operate  on  a line 
with,  or  in  rear  of,  the  supports,  and  incidentally  cover 
the  front  and  flanks  of  the  reserve  to  such  distances  as 
may  be  expedient.  The  supplies  gathered  in  excess  of 
the  needs  of  the  cavalry  are  collected  at  convenient 
points  for  the  use  of  the  troops  in  rear. 

CONNECTING  POSTS. 

Without  means  for  its  speedy  transmission  to  the 
rear,  the  information  gained  by  the  cavalry  screen 
would  be  of  but  little  value.  Scouts  ride  back  to  their 
patrols  with  information,  and  the  latter  constantly 
transmit  intelligence  to  the  contact  troops,  who,  in  turn, 
maintain  communication  with  the  intermediate  squad- 
rons, the  supports,  and  each  other,  by  means  of  com- 
municating patrols  or  single  scouts.  Communication 
back  to  the  reserve  is  also  generally  effected  by  means 
of  patrols  or  single  scouts;  but  between  the  reserve  and 
the  main  body  of  the  army,  and  sometimes  between  the 
reserve  and  the  supports,  it  should  be  maintained  by 
means  of  connecting  posts. 

Connecting  posts  are  generally  about  five  miles  apart; 
but  their  number  will  depend  largely  on  the  number  of 
well-marked  points  on  the  route;  such  as  cross-roads, 
taverns,  etc.  Each  post  should  ordinarily  consist  of 
one  non-commissioned  officer  and  six  men.  This  would 
admit  of  two  men  being  sent  in  each  direction  without 


CONNECTING  POSTS.  171 

denuding  the  post.  One  officer  should  have  charge  of 
four  posts. 

In  a dangerous  country,  or  when  the  number  of  men 
available  for  the  duty  is  limited,  the  connecting  posts 
may  be  larger  and  farther  apart;  often  consisting  of  a 
half-troop  under  a lieutenant.  If  the  country  is  very 
dangerous,  the  post  should  be  concealed  in  a position 
selected  with  a view  to  defense  and  retreat,  men  being 
detached  on  the  road  to  keep  watch  for  couriers. 

Two  horses  and  men  should  be  kept  ready  for  imme- 
diate departure,  and  a sentinel  must  be  constantly  on 
the  alert  at  the  post.  When  an  orderly  arrives,  he 
gives  his  dispatches  to  the  commander  of  the  post,  who 
receipts  to  him  for  the  same,  and  sends  them  forward 
by  a fresh  courier.  The  time  of  arrival  and  departure 
should  be  noted  on  the  envelope  containing  the  dis- 
patches. When  a dispatch  is  delayed  or  lost,  the  officer 
sending  it  must  be  notified  at  once.  The  orderly  bring- 
ing the  dispatch  will,  ordinarily,  rest  for  a time  at  the 
post;  remaining,  except  in  case  of  emergency,  until  the 
arrival  of  a courier  from  the  opposite  direction,  in  order 
that  he  may  carry  dispatches  back  with  him,  if  any  are 
brought  in.  On  leaving  a post  the  orderly  is  given 
careful  instructions  as  to  the  road  he  is  to  follow  and 
the  pace  at  which  he  is  to  go;  the  rate  of  travel  being 
noted  on  the  envelope  containing  the  dispatches.  The 
orderly  must  always  carry  the  dispatch  on  his  person, 
so  that  it  may  not  be  lost  in  case  of  any  accident  befall- 
ing his  horse.  To  prevent  the  dispatch  from  becoming 
illegible  from  wet,  it  should  be  enclosed  in  two  en- 
velopes. 


172 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


A register  should  be  kept  at  each  connecting  post,  and 
frequently  inspected  by  the  superintending  officer.  It 
should  show  the  time  of  arrival  of  each  courier,  whence 
he  came,  whither  he  went,  the  time  of  his  departure, 
from  whom  his  dispatches  came,  and  to  whom  they 
were  addressed.  Other  remarks  might  be  added  when 
necessary. 

If  the  posts  are  moving,  the  general  rules  for  their 
conduct  are  the  same  as  when  they  are  stationary. 
Each  commander  who  may  have  occasion  to  make  use 
of  a post  should  be  kept  informed  where  it  is  to  be 
found:  for  instance,  “till  noon,  at  Beverly;  till  6 P.  M., 
at  Bee  Creek;  till  midnight,  at  Platte  City.” 

When  a force  is  stationary  or  moving  directly  upon  a 
fixed  objective,  connecting  posts  should  be  practicable; 
but  otherwise  it  is  not  always  possible  to  establish  them. 
The  routes  of  the  contact  troops  being  entirely,  and 
that  of  the  whole  brigade  largely,  dependent  upon  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  it  is  not  always  possible  to 
know  where  the  chain  of  connecting  posts  is  to  begin 
or  end.  It  must  also  be  practicable  to  relieve  the  posts 
and  rally  them  upon  their  respective  troops,  and  they 
must  not  be  exposed  to  great  danger  of  capture  by  the 
enemy.  Failing  these  conditions,  connecting  posts  can 
not  be  considered,  and  dispatches  must  be  sent  through 
on  the  responsibility  of  a single  messenger.  Connect- 
ing posts  will  generally  be  found  practicable  from  the 
reserve  of  the  cavalry  brigade  back  to  the  rear;  but  to 
the  front  of  the  reserve,  towards  the  contact  troops, 
they  will  generally  be  out  of  the  question.  At  any 
rate,  the  contact  troops  must  not  establish  them,  as 


A REGIMENT  AS  A SCREENING  FORCE.  1 73 

these  troops  will  have  enough  to  do  in  watching  the 
enemy.  The  bodies  in  rear  must  be  held  responsible 
for  preserving  communication  with  the  contact  troops. 

A REGIMENT  AS  A SCREENING  FORCE. 

When  a single  regiment  of  cavalry  is  required  to 
screen  the  front  of  a considerable  force,  its  frontage  is 
necessarily  such  that  it  can  have  but  slight  power  of 
resistance.  Its  duty  consists  almost  entirely  in  recon- 
naissance of  the  enemy,  and  it  can  contribute  but  little 
to  the  security  of  the  force  in  rear,  except  by  keeping 
it  informed  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  front.  It  is 
out  of  the  question  to  give  it  sufficient  power  of  resist- 
ance for  advance  guard  duties  by  adding  infantry  to  it, 
as  its  mobility — its  most  valuable  characteristic — would 
thus  be  destroyed.  In  some  cases,  however,  infantry  in 
wagons  might  take  the  place  of  the  reserve. 

The  reserve  of  the  regiment  (one  squadron)  may  be 
from  five  to  ten  miles  in  advance  of  the  force  which  it 
covers.  The  other  squadrons  are  pushed  forward  and 
to  the  flanks  about  two  and  a half  miles,  each  sending 
forward  two  contact  troops  and  retaining  two  troops  in 
support.  The  distance  between  the  contact  troops  and 
the  supports  is  about  two  and  one-half  miles. 

The  following  alternative  formation  has  been  de- 
vised by  Lfieut.  Col.  Guy  V.  Henry,  U.  S.  A.,  to  use 
when  it  is  desirable  to  keep  a strong  reserve  well  in 
hand.  The  reserve,  consisting  of  six  troops,  is  pre- 
ceded by  the  rest  of  the  regiment  in  columns  of  two 
troops  each;  the  distance  from  the  reserve  and  the  in- 


174 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


tervals  between  the  columns  being  each  generally  about 
two  and  a half  miles,  but  varying  as  circumstances  re- 
quire. In  each  column  each  of  the  two  troops  in  turn 
throws  patrols  to  the  front,  which  send  forward  detached 
scouts  as  may  be  necessary;  each  column  covering  its 
own  front.  The  general  principles  regulating  the 
screening  and  reconnoitering  duties  of  a regiment  are 
the  same  as  in  the  case  of  a brigade. 


CONCLUSIONS. 

The  general  rules  for  the  conduct  of  the  cavalry 
screen  may  be  summarized  as  follows: — 

1.  Explore  the  country  well  to  the  front  with  small 
patrols,  which  must  not  lose  contact  with  the  enemy. 

2.  Keep  the  supporting  bodies  well  in  hand,  so  as  to 
be  able  to  concentrate  rapidly. 

3.  Always  maintain  a reserve  when  near  the  enemy. 

4.  Keep  up  constant  communication  between  all 
parts  of  the  screen  and  with  the  troops  in  rear. 

5.  Always  form  and  maneuver  the  screen  with  a view 
to  beating  the  opposing  cavalry.  This  is  the  paramount 
consideration. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


*75 


CHAPTER  VI. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


Retreats  of  great  generals,  and  of  armies  inured  to  war,  have  al- 
ways resembled  the  retreat  of  a wounded  lion,  and  such  is,  undoubt- 
edly, also  the  best  theory. — Clausewitz. 

When  an  army  has  been  engaged  in  a stubborn  battle, 
its  defeat  invariably  causes,  to  a greater  or  less  degree, 
a disruption  of  its  organization  and  a shattering  of  its 
discipline.  Different  battalions,  regiments,  and  brig- 
ades are  mingled  together  ; the  artillery  is  separated 
from  its  ammunition  ; baggage  wagons  are  mixed  up 
with  the  retreating  forces;  confusion  takes  the  place  of 
order,  and  subordination  is  lost  in  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  If  the  army,  while  in  this  condition,  be 
vigorously  pursued  by  intact  forces  of  the  enemy,  the  dis- 
aster of  battle  will  be  completed  by  the  havoc  of  pursuit, 
and  the  results  of  the  action  will  be  decisive. 

But  such  pursuits  as  those  which  followed  the  battles 
of  Jena  and  Waterloo  are  rarely  practicable.  In  the 
former,  the  large  body  of  comparatively  fresh  troops  at 
the  disposal  of  Napoleon,  and  in  the  latter,  the  late 
arrival  of  the  Prussians  on  the  battle-field,  made  possi- 
ble a prompt  and  vigorous  pursuit.  As  a rule,  however, 
victorious  armies  are  too  much  exhausted  to  pursue  im- 
mediately with  energy;  and  recent  wars  are  peculiarly 
barren  in  instances  of  vigorous  pursuit  of  a defeated 


176 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


enemy.  General  Johnston  declares  that  his  raw  troops  at 
Bull  Run  were  as  much  demoralized  by  victory  as  their 
undisciplined  opponents  were  by  defeat.  At  Gettysburg 
a fierce  struggle  of  three  days  left  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac in  poor  condition  to  follow  promptly  its  retreat- 
ing antagonist.  At  Koniggratz  the  Prussians  were 
thrown  into  such  confusion  by  the  concentric  nature  of 
their  attack  and  the  intermingling  of  their  armies,  that 
they  were  unable  to  resume  their  advance  for  nearly 
twenty-four  hours,  and  were  for  three  days  completely 
in  the  dark  as  to  the  direction  of  the  Austrian  retreat. 
At  Gravelotte  the  victorous  Germans  remained  immov- 
able for  an  entire  day. 

Whatever  may  be  the  extent  of  the  confusion  and  de- 
moralization attending  their  defeat,  good  troops  need 
only  to  shake  themselves  loose  from  the  enemy,  and 
have  a brief  respite  from  molestation,  to  recover  from 
their  confusion  and  regain  their  morale.  The  protec- 
tion needed  for  these  ends  is  furnished  by  a rear  guard. 

Duty  of  a Rear  Guard. — The  duty  of  the  rear  guard 
can  not  begin  until  the  battle  has  ended.  On  the  field 
itself  the  withdrawal  is  covered  by  the  artillery  and 
cavalry,  especially  the  latter  when  the  ground  favors  its 
action;  and  it  is  only  when  the  first  halt  is  effected  that 
the  rear  guard  can  be  organized  and  a regular  retreat 
begun.  In  thus  protecting  the  army  by  a fraction  of 
itself,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  enemy  must 
change  from  order  of  battle  to  order  of  march  to  pursue, 
and  that  he  can  at  first  bring  only  the  heads  of  his 
columns  against  the  rear  of  the  retreating  force. 

The  rear  guard  must  be  organized  as  soon  as  possible, 


REAR  GUARDS. 


1 77 


even  at  the  expense  of  a delay  comparatively  near  the 
enemy;  for  to  trust  to  speed  entirely  in  escaping,  would 
be  to  make  such  long  and  continued  forced  marches  as 
to  ruin  the  efficiency  of  the  army  and  disintegrate  it  by 
straggling. 

The  rear  guard  must  profit  to  the  utmost  by  the  de- 
fensive features  of  the  ground,  and  at  every  opportunity 
take  up  a strong  defensive  position.  The  enemy  will 
then  have  but  two  courses  of  action  open  to  his  choice; 
either  to  attack  with  the  heads  of  his  columns,  or  to 
deploy  for  action.  In  the  former,  his  advanced  troops 
should  be  easily  repulsed,  as  Murat’s  cavalry,  attacking 
with  “thoughtless  ardor,”  was  invariably  beaten  back 
by  the  hostile  rear  guards  in  the  Russian  retreat  to 
Moscow;*  in  the  latter,  the  enemy  will  be  compelled  to 
lose  time  in  deploying,  while  the  rear  guard  (which 
should  wait  until  the  enemy’s  dispositions  for  attack 
are  about  completed)  should  quickly  ploy  and  disappear 
from  his  front,  only  to  repeat  the  operation  at  the  next 
favorable  ground.  In  the  meantime,  the  enemy,  una- 
ble to  advance  quickly  in  deployed  lines,  again  loses 
time  in  changing  to  a marching  formation,  and  the 
main  body  of  the  retreating  army  steadily  continues  on 
its  way  without  halting.  The  duty  of  the  rear  guard 
is  thus  epitomized  by  Napoleon:  “ The  art  of  a general 
of  a rear  guard  is,  without  compromising  himself,  to 
check  the  enemy,  to  delay  him,  and  to  oblige  him  to 
consume  three  or  four  hours  in  going  a league.”  f 

*For  Davoust’s  strictures  on  Murat’s  method  of  combating  the 
Russian  rear  guard,  see  S^gur’s  “History  of  the  Expedition  to  Rus- 
sia,” Book  VII,  Chapter  II. 

f Maximes  de  Guerre. 

12 — W 


178  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

Ney’s  method  of  handling  the  rear  guard  in  the  re- 
treat from  Moscow  may  be  taken  as  a typical  example. 
Count  Segur  thus  describes  it:  “Every  day,  at  five 
o’clock  in  the  evening,  he  took  his  position,  stopped 
the  Russians,  allowed  his  soldiers  to  eat  and  take  some 
rest,  and  resumed  his  march  at  10  o’clock.  During  the 
whole  of  the  night  he  pushed  the  mass  of  the  stragglers 
before  him,  by  dint  of  cries,  of  entreaties  and  of  blows. 
At  daybreak,  which  was  about  seven  o’clock,  he  halted, 
again  took  position,  and  rested  under  arms  and  on 
guard  until  ten  o’clock;  the  enemy  then  usually  made 
his  appearance,  and  he  was  compelled  to  fight  until  the 
evening,  gaining  as  much  ground  to  the  rear  as  possi- 
ble.” 

Strength  of  the  Rear  Guard. — The  strength  of  the 
rear  guard  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  country,  and 
the  strength  and  character  of  the  pursuing  force.  In  a 
broken  country  full  of  good  defensive  positions,  it  would 
be  less  than  in  an  open  country;  and  it  would  be  greater 
when  the  pursuit  was  vigorously  pushed  in  force  than 
when  it  was  feebly  conducted  by  small  parties.  As  a 
rule,  it  corresponds  to  the  strength  of  an  advance  guard 
on  a forward  march;  and  would,  consequently,  vary 
from  one-eighth  to  one-third  of  the  entire  force — gen- 
erally consisting  of  about  one-sixth.  Care  and  good 
judgment  are  necessary  in  determining  the  strength  of 
the  rear  guard.  If  it  were  too  large,  too  many  troops 
would  be  kept  upon  a peculiarly  trying  duty,  and  the 
object  of  the  commander  to  withdraw  quickly  as  many 
men  as  possible  to  a place  of  safety  would  be  thwarted. 
If  it  were  too  small,  it  would  be  continually  driven  in 


REAR  GUARDS. 


J79 


upon  the  main  body,  to  which  it  would  communicate 
alarm  and  confusion;  and  the  latter  might  even  be  com- 
pelled to  halt  and  fight  for  the  protection  of  the  rear 
guard. 

Morale. — Everything  should  be  done  to  raise  the 
morale  of  the  rear  guard.  The  best  troops  should  be 
selected;  generally  those  which  have  suffered  least  in 
the  battle,  or  which  have  gained  therein  some  local  suc- 
cess. At  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  Sykes’  battalion  of 
regulars,  which  alone  remained  undemoralized,  was 
selected  to  cover  the  retreat;  Bleaker’ s division,  which 
had  not  been  engaged  at  all,  being  afterwards  detailed 
as  a rear  guard.  After  the  battle  of  Nashville,  Forrest’s 
cavalry  corps,  which  had  been  detached  at  the  time  of 
the  battle,  was  hurried  back  to  act  as  a rear  guard  for 
Hood’s  army. 

It  rarely  happens  that  an  army  is  defeated  on  every 
part  of  the  field,  and  troops,  finding  everything  prosper- 
ing in  their  front,  are  often  perplexed  and  indignant  at 
an  order  to  withdraw,  the  necessity  for  which  they  do 
not  understand.  These  are  the  troops  to  select  for  the 
rear  guard;  and  their  morale  should  be  still  further 
raised,  if  practicable,  by  occasional  ambuscades  or  offen- 
sive returns  against  the  enemy,  whenever  an  opportunity 
of  taking  him  at  a disadvantage  occurs. 

Offensive  Returns. — The  offensive  returns  should  not, 
however,  be  pushed  far;  for  their  result,  at  best,  can 
only  be  a moral  one,  and  the  distance  between  the  main 
body  and  the  rear  guard  must  not  be  dangerously 
increased. 

Offensive  returns  on  the  part  of  the  rear  guard  may  be 


I So  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

necessary  for  its  relief  when  closely  pressed  by  the  enemy 
at  a bridge,  defile,  or  ford.  At  Smolensk  the  bridge 
over  the  Dnieper  was  choked  with  a mob  of  stragglers, 
and  the  French  rear  guard,  being  at  the  same  time 
closely  pushed  by  the  Russians,  found  itself  in  danger 
of  being  thrust  into  the  river.  Ney  accordingly  ordered 
De  Fezensac  to  attack  the  enemy  with  his  regiment. 
The  attack  was  made  in  a spirited  manner;  the  Russians 
were  thrust  back,  and  the  rear  guard  filed  across  the 
bridge,  which  it  immediately  destroyed. 

A similar  incident  at  Boonsboro,  Md.,  in  1862,  is 
worth  noting,  especially  on  account  of  the  ingenious  and 
successful  tactics  employed.  Fitzhugh  Dee’s  cavalry 
brigade  was  covering  the  retreat  of  D.  H.  Hill  from 
South  Mountain.  The  pressure  upon  Dee’s  rear  was  so 
heavy,  as  he  was  passing  through  Boonsboro,  that  it 
became  necessary  to  make  an  offensive  return  with  one 
regiment,  in  order  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  others. 

The  attack  was  made  by  the  9th  Virginia  Cavalry 
(Col.  W.  H.  F.  Dee),  which,  owing  to  the  narrowness 
of  the  street,  charged  in  column  of  fours  with  a consid- 
erable interval  between  the  squadrons.  As  one  squad- 
ron, broken  by  the  collision,  retired  to  form  again  in 
rear  of  the  regiment,  the  next  squadron  took  up  the 
charge,  thus  giving  the  Union  column  a succession  of 
shocks.  The  9th  Virginia  was  finally  pushed  back 
through  Boonsboro  with  considerable  loss;  but  not  until 
it  had  gained  time  for  the  rest  of  the  brigade  to  take  up 
a position  west  of  the  town.* 

Commander  of  the  Rear  Guard. — The  commander  of 


See  McClellan’s  “ Campaigns  of  Stuart’s  Cavalry,”  p.  125. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


i8r 


the  rear  guard  should  be  a man  of  resolution  and  fertility 
of  resource.  He  should  be  as  prudent  as  a man  can  be 
without  being  timid,  and  as  brave  as  a man  can  be  with- 
out being  rash.  He  should  constantly  present  a bold 
front  to  the  enemy,  and  should  ever  be  ready  to  fight, 
even  to  the  extent  of  sacrificing  himself  and  his  entire 
command  if  necessary;  but  he  should  remember  that 
the  great  duty  of  the  rear  guard  is  to  gain  time,  and  he 
should  know  when  to  withdraw.  He  should  be  able  to 
distinguish  the  enemy’s  preparations  for  a serious  attack 
from  insignificant  demonstrations,  and  he  should  never 
allow  the  enemy  to  force  him  into  a fight  contrary  to  his 
own  interests  and  intentions.  He  should  never  expect 
assistance,  and  should  feel  disgraced  if  the  main  body 
should  be  obliged  to  suspend  its  retreat  to  come  to  his 
aid. 

Distance  from  the  Main  Body. — As  the  main  body 
seeks  to  withdraw  from  the  enemy  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
while  the  rear  guard  endeavors  to  delay  him  and  watch 
his  movements,  it  is  clear  that  the  distance  between  the 
two  bodies  can  not  be  definitely  prescribed.  In  general 
terms  it  may  be  said  to  be  usually  about  the  same  as  that 
of  the  advance  guard  from  the  main  body  on  advance. 
If  the  distance  were  too  great,  the  rear  guard  would  be 
in  danger  of  being  cut  off:  if  the  distance  were  too  small, 
the  main  body  would  be  subject  to  constant  alarms,  and 
each  reverse  of  the  rear  guard  would  quickly  affect  the 
main  body,  whose  retreat  would  be  constantly  harassed 
by  the  enemy.  In  marching  at  night,  the  rear  guard 
draws  near  the  column,  especially  if  the  night  is  dark, 
the  enemy  near,  and  the  inhabitants  inimical. 


182 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Formation  and  Composition  of  the  Rear  Guard. — The 
formation  of  the  rear  guard  is  that  of  an  advance  guard 
reversed.  Nearest  the  main  body  is  the  reserve,  after 
which  follow  the  support  and  the  rear  party,  the  extreme 
rear  being  composed  of  a point.  The  distances  between 
the  various  bodies  composing  the  rear  guard  are  the 
same  as  those  between  the  corresponding  bodies  of  the 
advance  guard.  Flankers  are  thrown  out  as  in  the  case 
of  an  advance  guard,  but  they  are  more  numerous,  and 
the  line  joining  them  is  a more  pronounced  curve,  for 
the  reason  that  flank  attacks  are  more  to  be  feared  than 
in  the  case  of  an  advance  guard,  and  the  flanks  must, 
therefore,  be  more  carefully  covered.  In  an  advance, 
an  attempt  against  a flank  of  the  advance  guard  might 
easily  result  in  the  assailing  troops  being  themselves 
struck  in  flank  by  troops  from  the  main  bod}"  but  in  a 
retrograde  movement  the  main  body  is  moving  away 
from,  instead  of  towards,  the  covering  ’detachment,  and 
thus  a flank  attack  upon  the  rear  guard  must  be  met  by 
the  rear  guard  itself,  or  else  the  main  body  must  halt 
and  march  back  to  its  assistance.  According  to  circum- 
stances, a portion  or  the  whole  of  the  rear  guard  will 
march  in  readiness  for  action. 

The  composition  of  a rear  guard  is  practically  the 
same  as  that  of  an  advance  guard.  It  is  generally  com- 
posed of  all  three  arms;  but  if  there  are  enough  cavalry 
and  horse  artillery  to  admit  of  the  rearguard  being  com- 
posed exclusively  of  those  arms,  it  would  be  best,  except 
in  a very  close  and  rugged  country,  to  leave  the  infantry 
with  the  main  body.  There  should  be  as  many  guns 
with  the  rear  guard  as  can  be  effectively  used  and  freely 


REAR  GUARDS. 


183 

maneuvered.  The  effective  use  of  artillery  may  obviate 
the  necessity  of  deploying  the  other  arms  of  the  rear 
guard,  the  deployment  of  the  enemy  at  a distance  being 
compelled  by  the  fire  of  the  guns.  The  fire  of  the  ar- 
tillery at  short  range  should  be  as  rapid  as  is  compatible 
with  its  cool  and  intelligent  action:  when  the  rear  guard 
is  pressed  by  the  enemy,  it  is  necessary  to  fire  as  many 
shots  as  possible,  and  still  more  necessary  that  each  one 
should  count.  If  it  becomes  necessary  to  abandon  the 
guns,  the  equipments  and  breech-blocks  should  be  car- 
ried away,  and,  if  practicable,  one  wheel  should  be  re- 
moved from  each  and  run  to  the  rear,  so  that  if  the 
pieces  are  recaptured  they  can  be  at  once  used.  If  there 
seems  to  be  no  hope  of  recovering  the  lost  pieces,  the 
guns  should  be  burst  and  the  caissons  blown  up;  or,  at 
least,  the  breech-blocks  should  be  broken  off,  damaged, 
or  thrown  into  a stream  or  well.  The  danger  of  losing- 
a few  guns  must  never  be  made  an  excuse  for  a prema- 
ture withdrawal.  If  the  guns,  by  remaining  until  the 
last  moment,  exact  a heavy  price  in  blood  from  the 
enemy,  and  contribute  largely  towards  checking  pursuit, 
they  are  profitably  sold,  and  their  loss  is  an  honor. 

The  cavalry  of  the  rear  guard  can  charge  bodies  of 
the  enemy  that  have  been  thrown  into  confusion  by  the 
ardor  of  pursuit,  or  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery7;  but  its 
chief  reliance  should  be  in  dismounted  fire  action.  It 
can  take  up  almost  any  position  that  the  infantry  can, 
and  thus  compel  the  deployment  and  retardation  of  the 
enemy,  while  its  superior  mobility  enables  it  rapidly  to 
diminish  the  distance  between  the  main  body  and  the 
rear  guard,  always  dangerously  increased  by7  a stubborn 


184  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

stand  of  the  latter.  Good  cavalry  of  the  American  type 
is  the  life  of  a rear  guard.  A rear  guard  entirely  with- 
out cavalry,  except  in  a region  where  that  arm  can 
not  be  used,  is  at  an  enormous  disadvantage,  unless  the 
enemy  is  also  without  mounted  troops.  In  the  retreat 
from  Moscow,  the  destruction  of  Napoleon’s  cavalry  by 
cold  and  starvation  left  the  French  rear  guard  exposed 
to  the  attacks  of  the  Cossacks,  who,  though  unable  to 
break  a single  square  of  infantry,  annoyed  it  incessantly, 
and  cannonaded  it  with  small  guns  brought  up  on  sleds. 

When  a rear  guard  is  composed  of  all  arms,  the  in- 
fantry should  be  with  the  reserve,  and  the  cavalry  with 
the  support  and  rear  party.  If  the  cavalry  is  not  in  suf- 
ficient strength  for  the  entire  support,  the  deficiency 
must,  of  course,  be  made  up  from  the  infantry.  The 
artillery  should  be  with  the  reserve;  but  horse  artillery 
may  sometimes  accompany  the  support.  The  engineers 
should  be  at  the  rear  of  the  reserve  or  at  the  head  of  the 
support.  Machine  guns  may  be  used  with  effect  by  the 
rear  guard,  being  always  used  defensively.  They  should 
generally  be  with  the  support. 

The  rear  guard  should,  if  possible,  be  entirely  free 
from  impedimenta,  in  order  that,  if  separated  from  the 
main  body  by  a considerable  distance,  it  may  close  up  by 
forced  marches.  If  its  baggage  can  not  be  sent  forward 
to  the  main  column,  all  that  is  not  absolutely  necessary 
should  be  destroyed,  if  the  pursuit  is  vigorous,  and  the 
remainder  kept  with  the  reserve. 

Plates  XIII  and  XIV  show  typical  formations  of  a 
rear  guard.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  rear  guard  is 
merely  a reversed  advance  guard  with  more  flankers 


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REAR  GUARDS. 


185 

Thus,  in  the  case  of  a company  of  infantry  (Plate  XIII), 
flankers  are  thrown  out  from  the  reserve.  In  the  case 
of  a troop  of  cavalry  (Plate  XIV),  the  reserve  throws  out 
a double  patrol  on  each  flank,  similar  to  the  one  thrown 
out  from  the  support  in  the  case  of  an  advance  guard, 
the  larger  patrols  being  on  the  more  dangerous  flank. 
The  support  sends  out  flanking  groups  which  march  at 
a distance  of  about  600  yards  from  the  line  of  march  of 
the  column.  Ordinarily,  a line  passing  through  the 
point  and  flankers  of  an  advance  guard  forms  a semicir- 
cle: a similar  line  in  the  case  of  a rear  guard  forms 
about  two-thirds  of  an  ellipse.  These  typical  formations 
are,  of  course,  merely  suggestive:  they  must  be  modi- 
fied to  suit  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  Rear  guards 
composed  of  larger  bodies  are  similarly  formed.  In  an 
open  country,  the  reserve  may  sometimes  be  advantage- 
ously formed  in  two  parallel  columns. 

Withdrawal  from  Action. — The  manner  of  withdraw- 
ing a rear  guard  from  action  will  depend  entirely  upon 
circumstances.  As  a rule,  only  a portion  should  with- 
draw at  a time,  taking  up,  if  necessary,  a new  position, 
to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  rest.  The  guns  espe- 
cially must  not  all  withdraw  at  once,  as  the  total  cessa- 
tion of  artillery  fire  would  betray  the  movement. 
Whether  the  withdrawal  should  be  by  alternate  battal- 
ions, or  whether  it  should  begin  at  the  center  or  at  a 
flank,  would  depend  upon  the  direction  and  progress  of 
the  attack  and  the  topography  of  the  field.  Generally, 
the  infantry  and  a portion  of  the  guns  withdraw  first; 
and  when  they  are  again  in  position  or  en  route , they  are 
followed  by  the  remaining  guns  and  the  cavalry.  The 


1 86 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


withdrawal  should  never  be  a difficult  matter  if  it  has 
not  been  delayed  too  long. 

Communication  between  the  Several  Parts  of  the  Rear 
Guard  and  with  the  Main  Body. — Uninterrupted  com- 
munication must  be  maintained  between  the  several 
parts  of  the  rear  guard  and  the  main  body.  The  road 
should  be  carefully  marked,  so  that  the  rear  guard  may 
not  lose  its  way.  The  trail  of  a retreating  force  is  usually 
only  too  plain;  but  it  is  well  to  leave  a patrol  at  cross- 
roads, etc.,  with  orders  to  rejoin  the  main  body  as  soon 
as  the  proper  road  has  been  taken  by  the  rear  guard. 
Similar  precautions  must,  when  necessary,  be  taken  by 
the  reserve  to  insure  the  proper  direction  being  taken  by 
the  support. 

Protection  of  Flanks. — Patrolling  must  be  carried  on 
with  vigilance  and  energy,  especially  on  the  flanks. 
The  enemy,  finding  a firm  front  opposed  to  all  his  di- 
rect attacks,  will  undoubtedly  attempt  to  cut  in  on  the 
flanks,  where,  in  fact,  always  lie  his  most  promising 
hopes  of  success;  for  if  he  can  cause  the  rear  guard  to 
form  front  to  a flank,  any  assault  by  which  it  can  be 
pushed  off  the  road  will  uncover  the  rear  of  the  main 
body,  and  will  be  only  less  disastrous  to  the  retreating 
army  than  the  destruction  of  the  rear  guard  itself. 
Prompt  notification  of  attempts  against  the  flanks  should 
be  given  by  the  patrols  (wdio  are  often  warned  of  them 
by  a diminution  of  the  enemy’s  forces  following  in 
rear),  and  the  rear  guard  should  then  endeavor  with  ce- 
lerity to  slip  past  the  menaced  point:  failing  in  this,  it 
should  form  a strong  front  towards  the  attacking  force. 

Conduct  of  the  Rear  Guard. — If  the  two  armies  are  of 


PLATE  Xlt 


REAR  GUARDS. 


I87 


approximately  equal  strength,  the  rear  guard  will  be 
about  as  strong  as  the  advance  guard  of  the  force  pursu- 
ing it,  and  the  advantage  of  a good  defensive  position 
should  give  it  a superiority  over  the  latter.  But  this 
superiority  will  be  only  temporary  at  best ; for  the  ad- 
vance guard  is  receiving  constant  accessions  of  strength 
from  the  rear,  while  the  distance  between  the  rear  guard 
and  the  main  body  of  the  retreating  force  is  constantly 
increasing.  Hence,  the  longer  the  rear  guard  remains 
in  its  position,  the  greater  will  be  the  odds  against  it. 
If  it  does  not  remain  long  enough,  the  enemy’s  advance 
will  not  be  seriously  delayed;  while  if  it  remains  too 
long,  it  will  suffer  heavily  in  the  engagement.  In 
Massena’s  retreat  from  Portugal,  Ney  made  the  one 
error  of  his  brilliant  rear-guard  operations,  by  remaining 
too  long  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ceira,  which  mistake 
cost  him  five  hundred  men,  though  he  succeeded  in 
withdrawing  the  greater  part  of  his  force  across  the 
stream  and  blowing  up  the  bridge. 

The  pursuing  army  will  always  be  in  more  or  less 
doubt  as  to  the  strength  of  the  force  which  it  finds  bar- 
ring its  way,  and  it  must  act  with  prudence,  or  run  the 
risk  of  a serious  and  costly  repulse.  At  Redinha,  Ney, 
with  a rear  guard  of  about  5,000  men,  made  such  skill- 
ful dispositions  as  to  compel  Wellington  to  deploy 
40,000  men,  and  incur  a delay  of  several  hours.  The 
morale  of  the  retreating  force  is  also  a matter  of  uncer- 
tainty to  the  pursuers,  and  this  consideration  also  for- 
bids rash  action.  Sir  John  Moore  at  Coruna  and  Mc- 
Clellan at  Malvern  Hill  each  turned  and  gave  his  pur- 
suer a knock-down  blow  at  the  termination  of  a retreat. 


i88 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


The  rear  guard  has  an  advantage  over  the  pursuing 
force  in  not  being  obliged  to  reconnoiter  the  ground 
over  which  it  has  to  inarch.  All  necessary  information 
as  to  the  roads  is  furnished  from  the  front,  and  a well- 
qualified  staff-officer  with  the  main  body  should  select 
defensive  positions  for  the  rear  guard,  and  furnish  its 
commander  with  a description  (and,  if  possible,  a topo- 
graphical sketch)  of  the  same.  The  positions  would  be 
ridges,  sunken  roads,  villages,  woods,  bridges,  or  defiles. 

The  rear  guard  must  not  be  tempted  by  the  great 
natural  strength  of  a position  to  occupy  it  at  the  ex- 
pense of  being  separated  at  too  great  a distance  from  the 
main  body,  nor  to  hold  it  so  long  as  to  become  compro- 
mised in  a regular  engagement.  The  amount  of  resist- 
ance to  be  made  by  the  rear  guard  will  depend  upon  the 
judgment  of  its  commander,  or  on  the  orders  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  At  very  important  positions,  the 
latter  should  join  the  rear  guard,  if  necessary,  superin- 
tending its  formation  for  resistance,  or  even  conducting 
its  action.  Sir  John  Moore,  on  his  famous  retreat,  per- 
sonally directed  the  movements  of  the  rear  guard.  This 
is  generally  neither  practicable  nor  desirable;  but  the 
commander-in-chief  should  always  know  what  his  rear 
guard  is  about,  and  whether  it  is  judiciously  handled. 
He  should,  above  all,  see  that  it  is  never  forced  to  fight 
superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  at  too  great  a distance 
from  succor.  It  is  best,  however,  never  to  interfere 
with  the  commander  of  the  rear  guard,  if  he  understands 
his  business  and  performs  his  part  properly.  The  nature 
of  his  duty  requires  that  he  should  have  even  greater 
independence  of  action  than  the  commander  of  an  ad- 
vance guard. : 


REAR  GUARDS. 


189 


The  Intermediate  Body. — The  advance  guard  of  the 
pursuing  force,  its  strength  constantly  increasing,  can 
act  boldly  to  the  flank  ; and  the  rear  guard  is  in  danger 
of  being  intercepted,  and  finding  a force  of  the  enemy 
barring  its  way  at  some  one  of  the  positions  selected  for 
its  own  defensive  stand.  This  danger  increases  with 
the  stubbornness  of  the  stand  made  by  the  rear  guard. 
In  view  of  these  considerations,  Riistow  recommends  an 
important  difference  in  the  composition  of  advance 
guards  and  rear  guards,  by  giving  to  the  latter  an  inter- 
mediate body,  which  should  march  midway  between 
the  reserve  of  the  rear  guard  and  the  main  body.  It 
would  thus  be  in  a position  to  hold  important  points 
until  the  arrival  of  the  reserve,  which  points  it  might 
even  have  time  to  fortify,  while  preparing  at  the  same 
time  for  the  destruction  of  the  passages  at  the  selected 
positions.  This  intermediate  body  should  have  artillery, 
especially  if  the  country  is  open  and  the  enemy’s  forces 
are  able  to  make  turning  movements  with  celerity. 
Riistow  recommends  further,  when  the  enemy  shows  a 
particular  tendency  to  execute  flank  movements,  with 
the  intention  of  separating  and  cutting  off  the  different 
detachments,  and  the  country  is  such  as  to  favor  his 
movements,  that  the  principal  column  leave  a detach- 
ment to  hold  an  important  position  until  the  arrival  of 
the  intermediate  body.  Under  some  circumstances,  the 
detachments  recommended  by  Riistow  might  be  impera- 
tively necessary;  but  the  system  is  open  to  the  objection 
that  the  detachments,  unless  composed  of  cavalry,  would 
be  unable  to  rejoin  the  main  body,  which  would  thus  be 
constantly  reinforcing  the  rear  guard.  If  composed  of 


190  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

cavalry  they  might,  perhaps,  better  be  with  the  rear 
guard  in  the  first  place,  and  be  sent  forward  to  hold  the 
positions  in  question.  They  would  thus  at  least  be  con- 
tinually and  definitely  under  the  orders  of  the  rear  guard 
commander. 

Contact  with  the  Enemy  to  be  Preserved. — Contact  with 
the  pursuing  force  should  not  be  lost,  but  its  movements 
should  be  continually  watched:  otherwise  the  army 
might  be  flying  from  a mere  phantom,*  or  it  might  be 
deceived  as  to  the  objective  point  of  the  enemy’s  attack. 
The  enemy  might  continue  the  pursuit  with  a small 
force  on  the  main  route,  and  move  the  bulk  of  his  army 
on  a parallel  road,  whence,  after  making  unobstructed 
progress  to  the  front  he  might  move  in  to  cut  off  the 
rear  guard  or  assail  it  in  flank.  In  Napoleon’s  retreat 
from  Moscow,  Miloradowitch,  with  a Russian  advance 
guard  of  25,000  men,  moving  on  a road  parallel  to  the 
French  retreat,  cut  in  between  the  main  body  and  rear 
guard  at  Wiasma,  and  would  have  wrought  irretrievable 
disaster  to  the  retreating  army,  if  he  had  been  properly 
supported  by  the  main  body  of  the  Russians. 

A similar  movement  was  more  effectively  executed 
against  Fee  in  his  retreat  to  Appomattox  Court  House. 
Pursuing  on  a parallel  road,  Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry 
corps,  cut  in  on  the  Confederate  line  of  retreat  at  Sailor's 
Creek,  interposing  between  the  main  body  and  the  rear 

* History  presents  a number  of  instances  of  armies  turning  their 
backs  upon  each  other  in  mutual  flight.  Thus  Napoleon  and  Kutus- 
off  both  retired  from  Malo-Jaroslawitz  ; the  troops  of  Braddock  and 
Beaujeu  both  fled  from  the  Monongahela,  and  the  Federals  and  Con- 
federates both  retreated  from  Big  Bethel. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


I9I 

guard.  Holding  the  latter  in  check  until  he  was  rein- 
forced by  the  Sixth  Corps,  he  compelled  its  surrender, 
capturing  five  general  officers  and  all  that  remained  of 
Ewell’s  corps. 

If  the  pursuit  seems  to  slacken  or  cease,  contact  must 
be  maintained  by  strong  patrols,  each  patrol  generally 
consisting  of  a platoon  under  command  of  an  officer. 
Small  patrols  could  not  drive  back  any  but  the  most  in- 
significant forces  of  the  enemy,  and  could  not,  there- 
fore, learn  whether  the  pursuit  were  conducted  by  a 
large  force  or  merely  by  small  parties.  The  patrols 
should  be  given  great  liberty  of  action,  and,  after  hav- 
ing been  informed  of  the  route  to  be  taken  by  the  main 
body  in  retreat,  and  given  such  general  orders  as  may 
be  necessary,  they  should  be  left  quite  independent  of 
the  rear  guard.  It  will  often  be  necessary  to  act  vigor- 
ously on  the  offensive  with  the  cavalry,  in  order  to  as- 
certain the  nature  of  the  pursuit.  If  the  enemy’s  ad- 
vanced troops,  when  repulsed,  fall  back  upon  larger 
bodies  in  rear,  the  enemy  is  evidently  pursuing  in  force  : 
if,  on  the  contrary,  they  are  driven  back  in  rapid  flight, 
and  are  not  supported,  the  enemy  either  is  not  attempt- 
ing a serious  pursuit,  or  is  moving  on  a parallel  road. 

Defiles. — Defiles  offer  the  greatest  opportunities  to  an 
energetic  pursuer  and  to  an  able  rear  guard  commander. 
To  the  former  they  afford  a chance  of  cutting  off  the 
rear  guard  by  interposing  a force  at  the  entrance  of  the 
defile.  To  the  latter  they  afford  a double  opportunity 
of  administering  a check  to  the  enemy,  who  is  com- 
pelled to  narrow  his  front.  In  defending  a defile,  the 
main  body  leaves  a detachment  to  hold  the  heights  on 


192  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

each  side  until  relieved  by  the  infantry  of  the  rear 
guard.  The  artillery  is  generally  stationed  at  the  en- 
trance of  the  defile,  and  the  cavalry  in  the  best  position 
for  dismounted  fire  action — always  at  that  part  of  the 
line  which  is  to  withdraw  last.  As  soon  as  the  enemy 
has  not  only  deployed  for  attack,  but  is  well  committed 
to  the  assault,  the  artillery  fires  its  parting  round  of 
shrapnel,  and  withdraws  rapidly  through  the  defile,  fol- 
lowed by  the  infantry.  The  cavalry  covers  the  with- 
drawal of  the  other  arms,  mounting  at  the  last  moment, 
and  retreating  rapidly  through  the  defile,  its  retreat  be- 
ing protected,  if  practicable,  by  infantry  skirmishers 
lining  the  crest  on  either  side  of  the  interior  of  the 
defile. 

The  outlet  of  the  defile  always  affords  a better  posi- 
tion for  opposing  the  enemy  than  the  entrance;  for  in 
making  a stand  with  a defile  at  its  back,  the  rear  guard 
runs  the  risk,  in  case  its  flank  is  turned,  of  being  cut  off 
altogether.  In  making  a stand  at  the  farther  side,  the 
artillery  is  posted  so  as  to  rake  the  defile;  and  the  in- 
fantry, so  as  to  bring  a converging  fire  on  its  outlet,  de- 
tachments of  infantry  also  holding  the  crest;  while  the 
cavalry  is  stationed  so  as  to  be  able  to  charge  the  enemy 
in  flank  as  he  emerges  from  the  defile.  Enough  of  the 
enemy  should  be  allowed  to  pass  to  enable  the  assault 
upon  him  to  be  more  than  a mere  stroke  at  the  head  of 
his  column;  but  the  mistake  of  allowing  too  many  to 
pass  would  be  a fatal  blunder.  Here  the  judgment  of 
the  rear  guard  commander  must  come  into  play,  and  no 
rule  or  suggestion  can  aid  him.  The  enemy  having 
been  severely  handled  and  thrown  back  into  the  defile, 
the  rear  guard  withdraws  without  delay. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


193 


If  practicable,  the  position  at  the  entrance  of  the  de- 
file should  be  convex  towards  the  enemy,  so  as  to  admit 
of  ready  withdrawal  by  the  flanks.  At  the  outlet,  the 
position  should,  on  the  other  hand,  be  concave,  so  as  to 
bring  a converging  fire  upon  the  enemy. 

Negative  Measures. — The  measures  taken  by  the 
rear  guard  to  delay  the  enemy  may  be  classed  as  posi- 
tive and  negative;  the  former  relating  to  the  delays 
caused  by  actual  or  threatened  combat,  and  the  latter 
including  all  measures  to  impede  his  progress  by  block- 
ing his  path,  destroying  bridges,  etc.  The  positive 
measures  have  already  been  considered:  the  negative 
measures  are  diverse  in  their  nature,  and  afford  a wide 
field  for  ingenuity.  Bridges  may  be  burned,  blown  up, 
or  torn  down.  In  the  first  case,  if  time  permits,  the 
timbers  should  be  coated  with  tar,  or  saturated  with  coal 
oil,  by  troops  from  the  main  body  or  the  reserve,  and 
fired  by  the  last  men  of  the  rear  detachment  who  cross: 
in  the  second  case,  the  charge  should  be  similarly  placed 
and  exploded;  and  in  the  third  case,  the  planks  should 
be  loosened  by  troops  in  advance,  and  thrown  into  the 
river  by  the  rear  point.  In  all  cases,  the  preparation  for 
destruction  should  be  made  by  the  main  body  or  reserve, 
and  the  consummation  should  be  the  work  of  the  last 
men  who  cross.  Loaded  shells  placed  under  the  heaps 
of  combustibles,  would,  by  bursting  at  intervals,  prevent 
the  enemy  from  approaching  to  extinguish  the  flames. 

Fords  can  be  obstructed  by  planting  therein  pointed 
stakes,  crows’  feet,  broken  bottles,  or  harrows,  plows, 
and  scythes,  so  arranged  that  the  sharp  sides  and  points 
are  uppermost.  Another  expedient  is  to  throw  in  trees 


194 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


with  the  branches  towards  the  enemy  and  weighted 
down  with  stones  in  sacks.  In  addition  to  these  meas- 
ures, the  banks  may  be  scarped,  and  an  epaulement 
with  artillery  established  on  the  side  opposite  the  enemy. 
Boats  should  be  taken  to  the  far  side  and  either  burnt  or 
sunk.  Roads  can  be  obstructed  by  felling  trees  across 
them,  or  blowing  up  the  road-bed;  and  gateways  and 
passages  can  be  blocked  with  heavily-laden  carts  dove- 
tailed together,  one  wheel  being  removed  from  each. 

Villages  may  be  fortified  in  some  cases,  but  generally 
it  will  be  more  expedient  to  burn  them,  and  thus  place 
a barricade  of  fire,  so  to  speak,  between  the  rear  guard 
and  the  enemy;  but  this  measure  will,  manifestly,  be  of 
value  only  when  the  enemy  is  following  close  upon  the 
heels  of  the  rearguard.  Thus  Ney  burned  Redinha  and 
Condeixa  in  the  face  of  Wellington,  delaying  him  in  each 
case.  The  commander-in-chief  should  give  general  in- 
structions as  to  the  extent  to  which  bridges,  villages, 
etc.,  are  to  be  destroyed,  and  no  wanton  or  unnecessary 
destruction  should  ever  be  permitted. 

Other  expedients  will  suggest  themselves  to  a good 
commander.  Of  Johnston’s  retreat  to  Jackson,  Miss.,  in 
1863,  General  Sherman,  in  his  “ Memoirs,”  says:  “On 
the  8th  [July],  all  our  troops  reached  the  neighborhood 
of  Clinton,  the  weather  fearfully  hot,  and  water  scarce. 
Johnston  had  marched  rapidly,  and  in  retreating  had 
caused  cattle,  hogs,  and  sheep  to  be  driven  into  the 
ponds  of  water,  and  there  shot  down;  so  that  we  had  to 
haul  their  dead  and  stinking  carcasses  out  to  use  the 
water.”  Any  means  of  producing  suffering  and  incon- 
venience to  the  pursuers,  such  as  to  cause  them  to  delay, 


REAR  GUARDS. 


195 


should  be  resorted  to  by  the  rear  guard,  stopping  only 
at  such  measures  as  are  condemned  by  the  laws  of  war. 

But  these  negative  measures  are,  after  all,  merely 
helps,  and  the  safety  of  the  retreating  force  must  depend 
upon  the  resolute  action  of  the  rear  guard  itself.  When 
it  is  essential  that  the  army  should  put  distance  between 
itself  and  the  enemy,  the  rear  guard  must  make  use  of 
every  good  defensive  position  to  delay  the  pursuers;  but 
no  halt  should  be  made  for  fighting  when  the  necessity 
of  checking  the  enemy  and  gaining  time  is  not  impera- 
tive. 

Sick  and  Wounded. — The  rear  guard  should  collect 
all  stragglers  and  compel  them  to  move  on,  and  it  should 
not  allow  the  sick  or  wounded  to  be  left  behind,  unless 
they  prove  a dangerous  encumbrance.  When  necessary, 
transportation  must  be  requisitioned  for  the  sick  and 
wounded,  and  they  should,  if  practicable,  be  sent  forward 
to  the  main  column  every  night.  When  it  is  found 
necessary  to  abandon  them,  they  should  be  formally 
transferred  to  the  authorities  of  some  village  or  town, 
and  one  or  more  medical  officers,  with  a liberal  supply 
of  medical  stores  and  money,  should  be  left  with  them. 
With  the  exception  of  such  medical  supplies,  no  stores 
of  any  description  that  could  be  of  value  to  the  enemy 
should  be  left  behind;  what  can  not  be  carried  along 
must  be  destroyed. 

Halts. — When  the  rear  guard  halts,  it  chooses  a good 
defensive  position,  and  establishes  its  outposts  towards 
the  enemy.  It  is  desirable  that  the  position  should  not 
only  be  strong,  but  that  it  should  command  an  extended 
view.  On  halting  for  the  night,  the  rear  guard  should, 


196  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

when  practicable,  be  relieved  by  other  troops.  The  new 
guard  should  be  halted  at  a suitable  distance  from  the 
point  selected  for  the  camp  or  bivouac  of  the  main  body, 
and  established  as  an  outpost.  When  it  is  passed  by  the 
old  rear  guard,  the  former  assumes  its  duties,  and  the 
latter  joins  the  main  column.  In  the  case  of  either  an 
advance  guard  or  a rear  guard,  the  distance  of  the  out- 
post from  the  main  body  will  depend  mainly  upon  the 
time  required  for  the  troops  to  turn  out  and  form  at  the 
designated  rendezvous:*  in  the  latter  case,  however,  the 
time  required  for  the  longest  column  to  march  out  in 
resuming  the  retreat  must  be  added,  no  allowance  being 
made  for  time  gained  by  the  resistance  of  the  rear  guard. 
The  distance  of  the  outpost  from  the  main  body  will, 
therefore,  be  greater  in  the  case  of  a rear  guard  than  in 
the  case  of  an  advance  guard. 

Retreating  by  Parallel  Roads. — When  an  army  is  re- 
treating by  several  parallel  roads,  each  column  will  have 
its  own  rear  guard,  each  rear  guard  having  its  own  chief, 
and  all  being  united,  when  practicable,  under  the  com- 
mand of  one  common  superior.  Connection  should  be 
maintained  between  the  several  columns,  and  between 
the  different  rear  guards,  by  connecting  groups  or  patrols. 
If  retreating  by  a single  route  to  which  several  other 
roads  are  near  and  parallel,  it  may  sometimes  be  ad- 
visable to  place  a secondary  rear  guard  on  each.  This 
would  practically  amount  to  a subdivision  of  the  rear 
guard,  which  should,  consequently,  be  of  a greater 
strength  proportionately  to  the  main  body  than  would 


* Provided,  of  course,  that  the  distance  is  not  determined  by  con- 
siderations of  artillery  fire. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


197 


otherwise  be  the  case.  The  necessity  for  these  secondary 
rear  guards  would  be  greatest  when  there  were  many 
lateral  roads  joining  the  parallel  routes,  and  such  roads, 
conversely,  would  be  necessary  in  order  that  a secondary 
rear  guard  might  not  be  left  entirely  without  support. 
Generally,  vigilant  scouting  to  the  flanks  will  obviate 
the  necessity  of  secondary  rear  guards. 

When  Line  of  Retreat  is  Changed. — When  the  line  of 
retreat  is  changed,  it  may  sometimes  be  advantageous 
to  leave  the  rear  guard  on  the  old  route  for  the  purpose 
of  deceiving  the  enemy.  Artillery  should  then  accom- 
pany the  rear  guard,  not  only  to  add  to  its  defen- 
sive power,  but  to  give  it  the  appearance  of  a force  of 
respectable  size.  A small  rear  guard  should  follow  the 
main  body  in  the  new  direction. 

Rear  Guard  in  Retrograde  Movement  which  is  not  a 
Retreat. — It  is  not  only  in  a retreat  that  a rear  guard 
becomes  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  holding  the  enemy 
in  check.  A retrograde  movement  may  be  designedly 
made  for  the  purpose  of  leading  the  enemy  into  a theater 
where  the  conditions  will  be  more  favorable  for  the  re- 
tiring army;  or  a movement  may  be  undertaken  against 
one  of  the  enemy’s  armies  in  such  a way  as  to  expose 
the  rear  to  another.  Thus,  in  Wilkinson’s  march 
against  Montreal,  in  1813,  a rear  guard  was  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  the  American  army  from  the  at- 
tacks of  the  British  from  Kingston,  though  the  enemy 
was  sought  in  the  opposite  quarter.  In  the  first  case, 
the  rear  guard  would  be  conducted  in  the  manner  al- 
ready described.  In  the  latter  (unusual)  case,  the  ad- 
vance and  rear  guards  would  be  of  equal  importance. 


198  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

In  tlie  latter  case,  in  fact,  it  would  be  better  to  leave  a 
containing  force  to  hold  one  of  the  hostile  armies,  in 
check  while  proceeding  against  the  other. 

Rear  Guard  in  a Friendly  Country. — In  a movement 
in  a friendly  country,  the  duties  of  the  rear  guard  are 
much  less  difficult  and  onerous  than  in  a hostile  one.  In 
the  former,  the  rearguard  easily  finds  subsistence;  guides 
are  obtained  without  difficulty;  the  inhabitants  aid  in 
obstructing  or  destroying  roads  and  passages;  they  assist 
in  enterprises  against  the  enemy;  and  they  remove  all 
supplies  upon  his  approach. 

In  a Hostile  Country. — In  a hostile  country,  how- 
ever, foraging  is  difficult  for  the  rear  guard,  as  it  must 
pass  over  a country  already  exhausted  by  the  main  col- 
umn; and  the  inhabitants,  far  from  rendering  assistance 
to  the  rear  guard,  are  ever  ready  to  turn  against  it,  and 
are  quite  sure  to  throw  all  manner  of  annoying  obstacles 
in  its  way. 

THE  REAR  GUARD  IN  A FORWARD  MARCH. 

The  rear  guard  should  never  begin  its  march  until  all 
the  baggage  has  moved  off.  The  provost-marshal  and 
provost  guard  generally  march  with  the  rear  guard, 
which  takes  charge  of  all  prisoners  arrested  by  them. 
No  duty  is  more  disagreeable  than  that  of  a rear  guard 
on  a forward  march.  Wolseley  says  of  it: 

“It  is  sheer  hard  work,  without  any  excitement  or 
glory.  Under  the  most  fortunate  circumstances  the 
men  composing  such  a rear  guard  can  not  expect  to  be 
in  camp  for  some  hours  after  the  main  body.  It  is  most 


THE  REAR  GUARD  IN  A FORWARD  MARCH.  199 

fatiguing  to  march  in  the  dusty  wake  of  an  army,  but 
it  is  on  such  occasions  that  officers  show  their  true 
metal ; any  man  can  be  cheerful  and  zealous  with  an  ad- 
vance guard,  or  even  with  a rear  guard  during  a retreat, 
but  it  is  only  those  who  have  the  keenest  professional 
feelings  who  can  throw  all  their  energies  into  every  lit- 
tle duty,  irrespective  of  its  being  agreeable  or  other- 
wise.” * 

If  marching  in  a hostile  country,  the  rear  guard  is 
charged  with  the  protection  of  the  baggage  from  the 
forays  of  guerrillas,  and  if  the  country  is  suited  to  par- 
tisan warfare,  and  the  enemy’s  raiding  parties  are  enter- 
prising, its  duty  greatly  increases  in  importance.  It 
should  carefully  watch  the  flanks  of  the  baggage  train 
with  patrols,  of  a number  and  size  suited  to  the  danger 
to  be  apprehended,  and  should  be  ready  to  repel  attacks 
on  the  flanks  as  well  as  on  the  rear  of  the  train. 


*“  Soldiers’  Pocket  Book,”  p.  346. 


200 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


APPENDIX  I. 


SPIES. 


Too  much  attention  can  not  be  given  to  spies  and  guides.  Monte- 
cuculi  says  that  they  are  as  necessary  to  a general  as  the  eyes  are  to 
the  head.— Marshal  Saxe. 

Although  the  method  of  gaining  information  from 
spies,  deserters,  prisoners,  newspapers,  etc.,  does  not 
strictly  belong  to  the  domain  of  tactics,  it  seems  too  im- 
portant a subject  to  be  omitted  from  consideration  in 
this  work.  The  questioning  of  deserters  and  prisoners 
has  already  been  considered  in  the  chapter  on  “Recon- 
naissance” ; the  other  methods  require  additional  notice. 

Spies  may  be  primarily  divided  into  two  classes:  mili- 
tary and  civilian.  The  first  class  consists  of  officers  or 
soldiers  who,  from  patriotism  or  a sense  of  military 
duty,  assume  a disguise,  and  penetrate  the  enemy’s  lines 
to  gain  information.  They  are  often  men  of  the  most 
exalted  character  and  distinguished  courage,  and  deserve 
a better  fame,  and  a better  fate  if  captured,  than  that 
usually  accorded  to  spies.  To  this  class  belong  Captain 
Hale  and  Major  Andre;  and  the  War  of  Secession  adds 
to  the  list  two  names  more  illustrious  and  more  success- 
ful. General  Nathaniel  Lyon  visited  in  disguise  the 
Confederate  camp  near  St.  Louis  the  day  before  he  at- 
tacked and  captured  it;  and  Colonel  Turner  Ashby,  in 
the  guise  of  a country  horse-doctor,  visited  the  Union 


SPIES. 


201 


■camp  at  Chambersburg,  in  1861,  and  returned  safely 
with  a great  deal  of  valuable  information. 

The  second  class  consists  of  men  who  often  deserve 
all  the  obloquy  so  freely  cast  upon  spies  in  general; 
though  instances  are  not  lacking  of  civilian  spies 
•actuated  solely  by  motives  of  disinterested  patriotism. 
But  whatever  may  be  their  motives  or  individual  char- 
acteristics, spies  are  indispensably  necessary  to  a general ; 
and,  other  things  equal,  that  commander  will  be  victo- 
rious who  has  the  best  secret  service. 

The  services  of  spies  are  most  valuable  during  the 
concentration  of  armies  on  the  theater  of  operations,  and 
during  the  investment  of  fortified  places.  During  active 
operations,  the  information  brought  by  them,  however 
accurate  it  may  be,  generally  arrives  too  late  to  be  of 
much  value. 

Spies  should  be  carefully  selected  from  people  whose 
occupations  are  such  as  to  enable  them  to  enter  the 
•enemy’s  lines  without  exciting  suspicion;  such  as  ped- 
dlers, drivers  of  public  vehicles,  strolling  players,  etc. 
Women  are  often  the  best  of  spies;  but  their  means  of 
gaining  information  is  generally  in  direct  proportion  to 
their  lack  of  character,  and  accordingly  proportionate  to 
their  lack  of  credibility.  * A marked  expression  of  dis- 

* “Les  femmes  galantes  et  surtout  les  filles  publiques  servent 
beaucoup  dans  l’espionnage,  quand  elles  offrent  quelques  garanties  de 
•fidelite.  Le  general  von  Decker  dit  a ce  sujet:  Si  le  partisan  sait  ac- 
querir  de  l’influence  sur  les  femmes,  il  se  gardera  de  negliger  ce 
inoyen;  c’est  a ce  sexe  qu’il  devra  ses  renseignements  les  plus  cer- 
tains. Un  secret  qui  ne  peut  se  savoir  ni  par  les  femmes  ni  par  les 
hommes  d’eglise,  ue  se  revelera  probablement  jamais.” — Lewal, 
Tactique  des  Renseignements , Tome  I,  p.  105. 


202 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


trust  on  the  part  of  his  employers  may  sometimes  pro- 
tect a spy  from  the  enemy’s  suspicion.  In  1863,  Gen- 
eral Hurlbut  expelled  a man  from  Memphis  for  uttering 
disloyal  and  threatening  sentiments.  The  fact  of  his 
expulsion  under  the  circumstances  recommended  him 
to  the  favorable  consideration  of  Johnston,  to  whom  he 
offered  his  services  as  a spy.  The  expulsion  had  been  a 
mere  ruse ; and,  some  months  later,  the  man  brought  to 
Grant  an  important  message  from  Johnston  to  Pember- 
ton, which  placed  the  Union  Commander  in  possession 
of  his  opponent’s  plans. 

A spy  should  be  “intelligent,  conscientious,  and  faith- 
ful ” — qualities  hard  to  find  in  a man  whose  very  occu- 
pation bespeaks  habitual  deceit  and  a want  of  principle — 
and  in  proportion  to  his  possession  of  these  characteris- 
tics will  he  be  valuable.  The  motives  which  induce 
him  to  play  the  part  of  a spy  should  be  ascertained. 
Men  banished  from  their  country,  smarting  under  a 
sense  of  injustice,  exasperated  by  ill-treatment,  embit- 
tered by  jealousy,  or  influenced,  in  short,  by  any  strong- 
passion  calculated  to  incite  a spirit  of  hatred  and  re- 
venge against  the  enemy,  are  almost  certain  to  be  faith- 
ful and  energetic  spies.  Spies  should  always,  when 
practicable,  be  tested  with  unimportant  missions  before 
being  entrusted  with  matters  of  great  moment.  It  is  a 
good  plan  to  require  them  at  first  to  report  upon  mat- 
ters that  are  already  known,  as  a means  of  testing  their 
reliability  and  accuracy.  The  services  of  a spy  perma- 
nently attached  to  a command  are  likely  to  be  much 
more  valuable  than  those  of  one  who  is  employed  only 
for  the  single  occasion,  and  whose  efforts  are  not  stimu- 
lated by  a hope  of  profitable  employment  in  the  future. 


SPIES. 


203 


It  is  clear  that  the  only  trustworthy  spies  are,  as  a 
rule,  those  who  serve  voluntarily;  nevertheless  it  is 
sometimes  necessary  to  force  men  to  act  as  spies  for  a 
particular  object  and  on  a single  occasion.  Bugeaud 
thus  describes  the  system  of  which  he  himself  made  use 
in  Spain,  but  which  certainly  should  not  be  copied 
unless  circumstances  were  so  extraordinary  as  to  justify 
its  brutality  : 

‘ ‘ When  spies  are  lacking  to  procure  news  of  the  en- 
emy, to  carry  letters  to  a distance  through  the  hostile 
lines,  or  to  gather  information  by  visiting  places  occu- 
pied by  the  foe,  rich  countrymen  should  be  taken  from 
the  villages  passed  through,  and  having  been  given  a 
certain  mission,  they  should  be  threatened  with  the 
burning  of  their  houses  and  captivity  of  their  wives 
and  children  if  they  fail  to  execute  their  charge  faith- 
fully. This  is  a good  method  of  giving  false  informa- 
tion to  the  enemy.  To  this  end,  the  messenger  is  given 
letters  containing  the  misleading  statements,  addressed 
to  the  commandant  of  some  place,  or  the  chief  of  some 
body  of  troops  supposed  to  have  arrived  at  some  point 
which  is  still  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  countryman 
goes  thither;  he  is  captured;  his  letters  are  read,  and 
the  ruse  rarely  fails.  Well-to-do  countrymen  are  better 
adapted  to  playing  this  part  than  men  of  a higher  class, 
because  they  value  more  their  little  possessions,  are 
more  hardened  to  fatigue,  and  patriotism  is  a sentiment 
less  developed  in  them  than  in  the  superior  classes. 
Moreover,  they  awaken  less  suspicion.  If  inhabitants 
are  not  to  be  seen,  as  often  happened  in  Spain,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  drive  along  the  cattle  that  are  found. 
Their  owners  will  not  fail  to  come  to  claim  their  ani- 
mals, and  they  can  be  compelled  to  ransom  them  by 
service  as  spies;  being  warned  that  their  herds  will  be 
restored  to  them  only  when  the  information  brought  in 


204  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

is  verified.  With  the  same  object  in  view,  hostages  may 
be  captured  during  the  night  in  a town  or  city  near  the 
enemy.  ’ ’ 

The  fidelity  of  a spy  depending  entirely  upon  his  in- 
dividual interests,  he  must,  even  if  apparently  devotedly 
faithful,  be  regarded  with  suspicion.  His  safest  and 
most  profitable  role  is  that  of  a “ double  spy  ” ; that  is, 
one  who  is  engaged  in  carrying  true  information  to  both 
armies.  For  fear  that  a spy  may  be  playing  this  double 
part,  he  should  always  be  halted  at  the  outposts,  or  even 
be  met  at  a designated  place  beyond  them.  It  is  a good 
rule  to  go  to  meet  the  spy,  instead  of  having  him  come 
in  to  report.  This  rule,  which  is  practicable  whenever 
the  time  of  the  spy’s  return  can  be  foretold,  subserves 
another  good  end ; for  there  are  often  men  who  are  will- 
ing to  act  as  spies,  but  who  are  afraid  or  ashamed  to  be 
known  as  such,  even  among  friendly  people.  Such  men 
would  willingly  render  their  reports  at  some  isolated 
rendezvous,  while  they  would  dread  to  be  seen  entering 
the  camp. 

Double  spies  are  often  of  great  value.  Prince  de  Ligne 
even  declares  that  they  are  the  best.  But  he  adds  that 
it  is  necessary  to  deceive  them  in  order  that  we  may  not 
be  deceived  by  them,  and  to  make  a false  movement  in 
order  to  test  them.  It  can  then  be  seen  whether,  after 
allowing  the  spy  to  learn  of  the  movement,  the  enemy  is 
informed  of  it.  If  he  is,  the  spy  should  not  be  hanged, 
but  should  be  confined  and  compelled  to  send  false  news 
to  the  enemy.  False  information  should  be  communi- 
cated to  a spy  only  by  an  authorized  officer  having  full 
knowledge  of  the  true  plans  and  conditions.  Any  unin- 


SPIES. 


205 


structed  officer  taking  it  upon  himself  to  disseminate 
false  news  might  unwittingly  give  true  information,  and 
cause  incalculable  mischief. 

Nothing  intrusted  to  a spy  should  be  put  in  writing, 
unless  it  be  false  information  intrusted  to  a double  spy. 
All  other  messages  should  be  either  verbal  or  expressed 
in  cipher.  The  message  should  be  closely  written  on 
fine  paper  and  enclosed  in  a small  quill,  which  could  be 
concealed  in  the  hair  or  beard,  or  enclosed  in  a hollow 
bullet,  which  could  be  fired  away  if  capture  seemed  un- 
avoidable. A still  better  plan,  perhaps,  would  be  to 
write  the  message  in  lemon  juice  on  the  margin  of  some 
book,  such  as  a Testament  or  prayer-book,  which  the 
spy  might  carry  without  exciting  suspicion.  Exposing 
the  leaf  to  heat,  or  passing  a hot  iron  over  it,  would  then 
bring  out  the  writing.  The  dispatches  carried  by  Camp- 
bell (one  of  Sheridan’s  spies)  were  closely  written  on 
tissue  paper,  rolled  up  in  tin  foil,  and  concealed  in  a 
quid  of  tobacco  in  his  mouth. 

A spy  should  never  be  allowed  to  see  that  he  is  mis- 
trusted; but  should  be  led  to  believe  that  particular 
confidence  is  reposed  in  him,  and  that  his  services  are 
regarded  as  especially  valuable.  At  the  same  time,  other 
spies  should  be  employed  to  cover  the  same  ground,  and 
their  reports  should  be  carefully  compared.  The  same 
rendezvous  should  not  be  assigned  to  different  spies  on 
their  return,  as  they  would  thus  become  acquainted  with 
each  other,  and  might  conspire  to  bring  in  false  news, 
or  one  might  be  betrayed  to  the  enemy  by  another.  In 
rare  cases,  it  may,  however,  be  practicable  to  employ 
spies  in  pairs.  In  Tennessee,  Sheridan  employed  the 


206 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


three  brothers  Card  as  spies;  two  of  the  men  working 
together,  while  the  third  remained  at  headquarters, 
available  for  duty  in  case  of  mishap  to  the  others,  or  in 
case  Sheridan  wished  to  communicate  with  them. 

When  a spy  leaves  the  post,  camp,  or  bivouac,  he 
should  be  escorted  beyond  the  outposts  by  an  officer  or 
non-commissioned  officer,  who  should  give  only  such  in- 
formation about  him  as  may  be  necessary  to  insure  his 
safe  exit.  When  a spy  comes  in,  he  should  be  halted 
by  the  sentinel,  and  conducted  to  the  nearest  picket, 
where  he  should  be  retained  under  charge  of  the  picket 
sentinel  while  awaiting  the  orders  of  the  officer  for  whom 
he  inquires.  While  at  the  picket,  the  sentinel  should 
see  that  he  communicates  with  nobody.  A spy  should 
always,  if  practicable,  be  assigned  to  the  same  officer, 
mutual  acquaintance  being  essential  to  complete  mutual 
understanding.  A good  spy  often  acquires  a feeling  of 
friendship  and  devotion  for  a chief  who  always  sends 
him  out,  who  always  receives  his  reports,  and  (above 
all)  who  always  rewards  him.  A spy  must  always  be 
well  paid.  He  is  usually  working  for  money,  and  for 
money  alone.  A badly  paid  spy  will  generally  strike  a 
bargain,  sooner  or  later,  with  the  enemy.  Communica- 
tion with  a spy  should  never  be  made  through  an  inter- 
preter, if  it  can  be  avoided.  His  information  may  be 
misinterpreted,  and  he  will  fear  misrepresentation. 
Liberal  pay  and  kindness  should  chiefly  characterize 
the  treatment  of  spies,  though  they  should  be  treated 
with  firmness,  and  held  to  the  faithful  performance  of 
their  duties.  Threats  should  never  be  used.  If  the  spy 
is  offended,  he  can  easily  leave,  or  perhaps  turn  traitor. 


SPIES.  207 

If  his  conduct  has  been  so  suspicious  as  to  warrant  a 
threat,  it  has  been  bad  enough  to  justify  his  arrest. 

A spy’s  abilities  should  always  be  considered,  and  too 
much  should  not  be  required  of  him.  If  charged  with 
ascertaining  too  many  things,  he  will  probably  bring 
back  a confused  report.  Unless  he  be  an  exceptionally 
able  man,  he  should  be  directed  to  ascertain  only  cer- 
tain definite  things.  It  is,  consequently,  necessary  to 
employ  many  spies,  and  to  assign  to  each  a particular 
mission,  giving  them  only  such  things  in  common  to 
report  upon  as  may  enable  them  to  act  as  a check  upon 
each  other.  The  questions  to  which  the  spies  are  to 
find  answers  will  depend  upon  circumstances.  The  fol- 
lowing ones,  of  general  application,  should  always  be 
kept  in  view  : 

1.  Where  are  the  headquarters  ? 

2.  At  what  places  are  the  different  generals  ? What 
are  their  names,  and  what  is  the  character  of  each  ? 

3.  What  are  the  numbers  and  strength  of  the  corps  in 
each  position,  and  how  many  guns  with  each  ? 

4.  Is  the  enemy  concentrating  or  dividing  his  forces  ? 

5.  What  are  the  measures  taken  for  subsistence  and 
transport  ? 

6.  How  are  the  enemy’s  troops  clothed,  fed,  and  paid  ? 
What  is  the  state  of  their  morale  ? How  large  is  their 
sick  report?  What  is  the  mortality  among  them? 
What  are  the  prevailing  diseases  ? 

7.  Is  the  enemy  moving?  If  so,  the  entire  army,  by 
corps,  or  by  detachments  ? 

8.  Is  he  awaiting  reinforcements  ? Whence  are  they 
coming  ? What  kind  of  troops  are  they  ? When  are  they 
expected  ? 


208 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


9.  Is  he  fortifying?  If  so,  on  what  points? 

When  the  army  is  engaged  in  active  operations,  it 
may  be  a difficult  matter  for  a spy  to  find  the  officer  or 
the  headquarters  to  which  he  should  report ; and  it  may 
not  be  easy  for  him  to  establish  his  identity  as  a bona 
fide  spy,  when  he  arrives  at  the  outposts  or  meets  an 
advance  guard,  unless  some  general  device  has  been 
adopted  beforehand.  In  1870-’  71,  each  German  spy 
wore  a small  medal,  similar  to  a religious  medal,  around 
his  neck,  under  his  clothes.  Wolseley  suggests  that 
each  spy  should  carry  ‘ ‘ a coin  of  a certain  date,  a Bible 
of  a certain  edition,  a Testament  with  the  3rd  or  7th 
leaf  torn  out,  &c.,  &c.” 

Spies  sometimes  remain  in  a certain  locality,  and  send 
information,  often  through  the  ordinary  channels  of 
communication,  in  regard  to  the  enemy’s  movements 
and  preparations.  These  communications,  either  tele- 
graphic or  by  letter,  may  often  be  couched  in  commer- 
cial language,  and  sent  to  persons  in  a neutral  coun- 
try, by  whom  they  are  transmitted  to  the  officials  for 
whom  they  are  intended.  Such  is  the  present  perfec- 
tion of  telegraphic  communication,  that  it  would  be 
practicable  for  an  American  spy  in  Quebec  to  send  a 
disguised  telegram  to  Hamburg,  and  have  the  informa- 
tion contained  therein  telegraphed  via  New  York  to  an 
American  army  on  the  St.  Lawrence  not  later  than  the 
following  day.  Spies  can,  with  a small  pocket  instru- 
ment, tap  the  telegraph  wires  and  gain  valuable  infor- 
mation by  means  of  the  messages  passing.  This  infor- 
mation can  then  be  forwarded  to  the  army  by  means  of 
mobile  spies,  or  under  disguise  through  neutral  terri- 


SPIES. 


209 


tory.  Officers  or  trusted  agents  should  always  be  posted 
in  a neutral  country  for  the  purpose  of  transmitting 
promptly  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army  such  news  of 
importance  as  they  may  there  learn. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  only  the  employment  of 
spies  against  the  enemy.  We  must  now  consider  the 
measures  necessary  to  guard  against  espionage  on  his 
part.  The  mischief  that  may  follow  carelessness  in  this 
respect  is  well  shown  by  Lewal  in  the  following  inci- 
dent : 

‘ ‘ A stranger  presented  himself,  giving  false,  but  spe- 
cious, news  of  the  Germans.  He  was  listened  to;  he 
gained  the  confidence  of  the  French;  he  went  without 
hindrance  to  the  center  of  the  army,  even  to  headquar- 
ters. He  saw  all  there  was  to  be  seen,  and  returned  to 
the  enemy  under  pretext  of  going  in  search  of  further 
news.  He  never  returned.  At  daybreak  the  enemy, 
well  informed  by  him  of  our  positions,  attacked.  A 
great  reverse  for  us  followed.  It  was  a case  of  a German 
spy  whom  nobody  had  suspected.  ’ ’ 

When  the  presence  of  the  enemy’s  spies  is  suspected, 
the  soldiers  should  be  warned  against  intimate  associa- 
tion with  the  inhabitants,  and  should  be  instructed  not 
to  answer  any  questions  relative  to  the  army  or  its 
movements  asked  them  by  strangers.  Strangers  caught 
giving  liquor  to  the  soldiers  should  be  at  once  arrested 
and  subjected  to  a rigid  examination. 

Vigilance  at  the  outposts  will  do  much  to  keep  spies 
away;  but  the  necessity  of  allowing  inhabitants  to  pass 
often  gives  admission  to  spies.  When  Napoleon  was 
bivouacked  on  the  Danube,  opposite  Essling,  some  Jews 
came  into  the  French  bivouac  ostensibly  to  bargain  for 
14 — w 


210 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


the  hides  of  the  animals  slaughtered  for  the  subsistence 
of  the  troops.  It  afterwards  transpired  that  they  were 
spies  of  the  Archduke  Charles.  People  on  such  alleged 
mercantile  errands  must  be  carefully  watched,  as  well  as 
persons  on  supposed  religious  missions.  Beggars,  ped- 
dlers, itinerant  preachers,  and  strange  women  should  be 
objects  of  suspicion,  and  should  not  be  allowed  to  ap- 
proach the  camp  or  bivouac  or  to  remain  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  troops. 

A spy  may  often  be  detected  by  his  obsequious  polite- 
ness, by  his  having  plenty  of  money  with  him,  by  his 
liberality  in  “treating”  the  soldiers,  by  his  extreme 
care  to  observe  all  the  regulations  of  the  camp,  by  his 
presence  everywhere  where  military  movements  are 
taking  place,  by  his  manner  of  looking  and  listening 
while  trying  to  seem  not  to  do  so,  by  his  assumed  air  of 
extreme  frankness,  and  by  his  promptness  in  producing 
papers  to  establish  his  innocent  and  worthy  character. 

When  a spy  is  captured,  he  should  be  carefully 
searched,  his  clothes  ripped  apart,  the  soles  and  heels  of 
his  shoes  cut  open,  and  his  buttons  examined.  If  he  is 
suspected  of  having  about  him  papers  which  are  not 
discovered  in  the  search,  his  clothing  should  be  burned. 
His  hair,  beard,  and  mouth  should  be  searched;  and  if 
he  is  armed  when  captured,  his  cartridges  and  revolver 
should  be  carefully  examined.  If  he  is  suspected  of 
having  swallowed  a dispatch,  he  should  be  given  an 
emetic. 

The  management  of  the  secret  service  of  an  arm}’  re- 
quires a profound  insight  into  human  nature,  and  an 
ability  to  estimate  at  once  the  military  worth  of  the  in- 


NEWSPAPERS. 


211 


formation  brought  in.  The  chief  of  the  secret  service 
should  be  a peculiar  combination  of  detective  and  gen- 
eral; it  is  not  sufficient  that  he  should  be  a detective 
alone.  The  chief  of  McClellan’s  secret  service  was  a 
well-known  and  skillful  detective;  yet  that  general 
seemed  to  be,  to  an  unusual  degree,  the  victim  of  mis- 
information in  regard  to  the  movements,  and  especially 
the  numbers,  of  the  opposing  army.  The  “Regula- 
tions for  Troops  in  Campaign”  now  prescribe  that  the 
provost-marshal-general  shall  superintend  the  secret 
service. 

NEWSPAPERS. 

In  time  of  war  much  attention  should  be  given,  at  the 
headquarters  of  an  army,  to  the  newspapers  of  the  enemy 
and  to  those  of  neutral  countries;  for  much  valuable  in- 
formation may  thus  be  obtained.  It  is  said  that,  in 
1796,  Moreau  first  received  intelligence  of  the  reverses 
of  Jourdan  from  the  columns  of  a German  newspaper; 
and  it  is  known  that,  in  the  Franco-German  war,  when 
McMahon  attempted  his  disastrous  march  to  the  relief 
of  Bazaine,  the  first  news  of  this  important  movement 
came  to  Von  Moltke  through  the  French  and  English 
newspapers. 

With  the  increasing  means  of  gathering  and  transmit- 
ting news,  and  with  the  constantly  growing  popular  de- 
mand for  late  and  complete  information,  the  trouble 
created  in  military  operations  by  the  mischievous  energy 
of  newspaper  reporters  will,  more  than  ever,  justify  the 
characterization  of  such  correspondents  as  ‘ ‘ the  plague 
of  modern  armies.  ’ ’ Such  is  the  power  of  the  press  in 


212 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


the  United  States  that  an  attempt  to  banish  newspaper 
correspondents  from  an  American  army  would  probably 
do  more  harm  than  good:  but  it  does  not  seem  imprac- 
ticable to  place  restrictions  upon  the  unavoidable  evil, 
and  even,  in  some  cases,  to  turn  it  to  practical  use. 

No  correspondent  should  be  allowed  to  accompany 
the  army,  unless  provided  with  a license  signed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  on  which  should  be  an  agreement, 
signed  by  the  correspondent  and  the  managing  editor  of 
his  paper,  not  to  violate  any  orders  relative  to  corres- 
pondence that  might,  from  time  to  time,  be  issued  by 
the  commander  of  the  army. 

An  officer  should  be  detailed  as  press  censor.  He 
should  exercise  a general  supervision  over  all  the  ac- 
credited correspondents,  and  should  satisfy  himself  as  to 
the  propriety  of  all  newspaper  dispatches  before  allow- 
ing them  to  be  sent.  Any  correspondent  known  to  be 
discreet,  subordinate,  and  trustworthy,  should  be  freely 
given  all  news  of  proper  nature  at  headquarters;  but 
mischievous  ones  should  be  promptly  deprived  of  their 
licenses,  and  otherwise  punished  according  to  the  nature 
and  degree  of  their  offense. 

It  is  impossible  to  prescribe  hard  and  fast  rules  for  the 
government  of  the  newspaper  reporters  accompanying 
an  army;  but  regulations  of  some  kind  must  be  adopted 
to  hold  in  check  the  mischievous  gossip  of  those  corres- 
pondents who  would  unhesitatingly  imperil  the  safety 
of  the  army  for  the  purpose  of  getting  ahead  of  their 
rival  reporters  with  some  item  of  news.  “Complete 
and  unfettered  freedom  of  the  press  is  incompatible  with 
a state  of  war.  ’ ’ * 


* Bronsart  von  Schellendorf. 


NEWSPAPERS.  2X3 

It  is  not  merely  the  metropolitan  newspapers  that 
work  the  mischief,  but  the  petty  local  press  as  well. 

“Of  course,”  says  Von  der  Goltz,  “even  the  best-in- 
formed paper  will  neither  be  able  nor  willing  to  make 
known  the  position  of  its  party  in  all  its  entirety.  But, 
even  here,  what  is  worth  knowing  is  composed  of  many 
petty  details.  Other  flashes  of  light  have  often  so  far 
lit  up  the  picture  of  the  enemy’s  doings,  that  only  a 
breath  of  wind  is  still  wanting  to  rend  asunder  the  thin, 
enshrouding,  veil  of  mist.  The  presence  of  a high  com- 
mander is  mentioned,  a letter  published,  in  which  the 
writer  mentions  a division  of  troops  and  its  station,  or 
narrates  a deed  of  arms,  exactly  describing  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, the  regiments,  and  commanders.  Each 
detail  by  itself  is  perfectly  unprejudicial,  but  may  yet 
serve  as  a valuable  link  of  a chain  that  at  last  leads  to 
its  aim.  * * * The  national  press  can  not  in  war 

time  be  sufficiently  warned  to  caution.  The  demand 
for  news  must  be  decidedly  suppressed  in  its  disastrous 
effects,  much  as,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  feeling  of  the  country,  be  treated  with 
regard.  It  would  be  better  to  trust  reliable  persons  with 
the  spreading  of  the  news  that  is  worth  knowing  to  the 
country,  than  by  attempting  to  close  all  sources  of  com- 
munication to  incite  unqualified  and  unreliable  persons 
to  independent  action.” 

It  may  sometimes  be  practicable  to  lead  the  enemy 
into  error  by  giving  the  newspaper  correspondents  in- 
correct information.  This  misinformation  will  do  no 
harm  to  the  reading  public  at  home,  and  it  may  produce 
great  results  in  the  field.  This  ruse  must  not,  however, 
be  too  frequently  attempted,  as  the  correspondents,  who 
are  invariably  men  of  alert  intelligence,  would  cease  to 
fall  into  the  trap,  and  might  feel  justified  in  smothering 


214 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


the  official  news  in  a mass  of  sensational  conjecture, 
which  they  might  succeed  in  smuggling  past  the  press 
censor. 

When  a newspaper  has  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the 
commander  by  the  nature  of  its  correspondence,  the 
punishment  should,  except  where  the  fault  manifestly 
lies  with  the  editorial  management,  fall  upon  the  cor- 
respondent individually,  and  not  upon  the  newspaper. 
Instead  of  denying  the  paper  the  privilege  of  having  a 
correspondent  with  the  army,  it  should  be  notified  that 
it  could  retain  that  privilege  only  by  sending  a new 
man  in  place  of  the  offending  reporter,  who  should  be 
expelled  from  the  army,  or  otherwise  punished  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  his  offense.  But  the  problem  of 
dealing  with  correspondents  is  a difficult  one,  and  it 
must  be  solved  by  the  commander  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  case.  The  chief  objects  to  be  con- 
sidered in  regard  to  the  newspapers  in  war,  are  to  derive 
the  greatest  possible  benefit  from  the  indiscretions  of 
the  correspondents  with  the  enemy’s  armies,  and  to  pre- 
vent similar  indiscreet  publications  by  the  reporters 
with  our  own.  * 

* For  illustrations  of  the  annoyance  caused  by  newspaper  corres- 
pondents in  the  War  of  Secession,  see  “Battles  and  Leaders  of  the 
Civil  War,’’  Vol.  I,  p.  141;  Sherman’s  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  232  et  seq.  ; 
and  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.  II,  p.  143,  et  seq. 


ORIENTATION  AND  MAP  READING. 


215 


APPENDIX  II. 


ORIENTATION  AND  MAP  READING. 


Th?  conduct  of  patrols,  reconnaisances,  partisan  corps,  and  in  gen- 
eral all  the  operations  of  war,  require  that  military  men  of  all  grades 
should  understand  orientation,  and  be  familiar  with  map  reading. — 
Von  Witzleben. 

Orientation  is  the  art  of  determining  the  points  of  the 
compass  at  any  place  where  the  observer  may  be. 

It  is  effected: 

1.  By  means  of  the  magnetic  compass; 

2.  By  observing  the  sun; 

3.  By  observing  the  moon ; 

4.  By  observing  the  North  Star; 

5.  By  means  of  maps;  and 

6.  By  means  of  indications. 

Orientation  by  means  of  the  compass  scarcely  needs 
explanation.  It  is  well  known  that  the  needle  points 
north.  Facing,  then,  towards  the  north,  a right  face, 
left  face,  or  about  face  will  cause  the  observer  to  face 
towards  the  east,  west,  or  south.  Care  should  be 
taken  that  the  needle  is  not  affected  by  the  proximity 
of  weapons,  or  other  objects  of  iron.  For  ordinary  pur- 
poses of  orientation,  the  variation  of  the  compass  may 
be  neglected.  All  the  ordinary  methods  of  orientation 
are,  in  fact,  the  rough  expedients  of  the  practical  soldier, 
and  not  the  scientific  calculations  of  the  astronomer. 


2i6 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Orientation  by  observing  the  sun  can  give  only  an  ap- 
proximation to  correct  results.  Roughly  speaking,  the 
sun  is  in  the  east  at  6 o’clock  in  the  morning,  in  the 
south  at  noon,  and  in  the  west  at  6 o’clock  in  the  even- 
ing. This  method  of  orientation  requires  that  the  hour 
be  known.  If  the  observer  is  without  a watch,  the  time 
of  day  can  be  judged  approximately  by  the  height  of 
the  sun  in  the  heavens.  To  judge  correctly  requires 
practice : no  rules  can  be  given.  If  the  observer  knows 
approximately  the  time  of  sunrise,  and  knows  the  dis- 
tance traveled  since  that  hour,  this  distance  divided  by 
the  usual  rate  of  march  will  give  the  hours  marched, 
and,  consequently,  the  time  of  day. 

The  sun  passes  over  an  arc  of  15  degrees  in  an  hour. 
At  11  o’clock  the  shadow  cast  by  a vertical  stake  will  be 
west  of  the  meridian,  and  will  make  an  angle  of  15  de- 
grees with  it.  If  then  a line  be  drawn  to  the  eastward 
of  the  shadow  and  at  right  angles  with  it,  a division  of 
this  angle  into  three  equal  parts  will  enable  the  observer 
to  lay  off  an  angle  of  15  degrees  east  of  the  shadow\ 
which  will  give  the  meridian  line.  At  10.30  o'clock 
the  right  angle  should  be  bisected.  At  10  o’clock  an 
angle  of  30  degrees  should  be  taken,  and  so  on.  In  the 
afternoon,  the  meridian  line  should  be  drawn  correspond- 
ingly to  the  westward  of  the  shadow.  But  all  attempts 
at  orientation  by  observing  the  sun  are  scarcely  more 
than  guesses,  unless  a timepiece  of  some  sort  is  at  hand. 

When  the  sun  is  shining,  a watch  answers  the  pur- 
poses of  orientation  as  well  as  a compass.  While  the 
sun  is  passing  over  180°  (from  east  to  west),  the  hour 
hand  of  the  watch  passes  over  360°  (from  6 o’clock  to  6 


PLATE  XX 

I 


CJ£. 


■ n 


ORIENTATION. 


217 


o’clock).  Consequently,  the  angular  movement  of  the 
sun  in  an  hour  corresponds  to  the  angular  movement  of 
the  hour  hand  in  lialf-an-hour.  If,  then,  holding  the 
watch  horizontal,  we  point  the  hour  hand  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  sun,  a line  from  the  pivot  of  the  hands  to 
the  point  midway  between  the  hour  hand  and  XII  will 
point  to  the  south.  To  illustrate:  Suppose  that  it  is 
nine  o’clock  in  the  morning.  Following  the  rule  given 
above,  we  find  the  south  as  indicated  in  Figure  1,  Plate 
XV. 

Orientation  by  observing  the  moon  is  more  difficult 
and  not  very  reliable;  it  depends  upon  the  quarter  in 
which  the  moon  happens  to  be. 

The  full  moon  is  in  the  east  at  6 o’clock  in  the  even- 
ing, in  the  south  at  midnight,  and  in  the  west  at  6 
o’clock  in  the  morning. 

The  moon  in  the  first  quarter  is  in  the  south  at  6 
o’clock  in  the  evening,  and  in  the  west  at  midnight. 

The  moon  in  the  last  quarter  is  in  the  east  at  mid- 
night, and  in  the  south  at  6 o’clock  in  the  morning. 

These  indications,  except  the  first,  may  vary  an  hour 
or  so  earlier  or  later. 

The  moon  in  the  first  quarter  has  the  concavity  to  the 
left.  In  the  last  quarter  the  concavity  is  to  the  right. 

Orientation  by  observing  the  North  Star  is  one  of  the 
easiest  methods.  In  whatever  position  the  constellation 
of  the  Great  Bear,  or  the  Dipper,  may  be,  the  line  join- 
ing the  “ pointers  ” will,  if  prolonged  to  about  six  times 
its  length,  pass  nearly  through  the  North  Star,  which 
can  be  readily  recognized  by  its  brilliancy.  (See  Fig. 
2,  Plate  XV.) 


2i8 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


Orientation  by  map  is  altogether  the  most  satisfactory. 
The  north  is  generally  at  the  top  of  the  map;  if  not,  it 
is  indicated  by  the  direction  of  an  arrow  or  similar  sym- 
bol. Having  a map,  and  being  on  the  ground  repre- 
sented by  it,  all  that  is  necessary  is  to  place  any  line  on 
the  map  in  the  same  direction  as  a corresponding  line 
on  the  ground,  and  the  map  will  give  the  direction  of 
the  points  of  the  compass.  Any  line  may  be  chosen, 
such  as  a portion  of  a road  or  railroad,  or  a line  joining 
two  prominent  landmarks. 

Orientation  by  Indications. — If  compass  and  maps  are 
lacking  in  cloudy  weather,  or  at  night,  the  points  of  the 
compass  may  be  found  by  various  indications.  In  the 
Northern  Hemisphere  the  moss  on  stones  and  trees  is 
found  thickest  on  the  northwest  or  north  side.  Walls 
are  damper  on  the  north  than  on  the  south  side.  The 
bark  of  trees  is  most  deeply  wrinkled  on  the  north  side. 
In  stumps  of  trees  it  will  be  observed  that  the  rings  of 
annual  growth  are  wider  on  the  south  than  on  the  north 
side.  Vines  are  trained  on  the  south  side  of  walls. 
Headstones  in  cemeteries  are  generally  at  the  west  end 
of  graves.  Weathervanes  are  often  marked  with  the 
points  of  the  compass. 

MAP  READING. 

Quick  and  accurate  map  reading  can  be  acquired  only 
by  practice.  This  practice  can  be  obtained  by  going  to 
the  ground  represented,  and  orienting  oneself  with  the 
map.  Pacing  the  distance  from  one  object  to  another, 
the  result  should  be  compared  with  the  distance  between 


MAP  READING. 


219 


the  same  objects  as  indicated  on  the  map.  At  each 
cross-road  or  fence  delineated  on  the  map,  the  angle 
made  with  the  road  should  be  estimated  or  measured, 
and  compared  with  the  angle  represented.  The  actual 
appearance  of  all  hills  or  natural  features  should  be 
compared  with  the  cartographic  representation,  and  this 
practice  continued  until  an  examination  of  a topographi- 
cal map  gives  to  the  mind  a clear  conception  of  the 
actual  appearance  of  the  ground  represented.  The  best 
way  to  learn  to  read  a map  is  to  learn  to  make  one; 
which  knowledge  can  be  acquired  by  the  study  of  mili- 
tary topography. 

To  ascertain  the  distance  between  any  two  points  on 
the  map,  take  the  distance  as  indicated  by  a pair  of 
dividers,  and  apply  it  to  the  scale  given  on  the  map.  If 
the  distance  is  too  great  to  be  measured  with  a single 
span  of  the  dividers,  or  greater  than  the  length  of  the 
given  scale,  draw  a straight  line  in  pencil  on  the  margin 
of  the  map,  or  on  any  convenient  paper,  and  lay  off  the 
distance  thereon.  Then  adjust  the  dividers  to  any  suit- 
able portion  of  the  scale  (say  1,000  yards)  and  see  how 
many  times  the  adjusted  span  is  contained  in  the  space 
marked  off.  If  there  is  a remainder,  apply  it  to  the 
scale.  The  quotient  multiplied  by  the  number  of  yards 
represented  by  the  span,  plus  the  number  represented 
by  the  remainder,  will  indicate  the  distance  measured. 

The  distances  measured  along  roads  are  rarely  on  a 
straight  line.  The  best  method  of  measuring  such  dis- 
tances is  as  follows: 

Let  it  be  required  to  find  the  exact  distance  from  the 
point  B to  the  point  A on  the  map,  measured  along  the 


220 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


road  B CDFJ  A.  (See  Fig.  3,  Plate  XV.)  Placing  one 
foot  of  the  dividers  at  B and  the  other  at  C,  we  get  the  dis- 
tance between  these  two  points.  Without  changingthe 
opening  of  the  dividers,  we  leave  one  foot  at  C,  and  swing 
the  other  around  on  the  prolongation  of  the  line  D C, 
where  it  falls  at  some  point  F.  Extending  the  other 
foot  of  the  dividers  to  the  point  D,  we  find  F D=B  C+ 
C D.  Swinging  the  foot  at  F around  in  prolongation 
of  F D,  and  extending  the  foot  at  D to  F,  we  find  G E— 
B C+C  D+D  F.  In  a similar  manner  we  find  H J=B  C 
+C  D+D  F+F  J,  and  finally  A I=B  C+C  D+D  F+E  J+ 
J A.  Applying  the  distance  A I to  the  scale  on  the  map, 
we  have  the  distance  by  road  from  B to  A. 


INDIAN  SCOUTING. 


221 


APPENDIX  III. 


INDIAN  SCOUTING. 


It  must  be  emphatically  asserted  that  there  does  not  exist,  never 
has  existed,  and  never,  except  by  pedants,  of  whom  the  most  careful 
students  of  war  are  more  impatient  than  other  soldiers,  has  there  ever 
been  supposed  to  exist,  “an  art  of  war  ” which  was  something  other 
than  the  resultant  of  accumulated  military  experience. — Maurice. 

As  contributing  to  a demonstration  of  the  fact  that 
sound  theories  of  war  are  simply  the  accumulations  of 
experience,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  essential  points 
in  common- possessed  by  the  scouting  methods  of  Euro- 
pean armies  and  those  of  the  Indians,  who,  far  from 
knowing  anything  about  European  warfare,  are  igno- 
rant of  the  existence  of  Europe  itself.  It  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  consider  the  methods  of  the  Apaches  and  the 
Sioux. 

Unlike  the  other  Indian  tribes,  the  Apaches  are  essen- 
tially foot-soldiers.  They  often  use  great  numbers  of 
horses  on  their  raids,  but  they  never  fight  mounted, 
their  horses  being  used  merely  as  a means  of  transporta- 
tion from  one  point  to  another.  As  warriors,  they  are 
formidable  only  when  afoot,  and  as  scouts  they  are  seen 
at  their  best  when  acting  as  small  infantry  patrols. 

During  the  wars  in  Arizona  during  the  past  decade, 
the  ordinary  methods  of  an  Apache  company  in  the 
field  against  hostile  Indians  were  about  as  follows:  The 
scouts  were  up  and  on  the  alert  before  the  earliest  signs 


222 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


of  dawn;  and,  having  received  their  instructions  as  to 
the  next  camping  place,  and  especially  in  regard  to 
“ranches”  inhabited  by  white  men  (by  whom  they 
were  likely  to  be  fired  upon,  if  they  approached  unaccom- 
panied by  troops),  they  started  out  from  camp,  spreading 
out  like  a fan,  in  groups  of  three,  and  pushing  on  so  far 
ahead  of  the  troops  that  the  latter  rarely  saw  them  until 
camp  was  reached,  or  the  trail  became  so  hot  that  word 
was  sent  back  to  the  column.  The  patrols  reconnoitered 
the  country  in  the  most  thorough  manner  for  about  five 
miles  on  each  side  of  the  trail,  and  absolutely  nothing 
escaped  their  notice;  tracks,  broken  branches,  upturned 
stones,  ashes  of  camp  fires,  horse  dung,  in  short  every- 
thing, being  commented  on,  and,  if  deemed  important, 
reported  to  the  commander  of  the  column  by  one  of  the 
party.  If  less  than  three  men  remained  of  a party,  it 
always  united  with  another,  an  Apache  dreading  to  be 
alone. 

As  soon  as  camp  was  made  (generally  about  one 
o’clock  P.  M.),  the  scouts,  without  instructions  being 
given,  encircled  the  camp  with  an  outpost  line,  which 
nothing  could  approach  without  being  seen.  As  soon 
as  it  became  dark,  everyone  came  in  and  went  to  bed, 
the  horses  were  turned  out  under  soldiers  for  night 
herding,  and  the  camp  slept  securely,  because  it  is  a 
cardinal  principle  with  the  Apaches  never  to  attack  at 
night.  This  peculiarity  of  the  Apaches  is  by  some  at- 
tributed to  the  extremely  rough  country  covered  with 
cactus  and  prickly  pear:  by  others  to  superstition. 
Whatever  the  cause,  it  seems  to  be  an  invariable  rule. 
The  earliest  gray  of  dawn  always  found  the  outposts 


INDIAN  SCOUTING.  223 

reestablished,  the  herd  in  (or  the  guards  about  it  quad- 
rupled), and  the  men  under  arms. 

The  methods  of  these  scouts  were  in  all  respects  es- 
sentially the  same  as  those  of  the  hostile  Indians  to 
whom  they  were  opposed. 

The  Apaches  show  a surprising  skill  in  the  selection 
of  positions  and  in  the  measures  taken  for  defense.  An 
officer  of  experience  says: 

“ In  the  field  against  Victorio  for  two  years,  I never 
saw  one  of  his  camps  that  did  not  astonish  me  with  the 
splendid  means  of  defense  against  any  opponent  com- 
ing in  any  direction,  and  the  absolute  impossibility  of 
sudden  surprise  guaranteed  by  his  arrangement  of  out- 
posts. * * * * In  his  own  country  the  Apache  is 

the  ideal  scout  for  an  infantry  patrol,  as  he  obtains  all 
information  without  being  seen,  can  conceal  himself  on 
a bare  plain,  and  is  good  for  thirty  miles  a day  all  the 
time.” 

While  the  Apache,  habitually  operating  on  foot,  gives 
us  a valuable  lesson  in  the  conduct  of  infantry  patrols, 
the  mounted  Indian  furnishes  a similar  one  for  the  cav- 
alry reconnoitering  service. 

The  Sioux  is,  probably,  the  best  type  of  mounted 
Indian.  He  is  “all  eyes  and  ears,”  is  seldom  seen,  and 
may,  in  fact,  be  characterized  as  a perfect  scout.  When 
General  Crook’s  command  left  Fort  Fetterman,  in  the 
campaign  of  1876,  it  had  in  its  front  from  8,000  to 
10,000  hostile  Sioux;  and  yet,  in  a march  of  200  miles, 
not  one  of  them  was  seen,  though  they  kept  the  com- 
mand under  constant  observation,  and  knew  its  every 
movement.  At  Tongue  River  the  camp  was  fired  into 
in  broad  daylight  by  Indians  who  had  stealthily  ap- 


224 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


proached  unseen  to  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river. 
Had  the  stream  been  unfordable,  so  that  the  Indians 
could  not  have  been  dislodged,  they  would  have  made 
the  camp  untenable. 

The  advance  guard  and  flankers  of  the  Sioux  are 
pushed  miles  beyond  the  main  body,  and  their  scouts 
hang  upon  the  flanks  of  an  approaching  enemy.  The 
scout  gains  some  high  point,  where,  lying  on  his  belly 
in  the  shadow  of  some  tree  or  rock,  he  sees  everything 
without  being  seen  himself:  his  horse  meanwhile  being 
either  picketed  or  grazing  with  dragging  lariat  behind 
the  crest  of  the  hill.  The  expedients  adopted  for  con- 
cealment are  many  and  ingenious.  The  scout  some- 
times crawls  towards  a rock  on  the  crest  of  a hill,  and 
when  near  it  draws  his  blanket,  or  a white  cloth  or  sta- 
ble frock  (according  to  the  color  of  the  rock)  over  his 
head  and  shoulders,  covering  everything  but  his  eyes, 
and  then  wriggles  himself  by  degrees  up  to  the  rock, 
where  he  remains  motionless  until  he  has  minutely 
scanned  all  the  country  in  sight,  when  he  withdraws  as 
stealthily  as  he  approached,  whether  anything  has  been 
discovered  or  not.  He  often  conceals  himself  by  hold- 
ing a piece  of  sage  brush  in  front  of  him  while  lying 
down.  Sometimes  he  fastens  bushes  to  the  upper  part 
of  his  body,  extending  above  his  head:  then  sitting  in 
a “wash-out”  or  wallow  he  is  completely  concealed, 
while  his  own  view  is  unobstructed. 

In  long-distance  reconnoitering,  the  scout  (lying  flat 
on  his  belly)  places  his  elbows  on  the  ground,  rests  his 
head  on  his  hands,  which  are  so  placed  as  to  shade  his 
eyes  and  limit  the  front  of  vision,  and  then  fixes  his 


INDIAN  SCOUTING. 


225 


gaze  upon  some  distant  object  which  he  watches  in- 
tently. In  this  way  Bloody  Knife,  one  of  General  Cus- 
ter’s scouts,  located  Sitting  Bull’s  camp  on  the  Little 
Big  Horn  at  a distance  of  about  twelve  miles:  discover- 
ing first  the  smoke,  and  then  ponies  grazing  in  the 
valley. 

“Buttes”  and  other  prominent  points  near  the  trail 
are  sought  as  lookouts,  the  scouts  often  going  miles  to 
reach  them,  unless  the  enemy  is  known  to  be  near.  In 
almost  every  case,  the  scouts  work  in  pairs,  a watch  be- 
ing kept  to  the  rear  as  well  as  to  the  front.  Before 
crossing  a ridge,  the  scouts  invariably  scan  carefully 
the  valley  in  front.  They  never  enter  any  place  with- 
out first  reconnoiteriug  it;  and  if  it  does  not  afford  means 
of  easy  escape,  they  keep  out.  If  they  come  to  an  un- 
fordable  stream,  they  swim  it  without  any  ado,  and  con- 
tinue their  reconnaissance. 

The  Sioux  place  their  camp  in  hollows  and  valleys, 
where  it  is  well  concealed:  the  location  chosen  being 
always  such  that  numerous  canons  or  ravines  provide 
means  of  escape.  In  the  daytime,  watch  is  kept  from 
the  highest  points:  at  late  dusk  and  early  dawn,  the 
scouts  are  drawn  in  so  as  to  enable  them  to  see  an  ap- 
proaching enemy  on  the  sky-line. 

If  attacked  and  forced  to  abandon  their  village,  the 
Sioux  retreat,  by  means  of  the  ravines  or  other  avenues, 
to  the  high  ground;  and  in  many  cases  a neglect  on  the 
part  of  the  troops  promptly  to  occupy  surrounding 
heights  has  enabled  the  Indians  to  drive  them  out  of 
the  captured  camp  by  fire  from  commanding  positions. 

On  the  battlefield  the  tactics  of  the  Sioux  is  simple 

15— w 


226 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


and  effective.  At  the  battle  of  Rosebud,  on  being-  dis- 
covered,  they  advanced  so  rapidly  to  the  attack  that  the 
troops  barely  had  time  to  prepare  to  receive  them.  On 
being  dislodged  from  one  height,  the  Indians  retreated 
rapidly,  and  made  a stubborn  stand  at  the  next.  They 
fought  in  successive  lines,  one  advancing  when  the 
other  retreated;  and  when  they  were  charged,  they 
scattered  only  to  unite  and  fight  at  some  point  beyond. 
Their  ability  to  rally  quickly  often  enables  them  to  in- 
flict a heavy  blow  upon  troops  disordered  by  pursuit. 

In  attacking,  the  Indians  endeavor  to  surround,  or, 
at  least,  to  extend  beyond  their  enemy,  so  as  to  bring 
upon  him  a convergent  fire;  their  tactics,  in  this  re- 
spect, as  in  many  others,  bearing  a considerable  resem- 
blance to  the  lava  of  the  Cossacks.  The  fact  that  their 
own  line  is  thus  thin  and  easily  broken  causes  them  no 
uneasiness;  for  their  enemy’s  fire  is  divergent  and  di- 
rected against  a difficult  target;  and  if  the  line  is  broken, 
they  scamper  away,  quickly  rally  at  a signal,  and  re- 
sume the  same  tactics  as  before.  The  chief  object  of 
their  tactics  is  to  place  themselves  in  such  a position  as 
to  give  them  the  most  effective  fire  on  the  enemy,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  to  incur  the  least  possible  loss. 

In  order  to  mislead  the  enemy  in  regard  to  the  move- 
ments of  their  “villages,”  or  to  gain  time  for  the  escape 
of  their  families  or  herds,  they  not  infrequently  uncover 
the  trail  and  mass  their  warriors  in  another  direction, 
making  just  enough  resistance  to  draw  the  pursuing 
force  away  from  the  trail  of  their  non-combatants. 

Like  the  Apaches,  the  Sioux  do  not  expect  a night 
attack.  They  post  no  sentinels  after  dark,  but  are  on 


INDIAN  SCOUTING. 


227 


the  alert  at  the  first  sign  of  dawn.  They  do  not,  how- 
ever, have  so  great  an  aversion  to  night  operations  as  the 
Apaches;  for  parties  of  prowlers  often  approach  camp, 
to  steal  horses,  if  the  animals  are  on  the  “picket  line,” 
or  to  stampede  them,  if  they  are  herded  or  lariated. 
Night  attacks  by  the  Sioux  are  almost  unknown;  though 
a considerable  force  of  warriors  fired  into  the  camp  of 
Baker’s  battalion  of  the  Second  Cavalry  at  Pompey’s 
Pillar,  on  the  Yellowstone,  in  1872. 

The  Sioux  warrior  also  resembles  the  Apache  in  his 
knowledge  of  the  country  and  its  topography;  in  his 
expertness  in  trailing  ; in  the  many  makeshifts  of  the 
practical  warrior;  and  in  his  skillful  interchange  of 
signals  with  distant  comrades. 

It  is  not  because  of  his  courage,  expertness  with  fire- 
arms, or  celerity  of  movement  that  the  Indian  is  a for- 
midable foe — indeed,  in  the  first  two  qualities  he  is 
greatly  surpassed  by  our  troops.  He  is  formidable  be- 
cause his  thorough  knowledge  of  all  the  essential  details 
of  the  science  of  security  and  information  generally 
enables  him  to  give  battle  when  he  chooses,  and  to 
avoid  conflict  when  he  sees  fit.  As  a scout  he  is  a 
model ; and  it  may  be  said  that  the  scouting  methods 
prescribed  by  the  best  European  authorities  are  valuable 
in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  their  approach  to  those 
of  the  North  American  Indian. 

It  should  be  observed  that  these  Indians  are  all 
trained  to  war,  and  that  their  methods  are  not  the  result 
of  the  inspiration  of  the  occasion,  but  of  constant  prac- 
tice, and  of  a study  which  is  not  less  deep  because  it  is 
unlettered.  Methods  of  scouting,  various  expedients  of 


228 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


warfare,  and  even  geographical  details,  are  learned  by 
one  generation  from  another;  and  more  than  one  in- 
stance has  been  known  of  an  Indian  finding  his  way 
without  difficulty  through  a country  which  he  was  tra- 
versing for  the  first  time,  because  he  had  learned  so 
thoroughly  from  others  the  relative  positions  of  promi- 
nent landmarks  as  to  be  in  possession  of  a reliable 
mental  map.  Constant  practice  in  hunting,  stalking 
game,  and  making  long  journeys  through  wild  country, 
makes  the  Indians  expert  in  judging  distances,  recon- 
noitering,  utilizing  cover,  and  husbanding  the  strength 
of  themselves  and  their  horses.  In  fact,  the  Sioux  quite 
as  well  as  the  Prussian,  teaches  the  lesson  that  nothing 
but  constant  practice  in  the  real  or  simulated  conditions 
of  war  can  properly  prepare  the  soldier  for  the  duties  of 
a campaign. 


QUESTIONS — ADVANCE  GUARDS. 


229 


APPENDIX  IV. 


QUESTIONS. 


The  following  questions  have  been  prepared  with  a 
view  to  their  use  in  a general  review  of  the  book: 

1.  How  is  the  security  of  an  army  provided  for  on  the 
march  ? 

2.  How,  at  a halt  ? 

3.  Why  are  the  two  elements  of  security  and  informa- 
tion inseparable  ? 

4.  The  information  necessary  for  a commander  is  of 
what  two  kinds  ? 

5.  How  is  the  first  kind  of  information  generally  ob- 
tained ? 

6.  In  what  two  ways  is  the  second  class  of  informa- 
tion gained  ? 

7.  By  whom  may  a reconnaissance  be  effected  ? 

8.  To  gain  reliable  information  of  the  enemy,  what 
should  be  done  ? 


ADVANCE  GUARDS. 

9.  What  would  be  the  effect  if  troops  moving  in  one 
body  should  come  suddenly  upon  the  enemy  ? 

10.  How  is  a column  of  troops  on  the  march  divided  ? 

11.  What,  in  general  terms,  are  the  objects  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  ? 


23O  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

12.  What  are  the  specific  objects  of  the  advance 
guard  ? 

13.  How  does  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  vary  ? 

14.  What  is  the  danger  in  having  the  advance  guard 
too  weak  ? 

15.  As  a general  rule,  what  portion  of  the  entire  force 
is  assigned  to  the  advance  guard  and  to  the  rear  guard 
on  advance — and  what  on  a retrograde  movement? 

16.  Whence  are  the  flanking  parties  taken  ? 

17.  With  a small  force,  what  may  be  the  proportion- 
ate strength  of  the  advance  guard  ? 

18.  Why  should  the  proportion  be  larger  in  the  case 
of  a large  force  ? 

19.  What  is  the  object  of  each  of  the  constituent  de- 
tachments of  the  advance  guard  ? 

20.  Into  what  two  parts  is  the  advance  guard  prima- 
rily divided,  and  what  is  the  strength  of  each  ? 

21.  Into  what  two  parts  is  the  vanguard  divided,  and 
what  is  their  relative  strength  ? 

22.  How  are  these  proportions  varied  ? 

23.  Draw  a diagram  representing  the  formation  of  a 
company  of  infantry  as  an  advance  guard. 

24.  If  the  nature  of  the  country  is  such  as  to  render 
the  use  of  flanking  groups  impracticable,  what  is  done  ? 

25.  When  marching  in  an  open  country,  how  may 
the  advance  guard  be  formed  ? 

26.  Describe  briefly  the  formation  of  an  advance 
guard  consisting  of  two  battalions. 

27.  What  might  result  if  the  distance  of  the  advance 
guard  from  the  main  body  were  too  great;  and  what,  if 
it  were  too  small  ? 


ADVANCE  GUARDS. 


231 


28.  Give  the  “rough  rule”  which  will  answer  in 
most  cases  for  determining  the  distance  of  the  advance 
guard  from  the  main  body. 

29.  When  must  this  distance  be  decreased,  and  when 
may  it  be  increased  ? 

30.  Where  does  the  commander  of  the  vanguard 
march  ? 

31.  Describe  the  duties  of  the  commander  of  the  van- 
guard. 

32.  How  are  losses  in  the  advance  party  replaced? 

33.  In  a command  of  considerable  size,  who  is 
charged  with  the  duties  of  selecting  a camp  or  bivouac 
for  the  main  body  ? 

34.  Where  does  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
march  ? 

35.  What  qualities  does  the  commander  of  the  ad- 
vance guard  need,  and  why  ? 

36.  What  should  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
continually  consider,  and  what,  in  general,  should  he 
do? 

37.  What  is  done  when  the  advance  guard  halts? 

38.  How  is  information  conveyed  from  one  part  of 
the  advance  guard  to  another  ? 

39.  Draw  a diagram  representing  an  advance  guard 
consisting  of  a troop  of  cavalry. 

40.  Describe  the  composition  of  the  advance  party, 
the  supports,  and  the  reserve,  when  the  advance  guard 
consists  of  two  troops. 

41.  What  would  be  the  composition  of  the  advance 
party  in  a very  large  advance  guard  ? 


232  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

42.  Why  are  the  distances  and  intervals  greater  in  a 
cavalry  advance  guard  than  in  one  composed  of  infantry  ? 

43.  Why  should  an  advance  guard  be  composed  of 
all  arms  ? 

44.  In  the  United  States  Army,  what  arm  should,  if 
in  sufficient  numbers,  compose  the  support  ? 

45.  Describe  the  use  of  artillery  with  the  advance 
guard,  and  its  position  therein  when  marching. 

46.  Describe  the  use  and  position  of  the  engineers 
with  the  advance  guard. 

47.  Upon  what  does  the  proportion  of  each  arm  with 
the  advance  guard  depend,  and  when  is  each  preferable  ? 

48.  As  a rule,  what  troops  perform  the  duty  of 
advance  guard,  and  when  may  it  be  desirable  to  com- 
pose the  advance  guard  differently  ? 

49.  State  the  general  and  important  rule  in  regard  to 
the  disposition  of  the  advance  guard,  whether  on  active 
service  or  merely  at  drill. 

50.  Describe  the  method  of  action  of  the  advance 
guard  on  meeting  the  enemy. 

51.  Describe  the  order  of  march  of  a division — ad- 
vance guard,  main  body,  and  rear  guard. 

52.  How  would  the  front  of  an  army  corps  on  the 
march  be  protected  ? 

53.  In  the  case  of  a flank  march  near  the  enemy,  in 
what  respects  does  the  flank  guard  resemble  an  advance 
guard,  and  how  does  it  differ  from  it  ? 

54.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
a company  of  infantry  is  formed  as  an  advance  guard. 

55.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
a battalion  of  infantry  is  formed  as  an  advance  guard. 

56.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 


OUTPOSTS.  233 

two  battalions  of  infantry  are  formed  as  an  advance 
guard. 

57.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
an  advance  guard  of  infantry  is  assembled. 

58.  Describe  the  commands  and  movements  by  which 
a troop  of  cavalry  is  formed  as  an  advance  guard. 

OUTPOSTS. 

59.  What  are  outposts,  and  with  what  duties  are  they 
charged  ? 

60.  What  effect  on  an  outpost  has  a good  cavalry 
screen  in  its  front  ? 

61.  How  may  the  duties  of  an  outpost  be  classified  ? 

62.  Into  what  four  parts  is  an  outpost  divided  ? 

63.  Who  occupy  the  line  of  observation  ; and  who, 
the  line  of  resistance  ? 

64.  What  are  the  normal  distances  between  the  sub- 
divisions of  an  outpost  of  infantry  ? — of  cavalry  ? 

65.  To  what  may  the  general  plan  of  an  outpost  be 
likened  ? 

66.  What  portion  of  the  strength  of  the  outpost  is 
generally  assigned  to  the  reserve,  to  the  supports,  and 
to  the  pickets  ? 

67.  On  what  does  the  strength  of  a picket  depend, 
and  what  principle  regulates  the  strength  of  each  sup- 
port ? 

68.  What  two  systems  of  outposts  are  there,  and  what 
are  their  general  characteristics  ? 

69.  State  the  requirements  of  a good  outpost  position. 

70.  State  what  furnishes  one  of  the  best  ; and  what, 
one  of  the  worst,  outpost  positions. 


234 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


71.  Wliat  should  be  done  when  the  outpost  is  com- 
pelled to  occupy  a wood,  the  farther  edge  of  which  is  too 
distant  to  be  occupied  ? 

72.  If  the  outpost  be  not  compelled  to  occupy  the 
wood,  in  this  case,  what  is  generally  advisable  ? 

73.  Where  a stream,  canal,  or  other  obstacle  having 
but  few  passages,  lies  parallel  to  the  outpost  line,  what 
may  be  done  ? 

74.  What  should  generally  be  the  shape  of  the  out- 
post line  ? 

7 5.  On  what  does  the  strength  of  the  outpost  de- 
pend ? 

76.  As  a rule,  what  is  the  maximum  strength  of  the 
outpost  in  proportion  to  the  entire  command? 

77.  When  the  army  is  marching,  from  day  to  day,  what 
constitutes  the  outpost  at  each  halt? 

78.  If  outposts  are  required  on  the  flanks  and  rear,  of 
what  are  they  composed  ? 

79.  Draw  a diagram  representing  an  outpost  consist- 
ing of  a regiment  of  infantry. 

80.  Draw  a diagram  representing  an  outpost  consist- 
ing of  a squadron  of  cavalry. 

81.  State  how  the  outposts  for  divisions  and  brigades 
are  generally  furnished,  and  give  the  alternative  forma- 
tions of  a brigade  outpost. 

82.  What  provisions  for  the  command  of  the  outpost 
are  made  in  this  case  ? 

83.  If  two  brigades  encamp  in  the  first  line,  with  the 
third  in  reserve,  whence  are  the  outposts  taken  ? 

84.  Where  is  the  baggage  of  the  outpost  troops  kept  ? 

85.  State  when  infantry  is  preferable  to  cavalry  for 


OUTPOSTS.  235 

outpost  duty,  and  the  reverse,  and  state  how  the  two 
arms  may  be  advantageously  combined. 

86.  How  should  artillery  be  used  with  an  outpost  ? 

87.  State  the  considerations  on  which  the  distance  of 
the  outpost  from  the  main  body  depends. 

88.  What  is  the  usual  distance,  and  what  is  the  maxi- 
mum distance  ? 

89.  How  is  the  outpost  divided,  and  where  are  the  sev- 
eral headquarters  ? 

90.  What  instructions  does  the  outpost  commander 
receive  from  the  commander  of  the  forces,  and  what  does 
he  (the  outpost  commander)  then  do  ? — including  his  in- 
structions to  his  subordinates. 

91.  As  a rule,  how  should  the  outpost  be  intrenched  ? 

92.  How  are  sentinels  generally  posted,  and  how  may 
the  group  system  be  used  ? 

93.  State  the  requirements  of  a good  post  for  a sen- 
tinel. 

94.  How  far  apart  may  sentinels  and  vedettes  be  ? — 
minimum  and  maximum  distances. 

95.  What  are  the  general  duties  of  a sentinel,  and 
what  should  he  clearly  understand  ? 

96.  What  persons  are  allowed  to  cross  the  line  of  sen- 
tinels, and  what  is  done  with  the  others  ? 

97.  How  are  deserters  from  the  enemy  received  at  the 
outpost  ? 

98.  When  a flag  of  truce  approaches,  how  is  the  bearer 
received  by  the  sentinel  ? 

99.  Everything  observed  by  the  sentinel  is  how  com- 
municated ? 


236  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

100.  What  are  the  general  rules  in  regard  to  sentinels 
firing? 

101.  How  often  should  sentinels  be  relieved? 

102.  How  are  vedettes  posted  ? 

103.  How  may  vedettes  sometimes  perform  their  duty 
dismounted  ? 

104.  What  is  a connecting  sentinel  ? 

105.  What  is  a picket  sentinel  ? 

106.  What  is  the  object  of  an  examining  post,  and  of 
what  persons  does  it  consist  ? 

107.  How  is  a person  approaching  an  examining  post 
received  ? 

108.  If  a person  approaches  the  line  of  sentinels  at 
any  other  point  than  the  examining  post,  what  is  done  ? 

109.  What  are  the  objections  to  examining  posts,  and 
when  may  such  posts  be  advantageously  used  ? 

no.  What  are  detached  posts? 

in.  What  points  may  be  advantageously  held  by  de- 
tached posts  ? 

1 1 2.  How  often  are  detached  posts  relieved,  and  what 
is  required  of  the  men  composing  them  ? 

1 1 3.  What  is  the  usual  strength  of  a picket? — both 
infantry  and  cavalry. 

1 14.  How  many  double  sentinels  or  vedettes  does  a 
picket  usually  furnish  ? 

1 1 5.  What  regulates  the  strength  of  a picket,  and 
what  portion  of  the  picket  is  used  in  patrolling? 

1 16.  What  are  the  maximum  and  minimum  fronts  of 
an  infantry  picket? 

117.  What  are  the  maximum  and  minimum  fronts  of 
a cavalry  picket  ? 


OUTPOSTS. 


237 


1 18.  Pickets  are  generally  about  how  far  apart  ? 

1 19.  Wliat  line  is  the  first  consideration  in  selecting 
the  ground  for  the  outpost  ? 

120.  What  are  the  six  requirements  of  a perfect  picket 
post? 

121.  If  a picket  is  posted  in  a defile,  what  should  be 
done  ? 

122.  What  is  the  general  rule  in  regard  to  posting  a 
picket  in  a house  or  inclosure  ; and  what  exception  is 
there  to  the  rule  ? 

123.  How  should  the  picket  be  situated  relatively  to 
a junction  of  roads  leading  from  the  enemy’s  position? 

124.  When  an  impassable  obstacle  lies  along  a por- 
tion of  the  front  of  the  outpost,  what  may  be  done? 

125.  What  are  the  general  rules  concerning  fires  with 
the  picket? 

126.  What  is  required  of  the  men  composing  the 
picket? — both  infantry  and  cavalry. 

127.  What  should  be  done  if  a noise  is  heard  from  a 
neighboring  picket? 

128.  What  do  the  supports  constitute? 

129.  What  regulates  the  position  of  the  supports,  and 
what  should  be  its  general  requirements  ? 

130.  What  arrangements  should  the  commander  of  a 
picket  make  with  a view  to  defense? 

131.  What  is  required  of  the  . men  composing  the 
support  ? 

132.  Describe  a Cossack  post. 

133.  What  are  the  disadvantages  and  advantages  of 
Cossack  posts  ? 


238 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


134.  What  does  the  reserve  constitute,  and  of  what 
does  it  generally  consist  ? 

135.  What  considerations  influence  the  selection  of 
its  position  ? 

136.  What  rules  obtain  in  regard  to  the  men  and 
horses  of  the  reserve  ? 

137.  When  may  the  reserve  be  dispensed  with? 

138.  What  is  the  advantage  of  the  omission  of  the 
reserve,  and  why  can  it  but  rarely  be  omitted  ? 

139.  What  is  the  objection  to  retaining  the  cordon 
system  at  night? 

140.  What  system  is  generally  adopted,  in  its  essen- 
tial features,  at  night ; and  on  what  is  it  based  ? 

141.  Give  the  important  details  of  the  outpost  system 
at  night. 

142.  In  cavalry  outposts,  wdiere  are  the  pickets  posted 
at  night,  and  what  precautions  are  taken  ? 

143.  When  the  enemy  is  close  at  hand  and  aggres- 
sive, what  may  sometimes  be  advisable  ? 

144.  When  are  the  changes  in  the  position  of  the 
outpost  arranged  and  made  ? 

145.  What  change  is  made  in  the  positions  of  the 
sentinels  for  night  ? 

146.  Describe  the  composition  and  duties  of  a visiting 
patrol. 

147.  When  are  visiting  patrols  mainly  used  ; wdiat 
extent  of  front  do  they  cover  ; and  how  far  to  the  front 
do  they  go  ? 

148.  What  is  the  object  of  reconnoitering  patrols? 

149.  What  is  the  size  of  reconnoitering  patrols,  and 
how  far  do  they  go  beyond  the  line  of  sentinels? 


OUTPOSTS.  239 

150.  What  patrols  should  be  used  at  night,  and  what 
must  be  constantly  varied  in  regard  to  them  ? 

151.  When  is  the  duty  of  a reconnoitering  patrol 
best  performed  ? 

152.  What  are  patrolling  posts  ? 

153.  Describe  the  manner  in  which  a patrolling  post 
performs  its  duties. 

154.  If  the  number  of  patrolling  posts  is  such  as  to 
weaken  the  picket  materially,  what  must  be  done  ? 

155.  From  what  part  of  the  outpost  are  strong  patrols 
taken,  and  how  do  they  vary  in  size  ? 

156.  How  far  from  the  line  of  sentinels  may  a strong 
patrol  advance,  and  how  may  it  sometimes  be  used  ? 

157.  With  what  should  the  men  detailed  for  outpost 
duty  be  supplied  ? 

158.  What  should  each  officer  detailed  for  outpost 
duty  have  ? — each  non-commissioned  officer? 

159.  Describe  the  posting  of  the  outpost,  both  infan- 
try and  cavalry. 

160.  After  the  picket  is  posted,  what  does  its  com- 
mander do  ? 

161.  When,  at  the  close  of  the  day’s  march,  the  ad- 
vance guard  forms  the  outpost,  what  portions  of  it  con- 
stitute the  various  parts  of  the  outpost  ? 

162.  Whenever  practicable,  what  should  be  done  to 
make  an  equitable  division  of  sentinel  duty  ? 

163.  Describe  the  defense  of  an  outpost. 

164.  If  the  enemy  is  repulsed,  by  whom,  and  to  what 
extent,  is  pursuit  made  ? 

165.  Soon  after  the  repulse  of  the  attack,  what  should 
be  done  ? 


240  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION, 

166.  When  knowledge  of  the  enemy’s  approach  is 
gained  in  time  to  admit  of  full  preparation,  how  should 
he  be  received,  and  why  ? 

167.  When  should  the  pickets  be  under  arms,  and 
why  ? 

168.  When  is  the  outpost  relieved,  and  why  at  this 
time  ? 

169.  Describe  the  manner  of  relieving  the  outpost. 

170.  How  often  are  outposts  relieved  ? 

1 7 1.  If  the  army  is  on  the  march,  when  is  the  out- 
post relieved  ? 

172.  If  the  army  is  retreating,  what  does  the  outpost 
form  ? 

RECONNAISSANCE. 

173.  Under  what  three  heads  may  reconnaissance  be 
considered  ? 

174.  By  whose  order,  and  how,  is  a reconnaissance  in 
force  made? 

175.  How  should  information  be  sought  from  the 
prisoners  captured  ? 

176.  What  arms  are  especially  valuable  in  a recon- 
naissance in  force,  and  why? 

177.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
making  a reconnaissance  in  force  in  the  evening;  and 
what,  in  the  morning? 

178.  To  what  three  serious  objections  is  a reconnais- 
sance in  force  open  ? 

179.  What  is  a special  reconnaissance? 


RECONNAISSANCE.  241 

180.  How  is  an  attempt  upon  a hostile  picket  carried 
out  ? 

181.  How  may  a force  employed  on  a special  recon- 
naissance vary  in  size  ? 

182.  How  are  patrols  primarily  divided,  and  how 
does  each  vary  in  size? 

183.  Patrols  are  also  classified  as  what  kinds? — State 
briefly  the  duties  of  each. 

184.  State  what  should  be  reported  by  an  exploring 
patrol  in  regard  to  the  following:  Roads,  railroads, 
bridges,  rivers,  woods,  canals,  telegraphs,  villages,  de- 
files, ponds  and  marshes,  springs  and  rivulets,  valleys, 
heights. 

185.  What  arm  is  generally  best  suited  to  patrolling; 
and  why  is  the  union  of  infantry  and  cavalry  on  this 
duty  undesirable  ? 

186.  What  is  the  composition  of  a small  infantry 
patrol  ? 

187.  Describe  the  preparation  and  inspection  of  a 
small  infantry  patrol,  and  describe  the  signals  used. 

188.  Every  patrol  should  have  what  general  forma- 
tion ? 

189.  What  is  the  only  definite  rule  that  can  be  laid 
down  for  the  formation  of  a patrol  ? 

190.  What  considerations  influence  the  distances  and 
intervals  between  the  members  of  a patrol,  and  what  are 
generally  the  minimum  and  maximum  distances  ? 

191.  Of  what  should  the  point  generally  consist;  how 
are  the  signals  to  and  from  the  commander  transmitted; 
and  how  is  the  patrol  assembled  ? 

16 — w 


242  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

192.  Describe  briefly  how  the  patrol  moves,  and  how 
it  returns. 

193.  What  should  the  patrol  do  in  regard  to  great 
roads  ? 

194.  What  is  the  general  rule  in  regard  to  a patrol 
halting  ? 

195.  If  another  patrol  of  the  same  army  or  any  friendly 
force  is  met,  what  should  be  done  ? 

196.  What  should  be  done  if  a hostile  patrol  is  dis- 
covered ? 

197.  What  should  be  done  if  the  patrol  falls  into  an 
ambuscade,  and  what  if  a hostile  sentinel  or  patrol  is 
suddenly  encountered  in  the  dark  ? 

198.  What  questions  should  be  asked  of  civilians 
coming  from  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  or  whose  neigh- 
borhood has  been  visited  by  hostile  troops  ? 

199.  What  should  be  done  in  regard  to  people  going 
in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  ? 

200.  Give  the  general  rules  in  regard  to  the  selection 
and  treatment  of  guides. 

201.  Describe  the  manner  of  reconnoitering  cross- 
roads, heights,  defiles,  bridges,  and  fords. 

202.  Describe  the  manner  of  reconnoitering  woods, 
inclosures,  and  houses. 

203.  Describe  the  manner  of  reconnoitering  villages, 
cities,  and  towns. 

204.  Describe  the  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  in  po- 
sition ? 

205.  Describe  the  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
march. 


RECONNAISSANCE.  243 

206.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  boats  and 
bridges  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  ? 

207.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  the  flames 
and  smoke  of  the  enemy’s  camp  fires  ? 

208.  What  indications  may  be  noted  of  the  arrival 
and  departure  of  troops  ? 

209.  Describe  the  noise  made  by  troops  on  the  march, 
and  the  distance  at  which  the  various  arms  can  be 
heard. 

210.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  the  reflection 
from  the  weapons  of  marching  troops? 

2 1 1.  State  the  distances  at  which  various  objects 
should  be  seen,  on  a clear  day,  by  a man  with  good 
vision. 

212.  State  some  of  the  conditions  which  cause  an  ob- 
ject to  look  farther  or  nearer  than  it  really  is. 

213.  What  information  may  be  gained  from  the  trail 
of  the  enemy  ? 

214.  What  indications  are  furnished  by  an  abandoned 
camp  or  bivouac  ? 

215.  What  inferences  maybe  drawn  from  the  manner 
and  bearing  of  the  inhabitants  in  a hostile  country? 

216.  When  should  reports  be  sent  in,  and  what  should 
be  reported  ? 

217.  How  should  a verbal  report  be  sent,  and  when 
are  such  reports  better  than  written  ones  ? 

218.  What  are  the  indispensable  qualities  of  a written 
report  ? 

2 19.  As  a rule,  what  is  the  general  nature  of  the  forma- 
tion of  a strong  infantry  patrol  ? 


244 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


220.  How  do  the  operations  of  an  expeditionary  pa- 
trol generally  differ  from  a special  reconnaissance  ? 

221.  In  general,  how  does  an  expeditionary  patrol 
effect  the  capture  of  a sentinel  ? — of  a patrol  ? — of  pris- 
oners generally  ? 

222.  When  is  the  most  favorable  moment  for  ques- 
tioning prisoners,  and  why  ? 

223.  What  is  the  relative  value  of  different  grades  of 
prisoners  ? 

224.  If  enlisted  men  are  captured,  what  should  they 
be  questioned  about  ? 

225.  When  the  object  is  the  destruction  of  roads, 
railroads,  or  telegraphs,  or  the  tapping  of  a telegraph, 
how  should  the  expeditionary  patrol  act  ? 

226.  When  may  harrassing  patrols  be  used,  and  what 
is  their  general  method  of  operating? 

227.  Describe  the  nature  and  duties  of  flank  patrols. 

228.  When  may  flank  patrols  be  called  covering  pa- 
trols ? 

229.  Describe  the  manner  in  which  an  advance  guard 
passes  through  a town. 

230.  What  are  the  essential  differences  between  a 
cavalry  and  an  infantry  patrol  ? 

231.  What  cavalry  soldiers  should  be  selected  for  pa- 
trol duty,  and  what  is  required  in  their  inspection? 

232.  What  general  rule  may  be  prescribed  for  the 
formation  of  a cavalry  patrol,  and  how  do  the  members 
of  the  patrol  carry  their  firearms? 

233.  How  do  the  signals  of  a cavalry  patrol  differ 
from  those  of  an  infantry  patrol,  and  what  additional 
signals  may  be  used  on  open  ground  ? 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN.  245 

234.  How  does  a cavalry  patrol  conduct  itself  at 
night  ? 

235.  Why  must  a cavalry  patrol  move  along  turn- 
pikes and  good  roads,  and  what  precautions  should  it 
take  ? 

236.  Why  should  the  patrol  commander  adhere  to  the 
road  selected  ? 

237.  In  what  details  of  the  reconnaissance  of  different 
kinds  of  ground  do  the  operations  of  a cavalry  patrol 
differ  from  those  of  an  infantry  patrol  ? 

238.  If  necessary  to  halt  to  feed  or  water,  what  places 
should  be  avoided,  and  what  selected  ? 

239.  Of  what  are  connecting  patrols  always  composed, 
and  how  do  they  operate  ? 

240.  Describe  the  composition  and  duties  of  pursuing 
patrols. 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 

241.  What  may  the  cavalry  screen  be  said  to  consti- 
tute ? 

242.  By  what  cavalry  may  the  screening  duty  be  per- 
formed, and  which  system  would  probably  be  adopted 
in  the  United  States  service  ? 

243.  On  what  does  the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the 
main  army  depend  ? 

244.  How  does  the  distance  of  the  screen  from  the 
army  change  from  the  time  the  armies  begin  to  concen- 
trate until  tactical  operations  begin  ? 

245.  What  are  the  two  great  objects  of  the  cavalry 
screen  ? 


246  SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 

246.  On  what  does  the  front  of  the  screen  depend, 
and  what  is  the  first  consideration  influencing  it  ? 

247.  What  would  be  the  average  front  of  an  American 
cavalry  brigade  in  screening  and  reconuoitering  ? 

248.  Draw  a diagram  representing  an  American  cav- 
alry brigade  on  screening  and  reconnoitering  duty? 

249.  How  may  this  formation  be  varied,  if  the  enemy 
is  at  a distance,  or  lacking  in  aggressiveness;  and  how, 
if  he  is  close  and  enterprising  ? 

250.  On  what  will  the  number  of  contact  troops  and 
the  intervals  between  them  depend  ? 

251.  How  much  artillery  should  be  attached  to  the 
brigade,  and  what  would  be  its  position  under  different 
circumstances  ? 

252.  When  the  brigade  is  marching  on  two  parallel 
roads,  where  is  the  reserve  ? 

253.  When  the  brigade  is  forced  to  march  on  a single 
road,  what  dispositions  are  made  ? 

254.  When  the  ground  permits,  and  no  serious  en- 
gagement is  expected  within  the  next  twenty-four 
hours,  what  formation  may  be  adopted  ? 

255.  What  rear  guard  is  provided,  and  what  advance 
guards  are  there? 

256.  Describe  the  formation  of  the  cavalry  screen, 
based  upon  the  experience  of  the  War  of  Secession. 

25 7.  Why  should  the  patrols  sent  out  from  the  screen- 
ing force  generally  be  small  ; and  what  is  the  general 
rule  for  the  size  of  a detachment  ? 

258.  From  what  bodies  are  the  scouting  patrols  taken, 
and  about  how  many  are  usually  employed  ? 

259.  Describe  Bonie’s  “points.” 


THE  CAVALRY  SCREEN. 


247 


260.  How  far  out  are  patrols  and  detached  scouts 
sent,  and  of  what  should  a patrol  always  keep  informed  ? 

261.  In  the  movements  of  the  patrols,  to  what  is 
everything  subordinated,  and  how  do  the  patrols  accord- 
ingly act  ? 

262.  As  a rule,  what  patrols  are  detailed  for  each  of 
the  main  routes,  and  the  flanks,  and  to  whom  are  the 
lesser  roads  intrusted  ? 

263.  When  should  a patrol  sent  out  on  a special  mis- 
sion return  ? 

264.  What  precautions  should  the  members  of  a pa- 
trol take  in  regard  to  papers  on  their  persons  ? 

265.  For  what  duty  are  officers’  patrols  especially 
valuable  ; and  in  entering  a village  or  town  what  should 
they  do  ? 

266.  As  a rule,  the  patrols,  if  driven  in,  will  do  what? 

267.  Why  must  the  duties  of  information  be  separated 
from  those  of  security  in  the  case  of  a cavalry  screen, 
and  how  is  this  separation  usually  effected  ? 

268.  To  whom  is  the  information  gained  by  the  cav- 
alry screen  transmitted  ? 

269.  On  gaining  contact  with  the  enemy,  what  is  the 
first  consideration,  and  what  should  be  done  ? 

270.  If  the  contact  troops  find  themselves  in  the  pres- 
ence of  large  hostile  bodies,  advancing  or  deployed  for 
battle,  what  should  be  done  ? 

271.  Concentration  effected,  what  should  be  done  un- 
der different  circumstances  ? 

272.  Why  should  good  cavalry  never  be  surprised  by 
a serious  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  break  through  the 
screen? 


248 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


273.  If  the  cavalry  is  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  on 
what  does  the  direction  of  its  retreat  depend  ? 

274.  How  may  the  cavalry  screen  sometimes  find  it 
necessary  to  act  as  a veritable  advance  guard  ? 

275.  In  combating  the  opposing  cavalry  screen,  when 
should  the  saber,  and  when  the  carbine,  be  used  ? 

276.  Why  must  cavalry  always  be  ready  for  effective 
fire  action  ? 

277.  What  effect  on  the  infantry  has  a good  covering 
screen  of  cavalry  ? 

278.  How  may  the  advanced  cavalry  be  used  to  seize 
important  points  ; and  in  this  use,  what  are  the  prime 
considerations  ? 

279.  Describe  how  the  advanced  cavalry  furnishes 
and  covers  foraging  parties. 

280.  What  determines  the  number  of  connecting 
posts,  and  of  what  does  each  generally  consist  ? 

281.  What  changes  are  made  in  the  strength  and  lo- 
cation of  connecting  posts  in  a dangerous  country? 

282.  How  are  dispatches  received  at,  and  forwarded 
from,  a connecting  post  ? 

283.  When  will  connecting  posts  generally  be  found 
practicable,  and  what  bodies  must  never  establish 
them  ? 

284.  Describe  the  formation  of  a regiment  of  cavalry 
as  a screening  force. 

285.  Describe  the  alternative  formation  when  a strong 
reserve  is  desirable. 

286.  Give  a summary  of  the  general  rules  for  the 
conduct  of  a cavalry  screen. 


REAR  GUARDS. 


249 


REAR  GUARDS. 

287.  How  is  the  withdrawal  of  a defeated  army  cov- 
ered on  the  field  of  battle,  and  when  does  the  duty  of 
the  rear  guard  begin  ? 

288.  Why  is  it  that  a retreating  army  can  be  pro- 
tected by  a fraction  of  itself? 

289.  Why  must  a rear  guard  be  organized  as  soon  as 
possible  ? 

290.  By  what  must  the  rear  guard  profit,  and  what 
two  courses  of  action  are  then  open  to  the  enemy’s 
choice  ? 

291.  State  the  strength  of  the  rear  guard  under  vari- 
ous conditions,  and  the  objections  to  having  it  too  large 
or  too  small. 

292.  What  troops  should  be  selected  for  the  rear 
guard,  and  what  should  be  done  to  raise  their  ?norale  ? 

293.  When,  and  how,  should  offensive  returns  be 
made  ? 

294.  What  qualities  should  be  possessed  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  rear  guard,  and  (briefly)  how  should  he 
conduct  its  operations  ? 

295.  In  general  terms,  what  is  the  distance  of  the 
main  body  from  the  rear  guard  ; and  what  are  the  ob- 
jections to  having  it  too  great  or  too  small  ? 

296.  Describe  the  formation  of  the  rear  guard. 

297.  Of  what  arms  should  the  rear  guard  be  com- 
posed ? 

298.  How  many  guns  should  there  be  with  the  rear 
guard,  and  what  may  their  effective  use  do  ? 


250 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


299.  How  should  the  artillery  of  the  rear  guard  be 
used,  and  what  should  be  done  if  it  becomes  necessary  to 
abandon  the  guns  ? 

300.  How  should  cavalry  be  used  with  the  rear  guard  ? 

301.  How  are  the  several  arms  arranged  in  a rear 
guard  composed  of  all  arms  ? 

302.  What  should  be  done  with  the  baggage  of  the 
rear  guard  ? 

303.  Draw  a diagram  representing  a company  of  in- 
fantry as  a rear  guard. 

304.  Draw  a diagram  representing  a troop  of  cavalry 
as  a rear  guard. 

305.  Describe  the  withdrawal  of  the  rear  guard  from 
action. 

306.  What  precautions  should  be  taken  to  insure  the 
right  road  being  followed  by  the  rear  guard  ? 

307.  Why  must  the  flanks  of  a rear  guard  be  guarded 
with  especial  care,  and  what  provision  is  made  for  pro- 
tecting them  from  surprise  ? 

308.  If  the  two  armies  are  of  approximately  equal 
strength,  why  should  the  rear  guard  have,  at  first,  an 
advantage  over  the  opposing  advance  guard;  and  why 
does  not  this  advantage  continue  ? 

309.  In  regard  to  what  is  the  pursuing  army  always 
in  doubt  ? 

310.  What  advantage  has  the  rear  guard  over  the 
pursuing  force  in  regard  to  the  ground  ? 

31 1.  What  topographical  features  afford  good  posi- 
tions for  the  rear  guard;  and  on  what  will  the  amount 
of  resistance  at  each  stand  depend  ? 


REAR  GUARDS.  251 

312.  To  what  extent  should  the  commander-in-chief 
supervise  the  operations  of  the  rear  guard  ? 

313.  What  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
having  an  intermediate  body  between  the  main  body 
and  the  rear  guard  ? 

314.  Why  must  contact  with  the  pursuing  force  be 
preserved  ? 

315.  If  the  pursuit  seems  to  slacken  or  cease,  how  is 
contact  maintained,  and  what  will  often  be  necessary  to 
ascertain  the  nature  of  the  pursuit  ? 

316.  Why  do  defiles  offer  good  opportunities  to  an 
energetic  pursuer  and  to  an  able  rear-guard  commander  ? 

317.  How  may  a defile  be  defended  at  the  entrance? 

318.  How  may  a defile  be  defended  at  the  outlet? 

319.  What  measures  of  the  rear  guard  may  be  classi- 
fied as  positive;  and  what,  as  negative? 

320.  Describe  some  of  the  most  important  negative 
measures  that  may  be  taken. 

321.  What  should  be  done  with  stragglers,  and  with 
the  sick  and  wounded,  wfith  the  rear  guard  ? 

322.  At  each  halt,  what  is  done  by  the  rear  guard? 

323.  How  is  the  rear  guard  relieved  when  practi- 
cable ? 

324.  When  an  army  is  retreating  by  several  parallel 
roads,  how  are  the  rear  guards  formed  and  commanded  ? 

325.  If  retreating  by  a single  road,  when  may  second- 
ary rear  guards  be  of  use  ? 

326.  When  the  line  of  retreat  is  changed,  what  may 
be  done  with  the  rear  guard  ? 

327.  How  may  a rear  guard  be  used  in  a retrograde 
movement  which  is  not  a retreat  ? 


252 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


328.  In  what  respects  are  the  duties  of  a rear  guard 
easier  in  a friendly  than  in  a hostile  country  ? 

329.  Describe  the  duties  of  the  rear  guard  on  a for- 
ward inarch. 


SPIES. 

330.  Into  what  two  classes  may  spies  be  primarily 
divided,  and  what  may  often  be  the  characteristics  of 
each  ? 

331.  When  are  the  services  of  spies  most  valuable? 

332.  From  what  people  should  spies  be  selected  ? 

333.  What  qualities  should  a spy  possess,  and  how 
should  he  be  tested  if  practicable  ? 

334.  How  may  compulsory  spies  be  used  in  certain 
extraordinary  cases  ? 

335.  What  are  double  spies  ; what  precautions  should 
be  taken  against  them  ; how  may  they  be  punished  ; 
and  how  may  they  be  utilized  ? 

336.  What  precautions  should  be  taken  in  regard  to 
messages  intrusted  to  a spy  ? 

337.  How  may  a check  be  kept  on  one  spy  by  the  em- 
ployment of  others? 

338.  How  should  a spy  be  conducted  from  camp,  how 
should  he  be  received  when  he  comes  in,  and  how 
should  he  be  treated  ? 

339.  State  the  questions  of  general  application  to 
which  spies  should  be  required  to  find  answers. 

340.  What  measures  may  be  taken  to  establish  the 
identity  of  a spy  ? 

341.  How  may  spies  remaining  in  a certain  locality 
convey  information  ? 


NEWSPAPERS,  ETC.  253 

342.  When  the  presence  of  the  enemy’s  spies  is  sus- 
pected, what  should  be  done  ? 

343.  What  people  should  be  especial  objects  of  sus- 
picion in  a camp  or  bivouac  ? 

344.  How  may  a spy  often  be  detected  ? 

345.  When  a spy  is  captured,  how  should  he  be 
searched  ? 

346.  What  qualifications  are  requisite  for  the  man- 
agement of  the  secret  service  of  an  army  ? 


NEWSPAPERS. 

347.  Under  what  conditions  only  should  a corre- 
spondent be  allowed  to  accompany  an  army  ? 

348.  What  are  the  duties  of  a press  censor? 

349.  How  may  correspondents  sometimes  be  utilized 
to  lead  the  enemy  into  error  ? 

350.  When  a newspaper  has  incurred  the  displeasure 
of  the  commander  by  the  nature  of  its  correspondence, 
upon  whom  should  the  punishment  fall  ? 


ORIENTATION  AND  MAP  READING. 

351.  What  is  orientation  ? 

352.  Describe  the  method  of  orientation  by  means  of 
the  compass. 

353.  Describe  the  methods  of  orientation  by  means  of 
observation  of  the  sun. 

354.  How  are  the  points  of  the  compass  indicated  by 
the  moon  in  the  different  quarters? 


254 


SECURITY  AND  INFORMATION. 


355.  Describe  how  an  observer  could  orient  himself 
by  means  of  the  North  Star. 

356.  Describe  the  method  of  orientation  by  map. 

357.  Describe  the  means  of  orientatiou  by  indica- 
tions. 

358.  Describe  how  practice  in  map  reading  may  be 
obtained. 


INDIAN  SCOUTING. 

359.  Describe  the  ordinary  methods  of  an  Apache  com- 
pany in  the  field  against  hostile  Indians. 

360.  How  far  out  do  the  Sioux  push  their  advance 
guard  and  flankers,  and  what  do  the  scouts  do  ? 

361.  Describe  some  of  the  expedients  adopted  by 
Sioux  scouts  to  obtain  concealment. 

362.  How  does  the  Sioux  scout  execute  long-distance 
reconnoitering  ? 

363.  What  places  do  the  Indian  scouts  seek  as  look- 
outs, and  what  are  their  methods  in  regard  to  ridges, 
enclosed  places,  etc.? 

364.  Where  do  the  Sioux  place  their  camps,  and  what 
do  they  do  if  attacked  and  driven  out  ? 

365.  Describe  the  tactics  of  the  Sioux. 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


257 


INDEX. 


Advance  guard,  7;  objects  of,  7;  strength  of,  8;  how  divided,  10;  typical 
formations  of,  10,  12,  18;  distance  of,  from  main  body,  13;  of  all 
arms,  21 ; important  rules  for  the  formation  of  the,  24,  31 ; encoun- 
tering the  enemy,  24  ; of  a division,  26  ; of  an  army  corps,  30  ; drill 
(infantry),  32  ; drill  (cavalry),  37  ; passing  through  a town,  133. 
American  war  of  1775-83,  69. 

Andre,  Major,  the  spy,  200. 

Apaches,  as  scouts,  221. 

Appomattox  campaign,  146. 

Archduke  Charles,  spies  of,  210. 

Army,  taken  by  surprise,  1 ; condition  of,  after  defeat,  175. 

Army  corps,  advance  guard  of,  30. 

Artillery,  with  the  advance  guard,  21;  with  the  outpost,  49  ; with  the 
cavalry  screen,  152  ; with  the  rear  guard,  182. 

Ash,  Captain,  gallant  exploit  of,  94. 

Ashby,  Col.  Turner,  as  a spy,  200. 

Atlanta  campaign,  91. 

Babcock,  Major  J.  B.,  on  cavalry  screen,  155. 

Baker’s  battalion  of  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry,  227. 

Balaklava,  Turkish  posts  at,  93. 

Banks,  Gen.  N.  P.,  44. 

Barnes,  Lieut.-Col.,  reconnaissance  by,  92. 

Beaujeu,  retires  from  the  Monongahela,  190. 

Benedict,  Gen.,  unfortunate  outpost  position  chosen  by,  44. 

Big  Bethel,  mutual  retreat  of  combatants  from,  190. 

Blackburn’s  Ford,  action  at,  91. 

Blenker’s  division  as  a rear  guard,  179. 

Bloody  Knife,  the  scout,  225. 

Bliicher,  night  attack  of,  at  Laon,  40. 

Boguslawski,  remarks  of,  on  cavalry  screen,  41,  167. 

Bonie,  Col.,  on  the  front  of  the  cavalry  screen,  149  ; patrol  system  of,  156  ; 

on  German  scouts,  158. 

Boonsboro,  rear  guard  action  at,  180. 


258 


INDEX. 


Braddock,  Gen.,  retreats  from  the  Monongahela,  190. 

Bridges,  reconnaissance  of,  97,  112. 

Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  98  ; on  the  press  during  the  war,  212. 

Buford,  Gen.  John,  report  of,  109  ; cavalry  of,  in  Gettysburg  campaign, 
147,  166. 

Bugeaud,  Marshal,  outpost  system  of,  72  ; on  compulsory  spies,  203. 

Bull  Run,  reconnaissance  at,  91  ; retreat  from,  179. 

Campbell,  the  spy,  205. 

Camping  places,  always  noted,  98. 

Canals,  reconnaissance  of,  97. 

Card,  the  brothers,  spies,  206. 

Cavalry,  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  49  ; an  expensive  arm,  49  ; advance 
guards,  composed  of,  18  ; with  the  outpost,  48  ; in  reconnaissance  in 
force,  89  ; Fifth  U.  S.,  93  ; the  arm  for  patrolling,  99  ; patrols,  differ 
from  infantry,  136;  how  composed  and  how  inspected,  136;  signals 
used  by,  137 ; conduct  of  patrols  at  night,  138. 

Cavalry  screen,  composition  of,  145  ; distance  of,  from  the  army,  146  ; front- 
age of,  148  ; formation  of,  149 ; separation  of  duties  of  security  and 
information  in,  162  ; transmission  of  intelligence  in,  163  ; contact  and 
fighting,  164;  protecting  the  infantry,  168;  seizing  important  points, 
168  ; foraging  by,  169  ; connecting  posts  with,  170  ; regiment  as,  173  ; 
conclusions  in  regard  to  the,  174. 

Chihuahua,  Wool’s  expedition  against,  4. 

Cities,  reconnaissance  of,  115. 

Clausewitz,  on  retreats,  175. 

Clery,  examples  given  by,  of  outpost  strength,  46. 

Cold  Harbor,  29. 

Colombey,  battle  of,  9. 

Commander,  the  duty  of  a,  1 ; of  the  advance  guard,  16 ; of  the  outpost, 
51,  52,  53 ; of  the  picket,  81 ; of  the  vanguard,  15  ; of  the  rear 
guard,  180. 

Compliments,  18,  57. 

Connecting  files,  19. 

Connecting  posts,  170. 

Connecting  sentinels,  59. 

Cooke,  Gen.  P.  St.  G.,  145,  146. 

Cordon  system  of  outposts,  43. 

Cossacks,  covering  detachments  of,  144. 


INDEX. 


259 


Cossack  posts,  45,  68,  82. 

Cox,  Gen.  J.  D.,  ingenious  disposition  of  advance  guard  by,  24. 

Crimea,  the,  unknown  to  the  Allies,  3. 

Crooke,  Gen.  Geo.,  march  of  from  Fort  Fetterman,  223. 

Cross-roads,  reconnaissance  of,  111. 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  90. 

Custer,  Gen.  Geo.  A.,  defeats  Rosser,  162. 

Davoust’s  use  of  cavalry,  144. 

DeCissey,  Gen.,  attacks  German  patrols,  161. 

Defensive  positions,  should  be  noted,  99. 

DeFezensac,  at  Smolensk,  180. 

Defiles,  reconnaissance  of,  98,  112  ; defense  of,  191. 

Deserters,  how  received  at  outpost,  56. 

Early,  Gen.  J.  A.,  in  Shenandoah  Valley,  161. 

Enemy,  in  position,  reconnaissance  of,  115;  on  the  march,  reconnaissance 
of,  116. 

Engineers  with  advance  guard,  23. 

Eugene,  perilous  march  of,  108. 

Examining  posts,  59  ; Von  Arnim  on,  60 ; when  they  may  be  of  use,  61. 
Firing,  by  sentinels,  57. 

Fires,  with  picket,  65  ; with  support,  67  ; with  reserve,  70. 

Fisher’s  Hill,  battle  of,  161. 

Flank  guards,  31. 

Fords,  reconnaissance  of,  112. 

Forey’s  division,  defeats  Stadion’s  corps,  90. 

Forrest’s  cavalry  as  rear  guard,  179. 

Forton’s  surprise  at  Vionville,  40. 

Franco-German  War,  advance  guards  in,  9. 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  advance  guard  entering,  134. 

Frederick  the  Great,  1. 

French  cavalry  patrols,  ingenious  expedient  of,  138. 

General  staff,  Bronsart  von  Schellendorfs  “ Duties  of  the,”  5. 

Gettysburg,  Army  of  the  Potomac  at,  176. 

Giulay,  Count,  90. 

Grant,  Gen.  U.  S.,  29 ; gets  possession  of  Johnston’s  plans,  202. 

Grant’s  Virginia  campaign,  4. 


26o 


INDEX. 


Gravelotte,  Germans  at,  176. 

Guides,  employment  and  treatment  of,  110. 

Hale,  Capt.,  the  spy,  200. 

Halts,  of  the  advance  guard,  17  ; of  rear  guard,  195. 

Hancock,  Gen.  W.  S.,  enabled  to  receive  Longstreet’s  attack,  128. 

Hardee,  Capt.,  surrenders  to  Mexicans,  141. 

Hardee,  Gen.  W.  J.,  at  Hoover’s  Gap,  169. 

Heights,  reconnaissance  of,  98,  112. 

Henry,  Lieut. -Col.  Guy  V.,  formation  of  regimental  screen  devised  by,  173. 
Heth,  Gen.  H.,  held  in  check  by  Buford,  166. 

Hohenlohe-Iogelfingen,  Prince  Kraft  zu,  on  German  scouts,  159. 

Hooker,  Gen.  J.,  146. 

Hoover’s  Gap,  battle  of,  169. 

Horse  artillery,  in  reconnaissance  in  force,  89;  with  cavalry  screen,  152. 
Hospital  troops,  27. 

Houses,  reconnaisance  of,  113. 

Howard,  Gen.  0 0.,  orders  special  reconnaissance,  95. 

Humphreys,  Gen.,  quoted,  128. 

Hurlbut,  Gen.,  at  Memphis,  202. 

Inclosures,  reconnaissance  of,  113. 

Indian  scouting,  221. 

Infantry  patrols,  small,  their  composition,  100;  preparation  and  inspection 
of,  100;  signals  used  by,  102;  formation  of,  103;  conduct  of,  104; 
encountering  the  enemy,  106  ; meeting  inhabitants,  108  ; employing 
guides,  110;  strong,  125. 

Information,  the  indispensable  basis  of  military  plans,  2 ; the  kinds  of, 
necessary  for  a commander,  3 ; lack  of,  in  Mexican  war,  3 ; how 
gained,  3,  5. 

Inhabitants,  how  questioned,  108. 

Jackson,  Gen.  Andrew,  harrassing  patrols  used  at  New  Orleans  by,  131. 
Jackson,  Gen.  “Stonewall,”  146. 

Jena,  pursuit  after  battle  of,  175. 

Johnston,  Gen.  J.  E.,  retreat  of,  to  Jackson,  Miss.,  194  ; on  condition  of  his 
army,  Bull  Run,  176. 

Jomini,  on  reconnaissance,  88. 

Katzler’s  contact  squadrons,  144. 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  reconnaissance  at,  92. 


INDEX. 


26l 


Koniggratz,  Prussians  at,  176. 

Kutusoff,  retires  from  Malo-Jaroslawitz,  190. 

Laon,  Marmont’s  neglect  at,  40. 

Lee,  Gen.  Fitzhugh,  29. 

Lee,  Gen.  R.  E.,  29  ; 160  ; 190. 

Lee,  Col.  W.  H.  F.,  at  Boonsboro,  180. 

Lewal,  Gen.,  on  German  spies,  209. 

Ligne,  Prince  de,  on  double  spies,  204. 

Line  of  observation,  by  whom  occupied,  42  ; regulates  position  of  picket,  63. 
Lomax,  Gen.,  defeated  by  Merritt,  162. 

Longstreet,  Gen.,  attack  by,  at  the  Wilderness,  128  ; precaution  of,  in  re- 
gard to  a written  order,  160. 

Lyon,  Gen.  Nathaniel,  200. 

Mac  Arthur,  Major  A.,  jr.,  reconnaissance  by,  92. 

McClellan,  Gen.  G.  B.,  testimony  of,  before  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  4;  obtains  Lee’s  orders,  160  ; secret  service  of,  211  ; at  Mal- 
vern Hill,  187. 

McDowell,  Gen.  I.,  91. 

McMahon,  Marshal,  news  of  the  march  of,  conveyed  to  Yon  Moltke,  211. 
Malo-Jaroslawitz,  mutual  flight  of  combatants  from,  190. 

Map  reading,  218. 

Marmont,  Marshal,  on  marches,  7 ; his  negligence  at  Laon,  40  ; in  1814,  147. 
Mars-la-Tour,  battle  of,  13. 

Mason,  Lieut.,  killed,  141. 

Massena’s  retreat  from  Portugal,  187. 

Maurice,  Col.  F.,  on  Art  of  War,  221. 

Merritt,  Gen.  W.,  on  cavalry  screen,  154  ; defeats  Lomax,  162. 
Milaradowitch,  cuts  in  between  main  body  and  rear  guard  of  the  French, 
190. 

Military  Intelligence,  bureau  of,  3. 

Monongahela,  mutual  flight  of  combatants  from  the,  190. 

Montebello,  battle  of,  91. 

Montecuculi,  on  spies,  200. 

Monterey,  Taylor’s  movement  on,  3. 

Moore,  Col.,  79. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  at  Coruna,  187  ; directs  the  movements  of  his  rear  guard, 
188. 


262 


INDEX. 


Moreau,  Gen.,  receives  intelligence  of  Jourdan’s  reverses,  211. 

Moscow,  French  annoyed  by  Cossacks  on  retreat  from,  184. 

Nancy,  entered  by  Uhlans,  140. 

Napoleon,  remarks  of,  23,  177 ; his  army  covered  by  a screen  of  cavalry, 
144  ; directions  to  Marmont,  147  ; retires  from  Malo-Jaroslawitz,  190. 

Nashville,  Confederate  retreat  from,  179. 

Negative  measures  of  rear  guard,  193. 

Newspaper  correspondents,  trouble  caused  by,  211 ; conditions  required  of, 
212  ; how  utilized,  213  ; how  punished,  214. 

Ney,  Marshal,  in  retreat  from  Moscow,  178  ; at  Smolensk,  180  ; mistake  of 
at  Ceira,  187  ; compels  Wellington  to  deploy  at  Redinha,  187. 

Observation,  line  of,  regulates  position  of  pickets,  63. 

Outposts,  definition  of,  40  ; disasters  resulting  from  neglect  of,  40  ; duties 
of,  42  ; subdivisions  of,  42  ; two  systems  of,  43  ; position  of,  43 ; 
strength  of,  45  ; composition  of,  46 ; distance  of  the,  from  the  main 
body,  50  ; at  night,  71  ; Bugeaud’s  system,  72  ; patrols,  75  ; posting 
the,  80  ; relieving  the,  83,  86  ; defense  of  the,  84. 

Orange  Court  House,  reconnaissance  toward,  93. 

Orientation,  215  ; by  compass,  215  ; by  sun,  216  ; by  moon,  217  ; by  North 
Star,  217  ; by  map,  218  ; by  indications,  218. 

Paris,  German  pickets  at  siege  of,  64. 

Patrol  system  of  outposts,  43. 

Patrolling,  95  ; patrolling  posts,  96. 

Patrols,  outpost,  75;  visiting,  75,  96;  reconnoitering,  76,  96,  99;  small, 
77,  95;  strong,  77,  79,  125;  officers’,  96,  156,  159;  covering,  96,  133; 
connecting,  96,  99,  142  ; exploring,  96 ; harrassing,  96,  99,  130  ; ex- 
peditionary, 96,  99,  126  ; pursuing,  96,  99,  142  ; flank,  132  ; with  cav- 
alry screen,  156. 

Picket,  strength  of,  62  ; front  of,  63  ; requirements  of  good  position  for,  64; 
posting  the,  81,  82  ; under  arms,  85. 

Picket  commander,  duties  of,  81,  82. 

Picket  firing,  in  War  of  Secession,  57. 

Picket  sentinel,  59. 

Pierron,  Gen.,  on  Cossack  posts,  69. 

Pleasant  Hill,  battle  of,  44. 

Ponds  and  Marshes,  reconnaissance  of,  98. 

Pont-i-Mousson,  capture  of  German  patrol  at,  141. 


INDEX. 


263 


Posts,  examining,  59  ; detached,  61. 

Prentiss,  Gen.,  79. 

Prisoners,  questioned,  89  ; examination  of,  at  Wilderness,  128;  Napoleon 
enjoins  their  capture,  128  ; when  questioned,  128  ; different  values  of, 
128. 

Railroads,  reconnaissance  of,  97;  destruction  of,  129. 

Rear  guard,  when  its  duties  begin,  176  ; strength  of,  178  ; morale  of  the, 
must  be  raised,  179;  offensive  returns  of,  179;  commander  of,  180; 
distance  of,  from  the  main  body,  181  ; formation  and  composition  of, 
182  ; withdrawal  of,  from  action,  185  ; communication  of,  with  main 
body,  186  ; protection  of  the  flanks  of,  186  ; conduct  of,  186  ; must 
preserve  contact  with  the  enemy,  190;  negative  measures  of,  193; 
sick  and  wounded  with,  195  ; retreating  by  parallel  roads,  196  ; when 
line  of  retreat  is  changed,  197  ; in  retrograde  movement  not  a retreat, 
197  ; in  a friendly  country,  198  ; in  a hostile  country,  198  ; on  a for- 
ward march,  198. 

Reconnaissance,  how  primarily  performed,  6 ; kinds  of,  88  ; in  force,  89  ; 
special,  92. 

Report,  of  exploring  patrol,  98  ; of  small  infantry  patrol,  122 ; indispensable 
qualities  of  a,  123  ; form  of  a,  124. 

Reserve,  of  advance  guard,  11  ; of  outpost,  70. 

Rivers,  reconnaissance  of,  97. 

Roads,  reconnaissance  of,  97  ; destruction  of,  129  ; obstruction  of,  194. 

Rosebud,  battle  of,  226. 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  W.  S.,  moves  against  Bragg,  168. 

Rosser,  Gen.  T.  L.,  defeated  by  Custer,  162. 

Rustow,  intermediate  body  recommended  by,  189. 

Sabine  Cross  Roads,  battle  of,  44,  146. 

Sailor’s  Creek,  battle  of,  190. 

Salamanca,  battle  of,  121. 

Saxe,  Marshal,  on  spies,  200. 

Scouts,  cavalry,  136,  139;  Apache,  221  ; Sioux,  223,  224,  225. 

Secret  Service,  requirements  of,  211. 

Sentinels,  how  posted,  54  ; their  duties,  55  ; who  may  cross  the  line  of,  56  ; 
connecting,  59  ; picket,  59. 

Shaw,  description  of  advance  guard  by,  10;  on  scouts,  139. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  roads  in,  154. 


264  INDEX. 

Sheridan,  Gen.  P.  H.,  on  the  condition  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  49  ; employment  of  spies  by,  205  ; screening  duty  by,  145, 
146  ; defeats  Early  at  Tom’s  Brook,  162,  164 ; cuts  off  Confederate 
rear  guard,  190. 

Sherman,  Gen.  W.  T.,  95  ; on  Johnston’s  retreat,  194. 

Shiloh,  carelessness  of  U.  S.  outposts  at,  40;  reconnaissance  before,  79. 
Signals,  use  of,  by  the  advance  guard,  17  ; by  patrols,  102. 

Signs  and  trails,  117. 

Sioux,  their  camps,  225  ; scouts,  223,  224,  225. 

Sitting  Bull’s  camp,  225. 

Smith,  Gen.  Kirby,  146. 

Smolensk,  rear  guard  action  at,  180. 

Smyrna  Camp  Ground,  reconnaissance  at,  95. 

Spichern,  battle  of,  9,  167  ; retreat  from,  161. 

Spies,  military  and  civilian,  200;  compulsory,  203;  double,  204  how  de- 
tected, 210;  how  searched,  210. 

Spottsylvania,  29. 

Springs  and  rivulets,  reconnaissance  of,  98. 

Stadiou’s  corps,  reconnaissance  by,  90. 

Staff  officer  with  the  advance  guard,  16. 

Stanley,  Gen.  D.  S.,  special  reconnaissance  by,  95. 

Stedman,  Fort,  capture  of,  57. 

Stoneman,  Gen.  Geo.,  145,  146. 

Stuart,  Gen.  J.  E.  B.,  screening  duty  by,  145. 

Stiilpnagle’s  advance  guard,  13. 

Support,  of  advance  guard,  11,  21  ; of  outpost,  66. 

Sykes’  regulars,  cover  retreat  from  Bull  Run,  179. 

Taylor,  Gen.  R.,  report  of,  to  Kirby  Smith,  146. 

Taylor,  Gen.  Z.,  movement  of,  on  Monterey,  3. 

Telegraphs,  reconnaissance  of,  97. 

Terrain,  influence  of  the,  on  formation  of  the  advance  guard,  24. 

Thomas,  Gen,  G.  H.,  169. 

Thornton,  Captain,  capture  of,  141. 

Tom’s  Brook,  battle  of,  162,  164. 

Torbert,  Gen.,  29. 

Towns,  reconnaissance  of,  115. 

Trench,  Chenevix,  on  frontage  of  cavalry  screen,  148. 

Truce,  flag  of,  how  received,  57. 

Tyler,  Gen.,  reconnaissance  by,  91. 


INDEX. 


265 


Uhlans,  enter  Nancy,  140  ; annoy  the  French  columns,  159. 

Valleys,  reconnaissance  of,  98. 

Van  Mulken,  on  outposts,  40. 

Vauban,  at  siege  of  Luxembourg,  107. 

Vedettes,  how  posted,  54,  58. 

Vibray,  German  cavalry  stopped  at,  167. 

Victorio,  skill  of,  in  selecting  positions,  223. 

Villages,  reconnaissance  of,  97,  113. 

Vionville,  Forton’s  surprise  at,  40. 

Von  Arnim,  on  examining  posts,  60. 

Von  Caprivi,  Lieut. -Col.,  with  cavalry  screen,  163. 

Von  Decker,  on  women  as  spies,  201. 

Von  der  Goltz,  on  advance  guards,  9 ; on  cavalry,  144  ; on  newspapers  in 
war,  213. 

Von  Moltke,  receives  news  of  McMahon’s  march,  211. 

Von  Valentini,  on  American  outpost  duty,  69. 

Von  Witzleben,  on  orientation,  215. 

Walker,  Gen.  J.  B.,  160. 

Waterloo,  pursuit  after  battle  of,  175. 

Weissenburg,  battle  of,  167. 

Wellington,  pursues  the  French  after  Salamanca,  121;  compelled  to  deploy 
at  Redinha,  187. 

Wiasma,  battle  of,  190. 

Wilder’s  mounted  infantry  at  Hoover’s  Gap,  169. 

Wilderness,  battle  of,  29,  128. 

Wilkinson,  Gen.,  march  of,  against  Montreal,  197. 

Wolseley,  Lord,  on  rear  guard  duty,  198  ; on  spies,  208. 

Woods,  reconnaissance  of,  97,  112. 

Worth,  battle  of,  9,  90. 

Wright,  Gen.  H.  G.,  29. 


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